The Trial: A New Translation Based on the Restored Text

by Franz Kafka

  Now both were silent for a long time. Of course the priest could barely distinguish K. in the darkness reigning below, while K. could see the priest clearly by the light of the little lamp. Why didn’t the priest come down? He hadn’t delivered a sermon, but instead merely told K. a few things that would probably harm him more than help if he paid any attention to them. Nevertheless, the priest’s good intentions seemed clear to K.; it was not impossible that they might come to terms if he would come down, it was not impossible that he might receive some form of decisive and acceptable advice from him, something that might show him, for example, not how to influence the trial, but how to break out of it, how to get around it, how to live outside the trial. Surely that possibility existed; K. had thought about it often in the recent past. If the priest knew of such a possibility, he might reveal it if asked, even though he himself was part of the court, and even though when K. attacked the court, he had suppressed his gentle nature and actually shouted at K.

  “Won’t you come down now?” asked K. “There’s no sermon to deliver. Come down to me.” “Now I can come,” said the priest, perhaps regretting having yelled at him. As he removed the lamp from its hook, he said: “I had to speak to you first from a distance. Otherwise I’m too easily influenced and forget my position.”

  K. awaited him at the bottom of the steps. The priest stretched out his hand to him while still on the upper steps as he descended. “Do you have a little time for me?” asked K. “As much time as you need,” said the priest, and handed the little lamp to K. for him to carry. Even up close, there was still a certain aura of solemnity about him. “You’re very friendly toward me,” said K. They walked side by side up and down the dark side aisle. “You’re an exception among those who belong to the court. I trust you more than I do any of them I’ve met so far. I can speak openly with you.” “Don’t deceive yourself,” said the priest. “How am I deceiving myself?” asked K. “You’re deceiving yourself about the court,” said the priest, “in the introductory texts to the Law it says of this deception: Before the Law stands a doorkeeper. A man from the country comes to this doorkeeper and requests admittance to the Law. But the doorkeeper says that he can’t grant him admittance now. The man thinks it over and then asks if he’ll be allowed to enter later. ‘It’s possible,’ says the doorkeeper, ‘but not now.’ Since the gate to the Law stands open as always, and the doorkeeper steps aside, the man bends down to look through the gate into the interior. When the doorkeeper sees this he laughs and says: ‘If you’re so drawn to it, go ahead and try to enter, even though I’ve forbidden it. But bear this in mind: I’m powerful. And I’m only the lowest doorkeeper. From hall to hall, however, stand doorkeepers each more powerful than the one before. The mere sight of the third is more than even I can bear.’ The man from the country has not anticipated such difficulties; the Law should be accessible to anyone at any time, he thinks, but as he now examines the doorkeeper in his fur coat more closely, his large, sharply pointed nose, his long, thin, black tartar’s beard, he decides he would prefer to wait until he receives permission to enter. The doorkeeper gives him a stool and lets him sit down at the side of the door. He sits there for days and years. He asks time and again to be admitted and wearies the doorkeeper with his entreaties. The doorkeeper often conducts brief interrogations, inquiring about his home and many other matters, but he asks such questions indifferently, as great men do, and in the end he always tells him he still can’t admit him. The man, who has equipped himself well for his journey, uses everything he has, no matter how valuable, to bribe the doorkeeper. And the doorkeeper accepts everything, but as he does so he says: ‘I’m taking this just so you won’t think you’ve neglected something.’ Over the many years, the man observes the doorkeeper almost incessantly. He forgets the other doorkeepers and this first one seems to him the only obstacle to his admittance to the Law. He curses his unhappy fate, loudly during the first years, later, as he grows older, merely grumbling to himself. He turns childish, and since he has come to know even the fleas in the doorkeeper’s collar over his years of study, he asks the fleas too to help him change the doorkeeper’s mind. Finally his eyes grow dim and he no longer knows whether it’s really getting darker around him or if his eyes are merely deceiving him. And yet in the darkness he now sees a radiance that streams forth inextinguishably from the door of the Law. He doesn’t have much longer to live now. Before he dies, everything he has experienced over the years coalesces in his mind into a single question he has never asked the doorkeeper. He motions to him, since he can no longer straighten his stiffening body. The doorkeeper has to bend down to him, for the difference in size between them has altered greatly to the man’s disadvantage. ‘What do you want to know now,’ asks the doorkeeper, ‘you’re insatiable.’ ‘Everyone strives to reach the Law,’ says the man, ‘how does it happen, then, that in all these years no one but me has requested admittance.’ The doorkeeper sees that the man is nearing his end, and in order to reach his failing hearing, he roars at him: ‘No one else could gain admittance here, because this entrance was meant solely for you. I’m going to go and shut it now.’ ”

