Russia Against Napoleon
Page 80
61 Brett-James, Wilson’s Journal, 30 August 1813, p. 169.
62 All the general histories of the campaign go into detail about the crucial events of 26–30 August on the allied right. Apart from Friederich and Bogdanovich, there is a full description in Geschichte der Kämpfe Österreichs: Befreiungskrieg 1813 und 1814, vol. 4: Maximilian Ehnl, Schlacht bei Kulm, Vienna, 1913. Apart from Eugen’s own memoirs, it is also important to read the memoirs of his chief of staff, General von Helldorff: Zur Geschichte der Schlacht bei Kulm, Berlin, 1856. All subsequent histories draw heavily on the three volumes written between 1844 and 1852 by Colonel Aster of the Saxon army about the autumn 1813 campaign. Nevertheless one must go back to Aster himself because his works contain significant details omitted from the later histories: on the events on the right wing, see H. Aster, Die Kriegsereignisse zwischen Peterswalde, Pirna, Königstein und Priesten im August 1813 und die Schlacht bei Kulm, Dresden, 1845. For obvious reasons it is far harder to find detailed French coverage of these events: Rousset, Grande Armée, for example, says little on the debacle though he does cite important correspondence of Vandamme. Saint-Cyr also publishes useful documents but like all the other French participants is anxious to exonerate himself from blame. Fezensac puts most of the blame on Vandamme though he is also critical of Saint-Cyr and Napoleon. His is the best-informed account from the French side: Souvenirs militaires, Paris, 1863, pp. 403–29.
63 The clearest and most detailed description of the intended march-routes is in Horstenau, Dresden, pp. 293–6.
64 There is a useful discussion of this decision in T. von Bernhardi, Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Leben des kaiserlichen russischen Generals der Infanterie Carl Friedrich Grafen von Toll, 5 vols., Leipzig, 1858, vol. 3, book 6, pp. 175–83.
65 Saint-Cyr, Mémoires, vol. 4, no. 30, Saint-Cyr to Berthier, 29 Aug. 1813, pp. 386–7; Brett-James, Wilson’s Journal, 30 Aug. 1813, p. 172; the best description of the road is in P. Pototskii, Istoriia gvardeiskoi artillerii, SPB, 1896, pp. 261–3.
66 P. Nazarov, ‘Zapiski soldata Pamfila Nazarova’, RS, 9/8, 1878, p. 535.
67 The key order to Vandamme, issued at 4 p.m. on 28 August by Berthier in Napoleon’s name, is reprinted as no. 5, p. 204, in the appendices of Ehnl, Kulm.
68 The memoirs of Eugen and of Colonel von Helldorff who served on his staff might be seen as biased against Ostermann-Tolstoy, though Aleksei Ermolov also remarked that at the battle of Kulm Ostermann-Tolstoy was more trouble than the French. Helldorff writes that the whole army knew that Ostermann-Tolstoy had mental problems in 1813 after returning from sick leave: Helldorff, Kulm, p. 17. Many other memoirs confirm that Ostermann-Tolstoy was in no fit state to command troops in August 1813. In his defence, see I. I. Lazhechnikov, ‘Neskol’ko zametok i vospominanii po povodu stat’i “materialy dlia biografii A. P. Ermolova”’, Russkii vestnik, 31/6, 1864, pp. 783–819.
69 Eugen, Memoiren, vol. 3, pp. 131–3; L. von Wolzogen, Mémoires d’un Général d’Infanterie au service de la Prusse et de la Russie (1792–1836), Paris, 2002, p. 169; Pototskii, Istoriia, p. 250. Helldorff says that Ermolov initially supported Ostermann but then backed down for fear of annoying Eugen and therefore bringing Alexander’s wrath down on his own head: Kulm, pp. 29–30.
70 The best description of the highway and the terrain is in Istoriia leibgvardii egerskago polka za sto let 1796–1896, SPB, 1896, pp. 125–30.
71 Apart, as always, from Bogdanovich, some of the regimental histories offer excellent descriptions of the events of 28 August. The history of the Guards Jaegers, cited in the previous note, is probably the best, but see also e.g. S. A. Gulevich, Istoriia 8-go pekhotnago Estliandskago polka, SPB, 1911, pp. 178–81.
