The secret of Israel’s Power

by Uzi Eilam

  I began to present our proposal for the discussion on research and development policy, making sure to vary the music of my recitativo in the opera I was performing while noticing that the audience was interested and listening carefully. Suddenly, the CGS stopped me and asked: “Why do we need to approve policy? Isn’t there already policy for research and development?” I was not certain if he was simply playing dumb, or trying to help us by providing me with a convenient opportunity to explain the policy. After all, I had met with him a few days earlier and he had given me the impression that he understood everything I said. I took a deep breath and broadened the scope of my comments on the military/technological situation assessment and the budgetary significance of the many actions required to implement the policy. I also provided examples of the main issues that needed to be included in the long-term working plans once the policy was approved.

  As expected, Benny Peled was unexpected, and spoke against the principle of the R&D Unit functioning as a body with dual responsibilities. Indeed, Peled was the only general who understood the complicated status and problematic nature of a body answering to two masters within the defense establishment — the IDF and the defense ministry, and particularly the degree of freedom with which such a unique status endowed the Unit. As commander of the air force, he was concerned about the ability of the new unit to dictate R&D policy.

  However, the air force commander opposed me in a positive tone: “What will you do if the entire budget is approved?” he asked “Will you be able to implement it?” As expected, the financial advisor to the CGS, Itzhak Elron, opposed setting such a large budgetary framework, as well as the long-term commitment that such a framework imposed on the system. Today (2011) — an entire generation and nine chiefs of general staff after the R&D policy discussion with CGS Motta Gur — we still have no multi-year budget plan for the entire Israeli defense establishment. Generations of finance ministry officials have refused and continue to refuse to surrender control over the annual budgets, and the respective committees that have recommended moving in the direction of multi-year planning regarding both content and budgets have thus far failed to rectify the situation. The country is run from year to year, sometimes in accordance with the political quagmire of inappropriate and exhausting haggling between the leadership of government ministries and officials of the finance ministry.

  During the policy discussions the budgets branch argued that “the R&D budget has increased disproportionately.” As we expected, General Tamir supported the proposal to develop long-term policies. While I was not surprised, I was happy to receive his well reasoned persuasive support. Herzl Shafir’s support was also a pleasant surprise. With great wisdom and a strong grounding in reality, the Operations Branch chief declared that the first test of the policy would be the decisions regarding the 1975 working year. Arguing against the traditional narrow-minded army attitude towards R&D, Shafir said that the fact that our unit was not purely military made it the right kind of body to manage long-term development policy.

  The CGS closed the discussion with remarks that I considered the best possible outcome we could hope for from the General Staff. The work presented at the meeting was solid and comprehensive, Gur said, and that the case for long-term research and development policy was both understandable and legitimate. Saying that he approved of the principles and the main points of the plan, Gur concluded by announcing that discussions regarding the major issues and the annual working plans would be held at the appropriate time.

  While listening to Gur I was already thinking about the next challenge — the meeting with the defense minister and the message we would deliver based on the lessons of the General Staff discussion. It was crucial to ensure the minister’s support for the budget, and most importantly not to give up on establishing the framework for the 1975 work plan. We felt the minister must understand the ongoing nature of R&D projects and the need to ensure a commitment to continuing them. Unlike the CGS, we felt the minister had to understand human resources issues in the context of building first-rate development teams within the defense industries. I knew that the general positive feedback we got in the General Staff meeting was not enough, and that we needed to strive for a concrete agreement with the minister. In those computer-generated projection days we made many changes to the transparencies we used during the presentation, incorporating lessons from the meeting with the CGS and additional elements that reflected the perspective of the entire defense establishment.

  The day of the meeting with the defense minister finally arrived, and at 4 p.m. the entire leadership of the Israeli defense establishment met around a table loaded with fruit and soft drinks. The IDF contingent was led by the CGS and included the chiefs of the Operations Branch, the Quartermaster’s Branch, the Planning Branch, the financial advisor, a group of three officers from the Air Force, and a representative of the Navy. Defense Ministry officials also arrived in full force, including Intelligence Advisor Yehoshafat Harkabi, Economic Advisor David Kochav, and Production and Purchasing Administration Director Zvi Alon. Peres also invited the directors of Israel’s defense industries: Zeev Bonen of Rafael; Israel Aerospace Industries Director Al Schwimmer and his deputy Israel Roth; Avraham Makov of Israel Military Industries; and Israel Tal, who was now a civilian. As I stood before this huge audience, I thought to myself: “And a little child shall lead them” (Isaiah 11:6). I was rather nervous, but with the help of the transparencies that I usually used the presentation proceeded smoothly and clearly. Peres looked extremely tired, but that is how he always looked during those years. During my introductory speech he permitted himself to ask a few insightful questions. As soon as I was done, he focused the meeting by saying that there was no need to discuss definitions. We needed to talk about the issues themselves.

