The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
Page 20
So far we have restricted ourselves to Calvinist religion and accordingly have assumed the doctrine of predestination to be the dogmatic background to Puritan morality as expressed in a methodically rationalized ethical conduct of life. This was mostly because that doctrine was adhered to as a cornerstone of Reformed doctrine far beyond the circle of that religious party, namely, the “Presbyterians,” which was firmly grounded in Calvin’s teaching in every respect. Both the Independent Savoy Declaration of 1658 and the 1689 Baptist Confession of Hanserd Knolly contain it, and even within Methodism (although John Wesley, the great organizing talent of his movement, was a believer in the universality of grace) the great agitator of the first generation of Methodists and its most rigorous thinker, Whitefield,16 as well as the group (who were quite influential for a time) surrounding Lady Huntingdon,17 were adherents of the “Particularism of Grace.” With its magnificent consistency, it was this doctrine which, in the most fateful era of the seventeenth century, kept alive in the militant representatives of the “holy life” the idea of being an instrument of God and the executor of his providential decrees [141], and prevented an early collapse into a purely utilitarian pursuit of justification by works [Werkheiligkeit] here on earth, an attitude which would never have been capable of inspiring such immense sacrifices for the sake of irrational and ideal goals.
The link that this doctrine established between belief in absolutely binding norms, on the one hand, and absolute determinism and the complete transcendence of the divinity on the other, was, in its way, an idea of genius. It was at the same time—in principle—to an extraordinary degree more “modern” than the gentler doctrine (appealing more to the emotions) that subordinated God as well as man to the moral law. Above all, however, the idea of being put to the test [Bewährung] (which is of fundamental importance for our discussion) constantly recurs. Since it is the psychological starting point for methodical morality, it will have to be studied “in its purest form,” by considering it in the context of a discussion of the doctrine of election by grace and the significance of this doctrine for everyday life. The most logically consistent form of this doctrine had to be our starting point because the idea of being put to the test as a schema of the link between faith and morality regularly appears in the denominations still to be discussed. Within Protestantism the consequences for the ascetic ordering of the conduct of their lives that the doctrine inevitably had for its serious followers are the fundamental antithesis of the (relative) moral feebleness of Lutheranism. The Lutheran “gratia amissibilis,” which can be won back at any time by penitence and contrition, evidently contains in itself no drive to adopt that which is important for us as a product of ascetic Protestantism, namely, a systematic, rational approach to the whole of the moral life. [142]
Lutheran piety was more inclined to leave the unrestrained vitality of instinctive action and uncomplicated emotional life undiminished; that pressure [Antrieb] for constant self-examination and thus for systematic regimentation of one’s own life, like that which the awe-inspiring doctrine of Calvinism contained, was lacking. A religious genius like Luther lived without constraint in the freedom of this openness to the world and—as long as his strength did not desert him!—was in no danger of falling back into the “status naturalis.” And that simple, fine, and typically emotional type of piety that has adorned some of the best kinds of Lutheranism, together with its nonlegalistic morality, finds few parallels with authentic Puritanism. It is much closer to the gentle Anglicanism of men like Hooker18 or Chillingworth.19 But for the ordinary, even the zealous, Lutheran, nothing was more certain than that he would only be raised temporarily—for as long as the influence of the individual confession or sermon lasted—out of the status naturalis.
