China and Japan

by Ezra F. Vogel

  to this issue.

  However, on July 20, 1982, Chinese media launched a full- scale attack

  on what they said was a Japa nese campaign to play down the horrifying be-

  hav ior of Japa nese soldiers during World War II. Graphic pictures of Japa-

  nese soldiers decapitating Chinese prisoners and of piles of Chinese corpses

  appeared in the Chinese press. In articles about the Nanjing Massacre it

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  was reported that 360,000 Chinese were killed, and newspapers showed

  pictures of chopped-up Chinese corpses. The Japa nese war time experiments

  in bacteriological warfare on live human subjects were featured in stories

  and pictures. The Japa nese “three alls” policy (kill all, burn all, loot all), car-

  ried out in areas where Chinese guerrillas had killed Japa nese troops, was

  also featured. The media campaign reached a peak on August 15, the thirty-

  seventh anniversary of the Japa nese surrender in 1945. Reporting on the

  campaign was particularly widespread in Chinese youth magazines, and the

  mid- September 1982 po liti cal report presented at the Twelfth National

  Party Congress by General Secretary Hu Yaobang, who later would play

  an impor tant role in promoting goodwill between Chinese and Japa nese

  youth, warned against the revival of Japa nese militarism. The Chinese media

  campaign, launched when the Chinese believed the Japa nese were begin-

  ning to soften their criticism of their own role in the Sino- Japanese War,

  reflected a deep anger about the Japa nese atrocities, but it was also a warning

  to the Japa nese to avoid a return to militarism.

  On August 15, 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro made an offi-

  cial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine to pay re spects to the 2.4 million Japa nese

  who had given their lives for their country. He was the first prime minister

  to pay such a visit while in public office. The Chinese, upset with Naka-

  sone for visiting a place that enshrined the souls of twelve accused class- A

  war criminals, surprised the prime minister with the strength of their crit-

  icism. Nakasone said that he had visited the shrine on the fortieth anniver-

  sary of the end of the war to pay re spects to those who had given their lives

  and whose souls were enshrined there. He explained that his own brother

  was enshrined there and that he went to pay his re spects to him as well.

  However, in the following year Nakasone announced that because of the

  views of Chinese, Koreans, and others, he would not visit the Yasukuni

  Shrine again; instead he would find another way to pay his re spects to

  those who had given their lives for the country.

  In the summer of 1985, a twenty- eight- part Chinese tele vi sion drama,

  Four Generations under One Roof, portrayed the suffering of a Chinese family

  during the Japa nese occupation. On September 18, 1985, on the fifty- fourth

  anniversary of Japan’s seizure of Manchuria in 1931, university students in

  Beijing and other major cities throughout the country demonstrated against

  the Japa nese. The themes of their protests echoed the complaints of earlier

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  Working Together, 1972–1992

  generations of Chinese students who had also demonstrated against the

  Japa nese. They opposed Japa nese militarism and advocated boycotting Japa-

  nese goods. Some students also complained about Chinese leaders who

  were courting Japa nese businessmen. Some gave speeches urging that the

  Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands be returned to China.

  At the same time, the Chinese authorities made efforts to quell the anti-

  Japanese mood. The official media, including Zhongguo Qingnian Bao

  (China Youth Daily) and Renmin Ribao ( People’s Daily) acknowledged

  that the Chinese people had suffered at the hands of the Japa nese, but they

  also editorialized that in the new era there were equal relations between

  China and other countries, and that relations should be based on mutual

  re spect and mutual benefit. At a meeting of the Commission for Sino-

  Japanese Friendship in the Twenty- First Century, Hu Yaobang said that a

  revival of militarism in Japan had to be prevented, but that the Chinese had

  to differentiate between war criminals and the Japa nese people.

  Disagreements in 1987 about the use of a Kyoto dormitory set off huge

  anti- Japanese demonstrations by Chinese students. The dormitory (Ko-

  karyo) had been built before World War II, and in 1950 it had been purchased

  by Taiwan for the use of students studying at Kyoto University. After normal-

  ization of relations between China and Japan in 1972, a controversy arose as to

  whether the property should belong to Taiwan or to the mainland. In 1977,

  the issue was taken to the Kyoto District Court, and the court ruled that the

  PRC had acquired owner ship in 1978 when Japan broke relations with the

  Taiwan government and established relations with the mainland. But in 1982,

  a higher- level court in Osaka ruled on appeal that the dormitory belonged to

  Taiwan. Fi nal y, when the issue was reviewed by the Osaka High Court on

  February 26, 1987, the ruling was again in favor of Taiwan. Chinese authori-

  ties and Chinese students were furious. The issue about owner ship of the

  dormitory was featured in the Chinese press for months on end, and it was

  linked to Japa nese relations with Taiwan and with the revival of Japa nese

  militarism. A local Taiwanese politician, Lee Teng- hui, whose first language

  was Japa nese and who had attended Kyoto University, became vice president

  of Taiwan in 1984. After Chiang Ching-kuo died in 1987, some mainlanders

  tried to stop Lee from becoming president but he gained enough support to

  become president in 1988. When Lee gained power, mainland Chinese feared

  that Japan was strengthening its relations with Taiwan.

