given the China seat in the United Nations in 1971 (taking over the seat pre-
viously held by the Republic of China on Taiwan), Japan generally sup-
ported China’s participation in UN activities and in East Asian regional af-
fairs. Although China opposed Japan’s permanent membership on the UN
Security Council, it supported meetings with Japan in the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus 3, which was just being launched.4
After Jiang’s visit, Japa nese trade and investment in China continued to
grow. In 1999, two- way trade between Japan and China totaled $66 billion,
four times the amount in 1990.
Prime Minister Obuchi’s Visit to China, November 1999
One year after Jiang’s visit, in a further effort to improve relations, Prime
Minister Obuchi Keizo visited Beijing to join in the cele bration of the fif-
tieth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic. Chinese diplo-
mats, aware of the negative Japa nese reaction to Jiang’s pressure on the his-
tory issue, were more restrained in asking for Japa nese apologies. Prime
Minister Obuchi met with Jiang Zemin, who thanked him for his hospi-
tality in Tokyo. In his meeting with Premier Zhu Rongji, Obuchi indicated
his support for China’s entry into the WTO. He continued to promote the
thirty- three areas of cooperation that had been designated during Jiang’s
visit to Japan, and he offered Japa nese assistance for several programs, in
par tic u lar those in Inner Mongolia, in which he expressed a personal in-
terest. The visit did help lessen somewhat the deterioration in relations.
. 378 .
The Deterioration of Sino- Japanese Relations, 1992–2018
Premier Zhu’s Visit to Japan, 2000
Zhu Rongji, who was highly respected in both China and Japan, was sent
to Japan the next year to try to improve relations and solidify Japan’s sup-
port for China’s entry into the WTO. In Japan, Premier Zhu said that the
Japa nese people, like the Chinese, had suffered during World War II, and
he did not request any more apologies. After he took part in a televised
dialogue with several Japa nese business and po liti cal leaders, Japa nese
viewers, as well as the leaders with whom he met, said they were very im-
pressed with Zhu Rongji’s knowledge, frankness, and his desire to develop
good business relations. Some even said they wished Japan had such a
statesman leading their country. Officials on both sides acknowledged that
the visit helped improve relations. Public opinion polls shortly after Zhu’s
visit reflected a modest improvement in overall Japa nese attitudes toward
China. Slightly more Japa nese respondents had positive opinions of China
than had negative opinions.
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and the Yasukuni
Issue, 2001–2006
Shortly after he became prime minister in 2001, Koizumi tried to find a bal-
ance between resisting Chinese pressures and apologizing for Japan’s role
in World War II. His po liti cal ally, Kato Koichi, consulted with Chinese
officials, who advised him that if Koizumi were to visit the Yasukuni Shrine
on August 13, 2001, instead of on August 15, the official anniversary of the
end of the war, Chinese reaction would be less strong. Still, when Koizumi
visited the Yasukuni Shrine on August 13, 2001, the Chinese press was
very critical of the visit and demanded that Koizumi not visit the shrine
again. The Chinese nonetheless allowed Koizumi to visit China shortly after
his visit to the shrine, and on that trip he went to the Marco Polo Bridge
Museum, where he acknowledged that Japan was wrong to start the war
and apologized to the Chinese people. After that, Koizumi visited the
Yasukuni Shrine each year.
In 2006, following attacks on Japa nese property and Japa nese people in
China, Koizumi made his final visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. He knew that
within several years China would have an economy larger than Japan’s, but
. 379 .
china and japan
he would not bow down. He made his final visit to the Yasukuni Shrine
on August 15, the anniversary of the end of the war, a date that would espe-
cially annoy the Chinese. He said, “I do not go to justify the past war or to
glorify militarism. I go with the feeling that we should not wage war again
and that we must not forget the sacrifice of those who went to war and
died. I am not going there for the class-A war criminals.” The Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Koizumi’s visit had “hurt the
feelings of the Chinese people” and “undermined the po liti cal basis for ties
between China and Japan.”5
To the Japa nese, the issue behind whether their prime minister should
visit the Yasukuni Shrine was not whether Japan was guilty of crimes during
World War II, for the Japa nese public accepted that. Rather, as Koizumi told
Professor Gerald Curtis, it was that no one, Japa nese or foreign, could tell
him that he should not pay re spect to the Japa nese soldiers who had sacri-
ficed their lives for their country. His insistence on visiting the Yasukuni
Shrine was popu lar with the Japa nese public. But to the Chinese, Koizumi’s
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine symbolized what they saw as a Japa nese re spect
for militarists, the Japa nese people’s unwillingness to face their history, and
an unacceptable refusal to re spect Chinese requests, especially at a time
when China was ascendant and its economy was beginning to pass Japan’s.