72 Helldorff’s description of these events, of which he was an eyewitness, is on pp. 35–8 of Kulm.
73 Eugen, Memoiren, vol. 3, p. 149.
74 All the general histories describe the terrain well, but Bogdanovich, Friederich and Ehnl presumably take it for granted that a reader will know that Bohemian villages were built of wood and say nothing about buildings. It is because he provides small but crucial details of this sort that Aster is so important: on houses, for example, see Aster: Kriegsereignisse…Kulm, pp. 14–15.
75 Helldorff, Kulm, p. 45.
76 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug, p. 88; Brett-James, Wilson’s Journal, p. 173; Londonderrry, Narrative, p. 124. Istoriia leibgvardii egerskago polka, p. 135.
77 For Kovalsky’s account, see ‘Iz zapisok pokoinago general-maiora N. P. Koval’skago’, Russkii vestnik, 91/1, 1871, pp. 78–117, especially p. 102; ‘Zapiski N. N. Murav’eva-Karskago’, RA, 24/1, 1886, pp. 5–55, especially pp. 22–6; P. Bobrovskii, Istoriia leibgvardii ulanskago E.I.V. gosudarynyi Imperatritsy Aleksandry Fedorovny polka, SPB, 1903, p. 231.
78 On French losses, see Muravev’s conversation with Vandamme’s chief of staff: ‘Zapiski’, p. 25; Brett-James, Wilson’s Journal, p. 173; Bobrovskii, Istoriia leibgvardii ulanskago…polka, p. 230.
79 L. G. Beskrovnyi (ed.), Dnevnik Aleksandra Chicherina, 1812–1813, Moscow, 1966, pp. 252 ff.; ‘Zapiski N. N. Murav’eva’, 24/1, 1885, p. 26.
80 This point is well documented by Friederich, Herbstfeldzug, pp. 90–92, and Ehnl, Kulm, pp. 112–18, so there is no reason why the fable still exists.
81 Bernhardi, Denkwürdigkeiten, p. 454.
82 Ehnl, Kulm, p. 132, writes that 41,000 allied infantry and 10,000 cavalry faced 39,000 French infantry and 3,000 cavalry. Given Vandamme’s casualties on 28 and 29 August, the figure for his infantry seems too high.
83 P. A. Kolzakov, ‘Vziatie v plen marshala Vandama 1813 g.’, RS, 1, 1870, pp. 137–44. Bogdanovich, Istoriia…1813, vol. 2, p. 704; SIM, no. 254, Alexander to Rostopchin, 22 Dec. 1813, p. 164.
84 Tartakovskii, Voennye dnevniki: Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky’s journal for 1813, p. 360.
85 This does not count members of the Romanov family or foreigners.
86 Hoen, Feldzug von Leipzig, p. 274: neutral in the sense that Hoen was an Austrian.
87 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug, pp. 144–8; Leggiere, Napoleon and Berlin, ch. 7 and especially pp. 137–41.
88 RGVIA, Fond 846, Opis 16, Delo 3911, fos. 213–4, Thuyl to Volkonsky, 21 Aug./2 Sept. 1813.
89 VPR, no. 141, Alexander’s instructions to Pozzo, 31 July/10 Aug. 1813, p. 345; Botzenhart, Stein, vol. 4, Stein to Munster, 7 and 10 Aug. 1813, pp. 390–92; Londonderry, Narrative, p. 179.
90 V. von Löwenstern, Mémoires du Général-Major Russe Baron de Löwenstern, 2 vols., Paris, 1903, vol. 2, pp. 136–7, 184–5; S. G. Volkonskii, Zapiski Sergeia Grigorovicha Volkonskago (dekabrista), SPB, 1902, pp. 264–5, 306–7.
91 RGVIA, Fond 846, Opis 16, Delo 3911, Winzengerode to Alexander, 7/19 Aug. 1813, fos. 148–9; 22 Aug./3 Sept. 1813, fos. 289–91; RGVIA, Fond 103, Opis 4/210, Sv. 53, Delo 18, fo. 7: Kankrin to Lotthum, 1/19 July 1813.
92 RGVIA, Fond 103, Opis 4/120, Sv. 18, Delo 57, fos. 5–6: Barclay to Lanskoy, 28 July 1813 (OS): Sv. 53, Delo 18, fo. 25, Barclay to Kankrin, 8 Aug. 1813 (OS).
93 Löwenstern, Mémoires, vol. 2, pp. 100, 146–78; Volkonskii, Zapiski, pp. 258–9; V. M. Bezotosnyi, Donskoi generalitet i ataman Platov v 1812 godu, Moscow, 1899, pp. 109–18.
