( Jiangxi province), Changsha (Hunan province), and Yichang (Hubei
province). In the battles for each of these cities, the Chinese forces put up
stubborn re sis tance, and in some cases they surprised Japa nese commanders
with their skill and commitment. Chiang Kai- shek had personally stayed
in Wuhan until the very end of the battle there. Chinese troops even initiated
attacks on places that the Japa nese had earlier occupied. The Japa nese even-
tually occupied Nanchang and Yichang, but they suffered heavy losses and
failed to annihilate the Chinese forces. After Wuhan, Japa nese military
commanders worried about a decline in the quality of their own forces, as
the Japa nese Army had to lower its recruitment standards to meet the
demand for more soldiers.
Some months later, in February 1940, at a conference with his high- level
strategists, Chiang Kai- shek analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of the
Japa nese military. Among its strong points, he acknowledged, was its ability
to make surprise attacks on poorly defended areas by disguising its inten-
tions. The battles of Xuzhou and Wuhan were the turning point in the
Second Sino- Japanese War, for after those battles, the exhausted Japa nese
slowed down their effort to subdue China. The decision to do so was also
based on Japan’s need to set aside troops and personnel to deal with the So-
viet threat. In May 1939 Soviet and Japa nese troops clashed in the village of
Nomonhan on the border between Manchuria and Mongolia. The clash led
to a large battle, the Nomonhan Incident, in which Japa nese troops were
badly defeated. Thereafter, Japan saw that it needed to set aside more re-
sources for a pos si ble clash with the Soviet Union. In 1938, even before the
Nomonhan Incident, the Japa nese Ministry of the Army, concerned about
a conflict with the Soviet Union, had de cided to reduce troop levels in China
from the 850,000 there in 1938 to 700,000 by the end of 1939 and 500,000
by the end of 1940.
In the spring of 1940, when Germany occupied France and the Nether-
lands, Japan saw new opportunities to attack the Eu ro pean colonies in
Southeast Asia and bring them into the Greater East Asia Co- Prosperity
Sphere, of which Japan was the leader.
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The Sino- Japanese War, 1937–1945
After leaving Wuhan, Chiang and his supporters moved through the
mountains to Chongqing, in southwestern China, which became Chiang’s
capital for the remainder of the war. Some Japa nese military leaders wanted
to inflict an all- out attack on Chongqing, but after 1940 they lost out in ar-
guments with those who wanted to pursue the fighting in Southeast Asia
instead, and after December 1941 they lost out to those pursuing the con-
flict with the United States. From December 1941 until 1944, while Japan
was preoccupied with fighting the United States, it maintained control over
its occupied areas in China, but it did not undertake any large new cam-
paigns. The Second Sino- Japanese War had reached a stalemate.
The National Puppet Government
On March 30, 1940, the Japa nese set up a “national” Chinese puppet gov-
ernment in Nanjing, led by Wang Jing wei, similar to the so- called national
government they had established in Manchuria with Emperor Pu Yi as the
titular head. The Japa nese had been slow to set up a separate national puppet
government because they had continued to hope that Chiang Kai- shek, who
had engaged in some informal peace initiatives with Japan, might come to
some accommodation with the Japa nese military occupation. On March 20,
after it became clear that Chiang would not make such accommodations,
Japan recruited Wang Jing wei, who had been Chiang Kai- shek’s leading rival
to succeed Sun Yat- sen, to serve as the head of a puppet regime, the Reor-
ga nized National Government of Nanjing. Chiang, who never completely
trusted Wang, had sometimes removed Wang from his positions and some-
times reinstated him in other positions. When Chiang first went to
Chongqing, Wang initially joined him. However, as the Japa nese advanced,
Wang expressed the view that China was unable to defeat Japan and that
continued efforts to fight Japan would be devastating to China and the Chi-
nese people. He advocated finding a way to make peace with Japan.
When the Japa nese set up its puppet government in 1940, Wang and
the Japa nese who supported him claimed that Wang’s administration,
with ministers and a government structure like the one that Sun Yat- sen
had established in 1925, represented a restoration of the true Nationalist
government. In inaugurating his government, Wang visited the tomb of
Sun Yat- sen at Purple Mountain in Nanjing to show that his government
. 267 .
china and japan
was the true successor of Sun’s government. Similar to the Nationalist
government that had been formed by Sun Yat- sen and continued by Chiang,
Wang established an Executive Yuan and a Legislative Yuan. Although
Wang claimed it was a national government and he amassed a sizable ad-
ministrative staff in Nanjing, his government in fact had limited control
only over several northern Chinese provinces.
