Brock’s prospects were decidedly bleak compared to Prevost’s. In early 1812 Brock proposed several laws which would have strengthened his control over the province. The assembly was not willing in peace time to give him the powers he wanted, but it did amend the Militia Act and vote some money for the militia. In July, even though war had been declared, the assembly was again unwilling to agree to Brock’s demands for a further strengthening of the militia law and the imposition of martial law (law established and enforced by military officers instead of by civilians). Brock’s despair is evident in his letter of 28 July to Prevost:
A more decent House has not been elected since the formation of the province — but I perceive at once that I shall get no good of them. They, like the magistrates and other in office, evidently mean to remain passive . . . if I have recourse to the law martial I am told the whole armed force will disperse. Never was an officer placed in a more awkward predicament.3
In the North and West, and perhaps elsewhere, Indians might help in the defence of Canada. Even before the war, western Indians were gathering at Amherstburg. Robert Dickson, a British fur trader, was bringing others to St. Joseph. But the Six Nations, or Iroquois, on the Grand River did not want to get involved.
NATIVE WARRIORS
Both sides wanted to gain the support of native warriors and part of the reason was the number of fighting men they could provide. By 1812 there were some 3,800 Iroquois living on reserves in New York and Pennsylvania and another 550 in Ohio just south of Lake Erie. At least 5,540 Iroquois lived on reserves in Upper and Lower Canada.4 Altogether, there may have been 10,000 warriors in the Great Lakes region, most of them Western Indians.5 Despite defeats, loss of lands, and outside pressures to adopt European culture, the Iroquois remembered their warrior traditions and many wanted to revive them.
Six Nations warrior, 1812.
[Courtesy of Parks Canada Service.]
Indian warriors were effective fighting men for several reasons. From childhood they learned warlike skills because they participated in hunting and in games, they accompanied war parties, and they practiced marksmanship and tomahawk-throwing. They acquired and developed both the physical and mental competence to operate in difficult or hostile conditions. In short, they were better trained for war than their American or European opponents. Part of this training involved developing martial attitudes and this was an important element in Iroquois tradition because warfare gave the Iroquois male the opportunity to prove his manhood, to gain recognition for his warlike skills, and, perhaps, advance to a leadership position. But preparation for war was not limited to individual skills. Warriors were also adept at carrying out controlled co-operative movements such as advancing in loose-line formation or forming circles, semicircles, or squares as required in combat. Their leaders controlled these manoeuvres sometimes from the front of the line, sometimes from the extremities and used animal or bird sounds as signals. Warriors acted as scouts and as skirmishers (much like European light infantry), but their favoured tactic was the ambush. They hoped to confuse their enemy, making effective response unlikely and keeping their own casualties low. They favoured rapid, silent movement taking advantage of cover, but, on occasion, they used shouts or war songs to frighten their opponents. This tactic sometimes proved most effective during the war — in particular, at Detroit and Queenston Heights.
Indian fighters used the same weapons as the British and Americans. The British supplied muskets of smaller calibre but of the same quality as used by their own infantry, decorated muskets for chiefs, pistols, and rifles. They also provided swords, knives, tomahawks, and spears. The Americans gave more rifles than muskets, but these weapons were of poorer quality than those the Iroquois obtained privately or from the British.
Native fighting forces displayed certain weaknesses when compared with European or American armies. An Indian warrior fought as an individual and when he had met his own goals, he might decide to leave the battle. Chiefs frequently did not exercise enough authority to prevent these departures. Sometimes as many as half or more of an Indian force might desert, as happened just before the battles of Queenston Heights and Fort George. Iroquois society could not survive heavy losses of manpower and when casualties were high — as at Chippawa — the warriors might decide to withdraw from fighting altogether.
The Iroquois on the Grand River were not being threatened by the Americans, as were the western Indians. Before and after the outbreak of war, the Six Nations on the Grand were divided among pro-British supporters, pro-American supporters, and those who wanted to remain neutral. Delegates from the Six Nations Indians living in the United States came to the Grand to urge their fellow natives to take no part in an Anglo-American war. After the outbreak of war, Erastus Granger, the American agent to the Six Nations in New York State, told them to remain at home because their help was not needed. Surrounded by American settlements, these natives could not make an independent choice of which side to support. On the Grand River, probably the majority wanted to remain neutral. John Norton (Teyoninhokarawen), a prominent war chief, tried to muster support for the British but he could not be certain how many warriors would follow him. Brock and Prevost knew about the divisions among the Six Nations and could only wait and see what support they would receive when fighting broke out.
THE PROVINCIAL MARINE
There was another force that was important to the defence of the Canadas, although we often forget about it. This was the Provincial Marine, consisting of warships on lakes Champlain, Ontario, and Erie. When war broke out, the British had naval control of these waters. On Lake Champlain they had a schooner, while the Americans had only two grounded gunboats. On Lake Ontario the British had four vessels, although only three were seaworthy — including the large twenty-gun Royal George; the Americans had only the sixteen-gun Oneida, though they soon bought six merchant schooners to convert to warships. On Lake Erie the British had the Queen Charlotte (sixteen guns), the General Hunter (six guns) described as “falling fast into decay,”6 and during the summer launched the Lady Prevost (twelve guns). The Americans had no armed vessels.
