Wargames

by Martin van Creveld

  Overall, the games may not have yielded many earth-shaking new insights. Some would argue that they were merely an enormously expensive way to bring out the obvious; if so, however, then the same also applies to many other kinds of research done in many other fields. Others claim that wargames of every kind may actually make the events they simulate more acceptable and thus more likely to take place. On the positive side, they certainly caused players to think about what they were doing. By testing and validating all sorts of concepts, they may even have helped bring about significant shifts in American strategic thought.143 For example, initially Blue thought it was all it could do to defend so as not to lose, or at any rate make victory expensive for Red. Later it came to believe that it should counterattack and might actually win. This belief was motivated in part by the possibility of revolts in the countries of Eastern Europe which would surprise Red, disrupt his communications, and make him wonder what he should do next. Operationally there was a shift from forward defense, meaning an attempt to stop the Reds as close as possible to the West German border, to much more flexible maneuver warfare, Airland Battle and FOFA (Follow-On Forces Attack). Whereas early on it was thought that the “Central Front” almost totally eclipsed all the rest, later other theaters were rehabilitated.

  At first it was thought that, to avoid defeat, Blue would have to start using nuclear weapons at an early stage. Later Blue became more confident; as the introduction of those weapons was delayed, wars tended to become longer. Not everybody agreed with this. Thus General Bernard Rogers, who served as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) from 1979 to 1987, explained that the bases in which the weapons were stored were in danger of being overrun within days of the opening of hostilities. Either they would be used, or else they would be lost.144 As is shown by the fact that the last game in the series, which was played in 1988, focused almost exclusively on war termination, there was a growing emphasis on that problem.145 Some of the shifts may not have reflected anything in the “real” world but merely the dynamics of the games themselves. How many times can one game a Soviet invasion of West Germany and the precise way it should be countered without trying other scenarios as well? And what is the point of introducing nuclear weapons early on if doing so would almost certainly cause the games to come to an almost immediate end?

  As always, it would be hard to say whether the games shaped the strategic outlook of those years, especially the renewed feeling of confidence that resulted from the vast Reagan-inspired increase in the defense budget and the Military Reform Movement, or the other way around. Did the games trigger thought, or did they reflect it and put it to the test? To what extent did they influence policy? After each game teams working for the director stayed behind. They prepared reports which were disseminated among senior decision-makers, who may or may not have studied them. Since such decision-makers seldom discuss their plans in advance (even if they care for wargames, which not all of them do),146 however, and since a great many scenarios remained secret for years after the games had ended, the answer is left blowing in the wind. Needless to say, the more senior the decision-makers the greater the problem.147

  As the following example illustrates, the games’ value in forecasting the future was mixed. Those held in 1985–7 assumed growing economic and political pressures towards German reunification.148 East German attempts to counter those pressures by stirring up trouble around Berlin led to escalation and the outbreak of large-scale warfare on the “Central Front” which spread to the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Far East. All this was supposed to happen between October 1989 and January 1991. However, the underlying assumption, which was reflected by the teams responsible for financing the “war,” was that it would last for at least two years. It would be paid for by Japan setting aside $2.3 trillion for the purpose. Whether the Japanese had been asked, and what their response was, is not recorded. Like so many scenarios of the period, in some ways it was simply a rerun of World War II with the Soviet Union playing the role of Nazi Germany. With hindsight we know that pressures toward German reunification did in fact peak precisely during the period in question – but also that they did not lead to war either on the “Central Front” or anywhere else.

  Designing games in such a way that they will faithfully capture past events is hard enough, but doing the same in respect of the future is harder still. Since validation is impossible, most games will probably get some things right, others wrong. However, it is only in retrospect that the two may be separated. The collapse of the Soviet Union, which some saw as the decisive event that brought the “short” twentieth century to an end,149 made journalists and scholars engage in a mad scramble to provide explanations as to why it had taken place. On the other hand, there is no evidence that it was gamed in advance.

