The secret of Israel’s Power

by Uzi Eilam

  The Office of Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

  Jerusalem

  June 24, 2002

  Dear Uzi,

  I was delighted to hear that you were awarded this year’s Israel

  Security Prize for Lifetime Achievement.

  I am a great admirer of your abilities in the field of defense research and development policy, which have enabled you to achieve success in the positions you have held over the years. You have succeeded in applying a standard of excellence and professionalism within Israel’s extremely complex security reality, and in this way you have made an important contribution to our progress toward a goal that still stands above all others: the existence of the state of Israel.

  Our work together during your tenure as director of the Atomic Energy Commission provided me with a first-hand opportunity to observe your unique contribution to scientific research and made me an admirer of your great ability to assimilate advanced technologies within the defense establishment. Israel is presently enjoying the fruits of your efforts to develop human capital, and will continue to do so in the future, in fields other than defense as well.

  For all these contributions, it is our privilege to honor you with this award.

  In friendship,

  Shimon Peres

  Epilogue

  How Can a Small Country Pursue Large Technology?

  Israel has come a long way since its days as “a state in the making”, and the country’s impressive development over the past six-and-a-half decades has by no means been a foregone conclusion. The moving force behind Israel’s technological development has been inextricably linked to its quest for survival. The 20th century was characterized by advancements in military technologies which governments regarded as urgent development priorities to counter the major military threats that emerged throughout the century. Although the drive to develop ever more advanced technologies has continued into the 21st century, there has also been a major change: the decreasing influence of military concerns and the growing importance of civilian economic considerations. The evolving Israeli state’s initial efforts to acquire advanced technologies were linked to its quest for a strong foundation for national defense. In those early days, the defense forces had only light weapons, hand-grenades and explosive charges. The Science Corps consisted of a group of young scientists and science students, including the Ephraim and Aharon Katzir-Katchalsky brothers, most of whom studied at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

  Before the establishment of the state, and even before the outbreak of the War of Independence, David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister and defense minister, understood that we would need to make use of our qualitative advantage to secure our existence. For him, it was clear that statehood required not only the ability to defend ourselves physically but also the capacity for economic development. His policy called for placing an emphasis on development of the country’s scientific and technological capabilities.

  In a speech before the first Knesset in 1949, Ben-Gurion said the following:

  The third factor that will bring about the miracle is the scientific and technological power with which we carry out our work. Our generation is currently witnessing perhaps the greatest revolution in human life on the face of the earth — the revolution by which man is seizing control of the strong forces of nature, the power of the atom, the conquest of air and space, and the secrets of the universe. Our intellectual and moral capacities are equal to those of all other peoples.

  Between the end of the War of Independence in 1949 and Operation Kadesh in late 1956, Israel had made a number of strides with important aeronautic developments, most importantly Rafael’s first surface-to-surface missiles. During this decade, Israel relied on the political and military support of France, which enabled us to import substantial French knowledge and technology. This was the beginning of the heyday of French–Israeli relations, which played a far-reaching role in laying the human foundation for Israel’s achievement of technological capabilities in a number of fields. One crowning achievement was Israel’s development of the Uzi submachine gun, a product of the hard work, talent, and exceptional resourcefulness of Uzi Gal, a brilliant technician and a serial inventor.

  The second decade of statehood, from Operation Kadesh through the Six Day War, was characterized by two developments that played an important role in shaping Israeli efforts to acquire advanced technologies. The first was the onset of Soviet military presence in the Middle East — in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. The Soviet weapons systems with which the USSR armed Israel’s enemies motivated Israel to find an integrated tactical and technological solution. The second was the intensification of Israel’s ‘French connection’, which stemmed primarily from French strategic and political considerations vis-à-vis its war in Algeria and provided Israel with welcome opportunities for defense cooperation. Indeed, the nuclear research center near Dimona was constructed under the supervision of French nuclear scientists.

  Another influential factor during Israel’s second decade was a growing concern with border security and the struggle to prevent border infiltration and attacks in border settlements. Border defense provided a legitimate and effective basis for the emergence of technological cooperation with the US. The initial result was the provision of capabilities which the Americans had developed for their war in Vietnam. It began with a sparing supply of first generation night-vision technologies, such as infrared floodlights and starlight amplification goggles. We also learned about border penetration warning devices and were encouraged and motivated to develop electronic warning fences. We were not, however, provided with advanced technologies for planes, tanks, and ships.

  The period between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War was characterized first and foremost by a widespread sense of euphoria, the result of the stunning victory that led to the hubris of preventing us from learning the lessons of the war. Today, all we can do is express remorse at our arrogance and our refusal to second-guess success. Today, we know that mistakes are made even during successful wars and military operations, and that we therefore need to analyze and learn from our successes as well as our failures. Soon after the end of the Six Day War, Israel began to fight the War of Attrition, which differed in form on the two fronts where it was fought: the Suez Canal and the Jordan Valley. The main focus of the Israeli Air Force during operations in the Suez Canal Zone was the threat of the Soviet SA-2 and SA-3 missile systems that had been deployed by Egypt. On the ground along the Canal, the main challenge was defending our combat soldiers against Egyptian sniper fire and artillery shelling along the Bar-Lev Line. Along the border with Jordan, in contrast, our main goal was to seal the front line with warning devices, ambushes, and manhunts in which we achieved a high level of operational success. A major development during this period was our loss of British and French military–technological support, and our sudden and almost complete dependence on the acquisition of American-produced weapons systems. Our increasing dependence on the United States, which stemmed from political considerations and from the generous military aid with which the US has provided Israel, sparked an ongoing reduction in Israel’s development and production of weapons systems for the IDF. The greatest beneficiary has been the Israeli Air Force.

