Woman and Goddess in Hinduism

by Tracy Pintchman

  In sum, RV 5.78’s use in the later vidhnic rite for the prevention of miscarriage implies several different perspectives on a miscarrying woman. First, the birth of any child could potentially be the birth of a great Brahmin sage, like Saptavadhri or Atri. Second, the way out of a potentially failing birth is to invoke a successful second birth, as is recounted in the various tales of Atri and is clearly the case in the story of Saptavadhri. The second birth may not be through a natural womb but rather through a womb substitute, such as that of a pot, or an earth cleft, or a tree trough. The Rgvedic mantras imaginatively “start the birth again” as the miscarriage is occurring.

  AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION FOR WOMEN

  The Basic Argument for Purusrtha

  In light of the purposes of this essay, however, the interpretive history I outline in the earlier essay and earlier in this essay does not have to be the only interpretive history. We can also move from historical-descriptive to normative arguments, and I intend to do so in the next section of this essay. Vedic arguments about interpretation and pluralism of schools was clearly alive in the fifth century BCE, when Yska fought his battles with Kautsa and also named several other interpretive schools of the Veda. So too, Vedic interpretive arguments were continued on with Mmsaka schools such as Prabhkara and Kumrila. It is entirely within Vaidika tradition to argue about the proper form of recitation and sacrifice.14 Thus, using the principle of the feminist Mmsaka discussed earlier, there is no reason not to continue to offer alternative perspectives now on behalf of women. If Vedic canon is truly relevant, it must be relevant even today—not because it has a cure for cancer or proof of space travel, but because it contains human truths about the nature of action and how we can flourish better.

  First, and most importantly, this idea can be articulated in terms of the Mms principle that a pururtha can and must include women and women’s welfare. We know from JMS 6.1.6, mentioned earlier, that when the male gender is referred to as a universal, and there is no other possible distinction about gender being made, then the implication of the sentence is all people, and not just men. Since both men and women desire heaven, they have the aâhikra to sacrifice. So, too, Ktyyana rauta Stra (1.2.5-6) supports this view. In JMS 6.1.8, the masculine gender is inclusive of the feminine, and abara also supports this position. In this passage, then, a class is referred to without any distinctions (jtyarthasyvieatvt); thus, women are included (strypipratiyetd).

  Mary McGee (2002) also notes that Patñ jali himself argued that grammar in the sacrifice might be changed on the basis of gender, because “mantras are not given in cases to suit every gender and context, and one needs to know how and when to modify the mantra accordingly.”15 Most significantly, this idea is helpful not only with respect to the issue of whether women can sacrifice, but also in defining the overall idea of a pururtha. Based on the grammatical and ritual arguments presented earlier, a pururtha can therefore include concerns specific to half the human race of women. It might also be relevant here to make the painfully obvious observation that many of the common pururthas, such as long life or the birth of an offspring, are best fulfilled when there are women who are strong and able to perform these tasks as well as men. Sacrifices on behalf of the well-being of women, then, should be understood as comprising a basic and straightforward purus rtha.16

  Use of Metaphors

  With this foundational point in mind, let us begin with our first principle of interpretation mentioned at the beginning of this essay—focusing on key metaphors as forms of ethical thought. We might note that, in this hymn, birth and the natural process of the opening of a tree trunk are homologized. In other words, in the recitation of the hymn even during the birth process, each image could be understood as directly related to a part of the body: the healing deities, the Avins are asked in the earlier verses to speed as quickly as possible to the site of the birth, the woman’s body, for healing purposes. They should be like geese (v.4) and like falcons (v.5). In addition, natural images of movement, such as the wind on the lotus pond (v.7) and the sea, the forest, and the wind stirring (v.8), are also a metaphor for the stirring or birth of the child.