As in Manchuria, the real power behind Wang’s puppet government was
the Japa nese military. When Wang Jing wei’s government appealed for inter-
national recognition, it was recognized only by Japan, Germany, and Italy,
whereas the other major Western powers continued to recognize Chiang
Kai- shek’s government. The Japa nese controlled the propaganda issued by
Wang’s government that was designed to win support for Japan’s efforts in
China. Japa nese propaganda attempted to rally support in China and South-
east Asia for Japan’s re sis tance to communism and Western imperialism.
Both the Guomin dang and the Communists considered Wang a traitor
for collaborating with Japan. Wang and his Japa nese supporters established
a network of spies who reported about pos si ble re sis tance, and those sus-
pected of being spies against Japan were killed. In cooperation with his Japa-
nese superiors, Wang resorted to a reign of terror to subdue the opposi-
tion. Although he died during the war, after the end of World War II some
2,700 of his former subordinates were executed and 2,300 were sentenced
to life imprisonment.5 Since his death, the Chinese have continued to re-
gard him as one of China’s most infamous traitors, despised by both the
Nationalists and the Communists.
Local Administration in the Japa nese Occupied Areas
In areas such as Nanjing and Wuhan, where there was massive damage and
loss of life, it was difficult under war time conditions to engage in rebuilding;
other places were affected by the dislocation of supply lines. Most higher-
level Chinese officials and elites fled to the southwest with Chiang Kai- shek.
The populations of cities such as Beiping, Tianjin, and Shanghai grew
slightly between 1937 and 1945 as refugees poured in to escape the fighting.
Japa nese commanders were given responsibility for administering the oc-
cupied areas.
. 26
8 .
The Sino- Japanese War, 1937–1945
Japa nese troops were able to dominate the cities and larger towns and
to control the rail lines, the main means of transport between cities. The
Japa nese had access to the 4,000 miles of railways in North and Central
China.6 However, because China was so large the Japa nese could not dom-
inate the countryside, even though in 1939 they tried to pacify rural areas.
The Japa nese could control the commercial activities in the larger cities, but
even the peddlers in the cities, to say nothing of the small- scale Chinese
businesses in the countryside, were largely beyond Japa nese control. Because
the Japa nese could not control the countryside, local people in areas near
the cities and along rail lines could engage in re sis tance and occasional small-
scale guerrilla attacks. In some cases, they could even carry out somewhat
larger attacks. The Japa nese troops, like U.S. troops during the Vietnam
War who were unable to track down those who had launched the attacks
against them, resorted to the brutal destruction of areas that they believed
the attackers had come from. When guerrillas attacked Japa nese forces along
the railways, the Japa nese often retaliated by destroying entire villages, in a
policy the Chinese publicized as “kill all, burn all, loot all.” The “three all’s”
became a rallying cry for strengthening anti- Japanese sentiment and pro-
moting patriotism.
The Japa nese military made virtually no specific plans for administering
each city or town that it took over. Although many places were devastated
by Japa nese attacks during the takeover, once the Japa nese were the occu-
pying power, the Japa nese officers responsible for pacifying the local areas
tried to achieve stability. Even when some Japa nese troops continued looting,
raping local women, and shooting local people who resisted, their leaders
knew that stability required having working relationships with the local
people. To succeed, they had to get municipal ser vices up and running again.
Japa nese military officials led the reor ga ni za tion of the local govern-
ments they took over, although in such a huge country they had no choice
but to rely on Chinese bureaucrats to fill the majority of administrative po-
sitions. A small number of Chinese individuals who had studied in Japan
were willing to accept leadership positions under Japa nese administration,
generally at the national or provincial levels or in the large cities. In addition,
a small number of people from Taiwan and Manchuria, who could speak
some Japa nese and had worked with the Japa nese in the colonies, were
. 269 .
china and japan
brought to the occupied areas to fill higher- level positions or to serve as li-
aisons between the Japa nese and the locals. In some cases, to establish
order in local communities under the Japa nese military, the Japa nese would
hire the local militia that had served in the local warlord’s army. But the ma-
jority of those on the administrative staff in the occupied areas were local
people who did not speak Japa nese. The few who could serve as translators
had an opportunity to use their special access to the Japa nese to shape the
information going to and from the Japa nese, and they would sometimes use
it for their own personal gain. Without interpreters, the Japa nese had little
communication with local people and had to resort to “brush conversations”
in which they and the literate locals wrote notes to each other using Chi-
nese characters.
