Raffles

by Victoria Glendinning

  Governor Macalister had been slack. Raffles had been opportunistic. The episode was his first black mark.

  Then there was another setback. Council, on account of Raffles’ increased workload, had authorised an increase in his salary in 1807, subject to agreement from the Court of Directors at India House. Not a word was heard about this from London until early 1810, when a despatch arrived vehemently disallowing the rise. Mr Raffles was to refund the overpayments – in English money, £1,625.

  Raffles appealed, citing the extra offices devolving upon him, his resulting illnesses, and ‘the increased demands upon my earnings’ in consequence of his having to support his bereaved sister and her three infant children. The appeal was supported by Governor Macalister – and by Henry Pearson, presumably in self-justification as he had been Acting Governor when the rise was approved in Penang. But the Court of Directors was adamant. Their decision had less to do with Raffles personally than with the financial retrenchments considered essential in failing Penang. The debt hung over Raffles until he was back in London on leave in 1817 and managed to get it written off.

  Governor Macalister now fell ill, and in March 1810 C.A.Bruce, a brother of Lord Elgin, arrived from Calcutta and took over as Acting Governor in Penang. In mid-August, Macalister departed ‘for the recovery of his health’ on a short sea voyage in the Company’s ship Ocean – and never came back. The Ocean went missing. (She went down in a storm.)

  Raffles was not in Penang at the time. On 7 June 1810 he precipitately took two months leave – which extended to four. He sailed for Calcutta in a dangerously light vessel which was all that was available. He had been offered an opportunity, and a way out of Penang, and could not wait to follow it up. He was going to meet the Governor-General, Lord Minto.

  The opportunity was not a dazzling one. In April 1810 the British took the Moluccas – the Spice Islands – from the Dutch almost by default, there being no resistance to a raiding party. Lord Minto was chary of taking on their governance without confirmation from the East India Company, and Rear-Admiral Drury, the Raffleses’ family friend, suggested that Raffles should be put in charge there provisionally, based on Amboyna (Ambon), the chief of the Spice Islands, while they awaited a decision from London.

  Raffles was keen to demonstrate his availability but, unfortunately, by the time he arrived in Calcutta the Amboyna post had already been disposed of. However, Minto and Raffles were to be engaged in discussions about something far more momentous – the invasion of Java.

  Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India 1898–1905, wrote that ‘Lord Minto was one of the class of Governors-General who leave no particular mark on history and cease to be remembered either for good or ill.’ Raffles would have been aghast at that judgment. Minto was the most benevolently influential figure in his whole life. Mr Ramsay at India House had believed in him and given him a leg up. Lord Minto believed in him, and raised him higher.

  Minto became Governor-General by default, the Court of Directors having vetoed the Board of Control’s first choice. Land rich and cash poor (relatively), he wanted the money. His wife Anna Maria stayed at home in Scotland. He had inherited a baronetcy; he had practised as a barrister, excelled as a diplomat, been MP for Roxburghshire and Viceroy of Corsica, and Pitt gave him a peerage as Baron Minto of Minto. He was a shareholder in the Company and briefly, in 1806, President of the Board of Control. An unassertive person, he was told by his friend Edmund Burke, ‘You must be less modest… You must be all that you can be, and you can be everything.’

  But Minto was an unassuming man, impossible to dislike, though Calcutta society felt that he kept too much to himself, surrounded by members of his family. His eldest son stayed at home with Lady Minto and their daughters. His second son, Captain George Elliot, was commander of the ship Modeste in which he sailed to India in 1807; his third son John Elliot, a junior civil servant in Madras, joined his father at Fort William as his private secretary, and his youngest, William, was a thirteen-year-old midshipman on the Modeste. William Hickey, Clerk to the Chief Justice in Calcutta, found John Elliot ‘one of the most pert, assuming, and forward coxcombs I ever saw,’ but then Hickey was horrible about most people. George and John both got married in India soon after their father’s arrival, and the two young couples lived with him in Government House.

