Winds of Destruction

by Peter John Hornby Petter-Bowyer

  Also revealed by the captured CT was the fact that Rex Nhongo had been at the base when the first airstrikes went in on Day One. He had crashed his Land Cruiser (around photo grid 050110) in his hurry to get away. He had then taken another vehicle and departed for Chimoio. The Selous Scouts found the crashed vehicle exactly where Peter Stanton said it would be and, following temporary repairs, it was brought back to Rhodesia at the conclusion of the operation.

  Hunter strikes were placed on each defended position before Scouts moved in to secure them. In a series of surprisingly smooth-flowing actions, the entire ridge was cleared. Ack-Ack Hill was all but neutralised by Hunters delivering Golf bombs before troops overran it. These actions made it possible to mount a second attempt on Monte Casino.

  When the assault took place, however, the troops were amazed to find the mountaintop deserted. Survivors had left behind many of their dead in trenches and crevasses. Wrecked guns lay strewn about the pulverised ground, which had been totally denuded of vegetation. The fact that the trees immediately outside of the anti-aircraft gun sites were still standing bore testimony to the accuracy of ground and airstrikes.

  Incredibly, the soldiers came upon Jamie and Amie off to one side of the devastated area. The two baboons immediately settled down when the Scouts took them into their care. Also taken into care were a few surviving anti-aircraft guns that had been moved but then abandoned.

  A small sector of the Monte Casino gun emplacements.

  Some of the guns captured in the camp areas.

  Following sharp actions that neutralised odd pockets of resistance, all the bases had been overrun by the end of Day Three. As they progressed through the bases burning and destroying all structures, the troops could see how well the defences and bunker systems had been prepared. Huge quantities of cooked food, found uneaten in the large kitchens, confirmed the estimated occupancy on Day One to be somewhere between 6,000 and 10,000 male and female CTs.

  The great majority of ZANLA had left the area in what appeared to be an ordered easterly withdrawal. Had this been anticipated, more troops would have been positioned east of the base. As it was, the gaps between the RLI ambush locations were too wide to prevent the outflow, though many CTs had fallen to the sharp-shooting soldiers.

  Thought was immediately given to mounting a new operation as it seemed certain there would be many vehicles moving along the main tar road running north from Vanduzi to collect fleeing ZANLA. The Selous Scouts’ mobile column could be expected to have a fine time if diverted to this new task, but it was too late to do this as Day Three drew to its close.

  During the night of Day Three, an early-warning callsign posted to the south reported FRELIMO tanks with deployed infantry advancing towards them along the narrow vehicle track leading to the base. The 25-pounder guns were given appropriate co-ordinates and commenced firing. Following two corrections, the guns straddled the tanks with a full salvo. This had the desired effect. The infantry scattered and the tanks, one trailing smoke, high-tailed back from whence they had come.

  Unfortunately no details were available to undertake a follow-up operation on fleeing CTs with any degree of certainty. In the meantime, our eavesdropping services reported considerable FRELIMO radio traffic that showed FRELIMO was moving in strength towards the ZANLA base. The risks involved in pursuing ZANLA outweighed the advantages to be gained because, by driving ZANLA from its main base and substantially disrupting its incursion plans, Op Miracle’s primary objectives had already been achieved. It was decided instead to recover forces in daylight on Day Four with small stay-behind parties remaining in hiding to watch for opportunity air targets.

  The stay-behind units remained on the high ground around the base to observe activities throughout the following week. During the morning of 3 October 1979, Day Five, they reported the presence of a large FRELIMO armoured column that had interrupted its northbound journey towards Cruzamento village to give Monte Casino a thorough going-over with accurately placed cannon fire.

  At Cruzamento village the armoured column based up and was joined by additional FRELIMO forces that came in from the east. There was a great deal of activity amongst the men and vehicles of the concentrated force, which appeared to be preparing to launch a night-time retaliatory attack against the nearby RSF permanent base at Ruda. In COMOPS we decided it was important to break up the force to drive FRELIMO back east. The Air Force was tasked to do this.

