The Great Illyrian Revolt
Page 27
When the Romans arrived on the scene, the Illyrian rebels defending Raetinum saw that they were heavily outnumbered. They could not hope to withstand the legions’ assaults for long. The Illyrians recognized that they would be easily defeated in a head-on fight, and the crude wooden fortifications were not enough to provide an edge. The rebels needed something to put the odds of victory in their favour. Then the defenders contrived a plan of how to do away with as many Romans as possible by luring them into a trap.
According to Cassius Dio, the Illyrian rebels deliberately made a weak spot in their defences, knowing that the sharp-eyed Romans would spot this and try to exploit it. The rebel garrison set fire to a section of the wooden wall that encircled Raetinum as well as the houses that were near the wall, but trying to keep the fire under control so that the entire wall didn’t go up in flames. Their plan was to allow the Romans to enter and then lure them into the centre of the fortress just in time to have the entire encircling wall devoured in flames, thereby trapping the Romans inside with no hope of escape.13
One section of the wall was now burning, but the Romans didn’t notice it. I’m not sure why, since they must have surely noticed the smoke. The defenders manning the walls abandoned their positions and retreated to the central stronghold. The Romans saw this and became bold, believing that the Illyrians were fleeing, and so chased after them, hoping to plunder the entire fortress. Their minds were so intent on killing the Illyrians, Cassius Dio states, that the Romans were completely ignorant of the fire that was steadily creeping around them until they were completely surrounded by a ring of fire. The Illyrians who had retreated to the citadel hurled missiles at the Roman soldiers down below. The Romans could not back up out of missile range because if they did they would be burned by the fire, but if they tried to avoid the fire, they would be shot full of arrows by the Illyrian warriors. Some of the Romans became so desperate to get out that they actually hurled the dead bodies of their comrades into the flames to form a bridge of corpses and thus a few managed to escape. However, Cassius Dio states that a majority of the Romans who entered the fortress perished either by the hand of the enemy or by the fire. The fire soon began raging out of control, and even the Illyrians deemed the citadel too unsafe to stay in and so retreated during the night to some underground chambers and stayed there while the fire raged above them. It is not recorded how many people perished in the fire.14
The Romans Regain the Upper Hand
After this hellish defeat, Germanicus needed another victory in order to revive his men’s morale. He turned his attention to Seretium, which Tiberius had earlier attacked but was unable to take. Seizing possession of this rebel stronghold would help his men to regain their confidence. Cassius Dio reports that Seretium fell to Germanicus, though he gives no details about this event.15 A man named Sir William Smith wrote in 1873 that Seretium ‘which with Rhaetimus, was captured by Germanicus’.16 This could mean that a person named Rhaetimus helped Germanicus to capture the town. No ancient source that I know of mentions anyone by this name, so this explanation is highly unlikely. Another possibility is that Rhaetimus refers to a place, not a person. In this case, Rhaetimus is almost certainly an incorrect spelling of Raetinum.
After Seretium was taken by Germanicus and his men, the Romans took control of other places in a series of easy fights. However, in spite of the fact that the Romans were steadily gaining ground, the Illyrians continued to resist, dragging out the war, determined to fight to the bitter end.17
Germanicus had been leading the Roman war effort during the campaign season of 9 AD. However, following Germanicus’ terrifying defeat at Raetinum, Caesar Augustus once more sent Tiberius into Dalmatia to command the troops. Tiberius saw that the Roman soldiers had become increasingly impatient with the war dragging on for so long and wanted to bring the revolt to a quick end, even if it involved great danger to themselves. Knowing that the grumblings of soldiers often led to mutiny, Tiberius divided his force into three parts: one-third was led by General Marcus Plautius Silvanus, another third was led by General Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, and the last third was commanded jointly by Tiberius and Germanicus. Paterculus says that Germanicus commanded the vanguard, the front units, of Tiberius’ army.18 Tiberius ordered his subordinates to take their respective two parts of the army and go and conquer certain areas of the country (which particular areas each general was ordered to take are not stated in the historical accounts), but Tiberius would take his third with the specific purpose of marching against Bato the Daesidiate.19
Bato’s Last Stand: The Battle of Andetrium
Aside from Germanicus’ defeat at Raetinum, from which he quickly bounced back, the campaign season of 9 AD was going very well. After three years of obstinate resistance, the Illyrian rebels had been severely weakened by massive casualties, disease and a devastating famine. In 9 AD, the Romans had gained a lot of ground, in contrast to the hard fighting through which they had suffered during the previous year. By now, many of them could feel that the end was coming soon. After all this time, the Great Illyrian Revolt was drawing to a close and the knowledge of that lifted the Romans’ spirits.
