from 1992 to 2002, and President Hu Jintao, from 2002 to 2012. Japan had
enjoyed stable government by leaders from the Liberal Demo cratic Party
(LDP) from 1955 through the late 1980s. Then reforms to the electoral
system were enacted in 1994, designed to give rise to a strong two- party
system that would weaken vari ous factions by replacing the election
districts that had each elected several members of the Diet with 180
smaller districts that each elected a single member, and allowing eleven more
. 371 .
china and japan
members to be selected from proportional- representation districts. Because
some Diet members from multiple- seat districts lost out when only one
member could be selected by their new district, many experienced se nior
members who had provided a long- term perspective were no longer in gov-
ernment after 1994. Furthermore, during the eigh teen years from 1994 to
2012, when Abe Shinzo was elected prime minister, Japan had thirteen
prime ministers. Some made an effort to improve relations with China, but
the frequent changes of leadership— and especially the period of rule by the
inexperienced Demo cratic Party of Japan from 2009 to 2012— made it dif-
ficult for Chinese and Japa nese leaders to develop and maintain long- term
understandings.
The issue that became the greatest focus of tension during the transi-
tion from 1993 to 2010 was the dispute over the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands
in the East China Sea.
The Dispute over the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands
The eight small islands in question, called the Senkaku Islands by Japan and
the Diaoyu Islands by China, are located approximately 100 miles north-
east of Taiwan, 100 miles northwest of Ishigaki (in the Ryukyu chain), and
200 miles from mainland China. They have been uninhabited since World
War II. In 1971 the U.S. agreement to return Okinawa to Japa nese rule and to
transfer administration of the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands to Japan aroused
concerns in Taiwan and on the Chinese mainland that Japan was again begin-
ning to expand as a military power. The Taiwan government and Chinese
activists from Hong Kong and Taiwan have supported the mainland in
claiming that the islands are Chinese territory. The islands became the focus
of a dispute over fishing rights when fishermen from China and Japan, having
exhausted resources close to their shores, began fishing farther offshore and
clashing with each other near the islands. In the 1970s it appeared that signifi-
cant undersea oil supplies might also be located near the islands, and this
heightened interest in control ing the area. But it was the islands’ strategic lo-
cation and the military competition in the area that inflamed the issue.
In 1973, within the framework of the third United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), nations began discussions concerning
rights to the use of the oceans. Although UNCLOS did not establish
. 372 .
The Deterioration of Sino- Japanese Relations, 1992–2018
rules about how to determine sovereignty, it did establish rules about ex-
clusive economic zones, low- tide elevations, and rights to maritime re-
sources, including petroleum found beneath the ocean floor. Nations
began rushing to make claims on islands in the Western Pacific as well as
claims to the disputed Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands. According to the Con-
vention of the Law of the Sea agreed to in 1982, coastal states have sover-
eignty over the waters within 12 nautical miles of their land at low tide. The
agreement also allows for an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles
(1 nautical mile is equal to 1.15 statute miles) from a country’s coast. The
distance between Japan and continental China is 360 nautical miles, so
there is no clear agreement on the rights of Japan and China to the seabed.
Most countries of the world, including Japan and China, have signed the
UNCLOS agreement. Although the United States signed the agreement
and has chosen to abide by it, it has not ratified it.
Once the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands became a focus of attention, both
China and Japan pulled out their historical rec ords to strengthen their
claims to the islands. China presented documents that reported that Chi-
nese ships had first charted the islands in 1534. China also argued that the
Potsdam Agreement of 1945 provided that Taiwan and the affiliated islands
would be returned to China. Japan pointed out that the Potsdam Agree-
ment did not specifically mention the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands as being
among the islands near Taiwan that were to be returned to China. It main-
tained that the islands had traditionally been used as landmarks for all nav-
igators in the region but had not belonged to any one country. Japan an-
nounced that it had surveyed the islands in the 1880s and found them
uninhabited. Therefore, by a cabinet decision in January 1895, prior to the
end of the Sino- Japanese War, it had declared sovereignty over the islands.
Japan added that the islands had been returned to Japan by the United
States in 1971 as part of the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. China claimed
that the islands were assigned to Japan by the 1895 Shimonoseki Treaty at
the end of the First Sino- Japanese War, and that with Japan’s surrender in
1945, sovereignty over the islands returned to China.
Japan does not acknowledge that there is a dispute over sovereignty of
the islands. The United States has taken the position that the question of
sovereignty has not been resolved, but that the Japa nese have administrative
control over the islands. When Chinese ships and planes began operations
. 373 .
china and japan
near the islands, U.S. officials made it clear that if the Japa nese were to be
attacked on or near the islands, the United States would, according to Ar-
ticle 5 of the U.S.- Japan Security Agreement, come to Japan’s defense.