  First strikes went in at around 13:00 against concentrated men and vehicles. First over target were Canberras flying low and fast to deliver Alpha bombs against exposed personnel. Next came Hunters attacking with Golf bombs, Matra rockets and 30mm cannons. The strikes inflicted high casualties with the destruction of a number of vehicles, but this only had the effect of bringing about a limited dispersion of the force.

  A heavy haze lay over the entire area due to smoke still drifting from the ZANLA base and dense black smoke rising from burning vehicles. Although these conditions made observation of FRELIMO’s activities difficult, the Scouts OPs could see enough to establish that FRELIMO was regrouping in preparation for their planned action. The Air Force returned as soon as the jets had rearmed; but this time disaster struck in consequence of poor visibility caused by smoke and heavy haze.

  It started when Flight Lieutenant Kevin Peinke and his navigator, Flight Lieutenant ‘JJ’ Strydom, struck one section of FRELIMO forces that were straddled either side of a section of road. They were on top of the first men and vehicles before seeing them but managed to release half of the bomb load amongst others ahead. Kevin decided to reverse direction and, using the dust and smoke from his first strike, bomb that part of the target he had seen first. This was an unusual and fatal error of judgement. Other enemy elements concentrated close by had seen the Canberra turning back and were fully prepared with every gun when the bombs were released.

  The Canberra lost both engines, forcing Kevin to convert excess speed to height for a powerless glide towards the border. It can only be assumed that Kevin waited for ‘JJ’ to get from his bomb-aimer position in the aircraft nose back to his ejector seat, but time was too short. Both men died when the Canberra crashed short of the border.

  Brian Gordon.

  Hunter pilots flying that afternoon said they had experienced great difficulty in judging their height above ground due to the appalling haze. This is possibly why Air Lieutenant Brian Gordon was seen to fly into the ground when making a rocket attack against armoured vehicles. His recovery from the dive was either made a fraction too late or he may have been hit. The sad facts were that we had lost another fine airman and our Hunter fleet was now reduced to eight aircraft.

  Op Miracle had been successful but the cost to Rhodesia was unacceptably high. Two airmen and an RLI officer had been lost, together with an Alouette, in the high-density operation performed in direct support of Op Miracle. One Selous Scout was killed whilst clearing trenches on Day One. Another was killed and three seriously injured on Day Three when a captured weapon exploded as it was being made safe. Then on Day Five the Air Force suffered the loss of three officers, a Canberra and a Hunter.

  Chambeshi bridges-Zambia

  PRIOR TO MY ARRIVAL IN COMOPS, plans had been made to pressurise Zambia into making better use of its southern rail route through Rhodesia to the ports of South African. Although an economics issue, it fitted well with military plans to deny ZIPRA the rail and road facilities needed to transport war equipment from Dar es Salaam to Lusaka. The plan involved the destruction of the Tanzam rail and road bridges across the Chambeshi River situated a great distance northeast of Lusaka. Whereas the SAS had been fully prepared for this task, it had been shelved because ‘political repercussions’ remained a big concern at that time.

  By August 1979, there had been substantial changes in political thinking and, because world reaction to our recent external operations had been less than expected, Operation ‘Cheese’, was on the action board again. Although there were other externals on the go, O
p Cheese was the most exciting one to follow because it was so audacious and was the longest-range operation ever undertaken by any of our ground forces. The two Chambeshi bridges, lying half a kilometre apart, were almost 800 kilometres from the still-secret Air Force base at Fylde from which the operation was launched.

  We were still getting over the shock of the Canberra and Hunter losses that day when Jack Malloch set off from Fylde to drop a four-man SAS free-fall pathfinder team from his DC7 into the target area. Things did not work out as planned near the bridges because one parachute failed to open, costing the team the loss of its canoes. In consequence, there was a long walk to recce the bridges and an equally long walk back to the rendezvous point to take the night drop of another twelve men.