Silvanus and Lepidus easily defeated their respective opponents in battles, but Tiberius was having a very difficult time tracking his enemy down. Like Captain Ahab pursuing the white whale Moby Dick, Tiberius had become hell-bent on his mission to find and destroy the rebellion’s ringleader, Bato the Daesidiate. Yet Bato was a crafty and elusive enemy, always managing to stay one step ahead of Tiberius’ advance, so much so that Cassius Dio remarks that Tiberius and his men were forced to wander across the entire country in their pursuit of the rebel commander.20
At last, Bato and his followers stopped falling back and took up a defensive position within the mountain fortress of Andetrium (also spelled as Adetrium, Anderium or Anderitum; modern-day Muc21 or Clissa22), located only a short distance from the province’s capital of Salona. Andetrium was an almost impregnable stronghold in classic Illyrian style: built atop a mountain, well-fortified and surrounded by deep ravines with fast-flowing rivers that would easily drown someone if they were unfortunate enough to fall in. The Illyrian defenders already had ample supplies necessary for a long siege, and more supplies were being carried to Andetrium by a vast number of porters who brought the provisions not with waggons or pack horses, but marched on foot carrying the supplies in their hands.23
Tiberius may have been glad that he at last had his opponent trapped, but he also knew he was in for a very long and difficult siege. The Illyrian defenders could not be starved out because they had plenty of food and water. Moreover, the Romans were being put into a worse position because roving parties of Illyrian warriors had swung around Tiberius’ rear and had cut off his supply routes and his pathway of withdrawal. Cassius Dio remarks that thus the Romans who wished to besiege the Illyrians were themselves the ones who were besieged.24 Within a stroke, the Roman force had been put on the defensive.
Tiberius realized that besieging Andetrium wasn’t getting him anywhere, but he was at a complete loss as to what he should do. The Romans were hard pressed due to lack of supplies and they were not able to break into the fortress, but giving up would be disgraceful and shaming. No Roman commander wanted it to be known that he was bested by ‘barbarians’. The Roman soldiers, who as said earlier were eager to bring the war to a quick end, became highly frustrated with the lack of progress and grew loud and disorderly. Cassius Dio states that the disaffected Roman soldiers raised such an outcry over such a prolonged period of time that the Illyrians defenders, believing that the Romans were about to launch a massive all-or-nothing attack, became so afraid that they retreated to the inner fortifications of the city.25
Tiberius assembled his men and reprimanded them for behaving in such an undisciplined manner, but this still left him in a quandary as to what to do. If he attacked Andetrium, his men would suffer heavy casualties, but if he withdrew, the rebel force would threaten his rear. So both sides appeared
to be at an impasse. Tiberius chose to remain in his camp, wishing neither to attack such a strong position nor withdraw, and hoped that Bato would simply give up.26
It seemed that Tiberius would get his wish. Although Bato had doggedly dragged on the fighting for as long as he could, inflicting as many casualties as he could, and had managed to resist the Romans thus far, the Illyrian rebel commander knew that the revolt was dying. He repeatedly received messages from his subordinate officers urgently requesting aid to help them against the attacks by Silvanus’ and Lepidus’ troops, but Bato was unable to lend any assistance. There were always more Romans coming and Bato knew that their numbers were too great to keep the revolt going on any longer. By now, he knew that the war was lost but he didn’t have the heart to ask his men to give themselves up to the Romans when they still wished to fight on. So the rebel leader secretly sent a messenger to the Roman commander asking what the Romans’ terms would be if he was to surrender.27
When Tiberius received word that Bato himself wished to surrender but that the rest of his warriors wished to continue the war, he did something completely out of character. Rather than acting as the cautious old commander that he had become, he behaved instead like his younger self, the energetic fighter that he had once been, and immediately ordered his men to storm the fortress and to bring this long and costly war to an end once and for all. Believing that he could overwhelm the rebel position without heavy casualties, he ignored the constraints of the terrain and instead ordered his men to advance in a massive frontal assault. Tiberius himself stayed in the rear, keeping a portion of the army in reserve, which he would personally lead into the fray if necessity called for it. He even sat upon a platform so that he could watch the battle unfold like a spectator, believing that his men would fight all the harder knowing that their commander was watching them.28