Naval control of the lakes was important for several reasons. For one thing, ships were the fastest way to move supplies and troops. For another, British control of the lakes would force the Americans to attack along land routes into Upper Canada instead of anywhere they pleased. This simplified planning for Canada’s defence. Moreover, if the Americans advanced far into Upper Canada, naval forces could cut their armies’ lines of supply and communication. The British faced great problems of maintaining naval forces so far inland. Canada had few trained or experienced sailors and, in effect, depended for almost all of them on the overstretched Royal Navy. It would also have to supply the numerous items necessary to build and supply ships. But how could the British navy spare men and supplies when it had the more important roles of blockading Europe and, after June 1812, the coast of the United States? By contrast, the United States had plenty of sailors and supplies to send to their naval bases of Plattsburgh on Lake Champlain, Sackets Harbor on Lake Ontario, and Presque Isle on Lake Erie.
WAR IS DECLARED!
On June 1, Madison gave Congress five reasons for his war message. The first was the impressment of American citizens into the British navy. Second, he complained of British ships off the coast stopping and searching American vessels. The third, was the British blockade by which, he said, “our commerce has been plundered in every sea.” Fourth came the Orders in Council. The major reasons, it would appear, were maritime rights. Finally, Madison stated, “In reviewing the conduct of Great Britain towards the United States our attention is necessarily drawn to the warfare just renewed by the savages on one of our extensive frontiers-”7 In other words, Madison blamed the British, not the Americans, for starting Indian warfare in the West!
On June 18 Congress passed a bill approving the President’s call for war and Madison signed it. This officially began the War of 1812, although Britain did not dec
lare war until January 9, 1813, almost seven months later. Meanwhile, as soon as the American decision was taken, messengers rode hastily north to Montreal and Newark.
A SUMMARY
While there were undoubted weaknesses in British North America’s defences, there were also significant strengths at the outset of war. There was British naval control of the lakes, regulars commanded by good officers, and the western Indians, many led by the valiant Tecumseh. The militia was the weakest part of Canada’s defences, but steps were being taken to improve it.
Disagreements among Americans over the war were an enormous benefit to Canada. The defence was also helped by the poor leadership of the American army — which was not well trained at the beginning of the conflict — and by the reliance on often-unpredictable state militias. President Madison did not provide firm direction for the political and military leaders who decided how the war was to be fought. As a result, the Americans time after time made the mistake of attacking west of Kingston instead of cutting the St. Lawrence route.
Upper Canada’s principal weakness was dependence on that route with its disadvantages of rapids, winter freeze-up, and proximity to the American border.
— 2 —
A SURPRISING WAR, 1812
EUROPE
From Spain to the Russian border, Napoleon straddled Europe. By spring Europeans could see that he was preparing to attack Russia, for he was gathering troops from the countries he controlled directly as well as from his allies. Napoleon’s Grand Army began the invasion in June and the Russians retreated. Even though the British knew that the Americans were making preparations for war, they were forced to give almost full attention to the spreading conflict on the continent.
The British commander, the Duke of Wellington, had been fighting the French in the Iberian Peninsula since 1809. In the spring of 1812, he began to win important victories, but it was clear that the French would not be driven out without a great deal more hard fighting. The British government would have to continue sending Wellington many soldiers and large amounts of supplies and money. There would be little to spare for war in North America.
Sensibly, the British government tried to avoid war with the Americans. Unfortunately, its move to repeal the Orders in Council, the major source of disagreement, was delayed by the assassination in May of Prime Minister Spencer Perceval. A new government could not be formed for some weeks because the major political leaders disagreed so strongly over policies. Eventually, Lord Liverpool formed a government and moved quickly to repeal the orders on June 23.
NORTH AMERICA
But it was too late in North America. Still, the British avoided acting aggressively and delayed their declaration of war until January 1813, in the hope that the Americans would rescind theirs. Thus, for more than six months, the British struggled with the problem of having to help British North America fight a war they wanted no part of while at the same time trying not to anger the United States so that fighting could soon be ended. President Madison, however, had no intention of changing his mind.
Napoleon’s empire.
[Adapted from R.A. Preston, S.F. Wise, and H.O. Werner, Men
in Arms: A History of Warfare and its Interrelationships with
Western Society, revised edition (New York, 1956), p. 185.]
Governor Prevost, General Brock in Upper Canada, and Sir John Sherbrooke, commanding officer in the Maritimes, had realized early in 1811 that the threat of war was serious. They knew that Britain could spare them little aid and that they would have to defend the colonies with the forces and means they had available.
