The Great Illyrian Revolt

by Jason R Abdale

  Tiberius’ base camp, the jumping-off point for the invasion, was the town of Carnuntum, located about twenty-three miles east of the modern city of Vienna, Austria (known in ancient times as Vindobona).23 Carnuntum was an army town, being heavily fortified, heavily garrisoned and stocked to bursting with weapons and supplies. It began its life as a mediocre-sized Celtic settlement on the southern shore of the Danube River. The name means ‘stone town’, or more likely ‘a walled settlement of stone’, since carn might be a version of the Celtic word caion, meaning ‘enclosure’ or ‘fenced-in place’.24 However, once the Romans took over control of this region following Tiberius’ conquest of Pannonia during the war of 12-9 BC, it began to truly grow and prosper. At first, Carnuntum was nothing more than an army base with a small civilian population, but its strategic and economic importance led it to expand more and more from the early first century AD onwards. At the height of its power in the middle second century AD, it had grown into a major city of 50,000 people, complete with an arena and a gladiator school. In its history, the city was attacked and destroyed twice, the first time in 166 AD during the Marcomannic Wars and the second time in 374 AD by the Germanic Quadi tribe. The city never recovered after this second act of destruction, and it quickly fell into ruins.25

  In June 2014, Austrian archaeologists from the Ludwig-Boltzmann Institute for Virtual Archaeology announced that they had discovered the remains of a large Roman military camp located just outside the western gate of Carnuntum’s town walls. Professor Wolfgang Neubauer, the head of the institute, stated that the camp was dated to the early first century AD and might possibly be the very camp that was set up by Tiberius immediately preceding his campaign against the Marcomanni.26

  Surely King Maroboduus would have become aware of an evergrowing build-up of Roman troops near his border. Yet despite the size and condition of his Germanic army, the historical records make no mention at all of any outright provocative or aggressive actions on Maroboduus’ part towards Rome. In fact, Paterculus states that Maroboduus promised that he would never start a war with Rome, but if Rome chose to start a war against him, he would fight them with every bit of strength that he could muster. His words would soon be put to the test.27

  The Explosion

  It was now 6 AD. The long-awaited invasion of the Marcomannic kingdom was going to begin. Knowing that this war would lead to many troops being pulled away from their usual stations and leaving large sections of the empire open and defenceless, Caesar Augustus authorized the creation of eight new legions, bringing the total number of legions in the empire from seventeen up to twenty-five.28 The legions were spread throughout the empire at strategic locations and were headquartered in fortified strongholds. Even with this increase in manpower, there were still large areas of the empire that had little or no military presence. Due to the vast space of the empire and the relatively low number of troops that were available to defend it, there were often huge swathes of land that had no protection whatsoever. Areas that were deemed more important had more troops on hand to defend them, such as Spain, Africa, Egypt and Syria. In the province of Illyricum, the majority of Roman military bases were located along the Danube River, which separated the province from the barbarian territories of the Germans, Dacians and Sarmatians. There were only a few handfuls of troops within the Illyrian interior or along the Balkan Adriatic coast.29

  The invasion was about to begin. A rendezvous point was established along the border for any additional recruits to collect before moving off into Marcomanni territory. Tiberius’ able lieutenant Gaius Sentius Saturninus, the military commandant of Germania Magna who would command the northern arm of the grand pincer attack, received his orders from his commander to move his troops into position for the opening offensive. When the ‘first shots’ were fired, it was expected that it would only take a few days for Saturninus’ men to cut their way through and link up with Tiberius’ troops in the south.30