  George Elliot was subsequently malicious about Raffles, who ‘though a clever man, was neither born nor bred a gentleman, and we all know that the nicer feelings and habits of a gentleman are not to be acquired – he was full of trick, and not so full of truth as was desirable, and he was the most nervous man I ever knew.’ Raffles, wrote George Elliot, looked upon him as a friend, but ‘I never could have any real feeling of friendship for the man.’

  Of course Raffles was not a ‘gentleman’ in George Elliot’s sense. He had no known family and no property, and was self-educated. George, a few years younger than Raffles, was irritated by his father’s partiality for his new protégé and, with the perceptiveness born of hostility, discerned Raffles’ eagerness, his insecurity, and his aspirations.

  Minto’s first three years as Governor-General had been difficult. A combined French and Russian attack on British India, supported by Persia, seemed a strong possibility. He sent a mission to the Rajah of Lahore to persuade him into an alliance and to sign a treaty extending the Company’s frontiers. Britain’s defences on the northwest frontier were crucial. He sent a mission to Kabul, over wild land never before trodden by Europeans. When news came through of the first British successes in Spain and Portugal, the Napoleonic threat from the north receded and Minto cancelled further operations ‘to save Johnny Company’s cash’ as he put it. There was a mutiny of army officers in Madras, which necessitated a long visit there to resolve the conflict between the insensitive Governor, Sir George Barlow, and an army which was, Minto said, ‘not like any other army or set of people that ever was.’

  Raffles already had his eye on Java. From 1806 the Royal Navy had been maintaining a blockade of Javan ports, paralysing not only French-Dutch shipping and trade, as intended, but that of Malay coastal vessels as well. This last impacted negatively on Penang’s trade, which led Raffles to focus on the strategic importance of Java. He learned that British attacks were planned on the French-held islands Réunion and Mauritius – as indeed took place, successfully, in 1810 and early 1811 – and prepared for Minto a memorandum with all the information on Java that he had, with a view to urging on the Supreme Government the conquest of Java as a crucial step towards furthering Britain’s maritime supremacy in the Archipelago.

  This wasn’t his own idea, nor a new idea, but an old one that had been scotched, twice, by Lord Castlereagh as Secretary of State for War and the Colonies before Minto’s time. Before Minto left London for Calcutta, Java had been mentioned again, along with Réunion and Mauritius, as desirable acquisitions from the French who, after they conquered Holland, took possession of Batavia (Jakarta), the Dutch headquarters in the region.

  Minto saw the logic of such a move, and had already written to London in March 1810, informing the Government of his proposal to attack Java. It was far too soon for any response to have arrived. What did arrive, in June, was belated permission to take Réunion and Mauritius. Minto received very little feedback from London, partly due to factional intrigues among the Directors at India House, partly because the administration which had appointed him fell from office. Replies to his despatches came even later than was customary – two whole years later, in the case of Company approval of his sanctions against the mutinous officers of Madras.

  Minto had no scruples about not waiting for instructions when he was set upon a course of action that he believed to be the correct one. This was the first thing that Raffles learned from him, and it suited Raffles’ temperament. In the future, he would disregard, as well as anticipate, instructions received from London. Another of Minto’s tenets was the supremacy of civil over military authority: ‘A military commander should come out [to India] pen
etrated with, and well instructed in, the indispensible subordination of the military power to the superintending superiority of the civil Government.’ Raffles was to take these two doctrines of Minto’s to perilous extremes.

  The reduction of Java became urgent as the French prioritised the island, and Batavia as a strategic port. In 1808 Napoleon appointed Herman Willem Daendels as Governor of Java. A Dutchman who fought with and for the French, Daendels’ brief was to check the worst of the self-enriching abuses that had grown up under the long Dutch occupation, reduce the power of the Regents – the Javanese rulers – and improve the defences of the island.