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  china and japan

  The owner ship of the dormitory was also associated with the idea that

  Japan was becoming more militaristic and arrogant. In the late 1980s, be-

  fore the Japa nese economic bubble burst in 1989, the value of the yen had

  increased compared with the U.S. dollar. The Japa nese economy was still

  growing rapidly and Japa nese firms were buying up valuable property in the

  United States as well as elsewhere. Japa nese manufacturing was gaining not

  only in textiles but also in areas that Americans had considered to be their

  strength— electronics and automobiles. Japa nese businesspeople in the late

  1980s had so much money to spend abroad that they earned a reputation

  among Westerners, as well as among the Chinese, of being arrogant. Some

  Chinese, in observing Japa nese businessmen at the time, felt they recalled

  the be hav ior of Japa nese soldiers during the Sino- Japanese War.

  Since the mid-1970s under Prime Minister Miki, there had been an un-

  derstanding among Japa nese po liti cal leaders that Japan would spend no

  more than 1 percent of its GNP on national defense. With Japan’s rapid

  growth in the 1980s, the 1 percent ceiling provided enough money for Japan

  to expand its defense expenditures. Then in 1987 Prime Minister Nakasone

  removed the 1 percent ceiling on defense expenditures and allowed the


  amount to slightly exceed 1 percent. The Chinese press expressed fears that

  the essential Japa nese spirit was the samurai spirit, and that proud Japa nese

  militarism was making a comeback.

  Still, throughout the 1980s China was closer to Japan than it was to any

  other foreign country. In 1986 about 40 percent of the 10,000 foreign ex-

  perts in China were Japa nese. Japa nese businesspeople and diplomats had

  better access to the Chinese than representatives of any other country. Japan

  played a major role in the transfer of technology and management skills to

  China, and the Chinese and Japa nese involved often developed very good

  personal relationships.

  After Tian anmen, Japan Ends Sanctions Quickly

  After the Tian anmen Square tragedy of June 4, 1989, Japa nese citizens, like

  those in Western countries, were deeply upset by the killing of innocent

  demonstrators on Beijing’s streets. In 1988, 69 percent of the Japa nese sur-

  veyed said they felt close to China, but the next year, following the violent

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  Working Together, 1972–1992

  suppression of the Tian anmen Square uprising, only 52 percent reported

  that they felt close to China.6

  The Japa nese government, along with Western governments, imposed

  sanctions on China because of its attack on the Chinese protestors. How-

  ever, Japan’s leaders, aware of the suffering Japan had inflicted on the Chi-

  nese during the Sino- Japanese War, knew that Japan was not in a strong

  moral position to criticize others who killed Chinese citizens. They believed

  that efforts to isolate China, like sanctions, would cause prob lems for many

  Chinese people, not just those who were responsible for the crackdown, and

  would end up strengthening the hard- liners within China who resented for-

  eign interference. They also knew that serious sanctions would hurt Japan’s

  trade with China and ultimately the future of Sino- Japanese relations.

  Compared with the Western governments’ severe sanctions on China,

  sanctions imposed by the Japa nese government were relatively light. At the

  Group of Seven (G7) Economic Summit held in mid- July 1989, only weeks

  after the Tian anmen tragedy, Japan joined the other powers in criticizing

  China, but it also urged the other countries not to escalate their sanctions.

  One year later, at the July 1990 G7 Economic Summit, Prime Minister Kaifu

  Toshiki announced that Japan would resume lending to China, which it had

  put on hold after June 4, 1989. In 1991 Japan initiated its third batch of loans

  to China. No Western nation was so quick to remove its sanctions.

  In August 1991 Prime Minister Kaifu was the first leader of a major for-

  eign country to visit China after the Tian anmen tragedy. As the only

  country that had been bombed with nuclear weapons, Japan was then taking

  the lead in promoting international nuclear nonproliferation. While Kaifu

  was in Beijing, Chinese officials, appreciative of Japan’s leadership in ending

  the post- Tiananmen sanctions, signed the Nuclear Non- Proliferation

  Treaty. Kaifu and Chinese leaders also discussed how to make use of 1992,

  the twentieth anniversary of normalization of relations, to further strengthen

  relations between the two countries. The boldest idea discussed was the

  possibility that the Japa nese emperor might visit China.

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  chapter eleven

  The Deterioration of Sino- Japanese

  Relations, 1992–2018

  Only once in the 2,000 years of contact between China and Japan has an

  emperor of Japan or China visited the other country. It was unimaginable that

  the Chinese would ever have welcomed Emperor Hirohito, the highest symbol

  of Japa nese invaders. After Emperor Hirohito died in January 1989, Japa nese

  po liti cal leaders initially tried to play down his responsibility for the war, but

  China’s foreign minister, Qian Qichen, representing China at Emperor Hiro-

  hito’s funeral ceremonies in Tokyo, rebuked the Japa nese for this and told them

  they should study their history. Not only Chinese spokespersons but also

  Western and even many Japa nese leaders and writers acknowledged that Em-

  peror Hirohito had attended meetings at which war plans were discussed.