  Tiberius needed as many men as he could get his hands on for the great expedition against the Marcomanni. He contacted Marcus Messallinus, the proconsul (a provincial governor who was an ex-consul) of Illyricum, and ordered him to come with his soldiers to provide aid for the invasion. Marcus Valerius Messalla Messallinus, Governor of Illyricum, was the son of the famous orator M.V.M. Corvinus. He was a member of the Senate and had served as one of its consuls in the year 3 BC and again in 3 AD. He was also highly-connected to the imperial family; he was married to one of Caesar Augustus’ nieces. In the future, when Augustus died and Tiberius was made emperor, Messallinus proposed to Tiberius that the people should swear an oath of allegiance to Tiberius every year in order to reaffirm their loyalty. This was important because the Roman soldiers didn’t swear their loyalties to the Roman Empire or to its emperor but to Caesar Augustus personally, and when Augustus died in 14 AD the legions were no longer beholden to anyone. As a result, several legions mutinied. To prevent such a thing from happening again and to continuously re-instil loyalty to Tiberius, a yearly oath of allegiance seemed like a good idea. After all, in spite of his martial prowess, Tiberius was no Augustus! The historian Paterculus held Messallinus in high regard, stating that he ‘was even more noble in heart than in birth, and thoroughly worthy of having had Corvinus as his father’.31 Tacitus claimed that Marcus Messallinus was a good speaker, which was an important quality in ancient societies, and he was a friend of the poet Ovid.32

  As soon as he received his instructions from Tiberius, Messallinus marched off to join Tiberius on the borders of Bohemia. He took with him the majority of the Roman soldiers that had been stationed in Illyricum, leaving only a small skeleton security force behind. This left the province woefully under-protected, but Messallinus believed that the province was secure. He had no reason to suspect any trouble.33

  According to Peter Swan, there were five legions posted in Illyricum at this time: the 8th Legion Gemina, the 9th Legion Hispania, the 14th Legion Gemina, the 15th Legion Appolinaris and the 20th Legion Valeria Victrix.34 The ancient historian Paterculus confirms that the 20th Legion was in Illyria at that time but it was only at half-strength, numbering at around just 2,500 men.35

  Before he left, Messallinus ordered the native Dalmatians of southern Illyria to provide as many warriors as they could to serve as auxiliaries in the upcoming war against the Marcomanni. The Dalmatians had no choice but to obey the governor’s order. The tribes selected groups of warriors and sent them on their way to join the Roman forces; their total number isn’t recorded. I assume that they travelled with their armour, weapons and equipment, as will soon become evident. For a long time, the natives of Illyria had chafed under the boot of Roman domination, and in particular resented the tributes that they had to pay to the Romans. Ever since the Romans conquered Pannonia and incorporated it into the province of Illyricum, Romanization had come in more forcefully than ever before. Taxes were levied, Roman laws were enforced and native culture was being progressively replaced by Roman culture. However, in spite of their hatred, they had kept their mouths shut and grudgingly obeyed their orders.36

  A point must be made here. During the early years of the Roman Empire, the vast majority of the empire’s male population were not citizens. By law, all free-born males in Italy were citizens, and there were smaller numbers of citizens scattered here and there throughout the remainder of Rome’s provinces.37 This means that the overwhelming majority of the men in the province of Illyricum were not citizens. As such, they were not allowed to join the regular legions but could only enlist in the auxiliary battalions. It would not be until 212 AD when Emperor Caracalla extended citizenship to all free-born men throughout the entire empire.

  Because the legions’ ranks could not be filled by the local native Illyrians, all of Rome’s legions that were stationed within Illyricum had to be raised from elsewhere (mostly in Italy) and then transferred to the western Balkans. The fact that there were no professional ‘homegrown’ legions within Illyricum was a significant flaw both st
rategically and logistically. When the Great Illyrian Revolt erupted and all of the professional troops within Illyricum were gone, the Roman government had to frantically divert troops from elsewhere in order to suppress the revolt. Of course, transferring the troops away from their posts to deal with the Illyrian rebels would open up huge gaps in Rome’s defences and set the stage for other enemies to take advantage of the borders’ weaknesses.

  When all the Dalmatian warriors from the various tribes gathered together at the designated assembly point (it isn’t stated where), all of them presumably heavily armed, they saw just how many of their own number they were. According to Cassius Dio, it suddenly came into their minds that with such large numbers as theirs, they could easily overpower the Romans:38 ‘Under the vehement urging of one Bato, a Desidiatian, at first a few revolted and defeated the Romans who came against them, and then the rest also rebelled in consequence of this success.’39

  It isn’t stated if Bato of the Daesidiate tribe was present at the assembly point and was in fact the primary instigator in urging his fellow warriors to attack and overpower the Romans, or if the attack happened first and after hearing about it afterwards he urged the remainder of his countrymen to join in the fighting.

