China and Japan
Page 31
director of the National Railway Bureau in Tokyo, where he could oversee
the policies he had established in Manchuria. He remained influential in
Japan, where he later became mayor of Tokyo and then the first director of
Tokyo Broadcasting System Corporation (currently NHK, the Japan
Broadcasting Corporation).
Goto Shimpei’s successors generally shared his liberal vision. After the
Rus sian Revolution of 1917 some Japa nese intellectuals in Japan accepted
many of the premises of the Rus sian revolutionaries— that officials should
strug gle to improve the lot of the working classes and, like some of the Chi-
nese leftists with whom they had come in contact, they should use na-
tional planning to promote economic development. As leftist intellectuals
within Japan felt pressure to conform to the increasing constraints imposed
by Japan’s ultranationalists, some migrated to Manchuria, where Goto’s suc-
cessors were more supportive of left- wing intellectuals than the govern-
ment was at home in Tokyo.
The Rus sians had opened coal mines shortly before passing control of the
railway over to the Japa nese, and Mantetsu also invested in coal mines in
Fushun, which became one of the largest open- pit coal mines in the world.
The railway began shipping coal to nearby Anshan, the site of iron- ore mines,
where it expanded the production of pig iron. As coal production increased,
the transport of coal became a major source of revenue for Mantetsu.
During World War I, when the embattled Eu ro pean countries had little
energy for activities in Asia, the Japa nese had more opportunities to expand
their commercial role in Manchuria and elsewhere in China. Japan’s growing
power during World War I, and in par tic u lar the publication in 1915 of the
its Twenty- One Demands, presented as an ultimatum to China for in-
creased Japa nese influence and control, led to anti- Japanese demonstra-
tions by many young intellectuals and labor unions in Manchuria.
The Kwantung Army
After 1905, the danger that Rus sia would start a war of revenge was used
by the Imperial Japa nese Army as a pretext for undertaking a sizable military
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buildup of Japa nese troops on the Liaodong Peninsula. In accordance with
the Portsmouth Treaty signed at the end of the Russo- Japanese War,
which required Japa nese and Rus sian troops to clear out of Manchuria
within eigh teen months, most demobilized Rus sian and Japa nese troops
had left Manchuria by 1907. However, the Japa nese were allowed to retain
guards posted every fifteen kilo meters along the railway and to station
troops in Port Arthur and Dalian (Dairen) on the Liaodong Peninsula. Ini-
tially totaling 10,000, the number of Japa nese troops in the Kwantung
Army expanded in 1931.
Since Manchuria was the main overseas location for Japa nese troops and
an assignment in Manchuria was considered challenging, the Kwantung
Army attracted some of the brightest, most patriotic, and most ambitious
gradu ates of Japan’s military academies. The Kwantung Army was respon-
sible for defending the area in case Rus sian troops should seek revenge for
their defeat in 1905 and for protecting Japa nese citizens from attacks by local
patriots. The Imperial Japa nese Army took deep pride in its successes during
the Sino- Japanese War and its dedication to the nation, giving soldiers a
sense of moral superiority over businessmen and politicians who pursued
only selfish, personal interests. Many of Japan’s military officers believed
they had a glorious national mission to protect Asia from Westerners.
When they saw that the Chinese government was not taking a strong
stand against the Twenty- One Demands, patriotic young Chinese protesters
responded with boycotts and occasional personal attacks on the Japa nese.
Japa nese citizens living in Manchuria sought the protection of the Kwan-
tung Army. Some Japa nese settlers in Manchuria, as well as some in the
home islands, resented the haughtiness of Japa nese soldiers and were more
sympathetic to the Chinese people than they were to the military, just as
some Mantetsu bureaucrats were sympathetic to the Chinese because of the
harshness with which Kwantung Army officials dealt with local people. In
1934, when several top positions at Mantetsu went to Kwantung Army of-
ficers, a number of Mantetsu officials resigned and tensions between the
two institutions grew. However, ordinary Japa nese residents in Manchuria
welcomed the protection the Kwantung Army provided against Chinese
nationalists.
In responding to anti- Japanese attacks in Manchuria, Kwantung Army
officers often moved quickly and forcefully, without waiting for directions
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The Colonization of Taiwan and Manchuria, 1895–1945
from Tokyo. It was difficult for Imperial Army officials in Japan to restrain
the Kwantung troops, and po liti cal leaders in Tokyo, intimidated by the
readiness of impetuous soldiers to assassinate government officials, were
cautious about restraining them.
Zhang Zuolin, Zhang Xueliang, and the Japa nese
From the time Mantetsu was established, Mantetsu and the Kwantung
Army were allowed to direct Japan’s activities in the Liaodong Peninsula,
but before 1931, aside from those along the strip of railway territory be-
longing to Mantetsu, the Japa nese did not officially control developments
at the local level in the rest of Manchuria. However, the Japa nese gradually
used their military power and funding to form relations with local leaders
so that they could extend their informal power beyond the official strip next
to the railway.
