The Great Illyrian Revolt

by Jason R Abdale

  It is unknown what the strengths of both sides were as they gazed at each other across the grassy slope of Mount Alma. The Thracian cavalry must have been sufficiently numerous to feel bold enough to attack the Illyrian position alone without any additional aid from Severus’ army. I dare say that the lure of plunder and personal glory played some part in King Rhoemetalces’ decision as well. Therefore the number of men involved on both sides may have been equal or nearly equal.

  The signal was raised, the command was given and the Thracians spurred their horses up the slope of Mount Alma. We can imagine the Thracian cavalry charging up the hill, perhaps only a handful of them at a time, hurling their javelins at the Illyrian defenders and then looping around to the rear, then turning back for another charge and so on. These hit-and-run tactics were just what the Thracian cavalry were best at. Behind this initial handful of horsemen was another group, who would hurl their javelins and then turn away. Behind them was another group, and behind them, another. In this way they quickly developed a wheel of cavalry spitting out javelins every time the wheel turned to face the Illyrian ranks, like a giant conveyor belt of missiles. The Thracians overwhelmed the rebel position atop Mount Alma, and the Illyrians were either slaughtered or forced to flee.89

  The Romans Fight their Way Inland

  In a year marred by defeats and costly casualty-heavy wins, the Thracians’ easy victory at Mount Alma was a much-needed morale booster for the Roman side. Considering that King Rhoemetalces ordered his vanguard light cavalry to attack an enemy defensive position without informing the remainder of the Roman force to come forward to assist him, things could have gone very badly for the Thracians that day. Tactically, ordering his light horsemen forward without infantry support was risky at best and foolish at worst. As it happened, King Rhoemetalces was lucky.

  After the battle was won, the Thracians either remained in position and waited for the rest of the Roman army under the consuls Severus and Silvanus to catch up to them, or else they back-tracked and rejoined the rest of the Roman force that was still in the process of making its way forward. The first option is more likely. As the Americans who fought in Vietnam discovered, the second that you abandon a strategic position, the enemy moves back in. Why fight to dislodge the Illyrian rebels from the slope of Mount Alma, only to withdraw and give the enemy the option of reoccupying the hill? So it is almost certain that the majority of the Thracian force remained at Mount Alma, resting and regaining their energy, and possibly using the hill as a lookout position, while a few riders were sent back to inform Severus and Silvanus of what had just happened.

  Severus and Silvanus, the two commanders of the Roman amphibious force, were informed that the Thracians who had been sent forward from the main army had easily defeated a small rebel force atop Mount Alma. Even so, while the small party of rebels atop Mount Alma had been turned back, the majority of rebel forces were still assembling to take on the advancing Romans. However, the victory at Mount Alma had made the Roman commanders confident, so confident that they made a serious blunder: they advanced without first sending out scouts to locate the rest of the enemy’s forces.90

  This was the second time that this army made a grave tactical mistake. Sending out scouting patrols was standard practice, and the fact that the two commanders didn’t do so shows that they were either incompetent or were so confident of victory that they didn’t bother to take even basic precautions. In Paterculus’ account, he states ‘the generals… had allowed themselves to come into contact with the enemy before they had learned through their scouts where the enemy was.’91 Paterculus also states that the Thracian cavalry as well as the Thracian king himself were with the Romans when they came under attack.92 What we can infer from Paterculus’ statement is this. Rather than keeping the cavalry out in front to screen the army’s approach and to spot any enemy forces that may be up ahead, the cavalry rejoined the Romans and they marched onwards as a single massive column. Big mistake. Lacking proper intelligence of enemy movements, the two consuls were unaware that a large Illyrian rebel force was gathering together to launch a mass attack against the oncoming Romans. When the Romans finally made contact with the bulk of the rebel force, they were caught completely by surprise. Not only that, but the rebels were far more numerous than the commanders had assumed, so numerous in fact that they completely surrounded the entire Roman force.93