Contemporaries were well aware of the difference between the ethical standard of the Reformed royal courts and that of the Lutheran ones [143], which were so often places of drunkenness and brutality. They were aware, too, that the Lutheran clergy were quite incapable of combating the ascetic Baptist movement by their preaching of the doctrine of “faith alone.” The qualities of “Gemütlichkeit” and “naturalness” that people notice about the Germans are quite unlike the Anglo-American atmosphere, which still today suffers under the lingering impression of that thorough crushing of the uninhibitedness of the “status naturalis”—this is even noticeable in people’s faces. And Germans are frequently disconcerted by the “narrowness,” “unfreedom,” and inner constraint that they find. These are opposing ways of conducting one’s life, arising from the lesser degree of ascetic permeation of life by Lutheranism in contrast to Calvinism. The antipathy felt by the uninhibited “child of the world” toward the ascetic life is expressed in these sentiments. Lutheranism, as a result of its doctrine of grace, simply failed to provide the psychological drive to be systematic in the conduct of life, and thus to enforce the methodical rationalization of life. This drive, which determined the ascetic character of piety, was capable of being engendered by various kinds of religious motives, as we shall soon see: Calvinism’s doctrine of predestination was only one of a number of possibilities. We have found convincing evidence, however, that it was not only quite unique in its logical consistency, but was also of the utmost psychological efficacy. In comparison, the non-Calvinist ascetic movements appear, purely from the viewpoint of the religious motivation of their asceticism, to be dilutions of the logical consistency of the Calvinist doctrine.
In the course of historical development, it was usually, though not always, the case that the Reformed type of asceticism was either imitated by the other ascetic movements or used as a point of reference in the development of their own principles (which may have deviated from it or gone beyond it) in order to compare and complement them.
[PIETISM]
Historically, at least, the idea of election by grace is the starting point for the ascetic movement usually known as “Pietism.” To the extent that this movement has remained within the Reformed Church, it is almost impossible to distinguish between Pietist and non-Pietist Calvinists. [144] Almost all the firm adherents of Puritanism have occasionally been numbered among the Pietists, and there is a quite tenable view that all the links between predestination and the idea of proof (or of being put to the test) [Bewährung], together with the interest in gaining the subjective “certitudo salutis” as set out above, are a Pietist development of the authentic doctrine of Calvin. [145]
With regard to England, therefore, one tends not to use the term “Pietism” at all. But even the continental Reformed Pietism (of the Netherlands and the Lower Rhine) is largely just a developed form of Reformed asceticism, like the religiosity of Bailey. The decisive emphasis had moved so strongly on to the “praxis pietas” that it seems to put dogmatic orthodoxy in the shade and even sometimes make it seem insignificant. The predestined can on occasion be guilty of errors of dogma as much as other sins, and experience teaches that many Christians without any formal training in theology can bring forth the most evident fruits of faith, while on the other hand it is clear that mere theological knowledge does not necessarily lead to conduct that gives proof of faith. [146] Election can therefore not be proved at all by theological knowledge. [147]
Deeply suspicious of the Church of the theologians, of which however—this is one of its characteristic features—it nevertheless officially remains a member, Pietism begins to gather the followers of the “praxis pietatis” in “conventicles” to be separate from the world. The movement aims to draw the invisible church of the “saints” visibly together on earth and, safe in this community, without going as far as to form sects, to lead a life which is dead to the influences of the world and based on the will of God in every detail, so that the daily outward signs manifest in their conduct may make them sure of their regenerate state. By leading more ascetic lives, the “ecclesiola” of the truly converted—and this is also a common feature of all true Pietism—hope to taste communion with God in all its bliss in this life.
