The Foundations

by Alexander Dugin

  For instance, the process of assimilation can be seen in the case of two societies of an ethnic order (two ethnoses), and also in the formation of a narod (wherein assimilation plays a crucial role), but also in the formation of the nation (naturalization). There is a form of assimilation characteristic to civil society, expressing itself in the propaganda of the ideology of liberalism, the principles of tolerance and political correctness, and in the condemnation of national and state structures, which form the means of incorporating a person into the structure of a “civil society.” In all cases, we are dealing with assimilation, but its quality and structure are different each time. For this reason, we speak of instrumental derivatives.

  That which is transparent and obvious on the level of the koineme becomes more veiled on the level of complex models of society. Ethnosociology is called upon not to reduce the complex to the simple, but to trace the following:

  • How the structuration of complex societies on the basis of simple ones occurs.

  • What happens in the meantime to simple societies and what their place is in the general context of more complex ones.

  • What is common between simple and complex societies.

  • What in them is principally different.

  3.

  The Theoretical Paradigms of Ethnosociological Methodology

  I. Primordialism

  The Fundamental Methods of the Interpretation of Ethnic Phenomena

  In Ethnosociology it is customary to distinguish three approaches to the understanding of the essence of the ethnos.42 These approaches are Primordialism, Constructivism, and Instrumentalism.

  Primordialism derives from the Latin word primordialis, “primordial,” “primary.”

  Constructivism is from the word constructio, i.e., “something artificially produced.”

  Instrumentalism is from the word instrumentum, the use of something for instrumental ends.

  Primordialism comes close to “Essentialism” (from the Latin essentia, “essence”), and “Constructivism” to “Modernism.” Sometimes to these three fundamental methods is added also the school of the “ethnosymbolists” (E. Smith).

  Some ethnosociological writers present the matter as if it dealt with diverse views of the essence of the ethnos.43 We shall show that in the course of the correct distinction of the ethnos and its derivations this problem disappears by itself, inasmuch as it is necessary to approach different types of society with different criteria, which automatically removes the contradiction.

  For convenience of exposition let us take as our basis the three approaches — Primordialism (Essentialism), Constructivism (Modernism), and Instrumentalism — and on their foundation, show the methodological peculiarities of the interpretation of ethnic phenomena and ethnic processes. Later we shall look at the approach of “Ethnosymbolism” separately.

  The Essence of the Primordialist Approach

  The primordialist approach in its broadest interpretation consists in the fact that the ethnos is acknowledged as the primordial characteristic of human society and human culture. The ethnos lies at the basis of social structures, which are its variations and dialectical moments.

  This term was introduced in 1957 by the American sociologist Edward Shils (1910–1995).44 He noticed that in archaic societies ethnic kinship is recognized as a special closeness to a relative not as a person but as the bearer of a special “significant relationship” which can be described as a “primordial relationship” or as the “Primordial.”45 Shils strictly opposes the structure of the “Primordial” to those social structures that are established on the basis of interpersonal interactions. Earlier we gave the example of the figure of Do Kamo, studied by Maurice Leenhardt.

  The ethnos is something original, primordial, unfolded around the figure of the Primordial.

  All types of Primordialism come together in this main point. And this assertion is so self-evident and confirmed by historical observations that it is rather difficult to dispute — at least in such a formulation. If we understand by the ethnos that which the majority of ethnosociologists understand and which Shirokogoroff formulated in his definition, then, indeed, language, belief in a common origin, and customs (i.e., the ethnos) characterize human society, beginning from the most ancient (original, primordial) epochs right up to today. And even in societies which we have defined as derivations from the ethnos and in which the ethnos, it would seem, should long ago have ceased to be, it is always possible to discover an ethnic component, which becomes manifest at a glance during a certain confluence of events.

  Hardly any opponents to such an approach to the ethnos would be found if primordialism were to be formulated precisely in this manner. But besides recognition of the primordialism of the ethnos, various authors added to this a variety of additional characteristics, which gave cause for criticism.