  What sort of a person was Bato? No Roman historian describes their enemies’ leaders in great detail. They commonly wrote down only vague cursory descriptions of the commanders who fought against the legions. Vercingetorix the Gaul was described as possessing great energy. Arminius the German was described as handsome, brave and intelligent. Queen Boudicca of Britannia has a somewhat more precise description, though by modern literary standards it feels incomplete: tall with long red hair, and with a harsh intimidating voice. All three of these famous native resistance fighters against Roman conquest have monumental bronze statues erected to them in their honour. Yet these are largely the product of nineteenth-century Victorian Romanticist imagination and are not meant to be taken as exact accurate depictions of their appearance.

  The Illyrian rebel leader, Bato the Daesidiate, is no exception to Roman brevity in describing their enemies’ leaders. We have no idea how old Bato was at the time of the rebellion (despite numerous modern sources of questionable quality which state that he was born in 35 BC – why certain people arbitrarily selected this year for his birth confounds me – which, if true, would make him 41 years old during the outbreak), we have no information about what he looked like, we have no information about his family, and we have next to nothing about his life before the rebellion. All we have to go on is one passing phrase given by Paterculus which reads ‘Cuius immensae multitudinis, parentis acerrimis ac peritissimis ducibus.’40 This translates as ‘Which of an immense multitude, he was the most clever and most experienced leader who was given obedience.’

  The Latin phrase is more complex than the translation suggests. The word ducibus is derived from the Latin word dux, meaning ‘military leader’ or ‘warlord’. The word parentis is also worth looking at. True, it is often translated into English as ‘parent’, but the word itself does not mean ‘one’s mother or father’. Instead, the word means ‘someone who is given obedience’, since one’s mother and father were expected to be obeyed. Army commanders were referred to as parentis, and so too was the emperor in all likelihood. Both of these words show that Bato was a leader of warriors, and a rather prominent one too since his men listened to him. Peter Swan hypothesizes that Bato might have been an auxiliary commander like the German warlord Arminius41 and this is almost certain, but auxiliary unit leaders were sometimes Roman citizens. However, there is no mention in the records of Bato possessing citizenship. The word acerrimis is translated as ‘sharpest’, derived from the word acer, meaning ‘sharp’. In this case, the word can be read both literally and figuratively. Bato, therefore, must have been intelligent, clever and very quick-witted. The Latin word peritissimis derives from peritus, which means ‘to become skilled or experienced after undergoing tests and trials’. This implies that Bato already possessed military expertise and had combat experience before the rebellion broke out in 6 AD. Unfortunately, Paterculus does not give any further information to elaborate on his statement. We will likely never know what sort of martial exploits Bato undertook prior to the year 6 AD, nor will we be able to determine just how engaging and sagacious he was, nor will we know exactly how many warriors he commanded.

  Cassius Dio stated that the Dalmatians ‘defeated the Romans who came against them’.42 This is almost certainly one of the small handfuls of soldiers that Governor Messallinus had left behind, presumably at the rendezvous point. No ancient source gives an exact date or a precise location for when this sudden outburst of violence occurred. As far as the question of ‘when’ is concerned, we know that the uprising began in the year 6 AD but can we refine the date a bit further? The most likely answer is very early spring, probably mid or late March. Throughout ancient and medieval times, military campaigns were almost always conducted in spring. By this time, the weather was getting warmer, the snows had thawed and the ice had melted, opening up travel routes that would later become invasion routes used by armies. The Romans were about to invade Bohemia, and they had to get all of their men in position when the spring thaws first came. Taking that into consideration, Tiberius and his subordinate commanders must have begun mobilizing for the campaign against the Marcomanni well beforehand to get everything ready for the scheduled invasion. The Dalmatian auxiliaries would have been called up in late February, maybe. It would have taken them a while to assemble and get things organized, not to mention march towards the rendezvous point.

