China and Japan

by Ezra F. Vogel

  En glish country gentleman, or a Spanish administrator in the Philippines

  was influenced by the lifestyle of a hacienda owner, the higher- level Japa-

  nese administrators in Taiwan adopted the lifestyle of a Meiji bureaucrat.

  In Japan it was widely understood that a bureaucrat occupied a position of

  re spect and remained somewhat aloof from the common people ( kanson

  minpi). But the Japa nese officials were also a disciplined group who took

  their work seriously and performed their work conscientiously. In addition

  to the high- level bureaucrats, who had been trained at Japan’s best middle

  schools and universities, there were also large numbers of Japa nese settlers

  in Taiwan who had been trained at vari ous specialized technical schools.

  All major businesses in Taiwan were owned by the Japa nese, though

  some business owners had Taiwanese partners, and all the major Japa nese

  zaibatsu (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda) were active in Taiwan.

  Japa nese companies had monopolies in salt, camphor, and tobacco. To en-

  courage more trade with Japan, Taiwan’s trade with mainland China was

  taxed but its trade with Japan was not. In response to peasants’ complaints

  about cruel absentee landlords, Japan forced the landlords to sell their land

  and to buy government bonds with the income they received from the sale.

  To eliminate opium use in Taiwan, the Japa nese first made opium produc-

  tion into a national mono poly so as to control the supply, and after they had

  control over opium cultivation and sales, they closed down both operations.

  In 1900 an estimated 165,000 opium addicts lived in Taiwan, but by the time

  Japan had completed its program, opium had essentially been wiped out.

  The standard of living in Taiwan rose rapidly under Japa nese rule, and

  by 1945 it was, on average, much higher than that on the Chinese main-

  land. The Japa nese in Taiwan set up stores and businesses similar to those

  on their home islands; most businesses in Taiwan were operated by Japa-

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  The Colonization of Taiwan and Manchuria, 1895–1945

  nese settlers. Western visitors to Taiwan in the 1930s praised its economic

  successes. Goto Shimpei and Nitobe Inazo, with their fluency in both

  German and En glish, became welcome participants in international organ-

  izations and were respected for their achievements in Taiwan.

  The Japa nese greatly expanded public education in Taiwan, far more

  than the Eu ro pe ans expanded education in their colonies. Study of the Con-

  fucian classics, which had been part of an elite education for a small group

  of Taiwanese youths before the arrival of the Japa nese, was largely replaced

  by a “scientific education.” Isawa Shuji, a Ministry of Education official who

  had been sent for advanced training to Bridgewater Normal School in Mas-

  sa chu setts in 1875, was charged with establishing a modern educational

  system in Taiwan that would produce good Japa nese citizens. The teaching

  of Japa nese language began immediately, so that elementary schools could

  quickly change to the use of Japa nese throughout the curriculum. In early

  1896 the first group of thirty- six young Japanese- language teachers, all gradu-

  ates of Japa nese normal schools, arrived in Taiwan, and their numbers

  would expand rapidly. Local Taiwanese teachers, after intensive training in

  Japa nese language, taught in Japa nese and used Japa nese textbooks. By 1944,

  71 percent of Taiwan’s elementary- school- age children would be in school,

  a far higher attendance rate than the rate in mainland China at the time.

  All classes were taught in Japa nese.

  In 1915 Japan opened middle schools in Taiwan, and in 1928 it opened

  Taihoku Imperial University ( today’s Taiwan University) in Taipei. The

  Japa nese living in Taiwan attended these middle schools and the university,

  as did able local students. The best local students, especially in fields such

  as medicine, went on to study at Japa nese universities, including Tokyo Im-

  perial University, after completing university in Taiwan. In the 1930s, some

  2,000 Taiwanese students were attending universities in Japan.

  After Goto Shimpei was transferred from Taiwan to Manchuria to di-

  rect the Manchurian Railway, a number of Taiwanese administrators were

  also sent to Manchuria as bureaucrats to help jump- start government ad-

  ministration there. Migration from Taiwan to Manchuria increased after

  1931, when Manchuria became a Japa nese puppet state. After Japan invaded

  China in 1937, some Taiwanese who knew the Chinese language were as-

  signed to mainland China to work as administrators under the Japa nese

  occupation.

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  china and japan

  In general, throughout their occupation of Taiwan the Japa nese held the

  higher positions in government and business and the Taiwanese occupied

  the lower positions. However, after the start of World War II many Japa-

  nese men who had been working in Taiwan’s government or business of-

  fices were recruited into the military, so a considerable number of Taiwanese

  bureaucrats and administrators were promoted to higher positions in gov-

  ernment and in Japanese- led businesses. Some, such as Li Denghui (Lee

  Teng- hui), later president of Taiwan under the Guomin dang, who had

  studied agricultural economics at Kyoto Imperial University, even became

  officers in the Japa nese Army. The Japa nese had intended to transform

  Taiwan’s youth into Japa nese citizens, and to a remarkable extent, the better-

  educated Taiwanese young people, even after the war, worked and spoke to

  each other in Japa nese.

