China and Japan

by Ezra F. Vogel

  them, and many were allowed to return to Japan.

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  The Col apse of the Japa nese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1972

  Most of the Japa nese who returned from China after 1949 had learned

  the Chinese language and had found some way to earn a living in China.

  By the time they returned to Japan, there were better economic opportuni-

  ties in their home country than there had been in 1945 and 1946, when Japa-

  nese returnees first began to arrive back home. However, culturally they

  were more Chinese than Japa nese, and they often had even more difficult

  adjustment prob lems than those who had returned right after the war. Some

  found work in Japa nese companies that wanted to carry on trade with China,

  where they could make use of their language skills, their knowledge of Chi-

  nese business practices, and their personal contacts in China.

  Clusters of administrators from Mantetsu settled in Kyushu where

  they worked in regional planning. Scholars from Toa Dobun Shoin in

  Shanghai built up Chinese studies programs at Aichi University. Many

  who had been administrators became the backbone of Sino-Japanese

  friendship associations.

  After Japan’s surrender, the Chinese who, in the late 1930s, had escaped

  from the advancing Japa nese troops and sought refuge in the countryside

  and in the Southwest, beyond the reach of the Japa nese imperialists, began

  to move back to their original home regions. Most had become refugees

  during the first years of the war, but others had fled later, when the Japa-

  nese began bombing Shanghai and Chongqing and during the 1944 Ichigo

  Campaign, when Japa nese troops marched into Henan, Hunan, and

  Guangxi. Most of the refugees were desperately poor, and many died of star-

  vation. Many of the refugees had lived in areas with very diff er ent cultures

  in which they never felt at home.

  There are no reliable figures on how many Chinese relocated after the

  end of the war, but the number was in the tens of millions. Some have es-

  timated that it was as high as 100 million. Because few could make use of

  the trains, and highways were not yet built, most refugees walked, either

  carry ing their few belongings by hand or pulling them on small carts.

  The Race to Take Over Japa nese Facilities in Manchuria

  In the weeks after Japan’s formal surrender on September 3, 1945, Japa nese

  commanders throughout China surrendered to nearby Chinese officials and

  turned over Japa nese facilities to the Chinese. In a few cases, high- level

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  Japa nese commanders had known their Chinese counter parts when they

  were fellow students at military academies in Japan, and such former school-

  mates found it easy to work with one another. In general, Japa nese sol-

  diers remained disciplined after their surrender. In some communities,

  because there were no Chinese troops in the area, they were asked to stay

  on for some weeks, or even some months, to maintain order. In Shanxi,

  former warlord Yan Xishan hired more than a thousand Japa nese troops

  to serve on his staff, in the hope that the Japa nese could help him resist the

  growing power of the Chinese Communist forces.

  After the end of World War II, the Nationalists and Communists were

  unable to maintain the United Front they had formed against their common

  enemy during the war. Both sides began maneuvering to take over Japa nese

  facilities and to position themselves for a pos si ble civil war, which others

  still hoped could be avoided. In December 1945 the United States sent Gen-

  eral George Marshall to Chongqing, where he hosted negotiations be-

  tween Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai- shek in an effort to facilitate the for-

  mation of a co ali tion government and avoid a civil war. It quickly became clear

  that the two sides could not work together.

  Within weeks after the end of the war, the victorious troops—

  Communist, Nationalist, and Russian— raced into Manchuria, where

  they vied to gain control of the facilities that the Japa nese had built in the

  four de cades since 1905. Manchuria was China’s largest industrial base and

  the location with the largest assemblage of modern military weapons any-

  where in China. As soon as World War II ended, Mao Zedong, acutely

  aware of his army’s shortage of modern military equipment, directed

  Communist troops in northern and northwestern China to march at top

  speed to the Northeast, to take control of stockpiles of Japa nese weapons

  and industrial equipment that they could use if war were to break out

  with the Nationalists. In addition to larger machinery, it has been esti-

  mated that the Nationalists acquired between 350,000 and 750,000 rifles

  in Manchuria.4

  Although the Nationalist troops, centered in southwestern China, were

  far from the Northeast, the United States helped transport them to the

  Northeast and to China’s east coast by air, by ship, and by rail. Officials in

  Washington specifically directed that U.S. forces were not to take part in

  military clashes or to provide military assistance to either side. However,

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  The Col apse of the Japa nese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1972

  Chiang Kai- shek was the official ruler of China, and some American leaders,

  worried about the threat of communism, found ways to assist him.

