by what they saw, and when they returned to Korea, they sought ways for
Korea to follow Japan’s path to modernization.
Among the twelve young Korean leaders in the gentlemen’s sightseeing
group was Kim Ok- kyun, a talented and energetic official who served as
the informal leader. After the tour of Japan ended, Fukuzawa Yukichi, per-
. 102 .
Rivalry in Korea and the Sino- Japanese War, 1882–1895
haps Japan’s leading liberal intellectual, who had been an interpreter on an
1860 mission to Washington, D.C., arranged for Kim Ok- kyun to remain
in Japan and to study for six months at Keio University, which Fukuzawa
had established in 1858 to promote Western studies. Kim Ok- kyun became
convinced that modernization, following the path of Japan’s Meiji Restora-
tion, was essential to strengthen Korea and to help it adapt to the modern
world. After he returned to Korea the next year, Kim Ok- kyun formed the
In de pen dence Party to promote modernization. His proposals encountered
serious re sis tance from more conservative Korean officials, some of whom
enjoyed good relations with Chinese officials.
In 1881 Korea expanded relations with all three major countries it be-
lieved could help it resist Rus sia: China, Japan, and the United States.
Within China, responsibility for managing Korean policy was transferred
from the Ministry of Rites, which had managed traditional tribute rela-
tions, to Li Hongzhang. Whereas Japan had developed a systematic pro-
gram of training its Foreign Ministry officials, Chinese management of
foreign policy rested heavi ly on that one person, Li Hongzhang. Li sup-
ported Korea’s efforts to avoid conflict and promote stability by having
good relations with both Japan and China. He did not object to Korean
students studying in Japan, but he also invited a Korean mission to visit
Tianjin to see the Tianjin Arsenal, which he had supported as part of Chi-
na’s Self- Strengthening Movement. Those who visited the Tianjin Arsenal
later helped establish the first modern arsenal in Korea, in 1883. Li Hong-
zhang also believed that a U.S. presence in Korea would help promote sta-
bility because the United States did not have territorial ambitions and
could provide a counterweight to Japan and Rus sia. Li supervised the signing
of a treaty between China and Korea, and he personally mediated discus-
sions between Korea and the United States over the drafting of a treaty that
was completed in 1882. This marked a turning point in relations between
Korea and the outside world— and the end of the old East Asian order
based on tribute relations among Asian countries and its replacement by
Western- style treaties built on legal specifications. Many high officials in
the key countries involved nurtured the hope that Korea would modernize
while maintaining peaceful relations with both China and Japan.
As part of their modernization efforts, in 1880 Korean military officials
had invited Japa nese military officials to help train eighty elite Korean cadets
. 103 .
china and japan
who were to form the nucleus of a modern Korean army. Korea had a very
limited bud get and chose to reduce the number of its old- style troops. In
July 1882, like the Japa nese samurai who had revolted against the ending of
their stipends, some older Korean soldiers who had been retired against
their will protested that they had been waiting more than a year for their
pay. When they were given payment in the form of grain, they found that
the grain had been mixed with chaff and was not edible. Infuriated by their
treatment, they seized weapons from the government’s arsenal and took to
the streets, attacking Korean reformers as well as Japa nese. The Japa nese
officer who had been training the Koreans to build a modern army and
three of his aides were killed, other Japa nese individuals were killed in the
streets, and the Japa nese legation was burned down. The minister at the
Japa nese legation barely escaped. The rioters attempted to kill Queen Min
as well, but she escaped by being carried on the back of a servant. Rioters
did, however, kill one official from the Min family. This event became
known as the Soldiers’ Riot of 1882, or the Imo Uprising.
The Taewongun supported the rioters but King Kojong did not. After
the uprising, the Taewongun forced King Kojong to step aside and the
Taewongun returned to power. He removed from office all officials from the
Min family and executed his own brother, who had allied with the queen’s
family. In response to the killing of the Japa nese officials, Japan sent several
hundred Japa nese soldiers to Korea to protect its citizens and to support
Japan’s allies in the government. Although China had not supported the Imo
Uprising, it was alarmed by the Japa nese troops, and in response it initi-
ated the first Chinese military intervention in Korea since the Manchus at-
tacked in 1636 by sending some 3,000 soldiers to Korea. The Chinese
troops quickly overwhelmed the much smaller number of Japa nese soldiers
and lent their support to the conservatives in the Korean government. China
thus abandoned its policy of suzerainty and began to take an active role in
Korean domestic affairs for the first time in 250 years.
Li Hongzhang, who managed the Chinese response, was confident that
in Korea the Chinese were stronger than the Japa nese, but he could see that
the Japa nese were gaining strength and he sought to maintain a stable
peaceful relationship with Japan. He was furious with the Taewongun, who
had upset Chinese- Japanese relations by overthrowing the lawful Korean
government, thus causing the Japa nese to send in troops and setting off a
. 104 .