  1 See Decker, Sports and Games in Ancient Egypt, pp. 124–31.

  2 According to L. Kurke, “Ancient Greek Board Games and How to Play Them,” Classical Philology, 94, 3, July 1999, p. 259 , based on Aristotle, Politics, 1.2.9–12.

  3 See Ludus Lantruculorum, available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludus_latrunculorum.

  4 See H. J. R. Murray, A History of Board Games other than Chess, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952, pp. 53–98.

  5 See H. T. Lau, Chinese Chess: An Introduction to China’s Ancient Game of Strategy, Tokyo: Tuttle, 1985.

  6 H. J. R. Murray, A History of Chess, Oxford University Press, 1962 [1913], pp. 44–50, 123–4, 151.

  7 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 75, 77.

  8 See M. Yalom, Birth of the Chess Queen, New York: Harper, 2005, especially pp. 15–30 and 213–27.

  9 See, for a simple exposition of the various styles, D. Shenk, The Immortal Game: A History of Chess, New York: Anchor, 2005, pp. 96–7 , 100, 103, 142, 166–7, 180.

  10 B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, London: Cassell, 1967, pp. 343–4.

  11 Quoted in Shenk, The Immortal Game, pp. 112–15.

  12 See on this M. van Creveld, Command in War, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985, especially pp. 1–16 and 261–77.

  13 Murray, A History of Chess, p. 124.

  14 See R. Desjarlais, Counterplay: An Anthropologist at the Chessboard, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011, pp. 63–4.

  15 F. Brady, Endgame: Bobby Fischer’s Remarkable Rise and Fall, New York: Crown, 2011, p. 112.

  16 See the account of M. M. Botvinnik, Achieving the Aim, Oxford: Pergamon, 1981, pp. 36, 56, 158.

  17 Clausewitz, On War, p. 95.

  18 See, for what follows, “Burmese Chess,” at: www.chessvariants.org/oriental.dir/burmese.html.

  19 The quote is from P. von Hilger, War Games: A History of War on Paper, Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2012, p. 21. See also Perla, The Art of Wargaming, pp. 15–60; S. B. Patrick, “The History of Wargaming,” in Staff of the Strategy and Tactics Magazine, eds., Wargame Design, New York: Hippocrene, 1983, pp. 30–44; N. Palmer, The Comprehensive Guide to Board Wargaming, New York: Hippocrene, 1977, pp. 13–7; and many others.

  20 See M. van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 11, 29.

  21 F. E. Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962, p. 25.

  22 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 245–7 and 297.

  23 Quoted in T. Stamm-Kuhlman, Koenig in Preussens groesser Zeit, Berlin: Siedler, p. 255.

  24 According to G. Gush, A Guide to Wargaming, London: Croom Helm, 1980, pp. 21–2.

  25 See G. Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, Cambridge University Press, 1972, p. 3.

  26 Van Creveld, The Culture of War, pp. 353–7.

  27 See K. D. Brown, “Modeling for War: Toy Soldiers in Late Victorian and Edwardian England,” Journal of Social History, 24, 2, Winter 1991, pp. 237–8.

  28 H. G. Wells, Little Wars, Boston, MA: Small & Co., 1913.

  29 See, for all these kinds of games, D. Featherstone and J. Curry, Donald Featherstone’s War Games, at: Lulu.com, 2
008.

  30 See on this D. Featherstone, Naval War Games: Fighting Sea Battles with Model Ships, London: Staley & Paul, 1965, p. 148.

  31 T. N. Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions and War, Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1979, pp. 28–9.

  32 B. von Reisswitz, Kriegspiel: Instructions for the Representation of Military Maneuvers with the Kriegspiel Apparatus, Hemel Hempstead: Bill Leeson, 1983 [1824].

  33 See, for the origin of such maps, the topographic map, at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Topographic_map.