Within Japan, some officials and newspapers were critical of Koizumi for
causing tensions with the Chinese and Koreans due to his visits to the Yasu-
kuni Shrine but within Japan he remained popu lar. While Koizumi was in
office, from 2001 to 2006, Sino- Japanese relations reached a new postwar low.
President Hu Jintao’s Efforts to Improve Relations, 2003
In China, Hu Jintao, who had become president in 2003, made an effort to
improve relations with Japan. In the 1980s he had been one of the Chinese
youth welcoming a del e ga tion of 3,000 young people from Japan, and he
had maintained contact with some of the Japa nese he had met. He did not
publicly say that China should improve relations with Japan, but he al-
lowed books and newspaper articles to be published that were more sym-
pathetic to Japan than the prevailing Chinese mood.
In April 2002, even before Hu took office, the Chinese General Admin-
istration of Press and Publications gave permission for the publication of a
. 380 .
The Deterioration of Sino- Japanese Relations, 1992–2018
book by Pei Hua titled ZhongRi waijiao fengyunzhong de Deng Xiaoping (Deng
Xiaoping amid changing Sino- Japanese relations), which, by presenting
an accurate account of Deng Xiaoping’s trip to Japan in October 1978,
was sympathetic to the Japa nese who had received him.
Also in 2002, Ma Licheng, a se nior writer for People’s Daily, who had
earlier worked at China Youth Daily, was dispatched to Japan for more than
a month, assigned to write a report on what he observed in Japan. His ar-
ticle, “New Thinking on Relations with Japan,” appeared at the end of
the
year in the Chinese journal Zhanlüe yu guanli (Strategy and management),
a publication with high- level sponsorship that was noted for fresh thinking
on strategic issues. Ma reported that, contrary to conventional Chinese
views, in conversations with Japa nese people from many diff er ent circles,
they all said they opposed militarization and they all wanted to pursue
peace. He also noted that in 1980, 78 percent of Japa nese people said they
had favorable impressions of China, but by 2000 the percentage had
dropped to 49 percent. Nevertheless, Japa nese people from all circles still
wanted to have friendly relations with China.
In 2003 Zhanlüe yu guanli published an article by Shi Yinhong, a strate-
gist with a military background who was also a professor at People’s Univer-
sity, that asserted that better Sino- Japanese relations were in China’s interest
and that China should support Japan in its bid to become a permanent
member of the UN Security Council. For several months following these
publications, it appeared as if Sino- Japanese relations might improve.
China also undertook the production of a tele vi sion series in 2003 on
the rise and decline of the great powers. It was a thoughtful, well- researched
effort to provide guidance to the public as China was on its way to becoming
a great power. The series was aired on Chinese tele vi sion in 2006. The se-
ries presented a balanced and respectful treatment of other countries, in-
cluding Japan. To be sure, the section on Japan talked of World War II and
Japa nese aggression, but it also discussed how Japa nese industrialization had
created better living conditions for its people.
The views on Japan published by Ma Licheng and Shi Yinhong were
available in the Chinese media for several years, but they never became part
of the mainstream. After 2003 their writings attracted less attention and in
2004, when passions between China and Japan again heated up, some even
referred to Ma and Shi as traitors. Ma Licheng never gave up his views, but
. 381 .
china and japan
finding it difficult to work in the mainland, he later moved to Hong Kong;
Shi Yinhong, less bold in his praise of Japan, remained a professor at People’s
University.
Chinese Reaction to Japan’s Soccer Victories, 2004
At the time when the UN was beginning to discuss whether to expand the
permanent membership of the UN Security Council, the Japa nese na-
tional soccer team visited vari ous Chinese cities ahead of the 2004 Asian
Football Confederation (AFC) Asian Cup, scheduled to be held in Beijing
in August, to play the first round of the games. In each city, the Japa nese
team won the matches, and passionate demonstrations erupted against the
Japa nese. In the Asian Cup final in Beijing, Japan’s victory over China, 3–1,
led to boisterous attacks against Japa nese people and Japa nese products.
Chinese police escorted the Japa nese team to safety, but the angry crowds
continued to demonstrate, jostling the car of a Japa nese diplomat and
breaking its win dow. Similar demonstrations took place in several other
cities, and scenes of the angry crowds were played and replayed on Japa nese
tele vi sion. Emotional expressions of animosity and nationalism in both
countries reached a high pitch. Before the emotions died down, the issue
of Japan’s place in the UN came to a head.
China Blocks Japan in the UN Security Council, 2005
In March 2005, during discussions concerning the upcoming decision on
the future permanent membership of the UN Security Council, Secretary
General Kofi Annan said that he supported Japan’s membership, and it ap-
peared that Japan had the support of more than the two- thirds majority of
UN members required for approval. The decision also required the sup-
port of all existing permanent members of the Security Council, so China,
which had become a permanent member when the UN was first formed
immediately after World War II, had the power to prevent Japan from be-
coming a permanent member. To cast the sole negative vote against Japan
would have made China appear vindictive at a time when it was seeking to
improve its international stature as a rising power. Chinese diplomats en-
couraged officials in the Southeast Asian countries, which had also suf-
. 382 .