94 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug, pp. 139–73, provides an excellent analysis and description.
95 A recent full account in English of both the battle and some of the disputes that surrounded it is in Leggiere, Napoleon and Berlin, ch. 11. Leggiere is more hostile to Bernadotte than is Friederich, Herbstfeldzug, pp. 177–91.
96 V. Kharkevich (ed.), 1812 god v dnevnikakh, zapiskakh i vospominaniiakh sovremennikov, 4 vols., Vilna, 1900–1907, vol. 2, p. 28.
97 Major-General E. S. Kamenskii, Istoriia 2-go dragunskago S-Peterburgskago generalafel’dmarshala kniazia Menshikova polka 1707–1898, Moscow, 1900, pp. 225–37. Volkonskii, Zapiski, p. 266.
98 Bogdanovich, Istoriia…1813, vol. 2, pp. 275, 281.
Chapter 12: The Battle of Leipzig
1 The treaty is in F. Martens (ed
.), Sobranie traktatov i konventsii, zakliuchennykh Rossiei s inostrannymi derzhavami, vol. 3: Traktaty s Avsrtieiu, SPB, 1876, no. 71, pp. 126–38. Kankrin’s comments are in Upravlenie General-Intendanta Kankrina: General’nyi sokrashchennyi otchet po armiiam…za pokhody protiv Frantsuzov, 1812, 1813 i 1814 godov, Warsaw, 1815, pp. 72–6.
2 L. G. Beskrovnyi (ed.), Pokhod russkoi armii protiv Napoleona v 1813 g. i osvobozhdenie Germanii: Sbornik dokumentov, Moscow, 1964, no. 214, Jomini to Alexander, 21 Aug./
2 Sept. 1813, pp. 241–2.
3 The letter to Knesebeck is quoted by Rudolph von Friederich, Die Befreiungskriege 1813– 1815, vol. 2: Der Herbstfeldzug 1813, Berlin, 1912, pp. 214–15; the letter to Alexander is printed in Beskrovnyi (ed.), Pokhod, no. 232, Blücher to Alexander, 30 Aug./11 Sept. 1813, pp. 268–9.
4 Rühle’s words are quoted by Friederich in Herbstfeldzug, p. 215: VPR, no. 162, Nesselrode to Pozzo, 21 Sept./3 Oct. 1813, pp. 393–4.
5 RGVIA, Fond 846, Opis 16, Delo 3399, nos. 50 and 51, Volkonsky to Blücher, Volkonsky to Bennigsen, 1/13 Sept. 1813, fos. 21ii–22ii; Delo 3416, ‘Zhurnal voennykh deistvii Pol’skoi armii’, fos. 12i–14i.
6 M. I. Bogdanovich, Istoriia voiny 1813 g. za nezavisimost’ Germanii, 2 vols., SPB, 1863, vol. 2, pp. 336–41; RGVIA, Fond 846, Opis 16, Delo 3399, Volkonsky to Platov, 4 Sept. 1813 (OS), fos. 24ii–25i.
7 Chernyshev’s journal covers the raid in fos. 26–31 of RGVIA, Fond 846, Opis 16, Delo 3386. Bogdanovich, Istoriia…1813, vol. 2, pp. 342–55, provides a narrative, though my conclusions are very different from his.
8 A. Raevskii, Vospominaniia o pokhodakh 1813 i 1814 godov, Moscow, 1822, pp. 1–77.
9 RGVIA, Fond 846, Opis 16, Delo 3416, fos. 16i–17ii.
10 The best and most detailed narrative is in Geschichte der Kämpfe Österreichs: Kriege unter der Regierung des Kaisers Franz. Befreiungskrieg 1813 und 1814, vol. 5: M. von Hoen, Feldzug von Leipzig, Vienna, 1913; on Schwarzenberg’s fears see RGVIA, Fond 846, Opis 16, Delo 3399, Volkonsky to Oppermann, no. 97, 24 Sept. 1813 (OS), fos. 38i–39i; on victualling, see A. A. Eiler, ‘Zapiski A. A. Eilera’, RS, 1/11, 1880, p. 367 and Pokhod, no. 254, Barclay to Wittgenstein, 20 Sept./2 Oct. 1813, pp. 296–7.
11 RGVIA, Fond 846, Opis 16, Delo 3385, Bernadotte to Winzengerode, 2 Oct. 1813, fo. 57i; I. Radozhitskii, Pokhodnyia zapiski artillerista s 1812 po 1816 god, 3 vols., Moscow, 1835, vol. 2, p. 246.