  That leads me to the question of ‘where’, which is a lot harder to answer. It’s certain that the rendezvous point could not have been the city of Carnuntum because that’s where Tiberius himself had gathered with all of the legions under his command. If the Illyrians revolted there, they would have been immediately slaughtered. I also highly doubt that the Illyrian auxiliaries were rendezvousing at the provincial capital of Salona and went on their rampage there. Salona was located on the coast of the Adriatic Sea. Such a location would be ideal for launching a naval expedition somewhere in the Mediterranean, but it’s very unsuitable as a forward base for launching an overland invasion of a landlocked country. Salona was simply too far away. The Marcomanni territory lay far to the north, and it would make much more sense to have a northern city as the major assembly point for the amassing Roman troops rather than a city located far away from the front. Furthermore, the provincial capital was heavily fortified and well-garrisoned. Salona served as the headquarters for the 11th Legion Claudia. With such a prominent unit stationed nearby, it certainly would have made a great deal of news and commotion if it had been defeated, although the 11th Legion may have been withdrawn from the city to prepare for the upcoming war against the Marcomanni. Therefore, I don’t believe that the provincial capital of Salona was the location for the beginning of the revolt.

  The most likely rendezvous location, and by extension the location for the revolt’s outbreak, was located somewhere in the northern part of the province, so that there would have been minimal marching time from the Illyricum border. All Cassius Dio says is that the Illyrians ‘defeated the Romans who came against them’.43 That’s not much to go on. Does he mean Roman soldiers, or ordinary Roman civilians who took up arms to resist the Illyrian aggressors? It is almost certain that each town and city had its own garrison. Local militia might have been the first target, or it could have been other Roman soldiers, be they legionnaires or auxiliaries, who had also rendezvoused at that location. It’s likely that this location, in order to accommodate or at least attempt to accommodate the large numbers of heavily-armed men that entered its gates, possessed some type of military base and a permanent garrison. In other words, this was a location where Roman troops were permanently stationed.

  So what options do we have to choose from? Most of the northern cities and towns that you’ll find on maps of Illyricum, such as Sabaria and Aquinc
um, which would appear to be ideal locations for gathering large numbers of troops together, were founded decades after the Great Illyrian Revolt and therefore they cannot be the right places. I believe that the city of Segestica was the location where the Great Illyrian Revolt erupted. Granted, I have no direct proof whatsoever of this, but I do have some pieces of circumstantial evidence that make Segestica the most likely contender.

  First, Segestica was located in the northern part of Illyricum. This would have made it an ideal place for Tiberius to establish his administrative headquarters prior to the invasion, and to collect his Illyrian auxiliaries together before moving off to join the rest of Tiberius’ forces at Carnuntum. Granted, it was still a long hike from Segestica to Tiberius’ base camp. In a straight line, Segestica and Carnuntum are approximately 180 miles from each other, but with the winding Roman roads, it would have been longer. Considering that Tiberius needed his auxiliaries to arrive at his base camp in a hurry, this sounds like a very long distance to walk and it is, but this may have been the only option. Second, Segestica would have been a good place for the Dalmatian recruits to gather. Remember, Governor Messallinus had ordered the Dalmatians of southern Illyria to assemble at a certain point, not the Pannonians of northern Illyria. The Dalmatians were, for the most part, a coastal people while the Pannonians dwelt in the deep interior, and Segestica was located on the border area between Dalmatian and Pannonian territories. It would not have been difficult for the Dalmatian auxiliaries to gather together at the northernmost Dalmatian city. Third, Segestica was a fairly large city, and as such would have been a good place for assembling large bodies of men and provisioning them. Fourth, Segestica had a large military garrison. A legionary fort was constructed nearby, though the actual number of men garrisoning the fort at the time was probably small. As I said earlier, no ancient historian would have been able to ignore the event of a legion being defeated, so the fort would not have had its full garrison during the outbreak. Fifth, when the time came for the Romans to take command of the situation and to fight off the Illyrian rebels, Tiberius made absolutely certain that he seized control of the city of Segestica first, even though there were many other places of equal importance that needed to be retaken as well. Therefore the city must have had great importance tactically and strategically, but maybe also symbolically. It would be a great blow to the rebels’ morale if the centre of their uprising was taken by the Romans.