  The discussion flowed smoothly, with the CGS repeating the conclusions of the meeting on policy principles that had taken place in his office. Gur argued that we were incapable of reaching a state of complete independence in obtaining weapons systems, and that each of the main R&D issues would have to be discussed separately in detail. Although Chief Scientist Amos Horev found it fairly difficult to be critical of a proposed with which he completely agreed, it was nonetheless prepared without him. In contrast, Motti Hod took pride in the committee he chaired with Avraham Tamir, Yehoshafat Harkabi, David Kochav, the financial advisor, and the director of R&D. They had conducted a preparatory meeting, he said, and were definitely in favor of our proposal. The discussion did not wake any sleeping bears and nobody got angry as I feared they might. Two and a half hours later, Peres closed the meeting with an excellent conclusion which left us with options for future action. We would have the freedom to plan and submit administrative papers on major development-related subjects, and the Unit would enjoy the support of the defense minister’s office. The sun had come out in the dark jungle of the Israeli defense establishment and things were beginning to look good.

  Late 1974 also marked the conclusion of another more personal project — the expansion of the Eilam family, which blessed Osnat and Nimrod with a baby sister named Noa. Naomi and I had been planning to have another child when the R&D Unit was still in its early days, but Noa only came into the world after things quieted down a bit after the wake of the bitter, difficult war. Noa’s birth was also related in a roundabout way to the birth of another new creature within the defense ministry – the Department for the Security of Information, known in Israel by the Hebrew acronym Malmab, which stands for the Supervisor of Security in the Defense Ministry.

  Issues of information security had been handled by a small team in one of the departments of the defense ministry, with the assistance of Israel’s General Security Services. Defense Minister Peres and Director-General Ironi wanted a different of structure, and asked me to serve as a one-member committee to propose a structure for information security management in the future. Neither Peres nor Ironi had a problem with a military man investigating a
matter that was security related but was also very much a civilian issue. They also did not know that that the family was now “plus one”. During the three days when Naomi was in the hospital, I conducted a round of interviews and gathered material to write the report. When Naomi came home I left the house to her, little Noa, and her grandmother who came to help, and took Osnat and Nimrod with me to Jerusalem for the weekend. I wrote the report that Saturday in a quiet Jerusalem hotel and submitted to the minister and the director-general on Sunday morning. A few days later the Department for the Security of Information, of which Chaim Carmon was the first director, was born.

  My Last Days as the Director of R&D

  During my first working meeting with Gur just after he took on the position of CGS, he asked me how long I had been serving as the director of R&D. I told him that it had been a bit over a year. “Ah,” he said, dismissing the issue, “then we don’t need to worry.” A few months later, however, I was surprised when Gur again raised the issue. It was during a private meeting with Gur about Yehoshua Rozen, director of the R&D Ground Forces Department. Tal had asked that Rozen be discharged in order to serve in the Armored Vehicle Administration which Tal had established within the defense ministry after his resignation from the IDF. Before the establishment of GOC Army Headquarters, the R&D Ground Department was the weapons development arm of Israel’s ground forces. Its connection with the Operations Branch chief...ember of the General Staff who was also the senior officer responsible for all ground forces — was natural and understandable. Tal knew that I was not one of his biggest fans, and he preferred working with people whom he could subjugate without being talked back to. Rozen understood the unique status of the Ground Forces Department in comparison to the other departments within the R&D Unit, and at times made his colleagues feel that he was somewhat more important than them. Tal was trying to build a kingdom out of various projects related to armored vehicles and wanted to include the Israel Military Industries’ project for artillery rockets in his realm. This led to harsh confrontations when I attempted to protect the R&D Unit. I was aware of Rozen’s abilities and did not want to lose him. But when Tal came to me with the suggestion, Rozen himself asked me to let him go. So I went to talk to the CGS but was surprised by Gur’s decisive opposition to Rozen’s discharge. He completely ruled out the idea and didn’t even allow me to make the case. “The IDF cannot give up an officer like Rozen now,” he argued. I assumed that another reason for Gur’s reaction was bitterness toward Tal, who had “just left the IDF and is already trying to steal good officers.” I was happy and relieved by the outcome of the meeting.

  However, I was also surprised when Gur told me: “I also want to talk to you about Uzi Eilam.” I had no idea what he wanted to talk about, and neither did his bureau chief. It was clear to me that I would soon have another meeting with the CGS, and I left his office full of curiosity about the kind of positions Gur might offer.