  Different Types of Primordialism

  In his work Myths and Memories of the Nation, the contemporary English sociologist Anthony Smith (founder of the school of “Ethnosymbolism,” about which we shall speak below) summarized the diverse approaches to Primordialism.46

  Primordialism, according to Smith, is of three kinds:

  • Essentialist, which proposes that the ethnos is the immutable form of the existence of society from antiquity to contemporary nations and that between contemporary nations and ancient ethnoses there exists an uninterrupted connection (this is an extreme form of primordialism);

  • Kinship, which insists that all ethnic symbols are directed toward demonstrating an uninterrupted line of kinship among generations;

  • The so-called “Geertz’s Primordialism,” is named after Clifford Geertz (1926–2006), author of the theory of “Symbolic Anthropology,” who asserted that despite the fact that it is impossible to prove a direct connection between historical forms of the ethnos, belief in such a connection is such a stable sociological fact that it must be taken account of in the analysis of a society as though it were indeed the case.47

  All of these definitions demand immediate commentaries. In the category of “Essentialist Primordialism,” Smith includes theories that do not at all distinguish between the ethnos and the nation and do not assign the narod to a separate category, considering ethnoses as an organic phenomenon, unchanged in the course of all history. This is obviously untrue, since during the transition from simple society, which is an ethnic society, to complex society there occur fundamental changes, affecting all social structures. That is why an ethnos in an ethnic society and an ethnos in a formalized state, religious context, or civilization will be different realities. To an even greater extent this concerns the nation, which is built on an entirely different principle than the ethnos is built on. Thus, “Essentialist Primordialism” should be recognized as excessively naïve and of very limited scientific worth.

  Even less adequate is “Kinship Primordialism,” which insists on an uninterrupted lineal history, around which, supposedly, the development of a culture occurs. We have already seen that an ethnos necessarily consists of a few exogamous parts (lineages), the relationship between which is built along rather complex sociological scenarios even within the simplest ethnoses. The lineage ties are only one of the elements of the ethnos, and ethnic culture consists of the recognition of plurality of lineages (duality as a minimum) and the rules of marriage relation with it. Thus, the basic culture pattern is much more complex than the lineal in the simplest societies, and in more differentiated ones this complex structure becomes even more complex. That is why “Kinship Primordialism” should also be set aside.

  Most adequate of all seems to be “Geertz’s Primordialism,” which considers the ethnos precisely as a society and as a sociological phenomenon and considers it most important in the complex of factors that form social identity.

  We can put in this same category of approaches the school that Smith calls “Perennialism” (from the Latin perennis, “long,” “constant,” “lasting”), and more specifically, one
of its varieties, “perpetual Perennialism.” The upshot of the perennialist approach to the ethnos is that it considers the ethnos not as an organic, but as a historical category, changing constantly and connected with extraneous motives: power, dominion, economic interests, the struggle for resources, etc. Perennialists as a whole think that the ethnos is a variable. But “perpetual perennialists,” much closer to “Geertz’s Primordialism,” propose that the ethnos always exists, but is found in constant change. This “perpetual Perennialism” can perfectly well be accepted in that part in which it emphasizes the change of the sociological structure of the ethnos in history. This indeed occurs, but only when the ethnos enters into history, and this we call transition to the stage of the narod. With such a correction, this approach can be acknowledged as helpful, especially in that it proposes to consider various forms of transformation of the ethnos in history.

  We now approach another important division of Primordialism. Generally, we can distinguish two primordialist approaches: one considers the ethnos only as a society, as a social and cultural phenomenon (the German Sociology of Thurnwald and Mühlmann, the American cultural anthropology of Franz Boas and his followers, the English Functionalism of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Browne, the French Structural Anthropology of Lévi-Strauss, “Geertz’s Primordialism,” “perpetual perennialism,” etc.); the other adds to the ethnos biological, generic and racial factors.

  We should recognize only the first approach as fully adequate, but in order to have a complete picture we should survey also the second one.

  The Biosocial48 Approach

  The supporters of the biosocial approach to the ethnos are guided by a specific anthropological attitude, according to which man is a dual phenomenon: on one hand, he is a biological organism, pertaining to a variety of animals (mammalia), and on the other hand he is the carrier of a rational, intelligent principle, on the basis of which he develops social structures, the socium. The origin of the understanding of man as a peculiar animal endowed with reason stems from Greek antiquity. Already Aristotle defined man as “an animal endowed with reason” (ζῶον λόγον ἔχον [zṓon lógon échon]), which sounds like the Latin animalis rationalis.

  This allows one to understand all the actions, creations, reactions, and deeds of in two ways, discovering in them the animal (biological, zoological) element and the properly reasonable, rational nature. The supporters of the Biosocial theory consider the ethnos through such an approach, discovering in the ethnos a biological (animal) and rational component. The ethnos on the whole is seen in this case as the extension of a genus with the addition of the animal component — the members of the genus perceive themselves as a flock, not unlike animal species; they hold one another, help one another, and battle with foreign lineages for loot, food, territory, and other material resources. A reasonable nature restrains these animal impulses and motivations and tries to limit them and to order, censor, crush, and supersede them.

  In this theory, the ethnos is a society based on a compromise between the animal and the rational; moreover, the animal principle is manifest here to a greater degree than in other forms of society.