  This drop was successfully conducted when the DC7 returned around midnight on 8 October. From there the sixteen-man team had to make its way upstream to the bridges in heavily laden canoes and a powered inflatable dinghy. The Chambeshi River was flowing more swiftly than expected and this delayed arrival at the targets until the night of 11 October. Once there, the bridges were rigged for demolition in the manner the SAS had pre-planned and practised. Whilst the explosive charges were being placed, two of the team members set up a roadblock to hijack a suitably large vehicle. This was necessary to transport the whole team with canoes and dinghy to a remote position in far-off Luangwa Game Reserve for uplift to Rhodesia by Cheetah helicopters.

  The hijacking of a twenty-ton truck driven by its white owner was successful but became complicated when the brother of the driver, noticing that the twenty-tonner was no longer following his own truck, turned back to investigate. This man refused to leave his brother.

  In the meanwhile, a third white man stopped, believing the twenty-ton truck had broken down. As if this was not bad enough, a ten-year-old white boy was accompanying one of the brothers, his uncle, as a special birthday treat. Consequently, for security reasons, the SAS had to hold captive the three white men, two black co-drivers and the ten-year-old birthday boy. Once the charges were set and fuses lit, the twenty-ton truck carrying twenty-two people with canoes and dinghy set off down the main road towards Lusaka. Some way from the bridges the satisfying sound of a single huge explosion reached the men; but they had no way of knowing if the bridges were down. When dawn was breaking a little short of the small town of Serenje, the truck turned south down a secondary road towards the Luangwa Game Reserve.

  Unhappily they came upon a power station in the middle of nowhere and the SAS were forced to shoot security guards who came to investigate their presence. From there they managed to bundu-bash their way to a position where the Cheetahs collected them, captives and all. By this time the SAS team was relieved to get the news via their HF radio that Canberra reconnaissance had confirmed both bridges were down.

  The hapless Zambians were noticeably apprehensive about their own safety right up to the moment they were ushered into the Cheetahs. Thereafter they relaxed and were treated to Rhodesian hospitality until suitable arrangements were made for their safe return to Zambia.

  Moatize bridges

  THE OP MANACLE PLAN TO destroy all Mozambique’s bridges was initiated with the downing of three rail bridges on the line north of the Zambezi River. Apart from denying ZANLA any rail transport for men and munitions from Beira to Tete Province, severing the line at this particular time complemented the cutting of the Tanzam rail at the Chambeshi River. With this rail line also cut, Zambia would have no Mozambican outlet as an alternative to the South African ports.

  Ten months had passed since the SAS destroyed the Mecito bridge and the train that was crossing it. No attempt had been made to repair the bridge or recover the engine that remained nose down in the riverbed, but trains were being run to each side of the river to transfer passengers and porter goods from one train to another. The destruction of another three widely separated bridges would put an end to this practice.

  Dakotas delivered three SAS teams to the bridges during the evening of 12 October 1979. Early next morning, Cheetahs brought in the heavy explosive packs and the three bridges were dropped in daylight on the same day.

  FRELIMO guards at the biggest bridge had fled when their fire was answered with overwhelming aggression. Apart from this, no opposition occurred save from a swarm of bees. Stirred to anger by detonation pressure waves, thousands of bees attacked all the members of one team, causing two to be hospitalised. Also stirred to anger was the FRELIMO Government.

  Improved methods of packaging and laying demolition charges had worked so well for the SAS on the five bridges in Mozambique and Zambia that the same principles were adopted and tailored for each of the bridges assigned for destruction during Op Manacle. When all was ready however, the Mozambican op was postponed at short notice. The SAS were about to launch from Chipinda Pools in southeast Rhodesia when analysis of intelligence confirmed the imminence of a ZIPRA invasion. Understandably the SAS Regiment was incensed by the eleventh hour deferral of an operation for which they were so well prepared. It had happened many times before but, in this case, there was a general belief amongst the SAS officers that there were sinister reasons for calling off their biggest job which, for the first time ever, involved every available member of the SAS.