In April 1978, shortly before the Treaty of Peace and Friendship was
concluded, nearly 100 small Chinese fishing vessels entered the area, flying
banners claiming that the islands were Chinese territory. However, when
Deng Xiaoping visited Japan in October 1978 he announced at his press con-
ference that China and Japan “could cooperate in sharing the economic
benefits of the islands, and that the question of sovereignty could be resolved
by wise leaders in future generations.”
Disputes escalated in the 1990s, as Japan began taking more respon-
sibility for defending the waters around the Japa nese islands and China
began expanding its military capacity over a broader geo graph i cal area.
China’s desire to re unite Taiwan with the mainland and the possibility
that it might use force to achieve that goal attracted more attention to the
nearby Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands, which would be of strategic importance
if conflict were to arise over Taiwan.
In 1994 China began sending scientific research vessels near the terri-
torial waters to explore the seabed. After the tensions in the Taiwan Strait
in 1995, the Chinese greatly increased their investment in naval resources
&
nbsp; to be better prepared in the case of a clash near Taiwan. In July 1996, a right-
wing Japa nese youth put up a light house on one of the islets, and in
August a war memorial stone was erected on Ishigaki, one of the Senkaku /
Diaoyu Islands. Following this construction, activists from Hong Kong
and Taiwan, in support of China’s claims, tried to land on the islands, and
ten fishing boats from Taiwan appeared in the vicinity. The Japa nese sent
in ships to try to prevent Chinese ships from moving into Japa nese territorial
waters as defined by UNCLOS. The emotions over the Senkaku / Diaoyu
Islands reached their peak just when China was replacing Japan as the
largest economy in East Asia.
The Transition to China’s Dominance, 1993–2012
During the ups and downs as China surpassed Japan as the largest economy
in Asia, tensions remained high but both sides tried to prevent the conflict
from getting out of control.
. 374 .
The Deterioration of Sino- Japanese Relations, 1992–2018
The Murayama Declaration, 1995
In 1995, fifty years after the end of the China War, Prime Minister Mu-
rayama Tomiichi of Japan made a noble effort to stop the deterioration of
relations. After tensions reached a peak when China ignored Japan’s request
that it end its nuclear testing, Prime Minister Murayama traveled to China
in May 1995 to try to improve relations. Murayama, who served from
June 30, 1994, to January 11, 1996, was the first non- LDP leader to be prime
minister since 1955. A Socialist who led a co ali tion government, he was a
modest and popu lar leader, the son of a fisherman from Beppu on the north-
east coast of Kyushu. He had long believed that Japan should acknowledge
the atrocities of World War II. During his visit to China, Murayama went
to Xi’an to pay re spects to the ancient capital from which Japan had learned
so much. He also visited the Marco Polo Bridge, where war had broken out
in 1937, to show his empathy for the Chinese suffering during the war and
to apologize for Japan’s aggression.
On August 15, to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War
II, Prime Minister Murayama gave a speech drafted by Tanino Sakutaro,
formerly ambassador to China, expressing his hopes for close cooperation
between China and Japan in the twenty- first century. Murayama declared,
“Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to
war, . . . and through its colonial rule and aggression . . . caused tremendous
damage and suffering to the people of many countries. Allow me once again
to express my deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. . . . I would like
to reaffirm once more that the Japa nese people are firmly determined that
Japan will never become a military power.” His speech was the fullest apology
that a top Japa nese leader had ever given for Japa nese aggression during
World War II. In the future, other Japa nese prime ministers would repeat
parts of the speech. Murayama was warmly welcomed in China by Presi-
dent Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng.
In September 1997, to further reduce tensions, Murayama’s successor,
Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro, traveled to Beijing to celebrate the
twenty- fifth anniversary of the normalization of relations. Prime Minister
Hashimoto offered reassurances that the U.S.- Japan Security Treaty was
not aimed at China, and he confirmed that Japan did not support Taiwan’s
in de pen dence from mainland rule.
. 375 .
china and japan
Jiang Zemin’s Visit to Japan, 1998
On the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship and
Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 visit to Japan, President Jiang Zemin made the first
formal state visit by a Chinese leader to Japan in the history of the two coun-
tries. When Deng had visited Japan in October 1978, he was not officially
China’s top leader and therefore he had not been received with the protocol
of a formal state visit. Jiang Zemin had visited Japan briefly in 1992, before
he was president, to help arrange the Japa nese emperor’s visit to China. This
time, during his full six- day state visit, from November 25 to 30, Jiang was
welcomed by Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo, treated with formal banquets,
welcomed by Emperor Akihito, hosted by po liti cal and business leaders, and
escorted by Prime Minister Obuchi on trips to Sendai and Hokkaido. The
visit was planned to solidify good relations between the two countries, but
in the end it led to heightened tensions.