After 1911 Zhang Zuolin, a shrewd, ambitious local warlord with little
formal education, formed linkages with other local strongmen and lent his
support to Yuan Shikai, who dominated Chinese national politics until his
death in 1916. By the time of Yuan Shikai’s death, Zhang Zuolin had estab-
lished himself as the dominant warlord in Manchuria, and in 1920 China’s
central government appointed Zhang governor- general of the three prov-
inces in Manchuria.
Zhang hoped to get rid of the Japa nese in the region, but he realized
the limits of his power against Japan’s greater economic and military
strength. He therefore made efforts to accommodate his rule to the reali-
ties of Japa nese power. The Japa nese, while trying to extend their power,
also made some accommodations to Zhang Zuolin. In 1925, when Zhang
Zuolin faced a revolt led by Guo Songling, an officer under him, the Japa-
nese assisted Zhang by refusing to allow Guo’s forces to travel on the railway
and by resisting efforts by his troops to travel across territory under their
control.
After 1926, as Zhang Zuolin was trying to build up his own railways
and horse carriages to compete with the Japa nese in transporting soybeans
and other supplies, and as Zhang’s ambitions were growing beyond Man-
churia, relations between Zhang and the Japa nese became strained. Zhang
was cooperating with Wu Peifu and other warlords in
Beiping to resist the
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Northern Expedition of Chiang Kai- shek (see Biographies of Key Figures),
who sought to unite all of China. Japa nese leaders in Tokyo did not sup-
port the warlords against Chiang Kai- shek, and Zhang was upset that the
Japa nese did not cooperate with him. Zhang’s efforts to secure supplies
within Manchuria for his activities beyond his provinces created shortages,
which in turn led to runaway inflation in the region. The resultant social
instability made it more difficult for Mantetsu and the Kwantung Army to
maintain order and heightened tensions between Japan and Zhang Zuolin.
By 1927 Zhang Zuolin had become the dominant leader in Beiping, but
in June 1928 his allies lost ground and he was forced out of the city. As he
was returning to his home in Manchuria, he was assassinated by the Japa-
nese. After his assassination, the Kwantung Army had to contend with
Zhang Zuolin’s son, Zhang Xueliang, who inherited his father’s troops and
followers. Zhang Xueliang, knowing Japan’s great military power, did not
publicly criticize the Japa nese, but he saw them as his adversaries. He not
only tried to maintain his military forces but also sought to strengthen the
economic base that his father had built. He had his own port facilities for
exporting soybeans and he worked to build up his own small railway net-
work. Tensions between the Japa nese and Zhang Xueliang were exacer-
bated by the economic depression that broke out in 1929, and in 1930, for
the first time in its history, Mantetsu lost money.
The Manchurian Incident, 1931
At 10:20 p.m. on the night of September 18, 1931, a dynamite explosion on
a track near Shenyang derailed a train transporting Zhang Xueliang, who
was unharmed. The explosion caused only minor damage, and within min-
utes another train was able to pass over the spot where the train had been
derailed. The next morning Japan, claiming it was responding to the sabo-
tage, sent in troops, and before the end of the day they had destroyed Zhang
Xueliang’s small air force and taken over his small garrison in Shenyang.
This event, the Manchurian Incident, quickly reverberated around the world
with implications that rippled out far beyond China and Japan.
Within two weeks it became clear that a group of right- wing radicals
within Japan’s Kwantung Army, following the plans of their strategist Ishi-
wara Kanji, had set off the explosion and used the incident to enable Japa-
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The Colonization of Taiwan and Manchuria, 1895–1945
nese troops to come in and gain control of all of Manchuria. Within days
after the explosion, more Japa nese troops arrived directly from Korea and
then from Japan. Chiang Kai- shek, who believed that Chinese forces were
not yet ready to fight the Japa nese, sent word that the Chinese troops should
not resist the Japa nese and should preserve their strength. The largest city
in Manchuria, Shenyang, was under Japa nese control within one day, and
within a week the city was back to work and Japan had gained control over
Changchun. Zhang Xueliang’s troops offered some re sis tance in Jinzhou,
a smaller city located not far from the pass separating Manchuria from the
rest of China. Emperor Hirohito said that the Japa nese troops should
not attack Jinzhou, but the troops carried out an attack nonetheless, and
several hundred people were killed. Five months after the Manchurian In-
cident, armed re sis tance to the Japa nese had basically ceased. At the time
of the Manchurian Incident, there were roughly 10,000 Japa nese troops in
Manchuria, approximately the same number of troops that had been there
since 1906. But within a year that number had increased to over 100,000
and the Japa nese military was able to occupy the civilian government of-
fices throughout Manchuria.
