soldiers in civilian dress moved into the safety zone, and Japa nese soldiers
followed to search for them, herding up suspects by the hundreds, and then
shooting or burning them. The presence of Chinese soldiers disguised in
civilian clothes in the safety zone made the zone much less safe for the in-
ternational residents and other civilians. The death toll among Chinese men
rose not so much from combat as from the rounding up of local young men
suspected of being soldiers in civilian clothes. Foreign residents of the safety
zone took walks outside and reported daily on the massive numbers of
corpses they saw, sometimes piled high in ditches, sometimes left lying in
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the streets for weeks. The Japa nese then began burning the city’s remaining
buildings. Some leaders of the safety zone believed that this was done to
disguise their looting in the commercial area of the city.
On December 24, to stabilize Nanjing, the Japa nese began registering
the local population. Those registered and given armbands theoretically
would no longer be at risk of being shot. The Japa nese quickly registered
some 160,000 local people who were not considered risks to public order—
in addition to children under the age of ten, older women were not regis-
tered. Thus, at the time, the number of Chinese remaining in Nanjing is es-
timated to have been between 200,000 and 250,000.3 Many Chinese
continued living in the safety zone because of the fear of assault by Japa nese
soldiers in other parts of the city and also because much of the original
housing in Nanjing had been destroyed by fires— both the fires set earlier by
the Chinese and those set later by the Japa nese. However, the zone became
overcrowded and by February many Chinese who were not originally housed
in the safety zone were forced out and relocated to other parts of the city.
In late December and early January, through negotiations between the
leaders of the safety zone and the Japa nese Foreign Ministry, the adminis-
trative functions that committee members in the safety zone had assumed
since Mayor Ma Chaochun had left Nanjing on December 7 were gradu-
ally transferred to committees under the direction of the Japa nese. The role
of the international committee in the safety zone was transformed into that
of a relief organ ization trying to provide food and ser vices to the Chinese
population.
The leaders of the neutral zone had appealed for help to Japa nese dip-
lomats, some of whom made efforts to protect the people in the zone and
to stop the looting, raping, and shooting. The Japa nese military, however,
was often unsympathetic to the zone leaders’ complaints. Rabe and others
wrote daily reports on the kil ings and looting that they observed. Day by day,
they reported on the hundreds, sometimes thousands, of people being kil ed,
and the rapes of students, house wives, and other young women. These daily
reports and Rabe’s diary are considered by scholars to be the most reliable
materials for understanding the extent of the atrocities in Nanjing.
All scholars who have examined the evidence, including Japa nese
scholars, acknowledge that Japa nese did commit atrocities in Nanjing and
that tens of thousands of people were killed. However, there remains great
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The Sino- Japanese War, 1937–1945
controversy over how many Chinese men and women were killed and raped
in Nanjing and its surrounding areas during the six weeks of fighting. The
Chinese police chief at the time, Wang Kepang, estimated there were
200,000 people left in the city. Lewis Smythe, a sociologist with a Ph.D.
from the University of Chicago who was then in Nanjing, reported in his
survey that there was a population of 212,600 in Nanjing at the time of the
Japa nese attacks, although he noted that there could have been another
10,000 people who were not reached in the survey. Foreigners in Nanjing
at the time reported estimates of 12,000 to 40,000 Chinese killed by Japa-
nese soldiers in the city. The Red Swastika Society, a Chinese charitable
organ ization that buried the corpses, estimated that 43,071 bodies were
buried.4 In his reports to Germany, Rabe estimated that in Nanjing and its
surroundings, between 50,000 and 60,000 Chinese were killed in the six
weeks during and after the attack on Nanjing. At the Tokyo War Crimes
Trials (the International Military Tribunal for the Far East) in 1946, repre-
sentatives of the two burial associations in Nanjing at the time of the
atrocities estimated that they had buried 155,000 bodies. The justices at the
War Crimes Trials, based on the testimony and the information provided
by Lewis Smythe, estimated that between 260,000 and 300,000 people had
been killed. In the 1950s, when the atrocities in Nanjing became the center
of Chinese discussions about Japa nese cruelties in China, the Chinese au-
thorities said 300,000 or more were killed, and since then Chinese scholars
have used the figure of 300,000 or more.
