In the end, what became of Mendoza and the other officers who had been left behind by Cos? Filisola does not say. Neither do the Pena and Sanchez narratives. Those two accounts give no more information about the men left behind than is found in Filisola’s history and an August 11, 1836 letter written by Jose F. Moro that appeared in the September 30, 1836 issue of El Mosquito Mexicano, a Mexican newspaper. This letter appears in the appendix of the Jesus Sanchez Garza Spanish language edition of the memoir draft Pena account. If the Pena and Sanchez accounts are authentic, why do they fail to report the fate of the wounded men? Soldiers left in the hands of the enemy was an important event. No soldier wants to be left wounded on the field, and no soldier wants to leave a brother on a battleground. On the other hand, if the two accounts are forgeries, why would the forgers have failed to explain the fate of the wounded men? The answer is simple when one thinks about it. If the forgers did not have a reliable source that answered the question, then they could not afford to create a fictional explanation that might later prove to be incorrect. Better to leave the question of what happened to the wounded men unanswered.29
Previous to the storming of Bexar, the last serious engagement was the “Grass Fight” on November 26, 1835. Edward Burleson reported that fifteen Mexican soldiers were found dead on the field and seven wounded men were carried from the field for a total of twenty-two. Whereas, Cos reported one wounded official, three dead soldiers, thirteen wounded soldiers, and thirty-nine horses lost (probably captured) in the action. Either Burleson inflated the number or Cos did not report the true numbers.30
In total, Cos appears to have suffered about 170 dead and wounded during the siege and storming of Bexar. He retreated from the city with over forty wounded men and left about fourteen men behind in the Alamo, including Lt. Col. Jose Maria Mendoza and Second Lieutenant Ignacio Solis. Cos’s number of dead was probably around 116 men. Doctor Mariano Arroyo and interns Jose Maria Ylisariturri and Jose Cardenas remained in San Antonio to care for the wounded men. Captain Francisco de Rada remained behind to help the wounded, probably with nonmedical activities. Therefore, when Santa Anna and his army marched into San Antonio on February 23, 1836, one surgeon and two interns were there to greet their commander-in-chief.31
Nevertheless, in regard to the medical staff available during the February and March 1836 siege of the Alamo, the published Pena account makes this unbelievable claim: “None of these commanders [Cos, Castrillon, Almonte, Duque, Amat, Romero, and Salas] was aware that there were no field hospitals or surgeons to save the wounded, and that for some it would be easier to die than to be wounded, as we shall see after the assault.” Pena, speaking to the medical aid available after the attack, quoted an alleged letter from an unknown person: “. . . it is true that few among us are sick, but we have 257 wounded with no surgeons to treat them, no medicines, no bandages, no gauze, and very meager food.”32
Then the Pena memoir seems to vacillate about the question of surgeons being available for the Alamo wounded. Pena claims: “Among the victims who perished because of General Santa Anna’s faults and lack of resources, one finds the name of Don Jose Maria Heredia, a sapper officer. . . . Urging on the platoon he commanded, at times scolding with sword in hand the soldier who showed little courage as the Sapper Battalion advanced, he received a mortal wound two inches above the right nipple in one of the last enemy barrages; this courageous officer could have been saved by the services of a good surgeon, but the lack of such and of medicine took him to his grave after thirteen days, during which, with admirable courage, he suffered intense pain.” Does the lack of a “good surgeon” mean the army had a surgeon, but he was incompetent, or does it mean there was no surgeon to treat Heredia?33
Mexican infantryman
Photo courtesy of Joseph Musso collection
There was an officer named Jose Maria Heredia. He was the lowest ranking lieutenant in the third Zapadore company. At the time of Heredia’s death, judging from what Pena actually wrote, the event did not make much of an impression on Pena. According to the Pena memoir Heredia died on March 19. The 109-page Pena second draft campaign diary does not mention Heredia being wounded or his death. The campaign diary manuscript has no entries for March 18, 19, and 20.34
Whatever, one surgeon and two interns does not equal Pena’s claim of “no” surgeons. There was one surgeon, Dr. Mariano Arroyo, who, with the assistance of the interns, could have handled the amputations. Whereas, the two interns were probably capable of performing minor surgery, such as removing lead balls from soft tissue, cleaning wounds, and stitching up wounds. Second, if there had been no medical personal, it is unbelievable that the commanders mentioned would have been unaware of the situation. Cos, given that he had left Arroyo and his two interns behind, most certainly would have known about them.
