The secret of Israel’s Power

by Uzi Eilam

  An urgent meeting of the General Staff was called. Prime Minister Golda Meir was about to fly to Washington for meetings with President Nixon, and the General Staff was asked to advise her on whether she should agree to a corridor for the encircled Egyptian Third Army. Most members of the General Staff decisively opposed allowing such a corridor, and the meeting focused on the different ways of dealing with the Third Army. Sharon proposed focusing the effort to the north and cutting off the Second Army as well. Tal radiated extreme pessimism, arguing that attacking the Second Army would be “suicide” and that it was essential to achieve a separation of forces in order to rebuild our strength. Elazar summed up by saying that the General Staff opposed the provision of a corridor for the Third Army. He also supported an effort to destroy the encircled Third Army, but not completely and not at a high price. Furthermore, he did not rule out Sharon’s proposal to cut off the Second Army. I knew Sharon’s way of thinking during my time as his intelligence officer in the Paratroop Brigade in the 1950s. He had the ability to effectively combine knowledge of the field and a thorough understanding of the location of enemy forces and exceptionally accurate assessments of the enemy’s capabilities and intentions. To me, Sharon’s plan sounded ingenious and could have helped us attain a better bargaining position.

  Within the R&D Unit we now got into a fresh momentum of orderly work, still working under the shadow of a possible collapse of the ceasefire. We made progress towards an agreement for cooperation with the American Department of Defense’s Department of Research and Engineering. An entry in my journal describes the work as follows:

  A draft agreement regarding cooperation with DDR&E on lessons... was ready, and I went upstairs for a meeting with Tzur. The assistant defense minister looked exhausted, but he offered insightful comments, as he tends to do, and approved it in principle. He also asked me who at the General Staff had seen it and agreed to it, and I told him that Benny (Peled, commander of the Air Force), Binyamin (Telem, commander of the Navy), and Eli (Zeira, Intelligence Branch Chief ) had seen and agreed to it and that I approved the final text. He said that it was fine, and that although Tal might make some noise about it afterwards, no one complains these days about someone who takes the initiative. We talked a bit about the unstable General Staff and about the fact that appointing an Operations Branch chief and a Planning Branch chief was a good idea, but not enough to clean up the situation. Tzur told me that Elazar was now going through the most difficult period in the history of Israel’s chiefs of the General Staff, with a divided General Staff, a slew of people saying “I told you so,” and no one he can talk to and consult with freely (except for Tzvi). He talked to me about Tal, who continues to constitute a bottleneck in the decision-making process. I almost said: ‘Why not remove him from his position?’ Even more serious was Tzur’s description of the embarrassment, helplessness, indecision and hostility within the government. Abba Eban is in Romania, Sapir is raising money, Moshe is in his office, Golda is somewhere in between... and nobody knows what needs to be done!

  We were most worried about the global political situation. Also disconcerting was Henry Kissinger’s feverish scuttling from one Arab capital to another. And on top of all that was the Soviet threat of calling for a discussion in the UN Security Council if Israel did not return to its borders by November 22.

  Saturday, November 10 was a quiet day that gave me a chance to work in peace. Tal, who had just been appointed OC Southern Command, had been selected for complicated reasons. I remembered what Tzur had said about Tal, and I thought that Elazar certainly knew things that we didn’t know and that perhaps this was his way of distancing Tal’s negative impact from the faltering General Staff. With the temporary appointment of Ze’evi, who was experienced and had served as assistant Operations Branch chief, Elazar would have someone he could depend upon. For two hours on that quiet Saturday morning, with no threat of a General Staff meeting or other meetings on the horizon, I was able to present to Tzvi the main points of my new working plan for 1973–1974, the data on human resources within Rafael, and the main points of the agreement for cooperation with the Americans regarding the lessons of the war.

  Motta (Mordechai) Gur, our military attaché in Washington, arrived in Israel for consultations. A major portion of our conversations on the encrypted telephone had to do with how to respond to the American requests for data on the performance of the Maverick and Walleye air-to-surface missiles.

  After a friendly handshake, Gur asked me about “his” brigade (the 55th) during the war, and I gave him a brief report. Tzur explained to him the details of the agreement we had drafted for cooperation with the Americans regarding the generation of war lessons. I was impressed by Tzur’s command of the details, and pleased by the persuasive manner in which he presented the issue and his conviction about what needed to be done. Later, I met with Gur again, gave him a copy of the complete draft agreement, and provided him with additional explanations.

  Once it became clear that the ceasefire was holding we were able to revert to the regular routine of General Staff meetings. The meeting on Monday, November 12 was attended by the defense minister. During the meeting, Dayan presented his view of the three phases of activity that he believed should follow the signing of the ceasefire agreement. Throughout the entire war, and even before it began, Dayan tended to remove himself from the chain of command, sending Elazar to Prime Minister Meir to make critical decisions and then acting as an advisor, not as the commander in chief of the army. He did not hesitate to fly to the front, and, in a few instances, we were surprised to learn that he had actually placed himself in the line of fire. A typical example was his visit to Sharon’s forces at the “hatzer,” the bridgehead east of the Suez Canal which at the time was being shelled day and night. But none of these limitations impaired Dayan’s sharp and lucid analysis, which was as usual extremely convincing.