  Paterculus states that the force commanded by Severus and Silvanus consisted of five legions, an unknown number of auxiliary cohorts and an unknown number of Thracian cavalry. At full strength, that would be a minimum of 25,000 men. In order for the Illyrian rebels to surround this force, their number would have to be just as large, if not larger. With the numbers involved on both sides, the battle was a fearsome one. Regrettably, none of the ancient sources state exactly where this monumental clash took place, nor is the terrain described in any way, nor how far away this battle’s location was from Mount Alma either in terms of miles’ or days’ travels. All that being said, it unfortunately seems unlikely that its location will ever be discovered. Yet although the battle’s location and the landscape’s topography are not described, Paterculus does give some information about how the fighting progressed. At first, the battle seemed in favour of the rebels: the Illyrians forced the valued Thracian cavalry to retreat, including the Thracian king’s elite royal guard, as well as all of the cohorts of Roman auxiliaries. After the Thracians and the Roman auxiliaries fled, the rebels focused their full power on the legions. The battle was going badly for the Romans. By now, some of the legionary cohort commanders had been killed. The camp commandant and other cohort commanders had been cut off and were desperately fighting for their lives. Some of the centurions had been wounded and other centurions who had been in the front ranks had been killed. Defeat seemed inevitable, but the Roman legions themselves held firm and would not let the same panic that had overpowered their auxiliaries and allies overcome them as well. Paterculus states proudly: ‘The legions, shouting encouragement to each other, fell upon the enemy, and not content with sustaining their onslaught, broke through their line and wrested a victory from a desperate plight.’94

  Throughout history, there are many examples of battles in which one side seems to be winning at first, but the opposing side manages to regain the initiative and emerges victorious. One parallel that immediately comes to my mind is the Battle of Verneuil, fought in 1422 during the Hundred Years’ War, where an English army, on the brink of defeat, took the offensive and smashed a much larger combined French and Italian army.95

  I also believe that the Illyrians made a serious mistake in the opening stages of this unnamed battle: they completely surrounded their opponents. As I stated in an earlier section, one should never entirely surround one’s enemy, because your enemy will know that his fate is sealed and he will fight all the harder to survive. Regardless of how much the odds are in your favour, it would be best to allow your enemy an escape route for no other reason than to provide them with the illusion of safety and escape, while your reserves wait patiently further off and then charge forward to slaughter your enemies while they frantically try in vain to run. Perhaps the Illyrians wished to slaughter the entire Roman force in one battle, mimicking the great feats of Alexander or Hannibal and they probably could have, if they hadn’t surrounded their opponents. Why would the rebels make the same mistake twice? If surrounding a smaller Roman force didn’t work when attacking Governor Marcus Messallinus, then why would it work now? It appears that the rebels were trying to overwhelm the Romans by sheer force of numbers and giving little thought to strategy. This, of course, flies in the face of the idea that the Illyrians were adept battlefield tacticians, employing cunning and strategy to win their fights against their traditional enemies of Greece, Macedon and Rome.

  One idea that may explain why the Illyrians kept blundering when they shouldn’t have is the notion that while Bato was experienced and battle-savvy, his subordinate commanders and warriors were not. This
also happened to the Germanic rebel leader Arminius several years later, in which he tried to organize an effective and decisive defeat of the Roman military and eradicate the Roman presence in Germania forever, only to be repeatedly undermined either by his contrary subordinate commanders or his men who were more concerned with plunder and gaining battlefield glory than with discipline and following orders. Decades before, the Gallic leader Vercingetorix had a similar problem in which he had to constantly negotiate and compromise with the various tribal chiefs under his command, all of which were very independently-minded, in order for them to follow his banner against the legions of Julius Caesar.