The state visit by Jiang Zemin was originally scheduled to take place be-
fore a visit to Japan by South Korean president Kim Dae- jung, but serious
flash floods in China caused Jiang to delay his trip until after Kim’s visit.
President Kim’s time in Japan was highly successful, and by comparison,
Jiang’s visit was judged to be less so. In his speech to the Japa nese Diet on
October 8, Kim Dae- jung, who, twenty- five year earlier, had been kidnapped
in Tokyo by Korean po liti cal enemies and had nearly been killed when he
was on a small boat headed toward Korea, thanked the Japa nese for helping
to save his life. He said that when Japan had pursued an imperial path, it
had caused great pain to the people of Korea and other nations. But,
speaking in Japa nese, he acknowledged that Japan had changed after World
War II, and he said that he looked forward to future cooperation. Kim’s
message created a high point of goodwill between Korea and Japan. Prime
Minister Obuchi and the Japa nese public were moved by Kim’s message,
and the leaders signed a joint declaration in which Obuchi expressed deep
remorse for Japan’s be hav ior during its occupation of Korea.
When Jiang Zemin visited Japan, five years into the period of rapid Chi-
nese growth that had resumed in 1993, he was representing a China that
was increasingly confident and had just weathered the Asian financial crisis
of 1997 with far less damage than Japan. China was also less worried that
. 376 .
The Deterioration of Sino- Japanese Relations, 1992–2018
the United States might side against it with Japan. In June, President Clinton
had made a ten- day visit to China to strengthen Sino- U.S. relations, and
despite urging from Japa nese officials, he had not stopped in Japan on the
way home.
Before Jiang Zemin’s visit, Chinese and Japa nese officials, engaged in ne-
gotiations on the content of the statement the two sides would sign while
Jiang was in Tokyo, were close to agreeing on a declaration that would en-
able Japan to express remorse without making a lengthy apology. But after
Japan signed the long written apology with President Kim, Chinese offi-
cials requested that Japan sign a similar apology to China.
To Jiang and the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people, Japan
had not done enough to apologize for its history. Prime Minister Obuchi
did say during Jiang’s visit, “The Japa nese side is keenly conscious of the re-
sponsibility for the serious distress and damage that Japan caused to the
Chinese people through its aggression against China during a cer
tain pe-
riod in the past and expressed deep remorse for this,” but Jiang did not re-
gard this as sufficient. What Jiang did not realize was that the Japa nese
mood had been changing. The Japa nese were tiring of China’s continued
lecturing about Japan’s atrocities and its endless requests for apologies, its
failure to acknowledge the apologies Japan had made, and its unwillingness
to heed Japan’s requests, for its part, that China refrain from nuclear tests.
Some Japa nese were upset that in Japan, Jiang thanked the Japa nese for the
aid it had given China, but that this expression of appreciation was not re-
ported in the Chinese press.
During his state visit, a portion of Jiang Zemin’s eve ning banquet with
Emperor Akihito was televised. In his brief pre sen ta tion at the banquet,
Jiang Zemin gave his opinions on how Japan should view history. To the
Chinese, Jiang’s comments were appropriate, but to the Japa nese it was
highly inappropriate to use a banquet, which was meant to be a ceremonial
occasion, for what seemed to them like a lecture by a teacher telling a pupil
what he should do. Reports by Japa nese journalists covering Jiang’s visit, re-
flecting growing irritation, heightened the perception of increasing Chi-
nese arrogance.
When Jiang pressed Prime Minister Obuchi to sign a written statement
like the one he had signed with Kim Dae- jung, Jiang expected that, as in
. 377 .
china and japan
the past, Japan would yield. However, Obuchi chose to give an oral apology
and not a written one. The prime minister’s refusal to sign a written apology
reflected his po liti cal judgment that the Japa nese public was tired of
China’s lectures, and his judgment turned out to be correct. To the Chinese,
it showed that the Japa nese were denying history and failing to show
proper re spect for the Chinese leader.
Despite these tensions, during Jiang’s visit Japa nese and Chinese offi-
cials did discuss ways in which the two countries might work together. They
signed a joint declaration for cooperation in thirty- three areas, covering ex-
changes of officials, economic and scientific collaborations, cultural ex-
changes, and environmental proj ects. This declaration paved the way for the
implementation of many cooperative efforts. After mainland China was
China and Japan Page 58