  34 See, on these critically important aspects of Reisswitz’s game, von Hilger, War Games, pp. 43–51.

  35 G. von Scharnhorst, Ueber die Wirkung des Feuergewehrs, Osnabrueck: Biblio, 1973 [1813].

  36 Von Reisswitz, Kriegspiel, p. 9.

  37 See on this point C. Coker, Barbarous Philosophers: Reflections on the Nature of War from Heraclitus to Heisenberg, London: Hurst, 2010, pp. 250, 252–3.

  38 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 117–18.

  39 E. H. Dannhauer, “Das Reisswitzsche Kriegspiel von seinen Beginn bis zu Tode des Erfinders 1827,” Militair-Wochenblatt, 56, 1872, pp. 22−4.

  40 Quoted in E. Halter, From Sun Tzu to XBox: War and Video Games, New York: Thunder Mouth’s Press, 2006, p. 43.

  41 According to Perla, The Art of Wargaming, p. 30.

  42 See, for a list of such games, von Altrock, Das Kriegspiel: Eine Anleitung zu seiner Handhabung, Berlin: Mittler, 1908, pp. 180–90.

  43 J. von Verdy du Vernois, Beitrag zum Kriegspiel, Berlin: Mittler, 1876.

  44 E.g. von Baerensprung, Einfuehrung in das Kriegspiel, Berlin: Mittler, 1913; E. Sonderegger, Anlage und Leitung von Kriegspiel-Uebungen, Frauenfeld: Huber, 1897; J. Meckel, Anleitung zum Kriegspiel, Berlin: Vossische Buchhandlung, 1875; and T. von Trotha, Gebrauch des Kriegspiel-Apparatus, Berlin: Mittler, 1870.

  45 See, on the kind of research involved, D. Isby, “Research,” in Staff of the Strategy and Tactics Magazine, Wargame Design, pp. 107–16.

  46 Y. Harari, “Wargaming the Battles of the Diadochi Wars,” unpublished, Jerusalem, September 1996.

  47 Dunnigan, Wargames Handbook, pp. 300–16.

  48 See on all this S. P. Glick and L. Ian Charters, “War Games, and Military History,” Journal of Contemporary History, 18, 4, October 1983, pp. 567–82.

  49 R. Smith, “The Long History of Gaming in Military Training,” Simulation Gaming, 41, 6, 2010, p. 9; L. Bloomfield, “Reflections on Gaming,” Orbis, 27, 4, Winter 1984, p. 784.

  50 See, for a good discussion, P. Sabin, Simulating War, London: Continuum, 2012, pp. 22–8.

  51 Dunnigan, Wargames Handbook, p. xii.

  52 P. K. Davis, “RAND’s Experience in Applying Artificial Intelligence Techniques to Strategic-Level Military-Political War Gaming,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1984, p. 9, available at: www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P6977.html.

  53 T. Zuber, The Moltke Myth, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2008, p. 306.

  54 A. von Schlieffen, Dienstschriften, Berlin: Mittler, 1939, vol. I, p. 118.

  55 T. Zuber, German War Planning, 1891–1914, Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2004, pp. 185–81.

  56 T. Zuber, Inventing the Schlieffen Plan, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 145–9.

  57 See T. Zuber, German War Planning, pp. 173–4.

  58 See the account of the 1894 game in particular, as printed in Generalstab des Heeres, ed., Die Grossen Generalstabsreisen-Ost – aus den Jahren 1891–1905, Berlin: Mittler, 1938, pp. 1–50.

  59 According to M. Caffrey, “Toward a History-Based Doctrine for Wargaming,” Aerospace Power, Fall 2000, p. 40.

  60 P. Bracken, “Unintended Consequences of Strategic Games,” Simulation and Games, 8, 3, September 1977, pp. 108–9.

  61 R. Hofmann, German Army War Games, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1983, p. 7.

  62 Ibid., pp. 29–30.

  63 K. Doenitz, Memoirs, London: Cassell, 2000 [1959], pp. 32–3.

  64 See E. R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France, New York: Wang & Hill, 2001, pp. 215–26, 260–6; also E. von Manstein, Lost Victories, London: Methuen, 1958, pp. 119–20; and F. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1962, vol. I, p. 185 , February 7, 1940.