  Israeli reactions to the trauma of the Yom Kippur War were extreme, and resulted not only in a fierce hunger for quantitative armament but also in an effort to achieve a clear technological advantage over our enemies. The “treasure” lists we submitted to the Americans included weapons systems based on the most advanced technologies in the fields of night vision; encoded communications; missiles (including Lance and Pershing missiles); and technologies for air-delivered landmines. Although the Americans refused to supply us with systems which they deemed as overly sensitive from a technological perspective, this was actually a blessing in disguise. We quickly realized the principle behind the Americans’ response: they would agree
to provide us with technologically advanced weapons systems only if we could prove that we either already possessed the technologies in question or that we were at an advanced stage of acquiring them. Israel learned its lesson well, and the result was a determined effort to develop advanced technologies on our own. These efforts were extremely successful and ultimately resulted not only in the ability to market Israeli weapons systems, but in American and European willingness to enter into equal partnerships with Israel for the development of advanced weaponry.

  Israel’s unique advantage in technological research stemmed from its pool of talented technicians and technological scientists serving in the corps and services of the IDF who were trained primarily by the IDF Academic Reserves program. Over the past three decades, the Talpiot program has also emerged as a producer of high quality scientific human resources for the IDF and the country’s technology sector. A major advantage of the Israeli defense establishment lies in the fact that many employees of the country’s defense industry have military experience not only in training but also, and perhaps most importantly, as soldiers in war.

  It is difficult to escape the troubling conclusion that the challenge of developing the technological capabilities necessary to support Israel’s many varying operational needs is almost impossible to meet. One way of meeting this challenge has been through bilateral cooperative projects. In order to enter into such partnerships, Israel needs to display a sufficiently high level of technological acumen. In addition, our cumulative experience of warfare with Soviet weapons systems from Operation Kadesh through the Yom Kippur War provided us with a wealth of tactical, technical, and technological information that the countries of the West could not have accessed otherwise. This experience provided the IDF and Israel’s defense industry with a unique form of enticement during its dialogue with the armies and defense industries of the West.

  In order to effectively generate advanced technological capabilities, it was important to support the momentum provided by large-scale development projects. A major project, we learned, is like a comet: the project itself is the nucleus, and its tail contains the technologies which we could never allow ourselves to develop without the project itself, as well as the professional skills acquired during the development. One example is an air-to-air missile development project, which provided us with new capabilities in aerodynamics, homing warheads, and missile navigation technologies. A second example is the Merkava tank project, which generated capabilities in the realm of tank-fire command-and-control systems and advanced armored defenses using various substances and complex electronic and mechanical systems. A third example is the aborted Lavi fighter plane project, which provided us with advanced aeronautic and radar technologies that were applied in the Homa and Arrow missile-defense systems. A fourth and final example is Israel’s satellite programs, which provided us with capabilities in the fields of satellite launchers, advanced observation systems, and synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) for satellites.

  Throughout the history of these developments, upgrading the foundations of these systems, which could not be changed, was achieved through the transplant of technologically advanced components and sub-systems. In planes, this included armament with advanced air-to-air missiles and air-to-surface homing missile counter-measures which could not have been assimilated without adapting the plane’s programming.

  Tank development also involved efforts to upgrade to higher caliber cannons and to adapt the system to accommodate more accurate and deeper penetrating ammunition. Installing fire-control systems in already existing tanks necessitated a complex transplant that proved to be a technological and engineering challenge. Israeli specialization in carrying out transplants with relatively modest budgets enabled the Israeli defense industry to offer its expertise in the field to many other countries seeking to upgrade their older weapons systems.

  An important consideration in the establishment of frameworks for cooperative technological-engineering projects with friendly foreign countries has been the classification level of the material in question. We always had to feel confident that information regarding the systems under development revealed in the course of joint work would not leak out or be passed on to a third party.

  But today, the playing field has changed. First, we no longer enjoy the advantage of having fought against the weapons systems and technologies of the Soviet Union, the West’s principal opponent. Second, the IDF is no longer a major consumer of the products of the Israeli defense industry. Rather, the defense industry today exports four times of what they develop for the IDF, and the argument “If it’s good enough for the IDF, it’s good enough for you” can no longer be used when marketing abroad. At the same time, however, Israel’s experience still carries weight in the war against terrorism.

  Toward the end of our extended presence in Lebanon after the first Lebanon war, Israel began making use of technologies which were initially developed to provide us with an element of surprise on the battlefield of the next “major war” in the war against terrorism. This move was based on recognition of the fact that the next war had already arrived: It was a different type of war with a dynamic nature, rapid changes requiring heightened alertness, and rapid responses in the realm of technological development.

  It is reasonable to assume that Israel, which has succeeded in achieving such a high standing among the world’s technological powers, will be able to contend with the challenges posed by the war on terrorism, in all its forms. This will require a readiness look anew at the way things are done and a new approach to decision making.

  Israel’s success in joining the ranks of countries that command today’s most advanced technologies has been the result of human effort. Working on technologies that verge on science fiction requires people who are gifted, talented, and creative. However, they must also be motivated. In the past, such motivation stemmed from a sense of dedication to the survival of the State of Israel against the threats posed by neighboring countries. Today, it must be recognized that there are a number of motivating factors. The strategic threats posed by long-term missiles and the use of non-conventional weapons are threats to Israel’s survival. Terrorism also presents a strategic threat, although it is actually composed of a massive collection of tactical threats. Today, however, the efforts of the Israeli defense industry to continue enhancing its ability to compete on the international market is as important a factor driving technological advancement as is the current threat to the existence of the state.

  Israeli decision makers, however, must not content themselves with the technological advancements stemming from competition on the global defense exports market. They must also pursue policies of allocating budgets and setting priorities to facilitate the development of technologies designated exclusively for the security of Israel.

  With President Reuven Rivlin