  In addition, one could also argue that there are conversely related metaphors, both of which valorize the birth process: the key metaphor for Saptavadhri is a woman giving birth, and so too the key metaphor for a woman giving birth is a i emerging from an opening tree. In both directions of metaphoric application, the notion of freedom of movement, and therefore freedom from constriction, is the key to a successful birth. Indeed, it might be argued that Saptavadhri needs the image of a birthing woman to help him.

  In this application of the hymn then, we might think of it as similar to the South American Cuna birth ritual about which Levi-Strauss (1967: 181–207) writes.17 T h a t r i t u a l w a s , h e a r g u e s , r e m a r k a b l y e f f e c -tive because it identified each part of the woman’s body with a mythical person and a mythical event. In this way, the Cuna ritual allowed the mother to identify the birth process with something larger than herself, and work toward a solution of the birth that had cosmic, and not just personal, meaning. The same could be said of the powerful metaphors within 5.78; although there are not specific identifications of body parts with mythical personages, the larger process of birth is indeed identif ied with something larger than the woman herself. The wind, sea, and forest have movements similar to that of the birth of the child, and so, too, does the wind on the lotus pond. And there are Artharvavedic hymns with similar wording (such as 1.11) as well as the Rgvedic ones, mentioned earlier, that could also be used for this purpose.

  The Argument of Prama as Superior to

  Arthavda and Sadcara in Ritual Action

  Let us turn now to the question of the actual words of the Vedic hymn as prama, or authoritative statements, articulated as an interpretive principle earlier. What is intriguing about this hymn and others for our present purposes is that it actually contains codtm, or a statement with injunctive force, in verses 7, 8, and 9. The codtm is that the child may be born alive (niraitu jvo), and therefore fits with the M mmsic definition of dharmic injunction. So, it is dharma of the highest kind—not just an arthavda, or descriptive verse that supports injunction, but a statement about what ought to happen, what action ought to occur. What is even more important is that, in verse 9, the woman too is described as living (jvimtiy ). The child needs to be born from a living woman. Thus, with the pururtha of women’s health in mind, RV 5.78.8 could be explicitly used to protect a woman giving birth and safeguard her well-being.

  But what about the problem of verse 9, where the child being “born alive” is clearly a boy (kumrah)? There are several approaches to dealing with this difficult aspect of the hymn and other hymns using similar language.18 Our first obligation would be to think about the nondharmic application of Veda, and find a way to prevent it. It would be entirely reasonable that the use of this hymn in practices of preference for boy children that result in harm to women (such as female infanticide) would be considered adharmic from the perspective of the stras. This is what Swami Narayanan himself argued; he reminded people that the killing of a child and the killing of a close relative are prohibited in the stras. But would this generally stric argument be a strong enough argument according to Mms? Probably not.

  Our approach might also be based on our second interpretive principle, stated earlier, that ethical thought on behalf of women and the hierarchies of traditional Vedic interpretive philosophy could be engaged here. Thus, as Jaimini 1.4-23 argues at length, only the direct knowledge of, and words of, the Veda have primacy of place in cognition. Other forms of knowledge, such as inference (tmumnd), presumptive reasoning, and sensory knowledge (pratyakam) are not as reliable as sources of knowledge about dharma. This would include sctdcctm, or tradition knowledge, mentioned in the Laws of Manu and other stras (also see lokavrtika 2.21–156; 3.1, for elaborations on these arguments). Later Mimms commentators also go on to extend the argument that smrts in direct c
ontradiction with the Veda cannot be accepted as trustworthy.19 Thus, we can also argue against female infanticide and other practices that harm women on the basis that the codan for life, and for a living mother, is far stronger than many of the statements regarding preferences for boys.