When the Japa nese took over a city or town, one of the most urgent
tasks was to find enough food to feed the local population and the Japa-
nese troops. In addition, they had to arrange for medical attention for in-
jured survivors and homes for orphans. In many localities, local members
of the Red Swastika Society buried the corpses without expecting any com-
pensation. People had to be recruited to help clean up damage from the
fighting and the burning of buildings. Others arranged temporary shelters
and then longer- term housing for refugees and for local people whose homes
had been destroyed.
While the war continued, it was not pos si ble for local leaders, either
Japa nese or Chinese, to make long- term plans, but as the invaders brought
the chaos under control, those in local administration had to arrange for
collecting taxes and providing local ser vices such as policing, supplying elec-
tricity and water, and making road repairs.
Some well- known schools moved farther inland, to Yunnan and Sichuan
provinces, to escape the Japa nese invaders. Some factories also moved inland,
along with hospitals and medical facilities, which had to be rebuilt in their
new locations. Roads and railways had to be repaired as well. Even if the
Japa nese sometimes played a role in guiding such reconstruction, the labor
was Chinese, and because little construction machinery was available, most
of the construction was done manual y, using shovels, picks, and buckets.
In some cities and towns, the Japa nese were able to hire local adminis-
trators shortly after their arrival, but sometimes it took several months of
. 270 .
The Sino- Japanese War, 1937–1945
hiring and firing before the local government staff was stabilized. The Japa-
nese tried to develop a group of Chinese in for mants who would supply
confidential intelligence on local people, especially those who might be
organ izing anti- Japanese re sis tance. In larger communities, as soon as the
Japa nese took over, those responsible for organ izing the community com-
monly set up temporary committees to or ga nize the local government. Then,
after a few weeks or a few months, with some replacements of personnel
who had proved unreliable or in effec tive, they established regular
organ izations.
Chiang was able to produce a limited supply of weapons in Sichuan,
using machinery that had been transported from factories east of the moun-
tains. To survive in areas occupied by the Japa nese, local businessmen had
to work under Japa nese leadership and, in some cases, with Japa nese part-
ners. In general, businesses did not do well under the war time conditions,
not only because of the destruction of the physical plants but also because
of the disruption of markets and transportation.
Local Chinese administrators had no choice but to obey their Japa nese
superiors, although some also felt a responsibility to provide for the needs
of the local people. However, their work made many Chinese people suspi-
cious or resentful of them. Some of their tasks, such as collecting taxes, or
recruiting people to work as laborers or construction workers for minimal
pay, inevitably incurred the enmity of the local people. The Japa nese assigned
many of these unpleasant tasks to Chinese administrators, who were
then regarded as detestable collaborators by other Chinese. Those sus-
pected of passing on information to the Japa nese that resulted in the ar-
rests or executions of Chinese individuals were despised as traitors. Those
who used t
heir positions for their own benefit, or for the benefit of their
family or friends, rather than for the good of the community, were de-
spised for their lack of morality. In many communities, any Chinese person
who worked closely with the Japa nese was suspect. But in others, local
Chinese administrators did make some efforts to provide police protection,
keep the streets clean, procure daily- life necessities such as food and sup-
plies, ensure the availability of water and electricity, and repair buildings.
Some of the Japa nese responsible for local administration—in par tic-
u lar, soldiers who originally had fought their way into the area— were
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china and japan
generally hated for their arrogance and cruelty. And some Japa nese admin-
istrators whose job it was to provide stability were accepted by the local
people, owing to their pragmatic efforts to improve local living conditions
and to restrain other Japa nese from attacking people in the community,
stealing property, and violating Chinese women. As they did in Taiwan
and Manchuria, some of the Japa nese made efforts in China proper to im-
prove public health and to provide some medical care. But Japa nese troops
also used their positions of power to rape local women and girls, to help
themselves to local property, and to respond viciously to those who did
not follow their orders— actions that have been kept alive in Chinese
memories through movies about World War II.
When the war ended, the Chinese had a chance to settle accounts with
other Chinese whom they considered collaborators. The Chinese who had
served under the Japa nese often destroyed the rec ords they had kept, for
fear that some people would want to seek revenge for the things they had
done. Many of those who had worked under the Japa nese escaped to other
communities and changed their names to escape retribution at the hands
of local people who were ready to attack them as traitors.
In the southwest, areas that remained under Chinese rule during the
war were called on by the Nationalists to supply soldiers to help Chiang’s
troops fight the Japa nese, draining the region of local able- bodied men. The
province tasked with supplying more troops than any other was Guangxi.
The warlords Bai Chongxi and Li Zongren, who moved their troops from
China and Japan Page 42