Hata Ikuhiko, a scholar who worked briefly as a historian in Japan’s Fi-
nance Ministry, recorded his conclusions in a small book, Nankin Jiken
(The Nanjing Incident), published in 1986. He acknowledges that Japa nese
troops went wild in committing cruelties. After examining reporters’ ac-
counts from the Nanjing area at the time, the population registers, and the
estimates of people who had already fled the Nanjing area before the ar-
rival of the Japa nese troops, Hata concludes that there were fewer people
left in the Nanjing area at the time Japa nese troops entered the city than
had been claimed. He also examined the testimony of the four witnesses
who spoke about Nanjing at the War Crimes Trials, information from the
later Nanjing trials conducted by the Chinese, and the movements of the
Japa nese forces in Nanjing at the time. In addition, he looked at the data
used by the Chinese, who claimed that 300,000 or more were killed. Based
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on the sources he investigated, Hata estimates that about 42,000 people
were killed. A handful of those on the right in Japan claim there was no
massacre, but the majority of Japa nese people acknowledge that atrocities
were indeed committed in Nanjing by Japa nese soldiers. During the war
there was no way of determining precise numbers, but all scholars who
have examined the evidence conclude that what happened in Nanjing was
a tragedy of im mense proportions. The Nanjing Massacre left a legacy of
bitterness that remains to this day, and it has become a symbol of Japa nese
war time cruelty, a focus of Chinese complaints that the Japa nese do not ac-
knowledge the extent of the Sino- Japanese War atrocities.
Fighting in Xuzhou and Wuhan, 1938
The Japa nese planned that after taking Nanjing, they would dispatch their
victorious troops to gain control of a major railway junction, Xuzhou, 200
miles north of Nanjing, where a north- south railway (the Jin- Pu) crossed
an east- west railway (the Long- Hai). Near Xuzhou, the Japa nese forces
would join other tro
ops coming west from the Beiping area. After taking
Xuzhou, the combined Japa nese forces would then go west to Zhengzhou
and then south to Wuhan, the major city in Central China, some 300 miles
south of Xuzhou. They were optimistic that they could take Wuhan by
the end of March 1938. Victory in Wuhan, they believed, would enable
them to control Central China and break the Chinese re sis tance. They could
then put military and po liti cal pressure on China to end the war and es-
tablish a government under Japa nese leadership.
Chiang Kai- shek, realizing the crucial role of Xuzhou in Japan’s plans,
de cided to make a strong stand there to stop or at least slow down the Japa-
nese advance. Before Chiang moved his forces out of Nanjing he had
80,000 troops in Xuzhou. He de cided to reinforce the troops in Xuzhou
not only with soldiers coming from Nanjing but also with troops from
vari ous smaller cities along the two rail lines that crossed in Xuzhou. In all,
he brought in some 300,000 soldiers who arrived in Xuzhou ready to fight.
The Communists at this point still had a relatively small force in Shaanxi.
For the battle at Xuzhou, Chiang drew heavi ly on the Guangxi warlords
Bai Chongxi and Li Zongren and their well- trained men.
. 262 .
The Sino- Japanese War, 1937–1945
Japa nese troops approached Xuzhou from the north, south, and east.
In early February 1938, fighting broke out roughly 100 miles north of
Xuzhou and 100 miles south of Xuzhou, as Chinese troops resisted the
approaching Japa nese forces. Chinese troops also fought the advancing
Japa nese east of the city. The biggest battle of the campaign took place at
Taierzhuang, about 13 miles northeast of Xuzhou. Fighting broke out near
Taierzhuang on March 22 and continued for two weeks, until the Japa nese
ran low on ammunition. At that point the Chinese were able to drive the
three Japa nese divisions out of Taierzhuang. The Japa nese estimate that they
suffered 5,000 casualties, either dead or wounded. Chinese casualties are
estimated to be as high as 20,000. By late April, with new arrivals, Japan
massed 400,000 troops near Xuzhou and with their massive firepower
drove the Chinese out of Taierzhuang. The town of Taierzhuang was dev-
astated by the fighting. The Japa nese regarded the battle at Taierzhuang
as a costly success. The Chinese, proud of their initial ability to push the
Japa nese out of Taierzhuang, were even more buoyed by what they con-
sidered to be their own success.
The battles for Xuzhou and Taierzhuang lasted five months and were
costly to both sides. It was not until late May, after the arrival of more Japa-
nese reinforcements, that Japa nese commanders felt ready to march into
the city of Xuzhou. Japa nese generals planned to surround the Chinese in
Xuzhou, some 200,000 soldiers, and crush them. On May 17, in prepara-
tion for the entry of Japa nese troops, Japa nese artillery began pounding areas
within the city, and on May 19 the Japa nese marched into the city to sur-
round the Chinese troops. The Chinese, however, had performed a clever
maneuver: they had been sending small groups of soldiers out of Xuzhou
at night to blend into the countryside and disperse in diff er ent directions,
so that when the Japa nese troops massed into the city to surround and de-
stroy them, the Chinese troops had already escaped.
The Chinese considered their fight in Xuzhou a great victory, for they
had killed or wounded many Japa nese troops, exhausted the Japa nese sur-
vivors, frustrated Japan’s plans to quickly conquer China, and enabled most
of the Chinese soldiers to escape. Chinese politicians and historians dis-
agree about which Chinese commanders deserve the most credit for the
victory: Chiang Kai- shek, who managed many of the decisions, the
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Guangxi generals Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi, who led their own
troops, or the midlevel officers on the ground.