  A similar situation might have met Bato. Remember that the Illyrians were composed of numerous tribes, just like the Celts and the Germans. The warriors of each of these tribes were loyal only to their tribal chief and not to any overarching authority. They did not identify themselves as ‘Illyrian’, nor was there any sense of a pan-Illyrian nationalism motivating these rebels. ‘Illyria’ was not a single unified entity. In order for Bato the Daesidiate and Bato the Breucian to carry out their rebellions against Rome, they too would have to negotiate, make deals and make compromises. They would have to work with very egocentric tribal chiefs who were more concerned with their own legacy and gaining power for themselves rather than acting for the greater good. The two Batos would have to grant concessions to them due to their position and the fact that their warriors answered to the chiefs, not to the rebellion’s two leading commanders. Both of these men could try to give orders, but those orders would only be obeyed if their subordinate commanders felt like obeying them. That was the greatest difference between the Illyrian rebel horde and the Roman legions. For the two Batos, orders or suggestions could be given and the subordinate chiefs could very likely issue their own orders instead. As for the Romans, if an order was given, it was followed with no exceptions. As the Great Illyrian Revolt continued, both Batos, especially Bato the Daesidiate, would become increasingly frustrated by lack of discipline among the lower ranks and back-stabbing among the upper ranks.

  It may be that Bato the Daesidiate intended to attack the Roman force only on three sides, leaving one side open for retreat, but his men either took it upon themselves to surround the Romans or else their commanders gave the order themselves. This is of course just supposition and guesswork, and while it may be what happened, it is only an idea and nothing more.

  For the Romans, victory had been attained when defeat seemed certain, but this victory had come at a high cost. Many high-ranking officers had been either killed or wounded, and although no actual numbers are given, casualties were likely heavy. This was the second time that Governor Aulus Severus of Moesia had won a hard-fought victory during the first months of the war.96

  These opening conflicts were a foretelling of how the Great Illyrian Revolt would play out. Despite their poor discipline, the Illyrians were tough tenacious fighters and they would use all their strength to bleed the Romans without mercy. However, the geography of the western Balkans, with its brutal mountainous terrain and steep jagged valleys, was just as much an enemy to the Romans as were the Illyrian rebels. For the next three years, the Roman legions would scrape and crawl through these winding limestone crags and forest-covered hills, fighting hard battles all along the way, being forced to assault one mountaintop stronghold or one staunchly-defended river crossing after another, often suffering horrendous casualties in the process. I am here reminded of the famous quote given by the Second World War American general Omar Bradley when he commented on the hard fighting in Normandy: ‘Beyond every river was another hill, and beyond every hill was another river’, and there are many hills and rivers in the western Balkans.

  Enter Tiberius

  It was around this time that Tiberius’ main army entered Illyricum. The fact that Tiberius delayed taking any action in the Illyrian rebellion, holding his army in the north while other troops further to the south fought on desperately, shows that he was still uncertain as to whether or not King Maroboduus and his 74,000 Marcomanni warriors showed any signs of launching an attack. He couldn’t abruptly swing around and attack the Illyrians in the south if there was a very distinct possibility that the Marcomanni would attack him in full force from behind. It was only when the Illyrian rebellion had grown so much that the rebels threatened to invade Italy and after Tiberius’ doubts about the Marcomanni were assuaged and he became confident that they would not launch an attack against him that he turned his army around and ordered them to march southwards to put down the Illyrian uprising. Paterculus states: ‘It did not seem to Tiberius a safe course to keep his army buried in the interior of the country and thus leave Italy unprotected from an enemy so near at hand.’97

  As an interesting side-note, Paterculus states that he fought in this war as a cavalry officer, and later as a legion commander, though he doesn’t state which legion he led:

  In this war also my modest abilities had an opportunity for glorious service. I was now, at the end of my service in the cavalry, quaestor designate, and though not yet a senator I was placed upon a parity with senators and even tribunes elect, and led from the city to Tiberius a portion of the army which was entrusted to me by Augustus. Then in my quaestorship, giving up my right to have a province allotted me, I was sent to Tiberius as legatus Augusti.98