12 It is true that some of the 35,000 were sick, but the basic point remains valid: on Bennigsen’s deployment of troops at Dresden, see Feldzug der kaiserlichen Russischen Armee von Polen in den Jahren 1813 und 1814, Hamburg, 1843, pp. 33–6.
13 Mémoires de Langeron, Général d’Infanterie dans l’Armée Russe: Campagnes de 1812, 1813, 1814, Paris, 1902, pp. 222, 298.
14 RGVIA, Fond 846, Opis 16, Delo 3403, fos. 27i–28ii, Sacken to Barclay, 1 Oct. 1813 (OS).
15 Langeron, Mémoires, pp. 299–300.
16 I visited the battlefield on two occasions, before major construction began on the motor-way which will provide a bypass for Leipzig and in the process ruin much of the southern battlefield.
17 Hon. George Cathcart, Commentaries on the War in Russia and Germany in 1812 and 1813, London, 1850, p. 298.
18 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug, p. 294.
19 Ibid., p. 295.
20 Bogdanovich cites Alexander’s words: Istoriia…1813, vol. 2, p. 439.
21 Hoen, Feldzug von Leipzig, pp. 402–10. The possibility of treason is raised by Digby Smith (1813 – Leipzig, Napoleon and the Battle of the Nations, London, 2001, p. 69) but no evidence is provided. My own explanation is partly drawn from Ludwig von Wolzogen, Mémoires d’un Général d’Infanterie au service de la Prusse et de la Russie (1792–1836), Paris, 2002, pp. 179–82.
22 The statistics come from Friederich, Herbstfeldzug, pp. 296–300.
23 Eugen, Memoiren, vol. 3, p. 230.
24 J.-N. Noel, With Napoleon’s Guns, London, 2005, pp. 180–81.
25 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug, p. 232; Mémoires du Général Griois, Paris, n.d., p. 202; Eugen, Memoiren, vol. 3, p. 232. Smith, Leipzig, p. 86, argues that Eugen should have moved his corps out of the line of fire or at least ordered them to lie down. But the prince could not just decamp and leave a hole in the allied line. Moreover, Russian troops (or Prussian and Austrian ones) were not trained to lie down in sight of enemy guns. Even Wellington’s infantry might have hesitated to do so on an open glacis with a mass of enemy cavalry nearby.
26 RGVIA, Fond 489, Opis 1, Delo 754, fos. 38 ff.
27 All this information comes from the personnel records (posluzhnye spiski) of the Murom Regiment in RGVIA, Fond 489, Opis 1, Ed. Khr. 517: each rank has its separate posluzhnoi spisok, beginning on fo. 2.
28 See for instance a report from Diebitsch to Barclay timed at 8 a.m. on 16 October in which the former urges that the Guards be moved forward immediately: unless this was done ‘the distance to Rotha is so great that they will never arrive in time’: Beskrovnyi (ed.), Pokhod, no. 283, Diebitsch to Barclay, 4/16 Oct. 1813, p. 329.
29 As one might expect, the Austrian official history gives most attention to this part of the battle but its account is largely confirmed by Bogdanovich: the Austrians and Russians were not very fond of each other even in 1813 and had become a good deal less so by the time they got round to writing their official histories of the campaign. On the whole, a good rule of thumb is to believe the Russian history when it praises the Austrians, and vice versa. If in doubt, Friederich is often a remarkably fair and neutral arbiter. Hoen, Feldzug von Leipzig, pp. 471–82; Bogdanovich, Istoriia…1813, vol. 2, pp. 461–4; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug, pp. 308–12.
30 Beskrovnyi (ed.), Pokhod, no. 300, Diebitsch’s account of the battle of Leipzig, 1813, pp. 360–81, at pp. 363–5.
31 Cathcart, Commentaries, pp. 306–7.
32 Ibid., pp. 307–8.
33 Ibid., p. 308; P. Pototskii, Istoriia gvardeiskoi artillerii, SPB, 1896, pp. 271–2; A. Mikaberidze, The Russian Officer Corps in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1795–1815, Staplehurst, 2005, p. 382.
34 Bogdanovich, Istoriia…1813, p. 460; Pototskii, Istoriia gvardeiskoi artillerii, pp. 270–73. Beskrovnyi (ed.), Pokhod, no. 299, Sukhozhanet to Iashvili, 29 Dec. 1813/10 Jan. 1814, pp. 358–60; no. 300, Diebitsch’s account of Leipzig, 1813, pp. 365–7.