Although it is not specifically stated in the accounts, the Roman legionnaires likely advanced upon the fortifications using the testudo or ‘tortoise’ formation. Our only clue to this is when Cassius Dio states that the Roman soldiers advanced on the Illyrians in a densely-packed square.29 The Roman military used the tortoise formation for the first time during the Siege of Aquilonia in 293 BC.30 The Greek historian Polybius, who lived during the second century BC, writes of an early use of the tortoise formation when the Romans assaulted Heraclea. In his account, he states that the Romans sent three maniples of infantry forward. The first of these held their shields aloft and overlapped them like roof shingles and formed a ramp so that the two maniples behind them could advance up to the enemy wall.31
Many people’s conception of what the tortoise formation looked like is that of a square or rectangular box, with the legionnaires covering the sides and the top with their shields. However, it seems that in ancient times the tortoise formation actually looked more like a ramp than a box, a ramp that allowed other soldiers in the rear to advance, clamber up and reach the top of enemy-held walls.
In a single massive body, the Roman force advanced up the steep rocky slope towards the fortress of Andetrium. At first, their advance was a smooth and steady walk, but due to the unevenness of the terrain, some parts became separated from the main body. The single united force became fragmented, with smaller portions of men being either thrust further forward or lagging behind the bulk of the Roman force.32
This description sounds similar to the advance of the French infantry on the Plains of Abraham outside Quebec that took place on 13 September 1759. In this famous battle of the Seven Years’ War, a British force of about 4,500 men, led by James Wolfe, threatened the city of Quebec by blocking the main road leading to the city. Defending Quebec was a French force led by Marquis de Montcalm. The British had managed to get into position very early in the day and took the French by surprise, who hastily assembled to meet them in battle. French artillery began firing upon the British line to drive them off, but despite taking casualties, Wolfe maintained his position. Montcalm realized that he would have to send in his infantry to force the British to leave. Although small in number, the British force had stretched itself out to encompass the width of the plain, a distance of nearly half a mile. That way, the French could not outmanoeuvre and swing around the British position; they would have no choice but to attack straight from the front. However, stretching the men out left the British line very thin and flimsy, at only two ranks deep and therefore vulnerable. A forceful attack could smash right through them. Montcalm was banking on this. Assembling his own force numbering about 4,500 troops, Montcalm ordered them to drive towards the British. However, things went badly even before the two sides engaged each other. While the professional French regulars advanced in step towards their foe, the Canadian militia broke ranks and charged towards the redcoats, who were 500 yards from the French lines. In addition to that, the coordination of the whole French force was lost as different units marched faster or slower than others, thereby breaking the single unified French line into several parts. As one witness recorded, the French left flank had lagged behind and was well in the rear, and the centre of the line had thrust itself too far forward. This disruption of the French force’s advance escalated into chaos and confusion as pockets of French troops fired upon the British ranks in a piecemeal fashion rather than the whole force attacking as a single unified body.33
The Illyrian defenders of Andetrium saw how the Roman advance was becoming more and more disorganized and so they decided to take a risk. Rather than continuing to maintain their positions atop Andetrium’s walls and within, they arranged themselves outside of the fortifications and hurled down all manner of objects at the Romans as they advanced up the steep slope in an attempt to completely break up their cohesion. Some shot small sling stones, while others rolled down large boulders onto the Romans. Others rolled down wooden barrels that were filled with rocks, and others even resorted to unleashing supply waggons loaded with rocks to roll down and smash through the Roman lines like improvised battering-rams. The Romans were continuously bombarded in this manner, forcing them to scatter or else be crushed. Cassius Dio records: ‘All these objects rushing down at once with great impetus kept striking here and there, as if discharged from a sling, separating the Romans from one another even more than before and crushing them.’34