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bsp; This latter striving has an inner affinity with the Lutheran “unio mystica” and often leads to a stronger cultivation of the emotional side of religion than is normal for the average Reformed Christian. This then, from our point of view, must be regarded as the most important feature of “Pietism” within the Reformed Church. For the emotional element, which on the whole is quite foreign to the original form of Calvinist piety, while having an inner affinity with certain forms of medieval religion, directs the practice of religion toward the enjoyment of bliss in this world instead of the ascetic struggle to secure a future in the next. And emotion can experience such a heightening that religious feeling can take on a truly hysterical character and then achieve precisely the opposite effect of that sober and austere discipline into which the systematic “holy life” of the Puritan takes a man, namely, a weakening of those “inhibitions” which support the rational personality of the Calvinist against “emotional states”. This emotional heightening occurs through that alternation (known from countless instances and with a psychophysical basis) between semisensuous states of religious exaltation and periods of nervous exhaustion, when God seems “remote”. [148] Similarly, the Calvinist idea of the depravity of the creature, if taken in an emotional way—for example, “feeling like a worm”—can lead to a deadening of the energies in working life. [149] Even the idea of predestination can lead to fatalism if—in contrast to the authentic tendencies of Calvinist rational religion—it becomes something to be emotionally appropriated. [150] And finally, the drive toward the seclusion of the saints from the world can, given a strong degree of increase in emotional in-volvement, lead to a kind of monastic community organization of a semicommunist character, like those which Pietism has frequently produced in the Reformed Church. [151]
But as long as this extreme effect, brought about by that cultivation of emotion, is not produced, and Reformed Pietism continues to strive to ensure salvation within secular working life, the practical effect of Pietist principles is merely an even stricter ascetic control of conduct in the calling and an even firmer religious foundation to morality in the calling than that which is provided by the mere worldly “respectability” of the normal Reformed Christian (seen by the “superior” Pietists as second-class Christianity). The religious aristocracy of the saints, which, in the course of the development of all Reformed asceticism, is the more certain to emerge, the more seriously it is taken, is then—as in Holland—organized within the church on a voluntarist basis by the formation of conventicles. In English Puritanism, on the other hand, as we shall see later, the religious aristocracy aimed for either a formal distinction between active and passive Christians in the constitution of the church, or—as previously mentioned—in the creation of sects.
The development of German Pietism (associated with the names of Spener,20 Francke,21 and Zinzendorf22) from within Lutheranism leads us away from the area of predestination. It does not, however, necessarily lead us away from the area of those ideas of which predestination was the ultimate conclusion. This is clear from the case of Spener, who, as he himself testifies, was influenced by English and Dutch Pietism, and, for example, from the fact that Bailey’s writings were read in the first Pietist conventicles. [152]
For our subject, at least, Pietism means merely the penetration of methodically cultivated and controlled, that is, ascetic, living [Le-bensführung] into areas of non-Calvinist religious observance. [153] Lutheranism, however, inevitably found this rational asceticism to be an alien element, and the lack of consistency of German Pietist doctrine is a result of the difficulties arising from this. In the case of Spener, the dogmatic foundation of systematic religious conduct is based on a combination of Luther’s ideas and the specifically Reformed component of good works performed “with the goal of honoring God” [154] and with the equally Reformed sounding faith in the possibility for the regenerate to achieve a relative degree of Christian perfection. [155] What is lacking is the consistency of the theory. With his strong mystical leanings [156], Spener attempts, in a rather vague, but essentially Lutheran, manner, to describe, rather than to give reasons for, the systematic character of Christian living which is essential to his Pietism also. The certitudo salutis is not derived from sanctification, and the latter concept, as previously mentioned, is linked in the loose Lutheran manner with faith, rather than with the idea of proof. [157]
But again and again, whenever the rational, ascetic element in Pietism gained the upper hand over the emotional side, the ideas that are so significant for our thesis came into their own. These were (1) that the methodical development of one’s own holiness to ever higher levels of firm assurance and perfection as measured against the law was a sign of a state of grace [158], and (2) that the providence of God worked in those so perfected, by giving them signs to which they would be receptive if they waited patiently and engaged in methodical reflection. [159] For A. H. Francke, too, labor in a calling is the ascetic means par excellence [160]; he is every bit as convinced as the Puritans that it is God himself who blesses his own with success in their labors. And as a substitute for the “double decree,” Pietism created ideas which, very much like that doctrine (though less strongly), established an aristocracy of the regenerate [161], with all the psychological consequences that we have already described for Calvinism. One of these is the doctrine known as “Terminism” [162], which was (falsely) attributed to Pietism in general23 by its opponents. This is the assumption that although grace is universally offered, it is only offered to any one individual once at one particular moment in his life, or at least on some occasion for the last time. [163] Anyone who misses this moment is beyond even the help of the universalism of grace—that person is in the situation of someone who has been passed over by God in Calvinist doctrine. In effect, this theory is quite close to the assumption, which Francke, for example, derived from personal experience and which was widely believed within Pietism—indeed, it could even be said to be predominant—that grace can only achieve a “breakthrough” under specific unique and un-repeatable circumstances, namely, after a “repentance experience” [Buβkampf].24 [164] Since, in the view of the Pietists, not everyone is disposed to have that experience, the person who, in spite of employing the ascetic method indicated by the Pietists to help to bring it about, does not experience it, remains in the eyes of the regenerate a kind of passive Christian. On the other hand, by the creation of a method for bringing about the “repentance experience,” the achievement of divine grace becomes in effect the object of rational human arrangement.