Third, as the Pena memoir often does, it reads just like Filisola, who wrote: “By taking the rather insignificant fortification of the Alamo, a large number of the best soldiers, including 26 leaders and officers, were sacrificed for no plausible reason. Santa Anna could have left a guard of the cavalry that could go no further because of the bad condition of the horses, or he could have knocked the adobe walls down with the 20 artillery pieces at his disposal. But he [Santa Anna] wanted blood, and blood was what he got. Those killed suffered no more, but the wounded were left to lie without any attention and with no shelter.” Both Filisola and Pena claim it was better for a soldier to have been killed than to have been wounded.35
In regard to the previous Filisola quote, there are passages in the Pena memoir that echo Filisola’s content. First, Pena reports: “We were in a position to advance, leaving a small force on watch at the Alamo, the holding of which was unimportant either politically or militarily, whereas its acquisition was both costly and very bitter in the end.” Second, the account claims: “In fact, it was necessary only to await the artillery’s arrival at Bejar for these [rebels] to surrender; undoubtedly they could not have resisted for many hours the destruction and imposing fire from twenty cannon.” Then, in regard to Santa Anna having desired a “bloody” battle, Pena alleges: “. . . because he [Santa Anna] wanted to cause a sensation and would have regretted taking the Alamo without clamor and without bloodshed, for some believed that without these there is no glory.” Both Filisola and the Pena memoir express the opinion that the capture of the Alamo by infantry assault was not worth the dead and wounded it cost. Rather, Santa Anna should have left a guard around the Alamo and continued east with the campaign. Or, Santa Anna should have destroyed the Alamo’s walls with their twenty cannon, forcing the Texians to surrender. Never mind that regardless of the state of the walls, the Texians were not going to surrender without an agreement that would have allowed them to live, conditions which Santa Anna was not going to give them. Both Filisola and the Pena memoir claim Santa Anna wanted a battle with unneeded bloodshed.36
In total, the Pena memoir reports that the casualties for the March 6 attack were 257 wounded and more than 300 dead, for a total of over 557 dead and wounded. Also, the Pena memoir claims that Colonel Esteban Mora, a cavalry officer, was appointed as the hospital director. According to a manuscript in the Pena papers, the order that made Mora the “inspector-general” of the hospital was issued as a general order on March 20, 1836. Dr. Arroyo, however, was most likely the hospital’s administrator until the arrival of Dr. Jose F. Moro.37
The earliest summary of the Alamo Mexican dead and wounded comes from Colonel Juan Andrade.38 It reads:
Andrade reported 60 dead and 251 wounded, for a total of 311. Santa Anna reported that he had 70 killed and 300 wounded. Colonel Juan N. Almonte reported “60 soldiers and 5 officers killed, and 198 soldiers and 25 officers wounded.” The alleged San Luis battalion journal (a manuscript in the Jose Enrique de la Pena papers) lists the dead and wounded as 21 officers, 295 soldiers, for a total of 316 men. Sergeant Santiago Rabia, of the Tampico lancers, reported the dead and wounded as 500. Jose Juan Sanchez claimed that 11 o
fficers were killed, 19 were wounded and 247 soldiers were wounded and 110 were killed, for a total of 121 dead and 266 wounded men. Caro, Santa Anna’s private secretary, claimed: “Though the bravery and intrepidity of the troops was general, we shall always deplore the costly sacrifice of the 400 men who fell in the attack. Three hundred were left dead on the field and more than a hundred of the wounded died afterwards as a result of the lack of proper medical attention and medical facilities in spite of the fact that the injuries were not serious.” Caro’s number of immediate dead from the attack appears to match the Pena memoir’s number.39
Mexican infantryman
Photo courtesy of Joseph Musso collection