  “So the doorkeeper deceived the man,” K. said at once, strongly attracted by the story. “Don’t be too hasty,” said the priest, “don’t accept another person’s opinion unthinkingly. I’ve told you the story word for word according to the text. It says nothing about deception.” “But it’s clear,” said K., “and your initial interpretation was quite correct. The doorkeeper conveyed the crucial information only when it could no longer be of use to the man.” “He wasn’t asked earlier,” said the priest, “and remember he was only a doorkeeper and as such fulfilled his duty.” “What makes you think he fulfilled his duty?” asked K.; “he didn’t fulfill it. It may have been his duty to turn away anyone else, but he should have admitted this man for whom the entrance was meant.” “You don’t have sufficient respect for the text and are changing the story,” said the priest. “The story contains two important statements by the doorkeeper concerning admittance to the Law, one at the beginning and one at the end. The one passage says: ‘that he can’t grant him admittance now’; and the other: ‘this entrance was meant solely for you.’ If a contradiction existed between these two statements you would be right, and the doorkeeper would have deceived the man. But there is no contradiction. On the contrary, the first statement even implies the second. One could almost argue that the doorkeeper exceeded his duty by holding out to the man the prospect of a possible future entry. At that time his sole duty appears to have been to turn the man away. And indeed, many commentators on the text are surprised that the doorkeeper intimated it at all, for he appears to love precision and the strict fulfillment of his duty. He never leaves his post once in the course of all those years, and he waits till the very end to close the gate; he’s well aware of the importance of his office, for he says ‘I’m powerful’; he respects his superiors, for he says ‘I’m only the lowest doorkeeper’; when it comes to fulfilling his duty he can neither be moved nor prevailed upon, for it says of the man ‘he wearies the doorkeeper with his entreaties’; he is not garrulous, for in all those years he only asks questions ‘indifferently’; he can’t be bribed, for he says of a gift ‘I’m taking this just so you won’t think you’ve neglected something’; finally even his external appearance hints at his pedantic nature, the large, sharply pointed nose and the long, thin, black tartar’s beard. Can there be a more conscientious doorkeeper? But certain other elements enter into the basic character of the doorkeeper which are quite favorable to the person seeking to enter, and which, in spite of everything, help us understand how and why the doorkeeper might exceed his duty somewhat by the intimation of that future possibility. For it can’t be denied that he’s somewhat simpleminded, and consequently somewhat conceited as well. Even if his remarks about his own power and that of the other doorkeepers, and about how unbearable their sight is even for him—I say even if all these remarks are correct in themselves, th
e manner in which he brings them forth shows that his understanding is clouded by simplemindedness and presumption. The commentators tell us: the correct understanding of a matter and misunderstanding the matter are not mutually exclusive. At any rate one must assume that this simplemindedness and presumption, trivial as their manifestations might be, could still weaken his defense of the entrance; they are breaches in the doorkeeper’s character. To this may be added the fact that the doorkeeper seems friendly by nature; he’s by no means always the official. Within the first few minutes he allows himself the jest of inviting the man to enter, in spite of the fact that he has strictly forbidden it; and he doesn’t send him away, but instead, we are told, gives him a stool and lets him sit at the side of the door. The patience with which he endures the man’s entreaties over the years, the brief interrogations, the acceptance of the gifts, the polite sensitivity with which he permits the man beside him to curse aloud the unhappy fate which has placed the doorkeeper in his way—all this points toward feelings of compassion. Not every doorkeeper would have acted thus. And finally he bends down low when the man motions to him, to give him the opportunity to ask a final question. Only a slight impatience—after all, the doorkeeper knows the end is at hand—is expressed in the words ‘you’re insatiable.’ Some go so far in such commentaries as to maintain that the words ‘you’re insatiable’ express a sort of friendly admiration, which of course is not entirely free of condescension. At any rate the figure of the doorkeeper that emerges is quite different from your perception of him.” “You know the story much better than I do, and have known it for a longer time,” said K. They fell silent for a while. Then K. said: “So you think the man wasn’t deceived?” “Don’t misunderstand me,” said the priest, “I’m just pointing out the various opinions that exist on the matter. You mustn’t pay too much attention to opinions. The text is immutable, and the opinions are often only an expression of despair over it. In this case there’s even an opinion according to which the doorkeeper is the one deceived.” “That’s an extreme opinion,” said K. “What’s it based on?” “It’s based,” answered the priest, “on the simplemindedness of the doorkeeper. It’s said that he doesn’t know the interior of the Law, but only the path he constantly patrols back and forth before it. His ideas about the interior are considered childish, and it’s assumed that