India's War

by Srinath Raghavan

  By the time these contretemps were resolved, Rommel had pulled further back to a line along the Wadi Akarit. This was an excellent defensive position, bounded by an impassable salt marsh at one end and the sea at the other: ‘A series of transverse crests merge in a labyrinthine tangle of pinnacles, escarpments, counter-escarpments, deep fjord-like chimneys and corridors.’30 The Eighth Army made contact with the enemy on the morning of 30 March. Montgomery had initially hoped quickly to tackle the Akarit defences with the leading division of the 10th Corps. Reconnaissance suggested, however, that the enemy was well dug in and capable of inflicting substantial damage. Accordingly, Montgomery ordered the 30th Corps – comprising the 4th Indian Division, the 51st Division and a Guards brigade – to force the enemy defences and secure a bridgehead. The 10th Corps would then break out towards the north and destroy the Axis forces in the area.

  Tuker felt that the plan was misguided. Not only was the main ridge held by the enemy a formidable position, but it was overlooked by an even sharper ridge – the Zouai Hill to its west. Tuker offered to take the latter position with his units and also suggested bringing a third division into the attack. In the event, it was decided that the 50th and the 51st Divisions would launch the main set-piece offensive at 0430 hours on 6 April. Before the main attack went in, the 4th Division would strike the Zouai Hill. In contrast to the Eighth Army’s firepower-heavy approach, Tuker’s plan relied on stealth, surprise and small-unit tactics. The attack went in after dusk on 5 April. The 7th Indian Infantry Brigade’s war diary noted:

  We are now creeping forward into the foothills where we know the enemy’s FDL [forward defensive lines] are, suddenly an Italian sentry challenges, immediately a yell of ‘pugaroo’ goes up and the Gurkhas charge. A fiendish uproar takes place … Some [Italians] fight as the clatter of exploding grenades and tommy guns shows. Others run screaming away from their positions.31

  By first light, the 4th Division had punched a 5-mile-deep hole in the enemy line and taken over two thousand prisoners. More importantly, it was able to establish contact with the 50th Division on its flank. And the divisional engineers set about preparing a crossing over the enemy’s anti-tank ditch. Yet the 10th Corps’ breakout never really materialized. The Axis anti-tank guns and the terrain combined to slow down its advance. This gave the defenders enough time to disengage, pull back and live to fight subsequent battles in North Africa.

  The battle of Wadi Akarit may have proved operationally abortive, but it showcased the qualities of the Indian division: its standard of training, excellent small-unit leadership and, above all, its flexibility in adapting from fighting in the desert to mountain warfare.32 These qualities were evident in subsequent engagements, too. An Indian captain of the Rajputana Rifles wrote an unusually vivid account of a battle to his father in Calcutta:

  Well here we are again back in a great area, after some of the bloodiest fighting that I have seen for a long time. It was hand to hand fighting from hill top to hill top and our Jawans [soldiers] were magnificent … One of the Coys [companies] got on to their objective where there was severe fighting, in which they were counter attacked four times with the result that they ran out of ammn. [ammunition], instead of calling it a day they threw stones at the adv. Germans, who as soon as they realised the jawans had no ammns., stood about 30x off and threw grenades at them. They killed poor [missing] and thirty of his men. But these were Rajputs. My M. Guns [machine guns] came into action and sprayed the adv. Germans with death. The Rajput Coy seeing this charged with the sword and after 20 mins. the hill was ours again. We took 20 German prisoners and buried 300 of them. One of their senior NCOs (with Iron Cross) was babbling with fright when I brought him in.33

  These qualities would stand the Indian units in good stead as the Allies moved on from North Africa to Italy.