  In 1989, the succession to the throne of Akihito, who at the end of World

  War II was only eleven years old, provided an opportunity to highlight the

  new era of peaceful relations between the two countries. It also gave China,

  which had been the target of sanctions by Western countries for its crack-

  down against protesters around Tian anmen Square on June 1989, a chance

  to showcase its return to the world of international diplomacy.

  Emperor Akihito’s Visit to China

  General Secretary Jiang Zemin visited Japan from April 6 to 10, 1992, to lay

  the groundwork for Emperor Akihito’s visit to China. In Tokyo, Jiang met

  with Emperor Akihito, high- level Japa nese officials, and people from vari ous

  walks of life. Japa nese officials wanted to make sure that a visit by Emperor

  Akihito to China would not be used by the Chinese to publicize Japa nese

  brutalities during the war, and China provided such assurances.

  Because some details of the visit were still unresolved while General Sec-

  retary Jiang Zemin was in Tokyo, the emperor’s decision to make the trip

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  The Deterioration of Sino- Japanese Relations, 1992–2018

  was not yet publicly announced. Discussions about the visit and Japan’s

  planning for the trip proceeded under the leadership of Prime Minister

  Miyazawa Kiichi, a well- educated cosmopolitan official who was considered

  sympathetic to China, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato Koichi, a leading

  Diet member who spoke Chinese and had previously served as a diplomat

  in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.1

  On October 23, 1992, only four days after the close of China’s Fourteenth

  Party Congress, Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko arrived in China

  for a five- day visit. In Tian anmen Square, the Japa nese emperor was wel-

  comed with a twenty- one- gun salute and a Chinese band playing the Japa-

  nese national anthem. Chinese police had cleared the streets of potential

  protesters, and no incidents occurred. The emperor was warmly welcomed

  by General Secretary Jiang Zemin and President Yang Shangkun, both of

  whom were restrained in their criticism of Japan. Beijing’s mayor, Chen

  Xitong, who accompanied Emperor Akihito to the Great Wall, reported

  that he was “very friendly to China,” adding, “we very much welcome him.”

  Chinese tele vi sion described Emperor Akihito’s visit as symbolizing the

  role that Japan was now playing as a peace- loving country.

  Wu Jianmin, then spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an-

  nounced, “It is up to the Japa nese side to decide what remarks the emperor

  will make during his visit to China.” At the opening banquet in Beijing, Em-

  peror Akihito acknowledged Japa nese aggression during World War II

  and the suffering that had been caused by Japan, saying, “During the long

  history of Sino- Japanese relations, there was a short period when Japan

  caused the Chinese people to live in dire mise
ry, about which I feel deep

  regret.” Emperor Akihito visited Xi’an, the site of the Tang dynasty capital

  that had played such a key role in the formation of Japa nese civilization. At

  the Shaanxi Provincial Museum in Xi’an, the emperor and empress viewed

  a stone tablet inscribed with the characters 平成 (in Chinese, the charac-

  ters are read as pingcheng, “preserving peace,” but in Japa nese, they refer to

  heisei, the name Emperor Akihito had chosen as the reign name for his era).

  This was a testimony to the deep cultural links between the two countries.

  There were no unpleasant incidents during the entire trip, and the visit was

  a high point in the history of relations between the two countries.

  However, by 1992 new issues were arising that would have an impact

  on the relationship. That year, China passed a domestic law that for the first

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  time provided a legal basis for its assertion that the Senkaku / Diaoyu Is-

  lands were part of Chinese territory. By 1996 China was carry ing out oil

  exploration in the vicinity. China began increasing pressure on the issue of

  the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands. As tensions over the islands rose, public

  opinion in both countries began to change. By 2006 only 27 percent of Japa-

  nese surveyed said they had positive views of China, and only 21 percent of

  Chinese respondents expressed positive attitudes toward Japan. The rela-

  tionship would continue to deteriorate until 2015.

  Sources of Tension after 1992

  There were several reasons for the worsening of relations between China

  and Japan. One was the loss of key “bridge builders” in the two governments,

  se nior members who had worked to normalize relations.

  The Exit of Deng, Tanaka, and Other Bridge Builders

  A few days before Emperor Akihito traveled to China, Deng Xiaoping was

  photographed at the 1992 Fourteenth Party Congress as he passed leader-

  ship of the party over to Jiang Zemin. Deng had been firmly committed to

  improving relations with Japan. With his unassailable Communist Party

  credentials and his seven years spent fighting the Japa nese, Deng was not

  vulnerable to charges of being soft on Japan. In contrast, Jiang Zemin was

  too young to have fought in the Sino- Japanese War and because Jiang’s

  father, like other Chinese businessmen, had had some contacts with Japa-