Sherbrooke had about 4,300 regulars, mostly in Nova Scotia. That colony had some eleven thousand men in the militia, but only half of them were armed and trained. The New Brunswick militia was too scattered and untrained and the Prince Edward Island and Cape Breton militias were too small to count as military forces. Halifax, a major British naval base, was the only town in the Maritimes with fortifications that troops could use to defend it. Clearly, the primary defence of the Atlantic colonies in case of war would be the Royal Navy.
In the Canadas, Prevost and Brock considered their 5,600 troops too few. In addition to organizing training for militia units, they set about strengthening defences in several ways. Prevost asked Britain to send help, specifically requesting, for example, ten thousand muskets, two hundred sabres, and saddles and bridles to equip cavalry. The two main regiments he had, the 49th and the 41st, were due to return to England. The government told Prevost that in the event of war, he could keep these regiments as well as those (the 103rd and the 1st, or Royal Scots) being sent as replacements.
During the spring and summer of 1812, Prevost sent what men and supplies he could spare to Upper Canada along with guns, money, and clothing. He asked Sherbrooke to send money and weapons from Halifax, and the first shipment of these arrived at Quebec in September. He also decided to keep the 100th Regiment, which was to have gone to Nova Scotia.
All this was good planning and is evidence of the professionalism of these British generals. On the American side, there was little of this kind of careful, detailed preparation. As a result, the President’s authority to call out thousands of men would not be very effective in practice. Even when these forces were raised, they were not trained or properly supplied. Of course, the serious flaws of the American military structure were not evident to Canada’s defenders and so they expected an early invasion by numerous and powerful forces.
The Canadas, the Maritime colonies,
and the northeastern United States.
(Courtesy of Loris Gasparotto.)
BRITISH STRATEGY
The Americans had the advantage of knowing when they intended to begin the war and, therefore, could choose where to gather forces and when to launch an invasion. For example, they could easily invade Canada from northern New York State and cut the St. Lawrence Route or even attack Montreal. Or if their objective was limited to Upper Canada, they could threaten it from their bases at Michilimackinac, Detroit, and Fort Niagara.
Clearly, it was vital to Prevost and Brock to know about American intentions and timing, and so they had informants gathering details. Canada’s defenders had no desire to conquer American territory; they wished simply to repel any invasion. If they were beaten back, it was accepted British strategic doctrine that their troops would retreat to Quebec City and at all costs, hold on to that fortress until succour could come from Great Britain.
But beyond that point, Brock and Prevost disagreed about strategy. Both before and after war was declared, Prevost opposed striking across the border at the enemy. He argued that a British attack would unite Americans in support of the war and would thereby increase the danger to Canada rather than eliminate it. Brock asserted that Upper Canada could be defended and insisted that vigorous efforts ought to be made to retain it. The most effective strategy, he argued, would be to attack the Americans in the West right at the outset of the war. Throw the Americans off balance rather than wait passively for them to strike first was his advice to Prevost.
Brock proposed to strengthen British forces at St. Joseph and Amherstburg and be ready to seize Michilimackinac and Detroit as soon as war broke out. He thought that victories early in the war were the only way to win the support of the Indians, and hoped that early defeats might discourage the Americans, who expected an easy victory. A setback might make them less willing to face the continued expense and difficulties of warfare. Moreover, if the British won battles in the West, the Americans would be forced to concentrate their efforts there rather than against the vital St. Lawrence route. The defenders would thus gain time — time to organize and train militia, and time for Britain to send aid across the ocean. It was the Americans who had to hurry before more British troops reached Canada and before the Royal Navy could attack the American coast.
The Detroit frontier.
[Reprinted from The War of 1812: The War for Canada, by W.B.
Turner (Toronto, Grolier Limi
ted, 1982), p. 26.]
Compared to battles in Europe, those in North America were short and fought by tiny armies. Yet these first clashes were important because Britain could not quickly reinforce her colonies. Canada’s fate really did hang on the battles of 1812.
Others, besides British army commanding officers, were anxious to know when war was declared. One group vitally interested in this news was the fur traders of Montreal whose valuable cargoes moved along the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence. War would interrupt their trade and the Americans might seize their trade goods and furs. To avoid this danger, the Montreal merchants could use other routes that would be safer, even if longer and more expensive.
The merchants had business partners in New York City who sent word to Canada as soon as they heard of Madison’s declaration of war. The message reached Montreal on June 24 and was taken the next day to Prevost at Quebec. Brock received the news at York on June 25 and immediately sent messages to the western forts. They reached Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas St. George, the commander at Fort Malden, on June 28 and Captain Charles Roberts at St. Joseph on July 8. These British officers acted on the declaration of war before their American opponents even knew about it.
HULL’S INVASION OF CANADA
Meanwhile, Brigadier General William Hull was leading a force of over two thousand American regulars and militia towards Detroit. The men struggled through pathless, thick forests in pouring rain. At last, on June 29, they emerged from the dark woods onto the shore of Lake Erie 130 kilometres from Detroit. By this time, many were too sick to continue the march and so Hull hired a ship, the Cayahoga, to transport them the rest of the way. He also put his papers containing his instructions and the list of his men on the ship. He did not know that war had been declared and that the British were waiting.
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