  The meeting with Gur about my future ended up taking place at Tel Hashomer Hospital. Like many paratroopers Gur suffered from back pains, and we talked while he was lying on a sort of Procrustean bed which stretched his body lengthwise. During the meeting Gur made me feel that the ball was actually in my court, and that I was the one who needed to tell him what I wanted to do after I finished my job at R&D. We both agreed that I would need to remain at R&D for another year. I told Gur about my past intentions to replace Nehemiah Kain at the helm of the Quartermaster’s Branch, but quickly added that I did not regard this as a realistic possibility right now. Then Gur asked me the difficult question, whether I had completely ruled out the idea of military command positions. At the time, as a paratrooper, my promotion track would usually entail moving over to the armored corps and receiving command of a division. I wasn’t enthusiastic about such a move. In light of the present situation in the IDF, Gur argued that I needed to stay in the army. He also said that one of his premises was that I could be a major general, and the question was whether I should take the command route or the General Staff route in which the time frame was shorter. Gur reminded me that the position of assistant Operations Branch chief was a way to reach the rank of major general, as Ze’evi had done. He mentioned the name of Chief Communications and Electronics Officer Brigadier General Shlomo Inbar as a possible next director of R&D. At that stage, Gur did not want to hear about awarding the rank of major general to the director of R&D, since he had enough troubles promoting the staff officers in the regional commands and did not have the energy left to fight for a major general at the head of the R&D Unit.

  Questions regarding the future moved into the background for a few months, and the CGS did not raise these issues with me, for better or worse. Suddenly there was a storm in the skies of the R&D Unit, although not a very bad storm. Inbar, the Chief Communications and Electronics Officer, asked me if I intended to leave R&D, saying that the CGS had told him that the position was open and that he wanted to ask as a friend if this was indeed the case. I told him that I knew nothing about it.

  A few days later, during the final preparations for a two-week trip to a country in Africa, I called Gur to say goodbye. Gur asked me to come up to his office, and told me with his somewhat naïve openness about the problems he had with Inbar. Gur felt that Inbar was an asset and should be kept in the IDF, and to this end he was willing to promote him to the rank of major general. The problem was that Inbar was not willing to stay in the army in any position, even as a major general, except as director of R&D. Then he told me that Inbar had already been offered the position of director-general of the Communications Ministry, and that he did not want to lose the officer whom he regarded as so important to the IDF.

  Gur’s proposal was that Inbar replace me and because I was what he called “young and assignable”, I would be given a different position. I remembered the conversation we had a few months earlier, when I did warm to the idea of a promotion track based on a return to a military command position. But I still did not think that was the correct path for me.

  I asked Gur if he really believed that I could do any job in the IDF. “Yes,” he answered. “Look at me. I also made the move to the armored corps and commanded a division as part of a promotion track, although only for a short time.” I agreed to discuss the matter again but set out with a heavy heart on my journey, which was supposed to be two relaxing weeks of interesting meetings in the African country in the company of Naomi, who was joining me for an extremely belated honeymoon.

  In my efforts to prepare myself for a meeting with the CGS after my return, I jotted down an analysis of my situation and possible courses of action. Despite sincere belief in my capabilities and the knowledge that I had proven myself as head of R&D, Gur’s sudden maneuver somewhat undermined my self-confidence. I wanted to continue moving on to other positions and to move up in the ranks, but I also felt that two years was too little for such a complex position, overseeing a unit that had only recently emerged from the Yom Kippur War.

  I wanted to meet with Peres as soon as I returned so I went to his office to report on my meetings in the African country. Peres listened to my account of Gur’s plans and gave me the impression that it was the first time he had heard it. Then he reassured me: “You don’t want to leave R&D? Well, I don’t want you to leave either, so you have nothing to worry about.” After I left the his office, Peres’s experienced military secretary Brigadier General Arieh Bar-On warned me that I should not be at ease, because when the CGS wants something badly enough, the defense minister can do nothing to stop him. I did not want to believe Bar-On at the time, but in the end he turned out to be right.

  I decided to seek the advice of the wise and experienced Chaim Israeli, who was plugged into all the important sources of information in the defense ministry. “If Motta (Gur) really insists on it you have to leave,” he told me. “It is best for you to assume the role of the underdog. This will ensure that you receive the maximum compensation you deserve for the ostensible i
njustices you suffered.” Israeli’s wisdom proved itself again, and only a few days had passed before a meeting between me, the defense minister, and the CGS was scheduled in order to settle the issue. Gur and I sat across from the minister, who did not know how to begin the discussion, which appeared to make him visibly uncomfortable.