  The Roman force led by the consuls Severus and Silvanus, which had been earlier mauled but not beaten, now linked up with Tiberius’ forces. Tiberius now commanded a total of ten legions, more than seventy auxiliary cohorts, fourteen cavalry battalions and more than 10,000 recalled veterans, along with numerous volunteers and the surviving remnants of the Thracian cavalry. Paterculus states that not since the civil wars of the late republic had so many soldiers been gathered together in one place. This single location was most likely Segestica, since this place is mentioned by both Cassius Dio and Paterculus as the place where Tiberius stayed. Therefore Segestica might have been the headquarters for the Roman forces taking part in the revolt.99

  Among those who likely entered the scene at this moment was the Germanic prince Arminius, a young nobleman of the Cherusci tribe who fought in the Great Illyrian Revolt under Tiberius’ command. It is possible that Gaius Paterculus, who would later write an account of this remarkable young man, knew Arminius personally. Paterculus describes the Germanic prince as brave and clever; no small praise, considering the Romans’ contempt for barbarians. Arminius was born in 16 BC, the son of Chief Segimerus, a prominent leader among the Cherusci tribe of west-central Germania (apparently this tribe did not have one single chief). Arminius’ younger brother Flavus (a Latin name literally meaning ‘yellow’, no doubt a reference to the boy’s blond hair) also served in the Great Illyrian Revolt as a scout and would later lose an eye during one of the war’s battles.100

  Prince Arminius had been taken under Rome’s care in 6 BC following the subjugation of the western Germanic tribes; he was 10 years old at the time. As a peace hostage, he would have been educated in Latin, been sent to school and eventually became an auxiliary commander in the Roman army. When he was posted to fight under Tiberius, he would have been 22. He would see action in the Great Illyrian Revolt, likely as an auxiliary cavalry commander, but from what we can gather of his life from the ancient sources, his combat service was limited to scarcely a few months during the year 6 AD. Still, during that time he performed magnificently, and as a reward for his battlefield bravery he was given a double promotion, which was an almost unheard-of honour. Prince Arminius was made a Roman citizen, which gave him the right to vote, and he was knighted, which enabled him to own land within the empire and to become involved in the workings of the Roman government.101 Unfortunately, none of the ancient accounts say what epic feats of daring Arminius did in order to deserve such rewards.

  The Romans were confident that with such a massive force behind them, they were certain to defeat the rebels. However, the men were to be disappointed. Tiberius allowed his massive army a few d
ays of rest and then split the force apart, deeming that such a large force could not be controlled effectively. He ordered Severus’ and Silvanus’ reinforcements back home. Realizing that the rebels might take the opportunity to attack the reinforcements as they made their way back, he ordered his own army to escort them, and so they travelled ‘on a long exceedingly laborious march, whose difficulty can hardly be described’.102

  While Tiberius and his commanders stayed in Segestica, the Dalmatians attacked and overran the territories of Rome’s allies in the area (probably the Liburnians, who by now had been thoroughly Romanized), and ‘caused many more to revolt’.103 There are two ways to interpret Cassius Dio’s quote. The first is that those who now joined in the revolt were in fact fellow Illyrians who had previously been sitting on the fence, not wishing to take part in the fighting, but now decided to join in. The second option is that they were the people that the Dalmatians had defeated, and they were now forced to change sides and fight for the rebel cause. I believe that the first of the two options is the more viable one, because if Rome’s allies had been forced to abandon their friendship with Rome and swear their loyalty to the rebels, the Roman authors surely would have made mention of such an act of treachery, as they would have seen it.

  Now it was the empire’s turn to strike back. Paterculus gives a rousing record of the achievements of Tiberius’ forces during the first year of the rebellion:

  What armies of the enemy did we see drawn up for battle in that first year! What opportunities did we avail ourselves of through the foresight of the general to evade their united forces and rout them in separate divisions! With what moderation and kindness did we see all the business of warfare conducted, though under the authority of a military commander! With what judgement did he place our winter camps! How carefully was the enemy so blockaded by the outposts of our army that he could nowhere break through, and that, through lack of supplies and by disaffection within his own ranks, he might gradually be weakened in strength!104