Arroyo and his interns worked alone until help from the interior arrived in San Antonio. Previously, on Cos’s December 1835 retreat, Dr. Moro and interns Eduardo Banegas, Victor Samarroni, and Narciso Gil had remained at Monclova. Santa Anna and his army arrived in that city on February 5. Soon afterward Moro informed Santa Anna of the medical staff and supplies that were available for the army. Moro wrote: “I notified him that [of] the medical supplies that I took out of that capital, the greater part of it was running out (since requesting it from that city could not be done, because of the distance at which we were located and the continuation of the march of the army). At the same time he commanded me that, with intern Eduardo Banegas [interns Victor Samarroni and Narciso Gil also remained with Moro], I should remain in Monclova for the care of about ninety-some sick [from Santa Anna’s force] whom the army had brought.” At that city, Santa Anna continued to upgrade the medical department. He appointed a number of interns to serve under Jose Reyes, a “skilled surgeon” who had joined the force at Saltillo on January 8. Strangely, when Santa Anna departed Monclova on February 8, he left Reyes and the medical staff behind. That section departed the city on February 23 with General Vincente Filisola’s command. By that time surgeon Andres Urtado and two more interns had joined the force. Moro later wrote that these much-needed people arrived in San Antonio “many days after the battle,” which appears to have been on March 9.40
By March 9 the Mexican Military Health Brigade at San Antonio contained the following individuals: Second surgeon Mariano Arroyo, third surgeon Jose Maria Reyes, provisional surgeons Andres Urtado and N. Vidal, second class interns Jose Maria Ylisariturri, Jose Maria Rodriguez, Jose Cardenas, Ygnacio Romero, Jose Maria Rojas, and intern Francisco Martinez for a total of four surgeons and six interns. First surgeon Jose Faustino Moro, first intern Nazario Gil, and second intern Eduardo Banegas finally arrived in Bexar on May 15. A short time before Moro and his interns arrived, Dr. Urtado and his interns (Ygnacio Romero and Jose Maria Rojas) had been sent to Goliad with the corp’s medical chest. Moro wrote that when he arrived in Bexar, he found all of the above individuals, except Urtado and his interns, in the Hospital of Bejar.41
According to the Pena memoir, he was aware of Dr. Moro being in San Antonio. The Pena account reads: “Among the few in the medical corps that finally found themselves in Texas, perhaps only Don Jose F. Moro is entitled to the name of surgeon.”42
It is strange that Pena would think so highly of Dr. Moro. First, Moro appears to have performed no surgery on the Alamo wounded. Second, Moro did not join the army at Bexar until May 15, 1836. Whereas, Pena departed the city at the end of March 1836 and would most likely not have been aware of Moro until early June 1836, when Colonel Juan Andrade’s force joined Filisola’s retreating army south of Goliad. Dr. Arroyo appears to have continued to be the working surgeon at Matamoros. He completed the hospital report on the dead and wounded, not Moro. The fact that the Pena memoir credits Moro as a good surgeon suggests that the writer of the Pena memoir did not have sufficient source material dealing with the medical situation at the Alamo to be able to write about it with authority.43
Regardless, the evidence shows that the Mexican army had a surgeon and two interns in Bexar on March 6 and that three additional doctors and four interns arrived on March 9. Therefore, why does the Pena memoir report there were no surgeons to treat the wounded? The reason seems to be that the medical data found in the four-hundred-plus-page manuscript is based on other written sources, rather than on Pena’s personal experience at Bexar or Pena’s 109-page campaign diary. The Pena memoir has Pena quoting data about the medical situation at Bexar from two letters. The first alleged letter, for which there is no source citation and no author identification, was dated March 18, 1836, and perhaps was written at San Antonio. The writer claimed: “It is true that few among us are sick, but we have 257 wounded with no surgeons to treat them, no medicines, no bandages, no gauze, and very meager food.” The medicines were limited, but there were four surgeons at Bexar on March 18. Also, cotton gauze was on hand. The second missive quoted by the Pena memoir is Dr. Jose F. Moro’s August 11, 1836 letter that appears in the appendix of the Spanish language edition of the Pena memoir.44