This notion of the “aristocracy of grace” was also responsible for many Pietists (though not all, for instance, not Francke) and especially, as the constantly recurring questions raised in Spener’s writing show, many Pietist pastors, having reservations about private confession. These reservations contributed to the undermining of private confession in Lutheranism, too, since the effect of grace visible in a holy life, achieved through repentance, determined whether absolution could be granted. It was therefore impossible to be satisfied with the mere “attritio” to justify granting it. [165]
Zinzendorf’s religious self-appraisal, even if it does waver in the face of attacks by the orthodox, constantly leads to the notion of the “instrument” [Rüstzeug]. Otherwise, though, the attitude of this remarkable “religious dilettante” (as Ritschl calls him) regarding the points which are important for us, is difficult to define unambiguously. [166] He referred to himself repeatedly as a representative of the “Pauline-Lutheran Trope”25 as against the “Pietist-Jacobean Trope” which adhered closely to the law.26” However, it is clear from the notary’s minutes of August 12, 1729, that the doctrinal standpoint of the brotherhood itself and its practice, which, in spite of his constantly stressed Lutheranism, [167] he permitted and encouraged, corresponds in many respects to the Calvinist aristocracy of saints. [168] The much discussed transferring of the office of elder to Christ (on November 12, 1741) expressed something similar for all to see. Of the three
“tropes” of the brotherhood, moreover, the Calvinist and the Moravian ones were essentially based on the Reformed ethic of the calling. Zinzendorf, too, speaking to John Wesley, expressed the Puritan view that other people could recognize the justified person by the manner of his life even if the person himself could not always do so. [169]
On the other hand, however, there is in the specific kind of piety characteristic of the Herrnhut Brotherhood a strong element of the emotional, and on more than one occasion Zinzendorf personally endeavored to thwart [170] the tendency toward the Puritan type of ascetic sanctification in his community and to reinterpret the idea of justification by works [Werkheiligkeit] in a Lutheran sense. [171] Also, as a consequence of the rejection of the conventicles and the retention of the practice of confession, an essentially Lutheran type of reliance on sacramental transmission of salvation was developed. Then Zinzendorf’s specific principle that the childlikeness of religious feeling was a feature of its genuineness, as well as, for example, the use of the drawing of lots as a means of discovering God’s will, operated so strongly against rationalism in the conduct of life that, on the whole, wherever the influence of the Count extended [172], the antirational, emotional elements in the piety of the Herrnhut community predominated to a far greater extent than elsewhere within Pietism. [173] The linking of morality and the forgiveness of sins in Spangenberg’s “Idea fidei fratrum” is just as loose [174] as it generally is in Lutheranism. Zinzendorf’s rejection of the Methodist striving for perfection corresponds—as elsewhere in his writings—to his basically eudaemonistic ideal of letting people experience bliss [175] (he used the word “Glückseligkeit”) in the present, and to experience it emotionally, instead of instructing them to be sure of enjoying it in the hereafter through rational work. [176]