  In other words, such statements are also stronger than any “practice” of female infanticide, which is only mentioned as sadcara, or “traditional practice.” Vedic injunctions, in the optative, imperative, and strong subjunctives are more powerful than the passing phrase: “Some people do this.” Many of the earliest references that could be used to support such practices are clearly stated in terms of a practice and not an injunction. Indeed, it is quite clear that these references constitute a statement of sadcara, what has been done, rather than prama, what should be done, and thus describe a lesser form of knowledge. One example from the Taittirya Samhit clearly has this tone of describing regular practice, rather than urging or impelling one to action: “Tasmt stryam jatam parasyanti ut pumasam haranti” (“Hence they reject a female child when born, and take up a male”; Taittirya Shit 6.5.10.3). What is more, not only would this statement be understood as describing only a “common practice,” but its form would also be understood as only an arthavda. Thus, while the words are meaningful, they are only supportive of sacrifice (arthavdd), and not as powerful as codan itself. This idea is understood from Jaimini’s view that there is a weakness in sacrificial procedure if it is “not expressive of injunctive force” (acodan).

  The Argument of Kratvrtha in Ritual Action

  However, there is an even stronger argument to be made, because there are passages for the preferences of boys over girls that do have injunctive force. Atharva Veda 6.11.3, for example, reads: “Prajpati, Anumati, Sin vl , have made it thus: may he put elsewhere a woman birth; may he put here a male.” Moreover, this passage is used in the Kautaki rauta Stra (35.8) for the conception of a male child, where fire is generated between two trees, and is also given to the woman wanting a child.

  How might we come to terms with such phrasing, or the use in a hypothetical agnioma of a mantra that might harm women? One argument is the overall cohesion of the rite—something very important in Mms. Atharva Veáa 6.11.3 is clearly making a distinction between boys and girls, and thus could not be understood as generic, as we could see in other cases presented earlier. But this does not mean that the force of the injunctive statement is a norm for all people, and all times and all sacrifices and sacrificers. Indeed, one might argue that in the case of rites for what would be for the conception of girl children (attested to in svalyana Ghya Strà), that it would not be used at all.

  Moreover, and even more importantly, in rites that included a concern about human flourishing, or long life, or the safe birth of a child of either gender, such a mantra would not be appropriate at all. It would not be in accordance with the unity of word and purpose, or the unity of action (JMS 11.1.6) within the sacrifice. As Jaimini writes in 11.1.1, while the acts might be distinct, they are, and should always be understood as, related to a single motivation (prayojansambandht); thus they should be regarded as a single action.20 This idea is related to an argument also made by the later M mmsaka thinker Kumrila that even in cases where the words might be taken to denote different things, one meaning should be decided upon, and that meaning should have direct relevance to the ritual action and the harmony between the word, act, and intentions of the sacrificer (lokavrtika 16.1-30).

  This idea is also related to the idea of kratvrtha, or the overall coherence in which no “extra” pieces are missing. In a rite in which the pururtha is understood to include both men and women, any use of coáan that directly contradicts the pururtha would go against the integration and coherence of the rite itself and would be considered either contradictory or extraneous as such.21 The principle of bhavan requires harmony of the means, the process, and the result of the sacrifice.

  Finally, we might also use as a further example the later M mmsic discussion about the yena sacrifice, which enjoins animal slaughter (2.235-78).22 Here, Kumrila argues that the process itself is not adharmic, since it is enjoined in a Vedic injunction, but the result, which is pain to the animal, might clearly be understood as adharmic. His conclusion is that the yena sacrifice should be considered neither dharmic nor adharmic. More importantly, it certainly could not fulfill the idea of bhavan, since there is not harmony between the means, the process, and the result of sacrifice. Any sacrifice undertaken for the health of offspring that also involves harm to women (such as the killing of girl children) could also be analyzed in exactly the same way.

  The Argument of Precedent

  What is more, there are clearly precedents for these kinds of rituals focused on girls and women in authoritative Vedic texts such as the Vidhnas, mentioned earlier, and the Grhya Stras. Mantras enjoined in places such as the Gryha Stras focus on rites for girl children as well as boy children. As I have written elsewhere, in the valyana Ghya Stra (AGS), major coming-of-age ceremonies include girls (the naming ceremony [1.13.12], the feeding ceremony [1.16.6], and the tonsure ceremony [1.17]). While mantras are not recited for girls in these contexts, girls are still understood as ritual agents. They have a life cycle, they enter into different phases of being, and they are not simply “patients” with no agency.

