Fukuzawa Yukichi Advocates Turning Away from
Chinese Culture
Despite the tensions over Korea, substantial numbers of Japa nese trained
in classical Chinese studies continued to travel to China and to write for
Japa nese audiences admiring accounts of Chinese culture. Takezoe Shin-
ichiro, for example, who served under Mori Arinori in the Japa nese lega-
tion in Beijing, wrote in Chinese for a Japa nese audience a report of his 111
days of travels in China. Reflecting his affection for Chinese culture, he de-
scribed the beauty of the places he visited and provided accounts of some
of the heroes described in Chinese lit er a ture as well as of con temporary
Chinese food and agricultural practices. Many other Japa nese scholars wrote
poems describing their visits to impor tant historical Chinese sites.
After the failure of the Kapsin Coup, however, a growing number of
Japa nese intellectuals became critical of Chinese culture because it was slow
in adapting to the needs of modern society. Earlier, Japa nese participants
on the Senzaimaru trip and the Iwakura Mission had been disappointed by
what they saw in China. Now, in 1885, a few months after the resounding
defeat of his former student Kim Ok- kyun, Fukuzawa Yukichi, perhaps the
most influential Japa nese intellectual of the Meiji period, wrote an article
stating that Japan should “datsu a” (leave Asia). Japan should no longer look
to China as a model, he said, but should look to the West, which in his view
was more advanced. At the time, Fukuzawa’s essay did not attract much at-
tention, but after World War II it would become the focus of China’s criti-
cism of Japan for allying with the West instead of with China.
For Fukuzawa, the decision to turn from China represented a tortuous
change in his core beliefs. Fukuzawa’s father, in naming him Yukichi, had
taken the name “Yu” from a Chinese book to celebrate his re spect for the
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Chinese classics. Fukuzawa had received a basic Confucian education, and as
a youth he liked the Chinese classics so much that he voluntarily memorized
long passages of Confucian texts. However, after the triumph of Korean
and Chinese conservatives following the failure of the Kapsin Coup, he
began to write articles extolling Eu ro pean civilization as being far above
that of China. Although many Japa nese scholars trained in the Chinese clas-
sics still derived joy from their studies, Fukuzawa’s sad farewell to Chinese
culture as a source of inspiration represented a new evaluation of China
among many Japa nese intellectuals.
Oka Senjin, a well- known specialist in the Chinese classics who could
communicate with leading Chinese intellectuals as an equal, traveled in
China from May 29, 1884, to April 18, 1885. When he returned to Japan, he
wrote that China was beset by two poisons: opium and the classics. The
writer Wang Tao, with whom Oka had had wonderful conversations during
Wang’s earlier four- month visit to Japan, had been unable to meet with Oka
in China because of his opium addiction. Oka was also deeply disappointed
that so many Chinese elite were wallowing in luxury while doing nothing
for other Chinese people who were starving. Those who aspired to offi-
cialdom wasted their time studying “eight- legged essays,” he wrote, obsti-
nately refusing to take the steps needed to adapt to modern times. Oka was
also disappointed to find that although Japa nese intellectuals had a deep
knowledge of Chinese culture, Chinese intellectuals had very little knowl-
edge of the changes taking place in Japan. Oka’s criticisms of Chinese cul-
ture were strikingly similar to the critiques of traditional Chinese culture
that would be voiced by Chinese intellectuals during the 1919 May Fourth
Movement.
Growing Japa nese Support for Overseas Expansion
The failure of the Kapsin Coup did not end Japan’s efforts to cooperate with
China and Korea against the West, but it strengthened public support in
Japan for defending Japa nese interests abroad. The expression “survival of the
fittest,” first coined by Herbert Spencer in 1864, spread quickly in Japan and
was used to justify, without any moral compunction, a belief in the domi-
nance of the strong over the weak. The members of the Iwakura Mission had
learned that the Eu ro pean powers assumed that “civilized” countries would
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Rivalry in Korea and the Sino- Japanese War, 1882–1895
establish colonies in the “less civilized part of the world” and that the re-
sources of the colonies would be used to benefit the economies of the home
countries. The British had moved into Shanghai after the first Opium War,
and in 1862 the British and Americans formally established the International
Settlement in Shanghai. King Leopold of Belgium established the Congo
Free State in 1862, during the same period that the French and British were
setting up their colonies in Africa. The Dutch, already in Java before the
Meiji period, invaded Aceh in Sumatra in 1873 and then began expanding
into other parts of Indonesia. In 1884, the Rus sians established the region of
Priamur along the coast north of Korea, including the cities of Vladivostok
and Khabarovsk, opposite the island of Sakhalin, and installed a governor-
general of Priamur, granting him power over the area. Priamur thus attained
a regional identity and attracted immigrants from overcrowded areas in
Ukraine, who came through the Suez and Indian Ocean by the steamship
ser vice that began in 1883. In Japa nese eyes, Japan was a step behind and had
to begin catching up with the other civilized socie ties.