  Both Chinese Communists and Nationalists accused Rus sian troops of

  stripping Japa nese factories to take industrial equipment across the border

  into Rus sia. The Rus sian troops recognized the Nationalists as the official

  government of China and allowed them to occupy key locations and to ac-

  quire some Japa nese equipment. The Chinese Communists hoped that

  Soviet troops, as fellow Communists, would side with them. Some Soviet

  troops did provide assistance to the Chinese Communist troops that were

  establishing their bases in the rural areas. But the Rus sians had worked with

  the Nationalists since the early 1920s, beginning with Sun Yat- sen, and

  Stalin still thought the Nationalists might win the war in China, so he con-

  tinued to work with the Nationalists until the Rus sian troops withdrew

  from the Northeast in the spring of 1946.

  Although Japa nese military equipment was taken by the vari ous

  armies, enough of the former Japa nese industrial base and infrastructure

  remained that for many years after 1949 the Northeast was the industrial

  base for the Chinese Communists. After 1949 the factories were operated

  by Chinese workers who had learned their skills under Japa nese leader-

  ship as well as by some Japa nese technicians and man ag ers who stayed on

  in China until Chinese replacements could be trained. Even Mao Zedong

  expressed admiration for the Japa nese state owner ship of and planning

  for the industrial development of Manchuria. In 1949 Liao Chengzhi

  asked Takasaki Tatsunosuke (see Biographies of Key Figures), former

  chairman of the Manchurian Industrial Development Com pany, for a list

  of Japa nese firms that could supply materials that could be used in the

  former Japa nese factories in Manchuria, along with a price list for such

 
materials. In 1952 China’s Northeast accounted for about half of China’s

  total industrial production. During the First Five- year Plan, 1953–1957, a

  high proportion of China’s key industrial proj ects, including those that

  received Soviet help, were in China’s Northeast, building on the original

  Japa nese industrial base. The area remained China’s main heavy industrial

  center until some years after reform and opening began in 1978, when in-

  dustry in the Shanghai and Guangdong areas began to grow rapidly, soon

  achieving a much larger production scale than that of the factories in the

  Northeast.

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  The Chinese Civil War and Reunification, 1945–1949

  Had it not been for the Japa nese invasion, the Nationalists might have de-

  feated the Communists in the mid-1930s. After Chiang Kai- shek was

  forced to form the United Front with the Communists to resist Japan in

  December 1936, the Nationalists could no longer attack the Communists.

  Once the Nationalists retreated to the Southwest, it was difficult for them

  to sustain national support, as they could do nothing to protect people in

  other parts of China. The Communists, based in China’s northwest, used

  this opportunity when they were not under attack by the Nationalists, to

  build a tight organ ization, gain experience in carry ing out land reform, hone

  a clear message to win public support, train an army that would be prepared

  to fight the Nationalists, and forge a general agreement among their fol-

  lowers about what policies should be pursued after their conquest of all of

  China.

  During some of the early battles of the Chinese Civil War in North-

  east China, the Nationalists fought well. They began with more weapons

  and had some well- trained troops. Gradually, however, the Communists

  gained in strength as their troops won key battles in the Northeast and took

  over Japa nese weapons, supplies, and their industrial base. Chiang chose to

  fight rather than to concentrate on bringing the economy under control. But

  the resultant wild inflation, shortage of goods, and corruption among the

  Nationalist troops trying to provide for themselves and their families in this

  chaotic period alienated the general public. Because they promised land re-

  form, the Communists had greater appeal to peasants, who hoped their

  families might acquire land if the Communists won the Civil War. By re-

  cruiting youths who were alienated by the corruption of the Nationalists

  and hopeful of gaining land, the Communists gained many soldiers who

  were more dedicated to the fight than the Nationalist soldiers, some of

  whom had been recruited by force.

  After capturing the bases in the Northeast, Communist forces captured

  Beiping and then moved southward toward the Yangtze. By the time they

  crossed the Yangtze, they had gained sufficient strength that the Nation-

  alist forces could no longer stop their advance. On October 1, 1949, even

  before their troops reached the Southwest, the Communists declared the

  founding of the People’s Republic. Thereafter, they consolidated their power,

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  The Col apse of the Japa nese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1972

  and through campaigns to wipe out counterrevolutionaries, they eliminated

  the landlord class and distributed land to poor peasants. By building up

  party and youth- league organ izations of loyal followers, they were able to

  unify the country for the first time since the collapse of the imperial order

  in 1911.

  Japan’s Re orientation from Al ied Occupation, 1945–1952

  American leaders, who dominated the Allied Occupation of Japan, believed

  that to prevent another world war, they had to help other countries make

  deep changes to remove the causes of war and create a basis for pursuing

  peace. From September 1945, when General Douglas MacArthur arrived

  to lead the Occupation, until April 1952, the Allied Occupation forces in-

  troduced changes in Japan’s po liti cal, economic, and education systems and

  controlled Japan’s foreign policy.