  Dayan made a case for the following three phases: (1) Clarification of the terms of the agreement, which was expected to take a few days. (2) Stabilization of the lines by withdrawing from the western side of the Suez Canal. (3) The beginning of peace talks. The negotiations could blow up and fighting could resume during any one of the phases, Dayan explained. The General Staff meeting was supposed to focus on the inquiry about the war that the CGS had announced to the media and the process of lesson generation but quickly turned into a more general discussion on policy and orientation, combining talk about morale and faith in commanders. Yitzhak Elron chose to attack the defense ministry establishment, which he argued was damaging the IDF by prioritizing the development and production of weapons in Israel over buying weapons from abroad. I interrupted with a few comments while noting to myself how far I had strayed from the traditional IDF opinions I held in the past. Tzur did not get involved in the debate but rather addressed the topic of development and production in Israel, in his characteristic broad, intelligent, and elegant manner. During his summing up of the meeting, Elazar also addressed the point made by Elron, but rejected his arguments and endorsed the position of the defense ministry.

  Gur visited our offices for a two-hour meeting that began with a discussion of the actions that needed to be taken with the American lesson-generating delegation. We agreed that Gur would meet with the American deputy defense secretary as soon as he returned to Washington and work towards signing an agreement. Gur was about to ask our defense minister to agree on his early return to Israel in order to assume a post on the General Staff, and he spoke frankly and openly about his intentions. We talked about the lesson-generation agreement with the Americans and about the best way to start working with them. There was absolutely no reason for concern when it came to our handling of the American delegations, as the issue was being handled skillfully by my deputy, Nahum Dayagi. The task of adapting our work plans to the situation that emerged after the war was also progressing well under the direction of my other deputy, Yedidia Shamir.

  The most troubl
esome subject at the time was long-term planning, for which we needed systems analysis, the area that Simcha Maoz was supposed to direct. I regarded Simcha as a diamond with great potential among other jewels in the R&D Unit. Unfortunately, Simcha was really like a diamond, not only brilliant but hard. He was hard on himself and he made it hard for those around him, making it difficult to incorporate him into the Unit. I agreed to the request of Major General Tamir, chief of the newly established Planning Branch, that both Simcha and Dr. Adam Shefi, who also seemed ill at ease since returning from the war in the north, would move to the new branch in order to build a systems analysis department. As time passed this department evolved into an integral component of the IDF planning system, and I was pleased that by giving up these two unique people R&D was able to make a significant contribution to the structure of the IDF Planning Branch and to the overall work of the General Staff.

  Saturday, November 17 was another quiet day. It was six weeks after the war had begun, and I went up to meet with Ze’evi on my own initiative. I really wanted to talk about the changes within the General Staff. Ze’evi had submitted his resignation a few days earlier, ostensibly as a result of his failure to convince the General Staff to adopt his proposals about handling the lessons of the war. However, it seemed to me that this was just the tip of the iceberg, and I came to hear what he had to say. Before I went in to see Ze’evi, Tal’s bureau chief Yigal stopped me and told me that Tal had asked him to inform me unequivocally that both R&D and the new Planning Branch would be coordinated by him directly, and that this arrangement had been endorsed by the CGS. I assumed that Tal had pressured Elazar to agree to the arrangement, which to me seemed rushed and wrong. Tal was not only deputy CGS and responsible for coordinating all the branches of the General Staff, he was also the commander of the southern front. How did he intend to find the time to coordinate the General Staff?

  Ze’evi talked about a number of things: about Elazar and the instability within the army’s senior command; and about Tal, who was in exile in the south and was trying his hardest to return and about his resignation, adding that Elazar had begged him to stay. Ze’evi shared with me his feeling that the CGS was not keeping him — his own Operations Branch chief — in the loop, and was not providing him with guidance and instructions regarding policy. It saddened me to hear what Ze’evi had to say. It wasn’t new, but it added more dark colors to the picture that was emerging. With surprising candor he also said that he would advise Elazar either to resign immediately or to fire whoever necessary in order to impose order and discipline. It was clear that Elazar did not have the authority for such bold action and would need the full support of Dayan and Meir for a clean sweep. According to Ze’evi, the people who needed to go were Gonen, Sharon, and perhaps Tal as well, “just to ensure that he won’t disrupt things and give everyone the run around.” He was less clear about who should stay. Indeed, this was a complicated and difficult question, partly because it’s never a good idea to switch horses mid-race, especially since we were still only in the midst of a ceasefire. I did not completely agree with Ze’evi’s claim that Elazar had still not returned to his old self and that this was the root of the problem. I didn’t know about Dayan’s role but I was sure that he was trying to save his own skin. My understanding of the situation reminded me of the proverb from Ecclesiastes, “he who increases knowledge, increases sorrow,” and I knew that the near future would be filled with explosive political developments.