  Manchuria under Japa nese Rule, 1905–1945

  In 1904 when Japan attacked Rus sian ships and launched the Russo-

  Japanese War, many Japa nese strategists did not plan to make Manchuria

  the center of Japan’s expansion plans. Rather, they wanted to focus on

  Fujian. Fujian at the time had a much larger economy than Manchuria; it had

  long carried out trade with Nagasaki; it was close to Taiwan, which the Japa-

  nese had just colonized; its dialects were spoken in Taiwan; and it could be

  a useful stepping- stone from Taiwan to expand business elsewhere along

  the China coast. But at the end of the Russo- Japanese War, when Japan ob-

  tained rights to the South Manchurian Railway and the Liaodong Penin-

  sula (an acquisition Japan had been denied by the Western powers in the

  previous de cade), Japa nese leaders began to make the most of their new pos-

  sessions. They were soon putting far more resources into Manchuria than

  into Fujian, and Fujian was already losing out as a dynamic economic base

  to Ningbo, Shanghai, and other areas along the Yangtze River. Manchuria

  was a vast and relatively undeveloped area. It also had a relatively small pop-

  ulation during the Qing dynasty, as the Manchus until late in the nine-

  teenth century prohibited non- Manchus from settling in their homeland.

  Once the Japa nese acquired rights to the South Manchurian Railway,

  they took advantage of opportunities to clear the land and to open up the

  mines. The railway the Rus sians had just built provided access to the sparsely


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  The Colonization of Taiwan and Manchuria, 1895–1945

  settled areas. Just as Americans going West in the nineteenth century were

  pioneers in the new open spaces, the Japa nese went into Manchuria for the

  great development opportunities the new territory could provide.

  The Japa nese started the Russo- Japanese War because of concerns about

  their security. They feared that Rus sia, after completing the Trans- Siberian

  Railway, expanding settlements in Siberia, constructing a railway in Man-

  churia, and building a port on the Liaodong Peninsula, would soon domi-

  nate the region, creating unending security threats. With its far larger pop-

  ulation and greater resources, Rus sia also threatened Japan’s economic

  interests not only in China but also in Korea, across the border from Man-

  churia. Work on the Trans- Siberian Railway, the world’s longest railway,

  had begun in 1891 and by 1903 passengers could, with a boat ride across Lake

  Baikal, travel from St. Petersburg to Chita, then south to Vladivostok, all

  without leaving Rus sian territory. With Chinese approval, in 1903 the Rus-

  sians also completed and then managed the Chinese Eastern Railway—

  creating a shortcut from Chita through Manchuria, passing through Harbin

  to Vladivostok, a route several hundred miles shorter than the one going

  from Chita to Vladivostok on the Rus sian side of the border.

  Some leading Japa nese strategists had hoped that Manchuria, following

  the U.S. open- door policy for China, would not be colonized by any one

  foreign country but would be opened to all countries, including Japan. The

  thinking was that if companies from all countries, including Western na-

  tions, acquired a stake in the area, the combined efforts of those countries

  could contain Rus sian advances.

  But other countries did not make major investments in Manchuria. The

  Japa nese sent in large numbers of troops, and within a de cade Japan was

  building on the territorial rights it had acquired on both sides of the Man-

  churian Railway and on the rights to the Kwantung Leased Territory in the

  southern part of the Liaodong Peninsula, including Dalian and Port Ar-

  thur (Lushun). Its overseas investments were centered not in Fujian or

  Shanghai but in Manchuria.

  Like nineteenth- century Americans who saw a chance to create their

  own future in the wide- open American West, many Japa nese settlers— poor

  second and third sons in rural Japan who would not inherit farmland and

  did not face good economic prospects at home— were attracted to the op-

  portunity to open up the relatively unsettled areas in Manchuria. Much of

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  china and japan

  Manchuria was comparatively sparsely populated when the Japa nese began

  arriving. The Japa nese appropriated land for their army bases, for their ad-

  ministrative offices, for their businesses, and for their farms. There are no

  precise figures available for how much they paid for the land, but to the local

  Chinese, the Japa nese were invaders who either took their land without

  paying for it or “bought” it at below- market prices. It is estimated that by

  the time of the Second Sino- Japanese War in 1937, some 270,000 Japa nese

  mi grants had settled in Manchuria as farmers.

  After 1931, when Japan took control of all of Manchuria, it expanded its

  investments in the region’s mines and machinery factories. Unique among

  the colonies around the world, Manchuria became an industrialized colony,

  run by bureaucrats trained in Japan, where the dominant issue discussed

  at universities was how to modernize a country. Some in Japan, such as the

  wise essayist Ishibashi Tanzan (see Biographies of Key Figures), suspected

  that Japan’s great industrial pro gress in Manchuria ultimately would fall

  victim to the rising tide of Chinese nationalism. However, Japa nese officials

  in Manchuria responded to growing Chinese nationalism not by leaving the

  area but by calling for more troops to defend their businesses and the local

  settlers. The Japa nese regarded the industrial development of Manchuria

  as a glorious symbol of Japan’s position as a modern nation. However, by

  World War II Manchuria would become a quagmire, requiring more troops

  and more police to keep it under control. Japa nese residents who hoped to

  return from Manchuria were unable to do so until Japan was defeated in

  the war.