Then Pena is alleged to have written: “In fact, the plight of our wounded was quite grievous, and one could hardly enter the places erroneously called hospitals without trembling with horror. The wailing of the wounded and their just complaints penetrated the innermost recesses of the heart; [italics added] there was no one to extract a bullet, no one to perform an amputation, and many unfortunates died whom medical science could have saved.” It is true there was not an adequate building for a hospital in the city. The army, however, did have qualified medical people to extract bullets and cut limbs off when needed. So, why would Pena have made such untrue claims? Pena would not have made such allegations. He was in San Antonio, and he was one of the wounded soldiers. He made no such claims in the smaller campaign diary manuscript. More importantly, he would not have needed to use written sources to write about the army’s medical services.45
The source for the previous Pena statement in the memoir appears to have been Dr. J. H. Barnard’s Journal, first published in the Goliad Guard in 1883, over forty years after Pena’s death. Barnard was one of the surgeons who had been with Colonel James W. Fannin’s command at Goliad. He and several other doctors were spared so that they could treat the Mexican wounded. Barnard and Dr. Jack Shackelford were sent to San Antonio on April 16 to assist the Mexican surgeons. Barnard reported there were surgeons at San Antonio. Otherwise, he wrote the same thing about amputations, bullet wounds, and soldier deaths from the lack of surgical care that the Pena memoir reports.
According to Barnard on April 21, 1836: “Yesterday and today we have been around with the surgeons of the place [San Antonio] to visit the wounded, and a pretty piece of work ‘Travis, and his faithful few’ have made of them. There are now about a hundred here of the wounded. The surgeon tells us that there were four hundred of them brought into the hospital the morning they stormed the Alamo, but I should think from [the] appearance that there must have been more. I see many around the town, who were crippled there, apparently, two or three hundred and the citizens tell me that three or four hundred have died of their wounds.
“We have two colonels and a major and eight captains under our charge, who were wounded in the assault. We have taken one ward of the hospital under our charge. Their surgical department is shockingly conducted, not an amputation performed before we arrived [italics added], although there are several cases even now, that should have been operated upon at the first, and how many have died from the want of operation is impossible to tell, though it is a fair inference that there has not been a few [italics added].
“There had been scarcely a ball cut out as yet [italics added], and almost every patient carrying the lead he received that morning.”46
In regard to the personal experience of a combat soldier, David H. Hackworth, a highly decorated combat soldier observed: “In battle, your perception is often only as wide as your battle sights. Five participants in the same action, fighting side by side, will often tell entirely different stories of what happened, even within hours of the fight. The story each man tells might be virtually unrecognizable to the others.”
Then Napoleon wrote: “A soldier seldom looks beyond his own company and an officer can, at most, give account of the position or movements of the division to which his regiment belongs.” Therefore, if the Pena memoir is authentic, one would think it would be limited to what he experienced and witnessed himself.47
Yet, the Alamo chapters in the Pena memoir are totally based on other written sources. One can argue that Pena, like other soldiers who have written memoirs, decided to pad and embellish his story with research. That is a possibility, but it conflicts with what Pena said about his diary in an authentic letter. He claimed that his diary alone was sufficiently detailed to serve as a history and that he planned to publish his campaign diary, not a political and military history of the war based on other written sources from participants, both Mexican and Texian. Granted there is an alleged Pena document that claims Pena used other written sources in writing the memoir. However, that missive is not in Pena’s handwriting and is among the documents that are suspected of being forgeries. In other words, the letter appears to have been created to explain why the Pena account is so obviously based on other accounts. Which also happens to be the only way a forger could have created the Pena final draft narrative.48
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