  The Middle East military censor noted that the morale of the division could not be higher: ‘Tails up is hardly a fitting description.’ A soldier of the Rajputana Rifles wrote to his brother: ‘You must have heard on radio that the Indian troops are doing very well. They have earned a very good name in breaking the Mareth Line and round about; they have kept up the old tradition. We are now very happy though we have to undergo great physical strain.’ Another wrote of life at the front:

  my palatial abode now is slit trench surrounded by barren hills. It is a very exciting and adventurous life that we are having. Artillery duel is the most impressive, a rolling rumbling noise and the ground shaking and the whole horizon lit up with smoke and light from the flash of guns. Enemy guns firing and our guns replying with double rigour. All this is very intoxicating and imagine me still sleeping and carrying on as usual … I think the recruitment slogan ‘join the army and see the world’ is quite right.34

  In striking contrast to the situation some months back, Indian casualties were raring to get back to their units. As an Indian doctor noted, ‘After applying “Morphia”, I asked some of them “How are you now”. In reply they said, “Thik hai sahib, mujhe firing line par bhejdijie” [“I am fine Sir, please send me back to the front”].’35

  Success also infused a competitive spirit among the units. As stories of the khukri-waving Gurkhas got abroad, the commanding officer of a Punjab battalion wrote:

  We are all rather browned off with this terrific ‘Gurka’ advertisement which is going on; they forget our lads and regiments like Raj Rif have been out here for 3 years and taken part in the Eritrea show as well. There is no glamour about the old Punjabi but he is the back bone of the Indian Army and has been unobtrusively magnificent in all the momentous desert fighting, taking success and defeat with equal calmness. I cannot express my admiration for the Punjabis, Sikhs and Dogras – they are all splendid.36

  The campaign in North Africa came to an end with the fall of Tunis and Bizerte. The tide was finally turning in favour of the Allies. An Indian captain was among the 26,000 troops that took part in a victory parade in Tunis:

  It was a very impressive show. There were 500 planes flying very low over us as we marched the streets of Tunis – and the people of Tunis lining both sides of the road were cheering madly when the Indian troops marches past them … men and women alike were yelling at the top of their voices – ‘Bravo! Bravo! Indian Soldiers’ – we were marching to a bagpipe played by an Indian soldier – a Punjabi.

  The impact of the victory in North Africa on the home front was considerable. Coming in the wake of the series of reverses against the Japanese, the 4th Division’s performance was praised in extravagant terms. The brother-in-law of a Tamil soldier was hailed by a poor lady and given a large quantity of sweets.

  I was amazed at her strange behaviour and exuberant joy and asked her for an explanation. And she told me that her son happens to be one of the heroes that have killed lakhs of Germans and conquered a Kingdom for the emperor and that she had come to know that I too had a brother-in-law fighting with that famous Army, and therefore she wanted me to share her joy and celebrate the occasion with her.37

  After over two continuous years in operations, the Indian units now had ample opportunities for rest and recreation. ‘With the end of the battle there is no excitement here’, wrote a young Indian officer:

  At the moment we are completely relaxing on the beaches of the Mediterranean, under a big palm-grove. All sorts of Tamashas [shows], Indian films and other recreations are being conducted for the troops. Nearly the whole day is spent on the beach, in playing and bathing and in the evening either cinema or some other show is on. The troops enjoy it.38

  Yet they also knew that a lot more fighting lay ahead of them. As another officer put it,

  what does the African Campaign matter, whilst there is still the whole of Europe and the East after that? … We are fed up with rest out here and wish to return back among bombs and shells. We are quite used to them now and life seems incomplete without them. You will be surprised to read it, but all officers and O.R.s have the same impulse in them.39

  As the Alli
ed conquest of North Africa proceeded apace, plans for an invasion of Sicily were being drawn up. The Indian army played a very minor role in the landings on Sicily and the mainland. A few Indian battalions were deployed on beachhead duties, and a battalion of the Jodhpur Sardar Light Infantry worked with the Americans at Salerno. Not until the end of September 1943 did the first Indian formation go into action in Italy.

  Indian soldiers were overwhelmed by the jaw-dropping beauty of the country. Sicily, wrote a soldier of a Z-Craft company, ‘is the Kashmir of Europe. Wherever you go you will find groves of date palms and innumerable vineyards … We get for one shilling one bottle of wine and for 1 penny 2 lbs. of almonds. Where will you get things so cheap?’ The people were ‘very sympathetic and kind-hearted’ to the Indians. ‘They call us often “DESERT FOXES” and say that we are the fittest soldiers to break the stony head of Hitler.’ Equally important, ‘The people here display no colour prejudice. The coloured are better loved than the white.’