  The Russo- Japanese War, 1904–1905

  The possibility of war had begun to concern the Japa nese by 1898, when the

  Rus sians took over Port Arthur on the Liaodong Peninsula. In the Rus-

  sian port of Vladivostok, ships were frozen in the sea for two to three months

  each winter, but in Port Arthur they gained a year- round warm- water port.

  The Chinese Eastern Railway, completed in 1903, created a link to Port

  Arthur that, with the Trans- Siberian Railway, gave Rus sia direct rail trans-

  portation from Moscow all the way to Port Arthur and then, by boat, to

  the Pacific. The Rus sians, like the Japa nese, were intent on modernizing to

  catch up with Western Eu rope. They began building Port Arthur into a

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  The Colonization of Taiwan and Manchuria, 1895–1945

  modern port as well as a European- style Western city, with new architec-

  ture based on up- to- date Eu ro pean models.

  When the Rus sians completed the 550- mile southern spur of the Chi-

  nese Eastern Railway, linking Port Arthur and Harbin and passing through

  Changchun, Shenyang, and Anshan, the Japa nese worried that nothing

  would stop Russia— which had a population of 130 million, compared with

  Japan’s 46 million— from expanding into Korea, where Japa nese investments

  were growing. During the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, the Rus sians had moved

  some 100,000 troops into Manchuria, and after the rebellion was quelled,

  Rus sian troops remained in Manchuria’s three provinces, Heilongjiang, Jilin,

  and Liaoning. Japa nese officials proposed to their Rus sian counter parts that

  Japan would recognize Rus sian interests in Manchuria if Rus sia would rec-

  ognize Japa nese interests in Korea, but the Rus sians initially refused. In

  April 1902, in line with discussions among Western countries to cease the

  carving up of China into diff er ent foreign- dominated territories, Rus sia

  changed its policy and agreed to remove its troops from Manchuria by the

  end of 1903. However, on May 15, 1903, Czar Nicholas ordered that other

  foreign interests should also be removed from Manchuria. He then began

  a rapid buildup of Rus sian troops, quickly moving them into the area along

  the Yalu River, the border between Manchuria and Korea. Japa nese saw

  this as a threat to their interests in Korea.

  In response to reports that Rus sia intended to keep other foreign inter-

  ests out of Manchuria, high Japa nese officials met in June 1903 to hear a

  report on the new military situation and to decide on a response. Major

  General Iguchi Shogo presented his analy sis of what Japan faced: Rus sia’s

  military resources were far larger than their own, and with the use of the

  Trans- Siberian Railway, it could gradually bring in far more people
and re-

  sources. Given these advantages, time was on Rus sia’s side; if Japan did not

  move quickly, it would be too late to protect Japa nese interests in Korea.

  Major General Iguchi said Japan could not be certain it would win a war

  with Rus sia, but he argued that they had no choice but to launch a surprise

  attack. If Japan won, Manchuria would be neutral territory and Japan would

  maintain its rights in Korea. While officials debated their response, Japan

  continued to strengthen its military and began to expand its spying activi-

  ties in Rus sia and on Rus sians in Asia. Most Rus sians, like the Chinese

  earlier, believed that Japan, as a small island country, could easily be defeated,

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  china and japan

  and they had scarcely both ered to collect information on the Japa nese mil-

  itary. Few Rus sians had any idea of Japan’s strength.

  Japanese Troops Invade Manchuria

  On February 8, 1904, knowing that Rus sian troops would be celebrating a

  holiday, Japan launched a surprise attack on their ships at Port Arthur and

  at Inchon, Korea. The Rus sians were completely unprepared, and damage

  was extensive. For the Japa nese, the first six months of fighting after that

  went better than expected, largely because the initial blow to the Rus sian

  Navy had inflicted such heavy damage. But the Rus sians then sent in a large

  number of troops and ships, and the battles continued for more than one

  year, on sea and on land, in Korea and in Manchuria. The Japa nese had re-

  peated difficulties in their effort to bottle up the Rus sian fleet in Port Ar-

  thur. Losses were heavy on both sides. Ariga Nagao estimated that some

  80,000 Japa nese were killed in battle or later died of their wounds in hos-

  pitals. But in the end, Japan’s superior information, the high level of literacy

  and discipline among Japa nese troops compared with Rus sian troops, and

  Japan’s short supply lines, especially compared with the months it took for

  Rus sian Navy ships to reach East Asia, proved decisive in the Japa nese

  victory.

  The Japa nese captured Port Arthur by the end of 1904. When the Rus-

  sian Revolution broke out in January 1905, it sapped the energy of the Rus-

  sian Army. Nonetheless, in May 1905 Rus sia’s Baltic Fleet was on its way