  At the end of World War II, leaders in the United States, by far the

  strongest nation in the world at the time, believed that a prosperous country

  would not need to attack other countries. In 1945 many Americans wanted

  to punish Japan for its sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, for its cruelty to Amer-

  ican soldiers during the Bataan Death March in the Philippines, and for

  its aggressive be hav ior in Asia and the western Pacific. But unlike the Chi-

  nese, who had suffered during eight years of Japa nese occupation, Ameri-

  cans had not directly experienced Japa nese occupation and the U.S. civilian

  population had had few personal contacts with Japa nese soldiers. Amer i-

  ca’s hatred of the Japa nese enemy was not as deep, long lasting, or personal

  as China’s.

  After considering the issue, Occupation officials concluded that for the

  Japa nese public to accept the decision to surrender and follow the Allied

  forces’ guidelines, they needed the support of the emperor. Therefore, Oc-

  cupation officials did not dwell on the question of the emperor’s responsi-

  bility for the war. The emperor renounced his divinity, announced the sur-

  render, and publicly appeared with General MacArthur, showing the

  Japa nese public that he supported the Occupation.

  American leaders had concluded that Germany had been punished too

  severely for war- making after World War I, resulting in a power ful German

  drive for revenge that resulted in its initiation of World War II. Hence, after

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  World War II they felt that they should be less vengeful in their occupa-

  tion of Germany and Japan. In Japan, the Allied powers gave directions, but

  the government was administered by the Japa nese. This required close col-

  laboration. As a whole, the Japa nese were orderly, accepted the directives

  of the Allied Occupation, and worked to carry them out. When U.S. sol-

  diers began arriving in Japan, the Japa nese found that they were a surpris-

  ingly friendly group that gave out candy and chewing gum to children.

  Allied Occupation leaders believed that to prevent Japan from ever again

  pursuing militarism, a thorough attack on the root causes of war was nec-

  essary. They believed that democracies did not make war, so Japan was

  “forced to be free” to develop demo cratic institutions, including a demo-

  cratically elected Diet, a free press, enterprises free of government control,

  and labor unions, as well as parent- teacher associations and textbooks that

  promoted democracy. To reduce the power of landlords and build up a rural

  base for democracy, the Occupation carried out land reform, dividing up

  the land formerly owned by large landlords. To strengthen democracy, the

  Occupation worked with Japa nese leftists, labor unions, and liberal aca-

  demics who supported the goals of the Occupation forces. The small

  number of Communists in Japan had been some of the boldest opponents

  of Japa nese militarism in the 1930s, and they were welcomed as a legal party.

  The Allied Occupation was suc
cessful in its attack on militarism not

  only because the Japa nese knew it was necessary in order to bring an end

  to the Occupation but also because Japa nese officials and the majority of

  the Japa nese public firmly believed that militarism had brought disaster to

  Japan, to other countries, and to Japan’s relations with other countries. The

  Occupation thus abolished Japan’s military forces, making them illegal. It

  destroyed factories and closed large companies that produced military

  equipment. Some Japa nese historians joined in criticizing the high concen-

  tration of power during the Meiji period, calling it “Meiji absolutism”

  because it had paved the way for the growth of the militarism that had re-

  sulted in suffering for all Asians and had alienated other Asians from Japan.

  During the first two years of the Occupation, tens of thousands of Japa-

  nese died from starvation. Having lost the colonies that supplied food for

  Japan, Japa nese leaders realized they had to increase exports to earn money

  to buy food from abroad. To a large extent, the United States replaced Man-

  churia as the main source of raw materials and soybeans for Japan. In 1951,

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  The Col apse of the Japa nese Empire and the Cold War, 1945–1972

  for example, the United States supplied 34 percent of Japan’s iron ore,

  71 percent of its coal, and 97 percent of its soybean imports.5

  The Japa nese drew on their war time experience in guiding the economy,

  but they chose to introduce indicative planning— setting targets but al-

  lowing companies the freedom to decide how to reach their targets—

  rather than imposing socialist- style government- administered planning.

  Japa nese leaders realized that Japan’s reputation for producing low- quality

  goods would negatively affect their exports, so they paid great attention to

  what was needed to improve quality, bringing in U.S. specialists and dedi-

  cating themselves to experimenting with new techniques. Within several

  years, Japan had gained a reputation for producing high- quality goods.

  In the early years after 1945, Japa nese scholars specializing in the study

  of China criticized some of Japan’s leading prewar China specialists, in-

  cluding Naito Konan, who died in 1934, for not having done enough to

  oppose Japa nese aggression in China. After the Occupation ended with a