  Indian soldiers also struck up relationships with the Sicilians. A captain in an engineer unit saw an Italian farmer struggling to thresh a massive heap of harvested wheat. ‘My men took pity on him and led by their curiosity joined him in the work. They were busy throughout the day and expect to finish it soon. He seems to be very grateful to me. Our relations with local inhabitants are cordial and they are very social.’ Sex was evidently part of the Sicilian experience. ‘I am passing some of the happiest hours of my life in a beautiful European island’, wrote an infantryman. ‘We are free from every sort of restriction and shall never forget this liberty throughout our lives.’40

  For all its bewitching beauty, Italy proved an extraordinarily difficult country to invade – especially from the south. Initially the going seemed rather good. As an Indian officer noted,

  The occupation of Sicily in such a short time and with such low casualties was not even dreamt of by its planners … What followed soon after came as a surprise to all i.e. fall of Mussolini, crumbling of Fascism like a house of cards over-night, and the unconditional surrender of Italy.

  Another officer conceded that ‘it’s a bit tough going in the hills and valleys all covered with thick greenery’. Yet it was ‘definitely better than the western desert, I don’t mind fighting – and now the Ities are also helping us to fight the Jerries out from their own homes’. Rome, he believed, was not very far: ‘now don’t you envy me – spending my X’mas in Rome?’41

  But the Germans proved tenacious defenders, contesting every mile of the country in a protracted and bitter campaign. In September, the 8th Indian Division landed at Taranto, fighting its way up successive lines of German river defences: Trigno, Sangro and Moro. In early February 1944, the 4th Indian Division was placed under the US Fifth Army to capture the town of Cassino and the surrounding hills. The Allied troops launched three bloody and costly attacks in the next six weeks. In the third offensive, the 4th Indian Division came close to capturing Castle Hill, thanks to the magnificent effort of the 1/9th Gurkhas in reaching Hangman’s Hill. But a determined German counter-attack restored the stalemate. By the time the final battle took place in May, the 4th Indian Division had been sent back to the Adriatic sector. But the 8th Indian Division arrived in time for the attack on 11 May on the German defences south of Cassino. After a few days of bitter fighting the 8th Indian and the 4th British Divisions knocked a hole in the Germans’ Gustav Line. The road to Rome was now open.

  After the fall of Rome on 4 June 1944, the 8th Indian Division continued to pursue the Germans until it was relieved at Perugia by the 10th Indian Division. The latter, in turn, had been replaced in the Adriatic sector by the 4th Indian Division. This division began advancing towards Florence on 30 June. By mid-August all three Indian divisions had reached Florence, whence they joined the attack on the German defences along the Gothic Line. The next month, the 4th Indian Division was redeployed to intervene in the civil war in Greece. But the 8th and 10th Divisions stayed on in Italy for the final offensives across the Senio River in April 1945. The 10th Indian Division and the 43rd Gurkha Lorried Brigade pushed the Germans across the Idice River – the last crossing before the Po River. And soon the war in Italy was at an end.

  Although three Indian divisions – totalling over 50,000 troops – took part in the Italian campaign, their overall operational contribution is difficult to judge. For one thing, they never amounted to more than a sixth of the Allied forces in Italy. For another, the Indian divisions did not operate under a single corps, let alone one commanded by an officer of the Indian army. Indeed, the absence of an Indian corps and a British-Indian corps commander rankled deeply with senior Indian army officers, many of whom saw it as another marker of the differential treatment meted out to their forces. More irksome was the fact that Indian units were constantly shuttled from one formation and front to another.