Once the ports of Wonsan and Inchon were opened, Japa nese manu-
facturing exports, taking advantage of Japan’s early industrialization, grew
rapidly. By 1893, 91 percent of imports into Korea were from Japan and
8 percent were from China. Of Korea’s exports, 49 percent went to China
and 50 percent went to Japan.1 But in the eyes of Koreans, even though
Korea was not formally colonized, the Japa nese were behaving like imperi-
alists and pursuing their own commercial interests, looking down on and
exploiting Korean people without moral compunction.
When the Japa nese public read of Japan’s weak response to the killing
of Japa nese citizens after Kim Ok- kyun’s failed coup, they were outraged
that their government had not responded more firmly. Japa nese leaders,
however, were prudent enough to realize that at that point they lacked the
necessary military power to respond. Nevertheless, public support for
sending more troops to Korea, and even to China, began to grow. By 1884,
the military’s plans to modernize the army, which Katsura Taro and Yamagata
Aritomo had introduced in 1878, had been completed, and the army, making
use of the stepped-up military bud get of 1882, was beginning to grow. A revi-
sion of the conscription law in 1883 expanded the number of recruits into
the army and extended reserve ser vice to nine years. Although in 1884 it was
still judged premature to challenge the Chinese in Korea, military offi-<
br />
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china and japan
cials were beginning to imagine the day would come when the Japa nese
Army would be better prepared.
In 1886 the Beiyang Fleet, responsible for protecting China’s northern
coastline, made a port call in Nagasaki and displayed four modern battle-
ships, including the Dingyuan, purchased from Germany, far larger than any
Japa nese battleship and then one of the most modern naval ships in the
world. The Chinese were showing Japan the great power of the Chinese
Navy, with the implicit message that Japan would be foolish to become
involved in a conflict with China. During the port call, scuffles broke out
between Chinese sailors and Japa nese locals in Nagasaki’s red- light district
and resulted in the deaths of four Chinese sailors and two Mitsui police,
and many injuries on both sides. The visit impressed Japan, but not in the
way that China had intended. After seeing the Dingyuan, the Japa nese gov-
ernment de cided to construct three large cruisers, each with firepower
comparable to that of the Dingyuan. After 1889, although China continued
to invest in the Summer Palace, including the reconstruction of its large
Marble Boat pavilion, there were no significant new investments in navy
ships. In contrast, in Japan after 1893, in addition to imperial contributions
to the navy, one- tenth of the salaries of civil officials and military officers
was deducted and added to the funding allocated for the construction of
naval ships and the purchase of arms.
Japa nese Information and Intel igence about China, 1880s to 1894
Among the factors responsible for Japan’s victory in the Sino- Japanese War
of 1894–1895, one of the most critical was the high level of Japa nese infor-
mation about China and the lack of Chinese information about Japan.
Despite the tensions in Sino- Japanese relations around Korea, trade be-
tween the two countries was growing in the 1880s, and Japa nese busi-
nessmen expected that trade with China would continue to expand. In prep-
aration for this expansion, they had been collecting information about
Chinese market opportunities. Before the establishment of diplomatic re-
lations in 1871, there were no Japa nese businesses in China, but by 1877 there
were some twenty- five Japa nese businesses in Shanghai alone, including the
trading com pany Mitsui Bussan and the shipping com pany Nippon Yusen
Kaisha (NYK).
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Rivalry in Korea and the Sino- Japanese War, 1882–1895
There are no rec ords showing that prior to 1894 Japan had plans to at-
tack China, but Japan had been gathering information on Chinese military
installations and ships in case any conflict were to break out. As early as
1879 Katsura Taro, who would become a division commander during the
Sino- Japanese War, took a trip to China with ten other Japa nese observers
to survey Chinese military facilities. The results of Katsura’s survey were
published the following year in a book with a foreword by Yamagata
Aritomo, describing China’s military bases, weapons, and military organ-
ization. The book was later revised in 1882 and 1889. By the time war broke
out between the two nations in 1894, the Japa nese military had access to
detailed information about China’s geography, the Chinese economy, ports,
ships, roads, and installations that had been collected by Japa nese writers,
reporters, and businesspeople. From the rec ords that are available, there is
no easy way to determine which writers were actually spies and which were
not. Even those from Japan who wanted good relations with China, who
wanted to help China develop eco nom ically and opposed military actions,
had provided information to Japa nese officials that could be used either di-
rectly or indirectly by the military in the case of conflict.