  65 H. Guderian, Panzer Leader, London: Cassell, 1951, p. 69.

  66 Hofmann, German Army War Games, pp. 15–19.

  67 Ibid., pp. 56–7.

  68 Ibid., pp. 37–66; Halder, Kriegstagebuch, vol. II, pp. 201, 203, entries for November 29, 1940, December 3, 1941; F. von Paulus, Ich stehe hier auf Befehl!, Frankfurt/Main: Bernard & Graefe, 1960, p. 90.

  69 Halder, Kriegstagebuch, 2, p. 170, entry for August 11, 1941.

  70 Hofmann, German Army War Games, pp. 19–20.

  71 Ibid., pp. 9–11, 22.

  72 W. von Tschischwitz, Anleitung zum Kriegspiel, Neisse: Graveur, 1867.

  73 F. Sayre, Map Maneuvers and Tactical Rides, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Press, 1910, p. 21.

  74 A. Gat, The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 222.

  75 Wilson, The Bomb and the Computer, pp. 7–12.

  76 M. D. Krause, “Anglo-French Military Planning 1905–1914,” dissertation submitted to Georgetown University, 1968, Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1968, pp. 8–21; G. Aston, “The Entente Cordiale and the ‘Military Conversations’,” Quarterly Review, 258, April 1932, pp. 367–73; W. Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, 1914–1918, London: Cassell, 1925, vol. I, pp. 24–5.

  77 M. R. J. Hope Thompson, “The Military War Game,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institute, February 1962, p. 50.

  78 See, on the various American games, Perla, The Art of Wargaming, pp. 54–7.

  79 Von Cochenhausen, “Wargames for Battalion, Regiment and Division,” Military Review, March 1941.

  80 See, for much of what follows, Perla, The Art of Wargaming, pp. 63–76.

  81 W. McCarty Little, “The Strategic War Game or Chart Maneuver,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1912, p. 1230.

  82 R. H. Spector, Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession, Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977, p. 81.

  83 J. A. Barber, “The School of Naval Warfare,” Naval War College Review, 22, April 1969, pp. 89–96.

  84 See, for the way it was done, J. McHugh, Fundamentals of Wargaming, Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1966, pp. 4.14–19.

  85 See J. B. Agnew, “From Where did Our Amphibious Doctrine Come?,” Marine Corps Gazette, August 1979, p. 53.

  86 E. S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007, pp. 3, 81, 168.

  87 See McHugh, Fundamentals of Wargaming, p. 2.18.

  88 D. C. Evans and M. R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997, p. 466.

  89 See, for this and what follows, G. W. Prangue, At Dawn We Slept, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981, pp. 181, 193, 223–35, 281–2, as well as Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, pp. 463, 439, 473.

  90 C. Reynolds, Admiral John J. Towers, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991, pp. 236–9, 276–9.

  91 See R. Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor, Warning and Decision, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962, pp. 355–7, 377.

  92 Prangue, At Dawn We Slept, pp. 223–30.

  93 J. Parshall and A. Tully, Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway, Dulles, VA: Potomac Press, 2005, p. 53.

  94 Ibid., pp. 61–2, 67, 410; Mitsuo Fochida and Masatake Okumiya, Midway, New York: Ballantine, 1955, pp. 87–94.

  95 See on this R. C. Rubel, “The Epistemology of War Gaming,” Naval War College Review, 59, 2, Spring 2006, p. 119.

  96 See on this S. Budiansky, Battle of Wits: The Complete Story of Codebreaking in World War II, New York: Free Press, 2000, pp. 12–13.

  97 See, on the various combinations, McHugh, Fundamentals of War Gaming, pp. 1.18–20.
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br />   98 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 61–2.

  99 See on this N. N. Talib, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, New York: Random House, 2007, especially pp. 251 , 257, 287; also Rubel, “The Epistemology of War Gaming,” p. 117.