  Moreover, in many other rituals (such as the ritual involving the discernment of character in a marriage), the woman’s agency involves ritual participation, including active offering of grains. And indeed, there can be active recitation of mantras, such as in the AGS marriage rite. Finally, AGS understands older women whose husband and children are alive as ritually authoritative because they are the ritual hosts of new brides and the ones who know procedures in the hair-parting ceremony (1.14.8; 7.1.10–22).

  svalyana Ghya Stra 1.7.4-6 also entails a rite for a man who wants only girl children or only boy children. In the marriage ceremony, if he wants only male children, he should grasp his bride’s thumb. If he wants only female children, he should grasp her whole hand (aulircva strïk ma). This passage constitutes a significant piece of evidence that the desire for female children was part of a Vedic worldview and had a sanctioned rite to go along with it.

  The Argument of Ritual Transfer

  Indeed, many rites could be conducted on the basis of the Mmsic principle of vidhi. While codan, or injunction, is the injunctive force of a statement per se, the vidhi is the specific conduct of that specific rite. As PMS 10.1.1, 4.2.30, and 7.3.1 suggest, the vidhi can be transposed from rite to rite. This is the nature of ritual embeddedness about which Frits Staal and Jan Gonda have written so eloquently.23As JMS 7.17 argues, vidhi may not be completely established in an original context of a rite, but it can be actualized based on an authorizing injunction in later cases. This rule establishes the diversity of sacrifices (codany pravtti). Thus, rites can have a prototype, such as the agnioma; this kind of prototypical action is called the prakti, and the variation, or ectype, is called the vikti. In our case, then, we might have an agnioma on behalf of women’s health, with the injunctions of 5.78 used in precisely the ways we suggest earlier. What is more, as Patñjali and Pnini have also argued, a mantra’s gender might be changed or understood in accordance with the purpose of the rite. Madhav Deshpande (1996) also notes this practice in contemporary American Hindu temples.24

  Let me summarize the position at this point: Among the diversity of sacrifices sanctioned by tradition could be included many different sacrifices offered on behalf of women, girls, unborn and recently born girl children, according to the injunctions of 5.78: that the mother be living and that the child should be born alive. This injunction has more powerful force than the references in Veda that could be used to harm women in any way, which could be understood as either arthavâa or sadcara. Moreover, Mms is very clear that the sacrificial action, and neither the deity, nor the material of the sacrifice itself, is the crucial motivator for modifications and overall design of the rite (9.1.1; 9.1.3; 9.1.15).25 T
hus, if the artha is clearly established as being for the flourishing of women, then modifications of the rite would be allowed. And grammatical variations in the mantras within the sacrifice on behalf of women are clearly allowed by both ritual sources and grammatical ones.

  RELEVANCE FOR TODAY

  In this essay, I have made some basic suggestions for how we might reconstruct a Mms view of ritual on behalf of women. Practices that harm women constitute an extreme fulfillment of an anti-woman ideology that can be found both in the Vedas and the stras. However, there are plenty of pramic injunctions to argue against such practices and ideologies, and these should be taken up.

  In the final analysis, one also wants to inquire why this would be a relevant endeavor at all for women today. And there are several answers to this question. First, in some parts of India such as Maharashtra, women are increasingly part of the ritual scene in India, even the Vedic ritual scene. Although they may not perform priestly rituals, women Vedic scholars are advisors and knowledgeable observers in Vedic sacrificial performances. And, as several recent scholars have noted, revival of the sacrifice is becoming quite popular in these same parts. As one prominent Sanskritist put it, “It has become a big business.”26 Thus, the question of relevance for women will become inevitable. More and more decisions will need to be made as to the participation of women in certain ritual situations. It is important for these kinds of attempts to be made early. There are several relevant principles mentioned in this essay, such as vidhi, prakti, and vikti, that could be of real use when applied in details.