One person who was well informed about China and had a broad range
of Chinese friends was Sone Toshitora. A strong advocate of Sino- Japanese
friendship, Sone traveled several times to China, where he made good
friends with Chinese reformers. He had kept detailed accounts of the places
he visited, including information on ports, ship cargos, and military instal-
lations, and his reports had been passed on to high- level Japa nese officials
and military leaders. Whether or not Sone was a spy, his information was
certainly useful to the Japa nese military.
Arao Sei, a businessman who founded a trading com pany in China, did
more than any other Japa nese citizen to train people to gather information
about China. In 1892 he and his assistants produced the three- volume Com-
mercial Handbook, which was filled with the kind of information needed
by those trying to set up a business in China. In 1890, with the help of
Japa nese businessmen he had established the Nisshin Boeki Kenkyujo
( Japan- China Trading Research Center), a school in Shanghai that offered
a three- year training program for Japa nese businessmen. The curriculum
focused on language training in Chinese and En glish, commercial geog-
raphy, accounting, and bookkeeping. When the first class graduated in
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1893, many of the gradu ates found business jobs in Shanghai. Arao be-
lieved that war with China was not in Japan’s interest and that Japan
should help China eco nom ically to counter Western advances. He per-
sonally opposed the Sino- Japanese War and sat out the war in a monastery.
After the war ended, he advocated more favorable terms for China to pro-
mote Sino- Japanese trade. Yet despite Arao’s personal stance against the
conflict, military officials had helped finance his research center, and when
the Sino- Japanese War broke out a year after the first class had graduated,
more than seventy of the eighty- nine gradu ates were recruited to serve as
interpreters or spies in the Japa nese war effort.
The information that Japa nese visitors to China collected was distrib-
uted to Japa nese troops as well as businesspeople and the interested public.
A Chinese writer describing the fighting in Manchuria during the Sino-
Japanese War wrote that Japa nese troops were much more aware of the
Manchurian topography than the Chinese troops were and that maps of
the local topography were found in the pockets of Japa nese soldiers fighting
in the area.
Information about China made its way to the very highest levels in Japan.
In 1893, to control government expenses, Japan’s House of Representatives
voted to cut warship construction. Because of disagreements over bud get
issues, Emperor Meiji was asked to resolve the issue. He de cided that
because other nations, including China, were then increasing their military
preparations, Japan should also increase its military preparedness. He agreed
to cut palace expenses to increase the bud get for building warships.
There were some Chinese reports from Japan on the Japa nese economic
situation. China’s consul general in Nagasaki, who took up the post in 1878,
wrote reports on the ships coming and going in Nagasaki harbor. The second
Chinese ambassador to Toky
o, Li Shuchang, who served there from 1881
to 1884 and 1887 to 1890, did make a serious effort to report on Japa nese
matters. His warnings about developments in Korea played a key role in
China’s readiness to send troops to Korea in 1882 and 1884. But other
reporting from Japan attracted virtually no interest in Beijing and was
sometimes surprisingly out of touch with real ity. Early in 1894, the year the
Sino- Japanese War broke out, China’s ambassador in Tokyo, Wang
Fengcao, reported to Beijing that the Japa nese were so beset with internal
squabbling that they were unlikely to be active externally.
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Rivalry in Korea and the Sino- Japanese War, 1882–1895
After the war broke out, even though Li Hongzhang followed the events,
most other high officials in Beijing initially displayed little interest. The his-
torian Samuel Chu, who has read through the memorials sent to the Im-
perial Court at the time, reports that high officials in Beijing were far more
occupied with plans for the empress dowager’s sixtieth- birthday cele bration
than with plans to pursue the war. Even after the war began, many officials
were mostly concerned about whether the Western powers would enter the
war and they did not consider Japan to be impor tant enough to worry about.
Antecedents of the Sino- Japanese War, 1894
Yamagata Aritomo, who had led the development of the Japa nese Army
and was head of Japan’s Privy Council, publicly stated in 1893 that Japan
should cooperate with China and that Japan’s main enemies were Rus sia,
France, and England. Despite the tensions in Korea, many Japa nese and
Chinese scholars who have studied the outbreak of the war believe that
without the timing of two key events, the assassination of Kim Ok- kyun,
which inflamed the Japa nese public, and the Tonghak Rebellion, which
brought Chinese troops into Korea, the Sino- Japanese War might have been
avoided, or at least postponed.
In early 1894 Kim Ok- kyun, who had led the coup in Korea in 1884, was
invited to visit Li Hongzhang in Shanghai. For more than a de cade he had
lived in fear of assassination, but he accepted the invitation of a Korean ac-
quaintance to travel with him to Shanghai. On March 27, on the ship to
Shanghai, Kim Ok- kyun was shot by that acquaintance, who had in fact
been tasked with assassinating him. Kim Ok- kyun’s body was mutilated,
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