35 ‘Vospominaniia Matveia Matveevicha Muromtseva’, RA, 27/3, 1890, pp. 366–94, at p. 378.
36 Dnevnik Pavla Pushchina, Leningrad, 1987, p. 128.
37 S. Gulevich, Istoriia leib gvardii Finliandskago polka 1806–1906, SPB, 1896, pp. 303–13; Istoriia leibgvardii egerskago polka za sto let 1796–1896, SPB, 1906, pp. 144–50; Griois, Mémoires, pp. 202–3.
38 Gulevich, Istoriia leib gvardii Finliandskago polka, pp. 312–15.
39 ‘Zapiski soldata Pamfila Nazarova’, RS, 9/8, 1878, pp. 536–7.
40 There is a good description of Vasilchikov’s attack in Smith, Leipzig, pp. 166–8.
41 Hoen, Feldzug von Leipzig, pp. 619–27.
42 D. V. Dushenkovich, ‘Iz moikh vospominanii ot 1812 goda’, in 1812 god v vospominaniiakh sovremennikov, Moscow, 1995, pp. 124–6.
43 Langeron, Mémoires, p. 330.
44 Ibid., pp. 326–34; Radozhitskii, Pokhodnyia zapiski, vol. 2, pp. 269–74.
45 Bogdanovich, Istoriia…1813, vol. 2, pp. 550–51.
46 On the 39th Jaegers, see RGVIA, Fond 489, Opis 1, Ed. Khr. 1802, passim, but also Sacken’s reports after the fall of Czenstochowa (RGVIA, Fond 846, Opis 16, Delo 3403, fos. 8ii–9i: Sacken to Kutuzov, 25 March 1813 (OS)) and the battle of Leipzig; Beskrovnyi (ed.), Pokhod, no. 293, pp. 349–51: Sacken to Barclay, 18/30 Oct. 1813.
47 See RGVIA, Fond 489, Opis 1, Delo 1855, fos. 2 ff., for the 45th Jaegers (‘Spisok…45go Egerskago polka’ dated 1 July 1813) and Delo 1794, fos. 2 ff., for the 29th Jaegers (‘29-go egerskago polka…o sluzhbe ikh i po prochim’, dated 1 Jan. 1814). Beskrovnyi (ed.), Pokhod, no. 300, Diebitsch’s account, pp. 379–82; Langeron, Mémoires, p. 343.
49 On allied losses, see e.g. Smith, Leipzig, p. 298; on French statistics, see J. Tulard (ed.), Dictionnaire Napoléon, Paris, 1987, p. 354; on lost guns, see Hoen, Feldzug von Leipzig, pp. 652–4.
Chapter 13: The Invasion of France
1 F. Martens (ed.), Sobranie traktatov i konventsii, zakliuchennykh Rossiei s inostrannymi derzhavami, vol. 3: Traktaty s Avstrieiu, SPB, 1876, no. 70, pp. 111–26, and vol. 7: Traktaty s Germeniei 1811–1824, SPB, 1885, no. 259, pp. 96–112, for Russia’s treaties with Austria and Prussia. The Austro-Prussian treaty was identical.
2 See e.g. a letter from Count Münster, the Hanoverian statesman, to the Prince Regent (the future George IV of Britain) about the arguments over military and diplomatic policy towards France in January: ‘The main factor in all these disagreements is that Russia has not stated how far it wishes to extend its borders in Poland.’ A. Fournier, Der Congress von Chatillon: Die Politik im Kriege von 1814, Vienna, 1900, sect. IV, no. 1, Münster to Prince Regent, 30 January 1814, pp. 295–6.
3 There is a large literature even in English about Metternich and his policies. The two great pillars of this literature are Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848, Oxford, 1994, and Henry Kissinger, A World Restored, London, 1957. Schroeder’s book in particular is a splendid piece of scholarship. Alan Sked punctures some of the more elevated interpretations of Metternich’s ‘system’ in Metternich and Austria, London, 2008. As regards this book’s focus, in other words Metternich’s role in Napoleon’s overthrow, I have some sympathy with his scepticism.
4 On Knesebeck’s views, see R. von Friederich, Die Befreiungskriege 1813–1815, vol. 3: Der Feldzug 1814, Berlin, 1913, pp. 81–2.