  A large delegation from the US Congress arrived in Israel to get firsthand impressions about the situation in Israel after the war. This important visit received considerable attention and we all worked hard to arrange tours in the north and the south and organize briefings on the war experience. The plans included a visit to the display of captured enemy weapons at the Beit Lid army base, and the R&D Unit was charged with overseeing this part of the program. As we drove to Moshe Dayan’s house for a meeting with the entire delegation, Tzur and I discussed the situation in the General Staff. I told him about my conversation with Ze’evi, about Tamir’s efforts to build up the new Planning Branch, and about my impression that the CGS needed to rest a bit and then to take matters into his own hands. Tzur agreed, and added that “if they keep running things as they have been, it will come back to haunt them.” It was clear to me that he was referring primarily to Elazar, the CGS.

  The defense minister hosted all the members of the American congressional delegation in the garden of his home in Tzahala, and worked his magic with light conversation and a presentation of his antiquities. During the evening the group was briefed by Intelligence Branch Chief Eli Zeira, who gave a polished and brilliant presentation; by Elazar, who surveyed the stages of the war; and by Air Force Commander Benny Peled and Navy Commander Binyamin Telem. Overall, we made sure to radiate not only strength but more confidence than we really felt. At the same time we spared no effort in expressing our gratitude for the logistical and political support the US had provided Israel during the war.

  The visit to the display of captured weaponry took place two days later and was impeccably organized. The Technical Intelligence Department was responsible for the collection of an impressive variety of all types of armored vehicles, tanks, cannon and missiles. It was a display that provided in a snapshot a clear picture of what we had been up against during the war. It also enabled us to go into detail about each weapons system, most of which were Soviet made. I began the visit with a talk comparing Soviet and Western technologies. The director of the Technical Intelligence Department provided delegation members with detailed explanations during the tour, after which we reassembled for my concluding remarks. The tour finished with a sense that we had clearly conveyed the message regarding Soviet weaponry and the assessment of the global Soviet threat. It was a brief moment of satisfaction in a sea of difficulties and worries.

  On Tuesday, November 20, we had a special General Staff meeting attended by Prime Minister Golda Meir. Dayan, Elazar, and Tzur sat at the head of the table, and after the Intelligence Branch and the Adjutant General Branch presented information that was neither new nor especially interesting, the prime minister entered the room. The group immediately fell silent. Meir took her seat and immediately lit what must have been her umpteenth cigarette of the day, and then carefully studied the group. Silenced by fear of the prime minister, few were brave enough to request the floor. Benny Peled, who was the first to speak, spoke of the widespread feeling that the political goals were not clearly defined and that the combat soldiers did not understanding why they were risking their lives. Adan, Amos Horev, Sharon, and Gonen also spoke. Sharon stressed the readiness and the high morale of the forces. In the days that I worked closely with Sharon as his intelligence officer, I learned that it was always necessary to understand not only what he said but what he meant. During the meeting it seemed to me that his intention was not to please Dayan or Meir, and that perhaps he was trying to prepare the ground for the proposal he had raised during the previous General Staff meeting: cutting off and surrounding Egypt’s Second Army, as we had done to its Third Army.

  Gonen, who appeared to be trying to recover from the feeling of being cornered since the first days of the war when he failed to function as OC Southern Command, supported Sharon’s proposal. Tal’s remarks marked a clear turning point in the discussion. As commander of the southern front he presented the thesis that we were weak, much weaker than we had been before the war, and while doing so he cited the number of commanders that had been killed. He argued that what we needed was disengagement from the Egyptians at any cost in order to refocus our efforts during the next year on rebuilding our forces. In the heat of his speech, Tal quoted “someone” who at a difficult point during the beginning of the war had said that all was lost. This was a clear reference to Dayan and this infuriated the defense minister, Elazar, and others in the room. The other speakers were scathingly critical of Tal’s defeatist attitude, particularly Sharon and Adan. People star
ted to quibble about the veracity of Tal’s insinuation. The atmosphere was electrifying, and some people interjected with comments reflecting the tension and the pressure which we were all under. Meir listened attentively and contemplatively, and did not interrupt the discussion.

  Dayan stressed the balance between us and the enemy. In his opinion, we had grown stronger in terms of weaponry and ammunition, and our positions in both the north and the south were extremely uncomfortable for the enemy, both militarily and psychologically. Elazar spoke in favor of a defensive strategy in all sectors, but also emphasized our ability to mount an offensive in one of them, in the event that the Egyptians began military action. As far as he was concerned, it was preferable to attack the encircled Third Army to further weaken it.

  Meir calmly praised the quality of steadfastness, which was not surprising. After all, she symbolized the refusal to be flexible, for better and worse. To illustrate her point she talked about the negotiations with Kissinger in Washington, which she had found particularly difficult. Although the American secretary of state had claimed that he was unable to get the Egyptians to agree to Israel’s conditions for a ceasefire, she explained, we maintained our position and remained steadfast, and in the end we were successful. “At such a juncture,” Meir concluded, “we cannot appear to be weak, because this could spell our end.” We left the meeting with the feeling that Meir was in fact strong and was not giving up the reins of power, that Dayan had recovered, and that Elazar seemed fine as well. The defeatist approach found no support during the rest of this unusual meeting, and we all felt that Tal’s days on the southern front were numbered.