  The general logic of social history is seen as a process of strengthening the rational principle in relation to the biological, animal principle. Each following form of society strengthens the rational component, elevating it into a social law. But the biological principle preserves its positions and continues to act as the motivating force of human activity, from the simplest spheres (struggle for survival) to the most complex ones (will to power). For this reason, man even in the most complex and highly differentiated social systems continues to preserve his biosocial nature, and thus, also some ethnic features, as a rudiment of the animal feeling of kin and flock.

  Such are the theoretical premises of the biosocial approach. It can be categorized as primordialist on account of its assertion of the primordiality and constancy of the ethnic factor.

  If we analyze this approach carefully we will see that the properly ethnic is interpreted here as a manifestation of precisely the biological element, whence the increased attention to the genus. Ethnic (simple) society is seen here as a society in which the animal principle is maximally manifest and the social, reasonable one, minimally. The ethnos is thereby declared to be the biological side of man. And that which is preserved in complex societies is interpreted as a contribution of the animal side of man as such.

  We have already spoken repeatedly the insufficiency of such an approach and shall again return to this after considering a few, more concrete forms of its manifestation.

  Evolutionary Theory: Herbert Spencer

  The classic expression of the biosocial approach is the theory of evolution of species (Charles Darwin), applied to society and its history. The English sociologist and eminent theoretician of liberalism Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) formulated this theory in a completed form in his ten-volume work A System of Synthetic Philosophy.49

  Spencer’s idea consists in the following: the world is a process of constant and irreversible development from simple to complex. This is a common characteristic of matter, living organisms, and societies. The complication of systems is always positive and creative. That is why the transition from simple to complex is considered “progress,” a “good,” a “value,” etc. “Complexity,” “complication,” and “differentiation” are thought of as ethnical categories, and not simply as neutral constants.

  The movement towards the complication of a system occurs in the form of conflicts. In the study of biological species Spencer relies on the theories of Darwin (1809–1882), seeing in them the confirmation of his own ideas of general evolution, formulated under the influence of the romantics, such as the philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854) and the poet Samuel Coleridge (1772–1834), a few years before he became acquainted with Darwin’s main work On the Origin of the Species.50 , 51 As in other animal species, the “struggle for survival,” which comprises the main law of evolution, is the same basic vector of human history. In this struggle, “the fittest,” capable of complicating their behavioral strategies, always win. Thus, there is a continuity between animals and men, supplied by the unity of the universal law of evolution.

  Spencer and his Social Darwinism do not so much explain human behavior by the presence in man of an animal principle as they consider the algorithm of both animal and human behavior as particular cases of a general law of complication of systems, which operates even for inanimate matter. Human society becomes a battlefield, as do all other levels of reality. In the animal world, we only see the grand and graphic horizons of evolution, which serve as an example for the explanation of human history. Human society, in itself more complex than a herd of animals, moves in the direction of complication along the same trajectory as in the evolution of species: the struggle for resources forces societies to produce ever more effective strategies and to adapt themselves to circumstances. Only “the fittest” societies win on this path.

  Spencer distinguishes two fundamental types of society, the militant and industrial. In a forceful society, the struggle for survival proceeds with the help of domination, violence, coercion. It is arranged hierarchically: the most “fit” mercilessly exploit the less “fit” and live at their expense. Forceful society is relatively simple.

  In industrial society, the social strategies of struggle become more complicated and are moved into the economic and contractual sphere. The essence of the struggle for survival remains the same, but the rules of its conduct become more complicated. Special laws are introduced, strictly determining the forms of struggle and the zones of its legitimate conduct, which are permissible. The war for survival in industrial society is transformed into economic competition, which moves society in the direction of greater complication. According to Spencer, this movement has a goal, consisting in universal equilibrium, when the complications of the social system reach their culmination. Then the state will die off, and each individ
ual will represent a maximally complex autonomous system. This kind of society will gradually leave only “the fittest”; the rest disappear as not conforming to the laws of evolution.

  Spencer does not speak directly about the ethnos and begins to build his social typology from forceful society, which in Ethnosociology corresponds to the stage of the narod.

  From an ethnosociological point of view, Spencer’s Social Darwinism can be accepted in its description of the process of complication of societies, which corresponds to empirical data, at least in the framework of Western-European civilization. But what should be rejected is his biological and Darwinist interpretation of the basic motive of human action (a purely biological approach, considering the main motive impulse of man to be the striving towards physical pleasure, identified in the spirit of English pragmatism with “happiness”) and confidence in the irreversibility and uni-directionality of evolution and progress. We know that the majority of societies can move from the point of view of the simplicity or complexity of its systems in both directions.