After the Manchurian Incident, the Japa nese began building a new cap-
ital city in Manchuria. They named it Xinjing (Shinkyo in Japa nese, or
“New Capital”) and located it at Changchun, which had been the northern
terminus of the South Manchurian Railway and until that point had been
dominated by the Rus sians, making it clear that Xinjing would be used to
strengthen Japan’s position in northern Manchuria. The Japa nese had wor-
ried about pos si ble re sis tance by the Rus sians to the placement of their
Manchurian capital so far north, but the Rus sian military had been greatly
weakened by Stalin’s purges and Rus sia did not offer any or ga nized re sis-
tance. At the time, Changchun, with 311,000 people, was smaller than
Shenyang, which had a population of 527,000. Drawing on their experience
in establishing a modern capital for Taiwan in Taipei, the Japa nese built a
modern city, with all the buildings patterned after the new government cen-
ters they had built in Tokyo and Taipei, which in turn were based on their
careful study of the most modern buildings in Eu rope and the United States.
Architects flocked in to take advantage of the design opportunities, and
proj ect man ag ers directed tens of thousands of local workers, who strained
to carry in large rocks and put them in place in an era before mechanized
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construction equipment was available. Dozens of buildings were con-
structed, including those for administrators and one for the Manchurian
parliament that the Japa nese had established. To create a new medical center,
a large modern hospital was built, doctors were brought in, and medical
training programs were established. A large public square and parks were
laid out. A grand new train station was built and the world’s most modern
railway cars were imported. Xinjing became one of the grand modern capi-
tals of the world.
Some Japa nese leaders in Tokyo were deeply troubled by the Kwantung
Army, referring to its actions in fomenting the Manchurian Incident and
then using the incident to establish military control in Manchuria as an in-
surrection. By the 1920s the government of Japan had lost the strong cen-
tral direction it had had when the genro, the se nior leaders who had taken
part in the Meiji Restoration, passed from the scene, and many Japa nese
po liti cal leaders feared assassination by extremists on the right. In 1931, with
the Japa nese government divided, Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijiro was
unable to control the military. Inukai Tsuyoshi, who became prime minister
in December 1931, tried to stop the Kwantung Army from occupying Jinzhou.
He was preparing to send a representative to improve relations with China
when he was assassinated by right- wing naval officers on May 15, 1932. His
assassination further intimidated Japa nese government officials. To the Chi-
nese and Koreans, Japan’s emperor, Hirohito, was the symbol of Japan and a
justification for Japa nese aggression. The emperor had the right to approve
the appointment of the prime minister, but he saw his role as being a symbol
of national unity, above any po liti cal strug gles, and he made no effort to re-
strain the activities of the Kwantung Ar
my in Manchuria.
The In de pen dent Kingdom of Manchuria, 1931–1945
Immediately after the Manchurian Incident, Japa nese officials in Tokyo,
aware that direct colonization of Manchuria would be strongly opposed by
the Western powers, began preparing a puppet government to give the ap-
pearance that Manchuria was ruled by a Manchurian government, not by
Japan. Pu Yi, China’s last emperor, who was five years old when the Manchu
dynasty was overthrown in 1911, was installed as chief executive of Man-
churia in March 1932, when the new government was officially announced.
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The Colonization of Taiwan and Manchuria, 1895–1945
In 1934 the Japa nese made him emperor of the “In de pen dent Kingdom of
Manchuria.” He accepted the position but later complained that he was
forced to take orders from the Japa nese.
Even before the Manchurian Incident, officials from the Kwantung
Army and the South Manchurian Railway had made contacts with local
officials and small- scale warlords throughout Manchuria, beyond the areas
they governed directly. Some local officials had received financial assistance
from the Japa nese. In Manchurian cities, the Japa nese worked with local
elites who shared their interest in stability and established committees
to maintain public order. After the Manchurian Incident in 1931, when the
Japa nese were choosing local officials for the new government, they selected
some whom they had already been paying as advisers and other local offi-
cials with whom they were familiar. Most local officials and small warlords
were allowed to remain in their positions.
By the time the so- called In de pen dent Kingdom of Manchuria was es-
tablished in 1934, the Manchus represented only a small percentage of the
population of Manchuria. According to estimates by the Mantetsu Research
Department, of the 34.4 million people living in Manchuria in 1930, approx-
imately 3 percent were Manchu, whereas 90 percent were Chinese,
6 percent were Mongolian, and scarcely 1 percent were Korean, Rus sian, or
Japa nese. In the 1940 census there were 850,000 Japa nese and 1,450,000 Ko-
reans living in Manchuria.
Within Japan, the establishment of the In de pen dent Kingdom of Man-
churia was celebrated. At the time of the Manchurian Incident, Japa nese