he himself fears the very thing with which he tries to frighten the man. Indeed he fears it more than the man, for the latter wants nothing more than to enter, even after he’s been told about the terrifying doorkeepers within, while the doorkeeper has no wish to enter, or at any rate we hear nothing about it. Others say that he must indeed have already been inside, for after all he has been taken into the service of the Law, and that could only have happened within. To this it may be replied that he might well have been named a doorkeeper by a shout from within, and at any rate could not have progressed far into the interior, since he is unable to bear the sight of even the third doorkeeper. Moreover there is no report of his saying anything over the years about the interior, other than the remark about the doorkeepers. Perhaps he was forbidden to do so, but he never mentions such a prohibition either. From all this it is concluded that he knows nothing about the appearance and significance of the interior, and is himself deceived about it. But he is also in a state of deception about the man from the country, for he is subordinate to him and doesn’t know it. It’s evident in several places that he treats the man as a subordinate, as I’m sure you’ll recall. But it is equally clear, according to this opinion, that he is in fact subordinate to him. First of all, the free man is superior to the bound man. Now the man is in fact free: he can go wherever he wishes, the entrance to the Law alone is denied to him, and this only by one person, the doorkeeper. If he sits on the stool at the side of the door and spends the rest of his life there, he does so of his own free will; the story mentions no element of force. The doorkeeper, on the other hand, is bound to his post by his office; he is not permitted to go elsewhere outside, but to all appearances he is not permitted to go inside either, even if he wishes to. Moreover he is in the service of the Law but serves only at this entrance, and thus serves only this man, for whom the entrance is solely meant. For this reason as well he is subordinate to him. It can be assumed that for many years, as long as it takes for a man to mature, his service has been an empty formality, for it is said that a man comes, that is, a mature man, so that the doorkeeper had to wait a long time to fulfill his duty, and in fact had to wait as long as the man wished, who after all came of his own free will. But the end of his service is also determined by the end of the man’s life, and he therefore remains subordinate to him until the very end. And it is constantly emphasized that the doorkeeper apparently realizes none of this. But nothing striking is seen in this, for according to this opinion, the doorkeeper exists in an even greater state of deception with regard to his office. For at the very end he speaks of the entrance and says ‘I’m going to go and shut it now,’ but at the beginning it’s said that the gate to the Law always stands open; if it always stands open, however, that is, independent of how long the man lives for whom it is meant, then even the doorkeeper can’t shut it. Opinions vary as to whether the doorkeeper intends the announcement that he is going to shut the gate merely as an answer, or to emphasize his devotion to duty, or because he wants to arouse remorse and sorrow in the man at the last moment. Many agree, however, that he will not be able to shut the gate. They even think that, at least at the end, he’s subordinate to the man in knowledge as well, for the former sees the radiance which streams forth from the entrance to the Law, while the doorkeeper, by profession, is probably standing with his back to the entrance, nor does he show by anything he says that he might have noticed a change.” “That’s well reasoned,” said K., who had repeated various parts of the priest’s explanation to himself under his breath. “It’s well reasoned, and now I too believe that the doorkeeper is deceived. But that doesn’t change my earlier opinion, for in part they coincide. It makes no difference if the doorkeeper sees clearly or is deceived. I said the man was deceived. If the doorkeeper sees clearly, one might have doubts about that, but if the doorkeeper is deceived, the deception must necessarily carry over to the man. In that case the doorkeeper is indeed no deceiver, but is so simpleminded that he should be dismissed immediately from service. You have to realize that the state of deception in which the doorkeeper finds himself doesn’t harm him but harms the man a thousandfold.” “You run up against a contrary opinion there,” said the priest. “Namely, there are those who say that the story gives no one the right to pass judgment on the doorkeeper. No matter how he appears to us, he’s still a servant of the Law; he belongs to the Law, and thus is beyond human judgment. In that case one can’t see the doorkeeper as subordinate to the man. To be bound by his office, even if only at the entrance to the Law, is incomparably better than to live freely in the world. The man has only just arrived at the Law, the doorkeeper is already there. He has been appointed to his post by the Law, to doubt his dignity is to doubt the Law itself.” “I don’t agree with that opinion,” said K., shaking his head, “for if you accept it, you have to consider everything the doorkeeper says as true. But you’ve already proved conclusively that that’s not possible.” “No,” said the priest, “you don’t have to consider everything true, you just have to consider it necessary.” “A depressing opinion,” said K. “Lies are made into a universal system.”