Rivalry in Korea and the Sino- Japanese War, 1882–1895
confrontation between China and Japan. Li seized the Taewongun and took
him to China, where he was placed under house arrest for three years, and
he returned King Kojong to power. China invited former officials from the
Min family, relatives of the queen, to return to office. Li Hongzhang also
had the Koreans apologize to Japan for the killing of its citizens and pay
Japan a small indemnity. Kong Kojong did not believe that he had to choose
between the Chinese and the Japa nese and he was ready to work with both
nations. However, Li was criticized by some nationalists in China for being
too generous to Japan, and Chinese military forces remained in Korea, in
effect becoming an occupation army. Some Koreans saw China as their pro-
tector. Others saw China as an arrogant imperialist power interfering with
Korean in de pen dence.
When the 3,000 Chinese soldiers were sent to Korea, Li Hongzhang
had been away from his post, mourning his mother’s death, but he soon
returned to office to formulate Chinese policy and give directives to the of-
ficials dispatched to Seoul. To take charge of Seoul’s new Capital Guard
Command and oversee China’s activities in Korea, Li Hongzhang sent an
able twenty- three- year- old leader from his Anhui Army, Yuan Shikai. Yuan,
who in 1912 would become president of th
e Republic of China, was to take
charge of training the local Korean forces. China also signed a trade agree-
ment with Korea that enabled the Chinese to dominate trade between
Korea and the outside world. Thus, the Chinese acquired greater influence
in Korea than the Japa nese had.
King Kojong abandoned his earlier progressive policies following the
Imo Uprising, and some Japa nese and progressive Koreans were deeply dis-
appointed that Korea would not undertake Meiji- style reforms. In Japa-
nese eyes, such reforms not only would have led to a government reor ga ni-
za tion but also would have made Korea a good trading partner that would
export grain to Japan and import products from Japan’s growing textile in-
dustry. But because the Chinese now had far more influence in Korea,
Japan was not in a position to take bold steps there. King Kojong still
favored Japanese- style modernization, but he wanted to work with the Chi-
nese and he was also cautious about moving too quickly.
For the Japa nese, the defeat of their small force in Korea by the Chi-
nese in 1882 and the constraints the Chinese placed on their trade with
Korea were deeply disturbing. Should there be another confrontation with
. 105 .
china and japan
the Chinese in Korea, they wanted to be better prepared. In 1873, following
the advice of German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, the Iwakura Mission
had championed a policy known by the slogan the Chinese had used during
their Warring States period: Fuguo qiangbing (in Japa nese, Fukoku kyouhei,
meaning “Enrich the country, strengthen military power”). In the 1870s,
the Japa nese bud get had been under great constraints, but in December 1882,
with a stronger economic base, Japan issued an imperial edict authorizing
the expansion of military preparedness. Thereafter, the military bud get
quickly grew to represent more than 20 percent of the entire Japa nese gov-
ernment’s bud get. So that the navy could increase the production of ships
without overly taxing the bud get, the government also issued bonds to help
meet the costs.
Kim Ok- kyun’s Disastrous Kapsin Coup, 1884
On December 4, 1884, Kim Ok- kyun, who had been a strong voice for re-
form since his visit to Japan as part of the gentlemen’s sightseeing group of
1881 and was frustrated by the Korean government’s continued unwilling-
ness to take steps toward modernization, led a poorly planned coup in which
six high- level ministers were killed, many more were injured, and a tempo-
rary government was installed. The bloody attack on Korea’s leaders, which
was overturned within three days, had disastrous consequences. It discred-
ited reform efforts, set back the cause of modernization, and poisoned Ja-
pan’s relations with both China and Korea. It is known as the Kapsin Coup
because it occurred in the year Kapsin, in the East Asian sixty- year cycle.
Kim Ok- kyun had been encouraged by Fukuzawa Yukichi, as well as
by other Japa nese intellectuals, for his ideas about promoting Meiji- style
modernization and had received popu lar approval in the Japa nese press for
his modernization goals, but Japan’s leaders did not support his plans for
the coup. Count Iwakura, who had led the Iwakura Mission, and Foreign
Minister Inoue Kaoru both refused to support the coup because they
believed it was impor tant to retain the goodwill of China. Shibusawa Eiichi,
the most prominent business leader in promoting Japa nese business in
vari ous parts of Asia, also refused to support Kim Ok- kyun’s plans for
the coup.
. 106 .