  In the memo Raffles brought to Calcutta for Minto, he stressed the comparative ease with which the island of Java might be taken. The slack, tyrannous and ‘degenerate’ Dutch had lost control. The native powers had all but shaken off their authority, and could be brought onside. Java was ‘the rice granary of the East’, and its coffee, pepper, cotton, tobacco and indigo could be sold so well as to undercut every other settlement. He used the word ‘annexation’, implying occupation of the whole island, whereas Minto was only envisaging the reduction of Batavia. When instructions finally did come from London, Minto was authorised only to ‘destroy the fortifications, to distribute the ordnance, arms and military stores amongst the native chiefs and inhabitants, and then to retire from the country.’

  Minto received Raffles and his memo warmly, as later Raffles described to his cousin, the Rev. Thomas Raffles: ‘On the mention of Java his Lordship cast a look of such scrutiny, anticipation and kindness upon me, as I shall never forget. “Yes,” said he, “Java is an interesting island. I shall be happy to receive any information you can give me concerning it.”’ From that moment on, Raffles wrote, ‘all my views, all my plans, and all my mind were devoted to create such an interest regarding Java as should lead to its annexation to our Eastern Empire; although I confess that I had never the vanity to expect that, when this object was accomplished, so important an administration would have been intrusted to my individual charge.’

  It was all in line with his and Leyden’s dream of an ‘Eastern Empire’. Raffles paid lip-service to the Company’s maxim of ‘trade not territory’, but his visions were other. He was staying with Leyden while he was in Calcutta, and in August 1810 Leyden wrote:

  Dear Sister Olivia

  He is looking quite famously and the ladies one and all have done nothing but take him for a batchelor since his star first rose in our quarter of the world. In short he is at least a foot higher than he used to be in consequence of being puffed by their flattery… However I have the pleasure of informing you that he has received the most cordial attentions from Ld Minto and that in my opinion everything will tend to the best possible issue…and don’t you be in the least alarmed about his health, as I will not suffer or permit him to be unwell here, but the truth is that if it were not for a few recollections of your Ladyship he would be a famously gay fellow and beat us all in spirits.

  The invasion of Java would take long and detailed planning, carried out in total secrecy lest the French caught wind of it. Raffles offered his services to Lord Minto ‘for carrying into effect any arrangements which your Lordship may have in contemplation as regards the Malay countries.’ He was offering to prepare the ground, to investigate the practicalities and logistics, to gather intelligence, and to communicate privately with the native rulers in Java, and the other significant rulers in the Archipelago, seeking their co-operation and support, perhaps arming them, and enjoining secrecy. He snowed Minto with memos.

  Minto virtually went into partnership with Raffles over the great project, officially appointing him ‘Agent to the Governor-General with the Malay States’. Raffles’ instructions were drawn up, drafted by himself. He chose Malacca as the headquarters for his communications and investigations, and as the mustering point for the invasion, not only for geographical reasons – it was closer to their objective – but because it would be harder to pursue his secret mission under the jealous watchfulness of Penang.

  Before he left Calcutta, he read his paper on the Malayan Nation to the Asiatic Society. He carried back with him to Penang a strictly confidential letter from the Governor-General to Governor Bruce, informing him of the plans and requiring him to allow Mr Raffles to indent for any supplies he needed. He also carried back a letter for Olivia from Leyden, assuring her that Raffles’ success was ‘in every respect compleat. If he succeeds in his present objects he will have a much finer game to play than he has hitherto had and one to which Amboyna is not in the least to be compared. I have to conjure you now to take care to throw no obstacles in R’s way, as I see every moment of the next six or ten months must be precious to him.’ Leyden had settled with Raffles ‘that the instant he is Governor of Java I am to be his Secretary.’

  Raffles got back to Penang on 22 October 1810, in time for his sister Leonora’s wedding. Aged twenty-five, she had found a husband within a few months of arriving. On 24 November, at Mount Olivia, she was married to John Billington Loftie, a widowed surgeon on the Madras establishment, now Acting Surgeon in Penang.

  Raffles did not want to return to Penang after the invasion of Java. He put Runnymede up for auction – ‘that valuable and very eligible Estate on the North Beach, with a most excellent brick-built dwelling house and offices erected thereon,’ as the Gazette announced. The day after Leonora’s wedding, he wrote to Leyden that he would be leaving for Malacca in a couple of days. He had found out that the Navy’s blockade of the Javanese ports had officially been lifted, but the ruling had never been implemented. At his request, Governor Bruce gave the order. This would please the all-important Javanese rulers and Malays and so put himself, Raffles, in the ‘very best light possible in the Eastward.’