  Encounter with conventional ZIPRA forces

  FOR SOME TIME SELOUS SCOUTS teams had been operating inside Zambia on recce and disruption tasks south of the main road from Lusaka to Livingstone. Helicopters were used for all deployments and recoveries and a limited amount of assistance was given to Scouts by Lynx pilots making visual recce sorties to assist in the selection of unpopulated routes.

  First indications of a ZIPRA conventional force in the remote dry country northwest of Kariba came from one Lynx pilot who reported encountering heavy anti-aircraft gunfire when he was returning to base from a recce task. Little notice was taken of this until two helicopter pilots were subjected to the same treatment from precisely the same location.

  The Canberra tasked to photograph the spot did so at midday on 10 October when the sun was directly above the aircraft. The Kariba area had remained completely dry in spite of heavy rains in the eastern areas of the country. In consequence, the dry white soil of the region reflected the sun’s rays so strongly that images on the photographs blended all features in a manner that made distinguishing between rocks, scrub and open ground difficult—even through stereoscopic viewers.

  Apart from a single vehicle track leading to the area, the JSPIS photo-interpreters could find little of interest on or near the prominent ridge the pilots reported as being the source of enemy fire. So one of the pilots was called in to view the photographs to clarify what he had seen coming from where.

  Bill Buckle was considering re-tasking a Canberra recce for 10:00 the next day to overcome the glare problem by bringing shadows into play. Whilst he pondered this with others, Norah Seear was taking another close look at the southern end of the ridge where the pilot said at least two of the guns were positioned. Vaguely, very vaguely, Norah saw lines that might be trenches—but she could not be sure.

  In COMOPS we knew that the pilot reports were accurate and that ZIPRA had certainly been where the anti-aircraft fire had come from. It was decided therefore to send in the SAS to investigate rather than run another photographic sortie, which might cause ZIPRA to move away.

  Captain Bob MacKenzie moved to Kariba and, on 18 October, launched two SAS patrols by helicopter. One patrol landed well to the north of the ridge to ambush the track and the second team was put down well to the south of the ridge. Once they were down, Hunters and Canberras put in strikes. As the jets cleared, a high-flying Dakota ran parallel legs each side of the ridge, dropping incendiaries in a failed attempt to burn vegetation and deny the enemy bush cover. Orbiting high over the ridge in a Lynx piloted by Air Lieutenant Trevor Jew, Bob MacKenzie took a good look at his area of operations.

  Apart from the main north/south ridge-line, a lesser ridge ran parallel to it two kilometres to the west
with a bone-dry water pan surrounded by thick bush occupying much of the space between them. The vehicle track from the north passed the pan on its eastern side. Bob came to the conclusion that the main base, if occupied, was on the low ground around the dry pan with primary defences high on the ridges.

  Bob and all the pilots saw trenches but no sign of people or anti-aircraft fire. The SAS patrols agreed that not a shot had been fired at any aircraft. So, all in all, it looked as if ZIPRA had vacated the position. Nevertheless, Bob MacKenzie instructed his teams to continue as briefed. This was to move closer to the base then listen and observe from ambush positions—a classic SAS task.

  The southern SAS patrol had only just established its ambush after sunset when a ZIPRA patrol came their way moving through thick bush in extended formation. One ZIPRA man was killed before the main group scampered into deep cover. Blood spoor showed that others had been wounded and dragged to safety.

  Because of this action, Bob ordered both patrols to break ambush and commence a move towards the main ridge. They were to link up on the high ground at first light before descending into the suspect base area. Faced with thick jesse bush conditions on a dark night, the southern patrol opted to move along the vehicle track. In doing so it ran into a ZIPRA ambush in which one of the SAS men, Lance-Corporal McLaurin, was fatally wounded. In consequence, and because another soldier was down with severe heat fatigue, the patrol moved to safety and held position until a helicopter casevac was made at first light.

  Because both patrols were still well short of the ridge, helicopters moved the troops closer to their objective. At the time, the commanders of both groups were sure that ZIPRA must have pulled out of the area following afternoon and night encounters. They were seriously mistaken!