The Deterioration of Sino- Japanese Relations, 1992–2018
fered from Japa nese aggression during the war, to oppose Japan’s member-
ship as well. On April 12, China’s premier Wen Jiabao, in registering his
opposition to Japan’s permanent membership on the UN Security Council,
said that only a country that re spects history can assume responsibility in
the international community. To patriotic Chinese familiar with their his-
tory, it was a wonderful reversal of the events of 1920, when Japan became a
permanent member of the League of Nations Council and China had to
compete to be elected as a nonpermanent member, and of the period prior
to 1971, when Japan supported the United States in preventing mainland
China from replacing Taiwan in the UN’s China seat.
Anti- Japanese demonstrations in China in the spring and summer of
2005 were intended to convey to the world that Japan did not deserve the
permanent seat on the Security Council because of its failure to deal prop-
erly with its history. In April 2005 China carried out a nationwide online
effort to collect signatures from those opposed to granting Japan a perma-
nent seat on the council. In her research, Western scholar Jessica Weiss
found evidence of anti- Japanese demonstrations in thirty- eight Chinese
cities; in many of the demonstrations Japa nese property was damaged. The
government, in backing the protests, bused more than 10,000 students to
central Beijing to engage in the demonstrations there. Demonstrators broke
the win dows of Japa nese restaurants and shops that sold Japa nese goods,
smashed Japa nese cars, and tore down signs advertising Japa nese products.
On April 9, crowds threw rocks and tiles at the residence of the Japa nese
ambassador, breaking win dows and terrifying Ambassador Anami Kore-
shige and his wife, Ginny. Police prevented the demonstrators from scaling
the fence to enter the ambassador’s property, but for hours they did nothing
to stop the demonstrators from throwing rocks. The worst vio lence occurred
in Shanghai, where tens of thousands demonstrated, many Japa nese shop
win dows were broken, and the Japa nese consulate was attacked. Chinese
officials expressed admiration for the patriotism of Chinese students during
the demonstrations, although they then tried to dampen the protests by
warning the students against taking illegal actions. After it became clear that
Japan would not be admitted as a permanent member of the UN Security
Council, the demonstrations died down.
Japa nese diplomats felt betrayed by China. Japan had supported China’s
entry into the WTO and other world organ izations, and yet Chinese officials
. 383 .
china and japan
had stirred up popu lar anti- Japanese sentiment among the Chinese
public
and in Southeast Asia to block Japan, the second- largest economy in the
world and the world’s second- highest contributor to the UN, from be-
coming a permanent member of the Security Council. In December 2005,
following the demonstrations in China, a Yomiuri poll showed that
72 percent of Japa nese respondents did not trust China. Japa nese public
opinion did not regain the level of positive feelings toward China that had
been expressed before the attacks and China’s opposition to making Japan
a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
Easing Tensions and Olympic Diplomacy, 2006–2008
Following the demonstrations and destruction of Japa nese property in
China in 2005, leaders on both sides tried to ease the tensions. None of the
several Japa nese prime ministers who succeeded Koizumi visited the Yasu-
kuni Shrine while in office, and Chinese officials urged anti- Japanese dem-
onstrators to display restraint. Japan had become China’s largest trading
partner in 2005 despite the attacks on the Japa nese soccer team, and it has
remained one of its top three trading partners since then. In 2005, Japanese-
owned firms in China, mostly in manufacturing, employed an estimated 10
million Chinese workers.
Chinese leaders, after the impasse with Prime Minister Koizumi over
the visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, made efforts to improve relations with Koi-
zumi’s successor, Abe Shinzo (who served his first term from September 2006
to September 2007), even though Abe did not promise not to visit the Yasu-
kuni Shrine while he was prime minister. Ordinarily, a newly instal ed Japa-
nese prime minister would make his first foreign visit to the United States,
but on October 8, 2006, only two weeks after becoming prime minister, Abe
Shinzo was welcomed in Beijing for a summit meeting. At the meeting
Abe apologized to the Chinese for the enormous damage and pain that
Japan had caused China during the Sino- Japanese War. President Hu Jintao,
aware that Chinese pressure on Japa nese leaders not to visit the Yasukuni
Shrine had led to a deadlock in relations, avoided publicly pressing Abe on
the issue, and Abe chose not to visit the shrine. Hu and Abe agreed to set up
a panel of experts, with representatives from both sides, to undertake a joint
. 384 .
The Deterioration of Sino- Japanese Relations, 1992–2018
China and Japan Page 59