  Nevertheless, it is clear that the Indian divisions deployed in Italy attained high levels of training and operational flexibility. For a start, Indian army officers played a central role in the setting up of a Mountain Warfare Training Centre in Lebanon in early 1943. Their pre-war experience of fighting on India’s north-west frontier came in handy in training troops for conventional mountain warfare in Italy. In October 1943, the centre offered mountain warfare training teams – comprising mostly of Indians – to General Alexander. Senior British officers observed that ‘they accomplished very useful results in subjects in which both officers and men had had little or no previous training’. Individual formations also placed considerable emphasis on training. The 4th Division under General Tuker was quick off the blocks, producing a ‘Mountain Warfare Training Instruction’ booklet in early 1943. The document stressed the importance in mountains of physical fitness and tactical awareness, junior leadership and specialist training, mobility and surprise, concentration of forces and all-arms co-operation. Not surprisingly, the division was converted into a mountain division later that year.42

  The 8th Indian Division under Major General Dudley Russell had been part of the Paiforce in the Middle East. In the run up to their deployment in Italy, the division prepared seriously. As one officer commented: ‘We have been extremely busy all summer … training circulars, almost daily demonstrations, lectures, little memos, about this and that.’43 The division also attended courses at the Combined Training Centre in Kabrit and the Mountain Warfare Training Centre in Lebanon. The 10th Division underwent a similar programme of training and preparation prior to deployment in Italy. In fact, the 8th and 10th Divisions conducted a joint exercise in Palestine in the summer of 1943.

  Once the campaign was underway, a series of military training pamphlets, Army in India Training Manuals (AITMs) began to be issued. Units and formations wrote up their own notes on lessons learnt for wider circulation. Learning from Italy also fed back into the units and formations in India, especially those deployed on the Burma front. The experience of opposed river crossings and operating in a geographically diverse country was deemed particularly useful. Thus, AITM no. 27, issued to units in Burma in early 1945, had a section titled ‘Notes by a Corps Commander in Italy’, followed by another section ‘What the Brigadier Said’.44 By the time, the Italian campaign ended, the Indian army’s transmission-belt of tactical learning was working perfectly. The real challenge, however, lay in its operational performance in the east.

  16

  Preparation

  The dismal failure of the first Arakan offensive drove home the need for far-reaching changes to enhance the Indian army’s fighting power. In the wake of the mauling, the Indian government and the India Command initiated a series of reforms. The army’s organization and doctrine, tactics and training were revised in the light of the experience of fighting the Japanese. Attempts were also made to rejuvenate the health and morale of the soldiers. A massive logistical effort was undertaken to support and sustain the forces on the eastern frontiers and beyond. These seemingly mundane administrative changes may lack the glamour of grand strate
gy, but they are central to understanding how a debilitated India eventually delivered a knockout blow to the apparently invincible Japanese forces.

  Wavell was well aware that the Arakan campaign had sent severe shock waves through the army. Months of effort and fighting in only a small part of Burma had led to nothing but humiliation. Worse still, it had fostered a false notion about Japanese fighting skill and nurtured a myth about their invincibility. In consequence, Wavell believed, the army sought to shield itself from the enemy and shrank from taking the fight to him. Restoring their offensive spirit necessitated the demolition of the myth of Japanese invincibility. Japanese successes, Wavell held, stemmed primarily from their superior organization and training for operating in the terrain of Malaya and Burma. The Indian army units, by contrast, were hastily formed, partially equipped and trained to fight in the deserts of the Middle East. The army in India, therefore, had to be reorganized, re-equipped and retrained before any further operations against the Japanese could be risked.1

  The need for organizational changes to the Indian army was recognized even before the Arakan campaign flopped. In the summer of 1942, Wavell convened a conference in Delhi of commanders of formations and units as well as staff officers of all ranks. The conference examined the lessons learnt from the recent defeats and sought to apply them to the organization and equipment of the Indian army. A central problem, the conference quickly realized, was that the standard Indian division was too mechanized and too dependent on roads for its movement. The Japanese had exploited this to the hilt by brilliant use of roadblocks. When compelled to fight off the main roads and in the jungle country, the absence of animal transport had left Indian divisions at a distinct disadvantage.2