Despite the vigour of the Illyrian defence and despite the heavy casualties that the Roman force was suffering, the men pressed onwards and upwards. As the Romans advanced closer to the rebel position, they came within range of enemy arrows and javelins. Cassius Dio states that many Roman troops were slain by enemy missiles.35 Arrows and javelins seldom inflict damage upon a compact body of men with interlocking overlapping shields. So it seems that by now, if the Romans did indeed employ a tortoise formation, it was no longer in place. The forceful defensive measures undertaken by the Illyrians, especially sending down rock-filled waggons and barrels to smash through the Roman ranks, had disrupted the cohesion of the force to such an extent that they were probably no longer advancing in any semblance of unison at all. Most likely it was every man for himself. In such circumstances, the individual legionnaires were easy pickings for rebel marksmen. Casualties were becoming alarmingly high. The fighting was intense:
One side endeavoured to ascend and conquer the heights, the other to repulse them and hurl them back…. Each side, both individually and collectively, was encouraging its own men, trying to hearten those who showed zeal and chiding those who gave way at any point. Those whose voices could be heard above the rest were also invoking the gods at the same time, both sides praying for the safety of their warriors at the moment, and one side begging for its freedom, the other for peace, in the future.36
Tiberius watched in horror. His men were slowly advancing up the slope, but they were being slaughtered in the process. Several times, it looked as if the Romans would be forced to retreat, and to prevent this from happening, Tiberius had sent over detachments of his reserves to reinforce the main Roman assault force, but this was not enough. Tiberius deci
ded to commit the last of his reserves. He sent some to aid their comrades, but he sent the rest in a flying column around the back and advanced upon the stronghold from the rear in a place where the slope was less steep and could thus be ascended with much less difficulty. The Illyrian garrison was small, and they only had enough men to fight on one front. Now, being attacked from both the front and the rear at the same time, they did not have enough men to keep both Roman forces at bay. The warriors wished to take shelter within their stronghold, but they were prevented from getting inside because they were continuously under attack, and so the entire Illyrian force was scattered all across the face of the mountain. The warriors cast off their armour to make them lighter so that they could flee, but the Romans were in hot pursuit, ‘for they were very eager to end the war once and for all, and did not want the foe to unite again and cause them further trouble. They discovered most of them hiding in the forests and slew them as they would so many wild beasts.’37
It was now clear that the hard-fought Battle of Andetrium was going to end in failure for the Illyrian rebels. Bato, who was inside the city, knew that he would now have no choice but to surrender. He sent his son Sceuas to Tiberius as a peace hostage, carrying a message. The note said that Bato would surrender himself and all of his followers who were still inside the fort if he obtained a pardon; that is, he and his soldiers would surrender if the Romans promised not to kill him or any of his men. Tiberius sent a reply back to Bato, stating that if he and his rebels surrendered, Bato would not be executed. During the night, Bato went down to the Roman camp, and the following morning Bato was brought before Tiberius as the Roman commander sat in judgement of him. Bato asked nothing for himself, but he made a lengthy plea with Tiberius to spare his people, and even offered to submit to being executed in exchange for having all of those who still remained inside Andetrium spared. Cassius Dio reports that Bato actually stuck his head forwards, waiting for Tiberius to personally slice it off with his own sword. It must have been a very dramatic scene and it is a shame that we don’t have any more details of it. Tiberius was apparently moved by Bato’s entreaty and his willingness to die in order to save the lives of others. He consented to Bato’s request. The remaining defenders who were still inside the fortifications surrendered. When Tiberius asked Bato why he and his people had decided to declare war on Rome and to resist for so many years, the rebel commander replied: ‘You Romans are to blame for this; for you send as guardians of your flocks, not dogs or shepherds, but wolves.’38