  ‘Mr Bruce has personally behaved most kind, I cannot calculate tho’ Mr Bruce as a political character,’ he told Leyden, since his main preoccupation was the re-allocation of Raffles’ various offices and his salary. ‘Here they think of nothing but themselves… I shall write you fully from Malacca – here I am full of confusion.’ He was taking with him to Malacca ‘Mrs R and two sisters – one of them I have got rid of as you may see in the papers – you’ll judge I have not been idle – Olivia is too full of trouble and confusion to write to you from hence – you will hear from her often enough from Malacca… I leave Penang with very little regret.’

  Olivia and the sisters might well be in confusion. They were to up sticks and leave comfortable Runnymede for they knew not what. Although, as Raffles cheerfully told Leyden, Leonora was ‘got rid of’, she and her husband also joined the party sailing down to Malacca.

  The East India Company was chary of acquiring territory in the East Indies because it meant expense, and could incur armed conflict. Yet it was impossible to establish a trading settlement, if it was to be more than an entrepôt and port of call, without an establishment and territory which, in theory, should support itself by its trade and by the collecting of taxes.

  The early Empire, like all protection rackets, worked to the benefit of both sides, with the balance of power on the side of the ‘protector’. When it was a case of acquiring territory from a local ruler, the Company agreed by formal treaty to pay the Sultan, Rajah or Chief an annual sum for the occupation and use of some or all of his land and its products, and to provide him with protection, armaments and advisors. The Company exacted loyalty and cooperation, the right to impose laws, rules and regulations in the leased territory, and to raise taxes on everything taxable. The whole point, for the East India Company, was to transfer wealth from the East to Britain.

  This did not always happen. What is more, it frequently suited a Sultan, Rajah or Chief to receive money and weapons to reinforce his security and prestige. His concerns were overwhelmingly local and personal, centring on historical chains of events in his own polity, and on relations between himself and the opposition – often members of his own family – and between his own and neighbouring states. The aliens mos
tly clung to the coasts, swapping islands and ports between themselves by conquest or treaty with every shift in their own wars.

  The poor people of the Archipelago were like poor people everywhere. Their rulers, like rulers everywhere, varied between the wise and the moronic, in either case desirous of holding on to power. The principal rulers were subtle and shrewd. Their culture was complex, their thinking at the same time magical and pragmatic, their etiquette sophisticated. They often hedged their bets by keeping in secretly with both the Dutch (or French) and the British. Many European incomers were in comparison blunt instruments. Raffles did not come into that category. In the case of Java, it was crucial to negotiate with local rulers, but only as a preliminary to the main event, which was to be armed conquest.

  Chapter 4

  ‘All roads are long that lead to one’s heart’s desire’

  Malacca 1810–1811

  The Raffles family arrived in Malacca on 4 December 1810. They moved into a house at Bandar Hill, outside the only Portuguese gate that had escaped demolition. On 18 December, Raffles wrote an unusually agitated letter to John Leyden in Calcutta, asking him to expedite the sending of military stores, because ‘from Penang I can get nothing, their narrow minded jealousy and envy has so disgusted [me] … between ourselves Mr B[ruce] did not act to me as he ought – and I lay the whole to the account of Phillips who has I believe a most rancorous hatred for your humble servant on many accounts.’

  He also asked for a dozen pairs of ‘good spectacles’ for his scribes, and said that Olivia was ‘in very bad health and has not left her room these 5 days past.’ He was working ten hours a day and had no time to give to his paper on the maritime law of the Malays, which Leyden was keen for him to complete, or to answer linguistic queries from William Marsden, who was about to publish a third edition of his History of Sumatra. In it Raffles would read a graceful acknowledgment to himself as ‘a gentleman whose intelligence and zeal in the pursuit of knowledge give the strongest hope of his becoming an ornament to oriental literature.’