On June 5, 1938, after abandoning Xuzhou and as Chinese troops were
moving south, Chiang Kai- shek made the most controversial decision in the
entire war— the decision to destroy the dikes on the Yellow River. The Japa-
nese had just moved into Kaifeng, the ancient capital and cosmopolitan
cultural and economic center of the Northern Song dynasty (960–1127).
Chiang, fearing that Japa nese troops were about to cross the Yellow River
and threaten Zhengzhou in Henan province, de cided to flood the area to
block their advance. On June 9, on Chiang’s orders, the dikes at Hua-
yuankou, just north of Zhengzhou, were blown up, causing the river to
change its course and water to flow into the surrounding areas. Although
there are widely diff er ent estimates of the damage, Diana Lary, after exam-
ining vari ous reports, estimates that several hundred thousand people were
drowned, several million became homeless, and between two and three mil-
lion died as a result of the subsequent floods and famine that followed the
dikes’ destruction. Prob lems in the area continued until 1946 and 1947,
when the dikes were fi nally repaired and restored to their pre-1938 condi-
tion. The flooding did prevent the Japa nese troops from moving into
Zhengzhou and delayed for several weeks the arrival of Japa nese troops in
Wuhan. Debates continue today about the wisdom of destroying the dikes,
but the weight of opinion is largely critical of Chiang for sacrificing the lives
of so many Chinese people for what proved to be only a minor delay in the
battle for Wuhan. The flooding also forced the Japa nese to approach Wuhan
by attacking from the east along the Yangtze, with the Japa nese Navy playing
a major role, rather than the Japa nese troops who were marching south.
The Japa nese hoped that a victory in Wuhan would give them access to
the central portion of the Yangtze, which was the great east- west transport
route, and end the Chinese re sis tance. Chiang de cided to concentrate large
numbers of troops in the areas east of Wuhan as the Japa nese approached,
in the hope of destroying the Japa nese threat. On the eve of the battle, the
Chinese had amassed approximately 1.1 million troops to defend Wuhan.
By June, the Japa nese had amassed some 400,000 troops. As elsewhere, the
Japa nese were very mobile, and they used their navy and air force, relying
on planes and heavy artillery to provide support for the soldiers, whereas
the Chinese relied on small arms, machine guns, and hand grenades.
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The Sino- Japanese War, 1937–1945
As in other battles, the Chinese troops came from diff er ent regions and
were under diff er ent commanders, some of whom were not particularly
loyal to Chiang Kai- shek. Many Western military specialists at the time
thought that the Chinese would be able to hold off the Japa nese for only
about one month. In the end, however, the Chinese were able to hold them
off for ten months, and they inflicted far heavier casualties than the Japa-
nese had anticipated.
The Japa nese military and foreign military specialists had greatly un-
derestimated China’s
capacity to resist the Japa nese in fighting over Xuzhou
and Wuhan in 1938. Stephen MacKinnon concludes that the key to Chi-
na’s success in the fighting for Xuzhou and Wuhan was the military skill,
the camaraderie, and fighting spirit of the field commanders, who had grad-
uated from Baoding Military Acad emy. The se nior Chinese generals, who
had graduated from Huangpu Military Acad emy, were not nearly as effec-
tive in guiding strategy and leading troops in battle as the younger generation
of field commanders trained at Baoding. The gradu ates of Huangpu were
better trained in politics, but the Baoding gradu ates were trained in military
strategy and operations. Although they commanded troops who came from
diff er ent localities and had varying backgrounds, the common training of the
officers from Baoding Acad emy enabled them to work together to slow down
the Japa nese military, which had much greater firepower. Chiang Kai-
shek was also personal y pre sent for the battles at Xuzhou and Wuhan and
was considered effective in providing overall leadership.
Some of the heaviest fighting during the war took place during the ap-
proach to Wuhan in the summer of 1938, and fighting continued in Wuhan
until October 25. In mid- June, as the Japa nese began advancing toward
Wuhan, initial clashes occurred in Anqing (southern Anhui) and Jiujiang
(northern Jiangxi, on the Yangtze River), more than 100 miles east of Wuhan.
In both areas, Japa nese troops outmaneuvered the Chinese and quickly
broke through their defenses, enabling them to take Jiujiang on July 28.
However, once the Japa nese occupied Jiujiang, they met well- organized re-
sis tance and suffered heavy losses. It took two months of heavy fighting for
the Japa nese to advance from Jiujiang to Wuhan. As the Japa nese troops
entered Wuhan on October 25, Japa nese officers, aware of the worldwide
anti- Japanese sentiment created by their unruly soldiers in Nanjing, made
a greater effort to enforce discipline and prevent looting and rape.
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After the heavy fighting during the Chinese defense of Wuhan, both
Japa nese and Chinese troops were exhausted. After Wuhan, the two sides
paused for several months to recoup their strength. Then, in early 1939 the
Japa nese launched offensives in the central Chinese cities of Nanchang
China and Japan Page 41