Rivalry in Korea and the Sino- Japanese War, 1882–1895
By 1884 Kim Ok- kyun had grown frustrated with the Korean leaders’
re sis tance to undertaking reforms. He admired the young Japa nese samurai
who had overthrown the shogun’s government and initiated the Meiji Res-
toration, but before 1884, with 3,000 Chinese troops still in Korea, he knew
he had no chance of overthrowing the Korean government. However, when
the Sino- French War broke out in August 1884 and China sent forces to
Vietnam to preserve Chinese interests there, Kim Ok- kyun saw an oppor-
tunity to carry out his coup. Although he did not have the support of leaders
in Tokyo, he did have the support of some members of the Japa nese em-
bassy staff in Korea and the small number of Japa nese troops in Seoul.
At a banquet celebrating the opening of Korea’s new post office on
December 4, 1884, when many high officials opposing reform were pre sent,
Kim’s supporters set fire to a nearby building, creating noise and confusion.
They seized King Kojong and took him to his palace. They then summoned
the vari ous Korean barracks commanders who might have mobilized Ko-
rean military forces, and as they arrived at the palace, one by one, they were
killed by Kim’s supporters. Kim immediately promulgated a fourteen- point
reform program that called for the termination of China’s suzerainty over
Korea, the abolition of the yangban class (the large aristocratic class con-
sisting of blood descendants of those who had passed Korea’s official ex-
aminations). Until then only descendants of this class had been allowed to
take the examinations. The program allowed anyone to take the exams
and officials would be selected by individual merit. It also sought to in-
troduce a state council and undertake other reforms.
Although Kim Ok- kyun had prepared a detailed list of reforms, he was
astonishingly unprepared to implement them. His hope that he could main-
tain power when there were only about 200 Japa nese troops in Korea who
might support him against the 1,500 Chinese troops still stationed there
was totally unrealistic. After three days, General Yuan Shikai, who had re-
mained in Seoul after 1882, brought in his Chinese troops. In the fighting
that followed, more than 180 people were killed, including some 38 Japa nese
troops and 10 Chinese. The officials who had been put in place by Kim
Ok- kyun were all dismissed. Japa nese citizens living in Seoul, who were
viewed by many in Korea as exploiting cap i tal ists, became targets for pos-
si ble attack, and their homes were looted and burned. Kim Ok- kyun and
. 107 .
china and japan
eight of his followers managed to escape to Japan on a Japa nese ship that
had been docked in Inchon harbor.
Before the attempted coup, King Kojong had met with Kim Ok- Kyun
and was ready to offer some support for his reform goals. But after the coup,
all those who had been supportive of reform were discredited, and Kim
Ok- kyun was regarded as villainous for his bloody attack on high officials.
Many Koreans felt he should be shot. Although he had escaped to Japan,
where he remained in hiding, Kim was still fearful of assassination. The
Japa nese press, however, presented a much more positive view of Kim
Ok- kyun and his efforts to bring modernization to Korea.
Ito Hirobumi and Li Hongzhang, representing the Japa nese and Chi-
nese governments, respectively, made statesmanlike efforts to preserve the
peace and maintain
workable Sino- Japanese relations. In April 1885, they
signed the Tianjin Convention, in which they agreed to pull all Japa nese and
Chinese troops out of Korea within four months. They also agreed that in
the future, if one country were to send troops into Korea, it would imme-
diately notify the other country, which could then also send in troops.
Li Hongzhang appointed Yuan Shikai, commander of the Chinese
troops in Korea and only twenty- six years old at the time, as the “Director-
General Resident in Korea of Diplomatic and Commercial Relations,” to
look after Chinese interests in a civilian capacity. Officially, in line with the
Tianjin Convention, Yuan was no longer a military leader, but China and
Japan both understood that he could call on Chinese troops if he judged it
necessary. Li Hongzhang assigned Yuan Shikai responsibility for preventing
Japan’s commercial dominance in Korea, and indeed Chinese trade with
Korea increased rapidly in the next several years. Although Japa nese mer-
chants continued to dominate commercial activities in Pusan, Chinese held
the dominant position in Inchon, Wonsan, and along the Chinese border.
After Chinese and Japa nese troops left Korea, in line with the Tianjin
Convention, many Chinese troops remained in areas near the Korean
border, and the Japa nese had no choice but to accept China’s greater influ-
ence in Korea. The telegraph lines in Korea, for example, were completely
under Chinese control. Although Japan had telegraph lines from Japan to
Pusan, it did not receive permission to link its lines from Pusan to Seoul.
The Japa nese could communicate with Seoul only by going through the
Chinese telegraph system. Yuan Shikai, despite his youth, exercised strong
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Rivalry in Korea and the Sino- Japanese War, 1882–1895
leadership. Although the Koreans were happy to be rid of Kim Ok- kyun
and his Japa nese friends, some complained about Yuan Shikai’s arrogance
in giving directions to the Korean government. And to the Japa nese, the
shutdown of Korea’s Meiji- style reform efforts and the dominance of Yuan
Shikai represented yet another humiliating defeat. Some in Japan became
determined that, in the future, Japan would be strong enough in Korea that
it would no longer have to submit to China.
China and Japan Page 17