China and Japan

by Ezra F. Vogel

  study on the history prob lem, a proj ect that was led by Bu Ping and

  Kitaoka Shinichi.

  As the time approached for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, Chinese

  leaders sought to ensure the full cooperation of all countries, including Japan.

  Abe’s successor as prime minister, Fukuda Yasuo, whose father, Prime

  Minister Fukuda Takeo, had welcomed Deng Xiaoping to Japan in October

  1978, also sought good relations with China. In May 2008, two months

  before the Beijing Olympics, Fukuda welcomed President Hu Jintao to

  Tokyo. It was the first visit to Japan by a Chinese president since President

  Jiang Zemin had visited in 1998. Like Jiang, President Hu also met with the

  Japa nese emperor. During the visit the two sides began laying plans to

  cooperate in a joint natural- gas development proj ect in the East China Sea.

  While Fukuda and Hu were working to improve relations in 2008, an

  issue arose that negatively affected the Japa nese public’s view of China. The

  Japa nese press reported that several hundred Japa nese consumers had suf-

  fered severe nausea because of food poisoning after eating Chinese dump-

  lings that had been sold to Japan. It was found that an insecticide had been

  mixed into dumplings produced by the Tianyang Food Pro cessing Com-

  pany in Hebei. When the Japa nese complained, the Chinese initially played

  down the incident, saying that since no one had died there was no prob lem.

  The Japa nese were disturbed by the failure of Chinese officials to take re-

  sponsibility; explaining that they were acting for reasons of health safety,

  Japa nese officials took several Chinese food products off the market. After

  some months, just before the Olympics, Chinese officials accepted respon-

  sibility, stopped the production of the dumplings, and recalled all dump-

  ling exports.

  Eager for cooperation in preparing for the Olympics, the Chinese al-

  lowed the Japa nese to send in rescue teams in response to the devastating

  earthquake that struck Wenchuan, in Sichuan province, on May 12, 2008,

  causing an estimated 69,000 deaths. Japan rushed in 61 workers to offer as-

  sistance, and next to Pakistan, it was the largest donor of funds for the

  victims. The quick dispatch of assistance was welcomed. Although the Chi-

  nese did not publicly recognize the Japa nese when rescue efforts were

  ended, they did give positive publicity to Japan for its contributions to aid

  earthquake survivors. Diet member Nikai Toshihiro, head of the assistance

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  del e ga tion, played a key role in leading other del e ga tions to China to take

  part in preparations for the Olympics.

  Prime Minister Fukuda personally represented Japan at the opening cer-

  emony of the Olympics, and Japan’s participation in the Beijing Olympic

  Games, held August 8–24, 2008, went smoothly. Fukuda was later appointed

  chairman of the Boao Forum for Asia, China’s version of the Davos World

  Economic Forum, and since then Fukuda has held more meetings with se-

  nior Chinese leaders than any other high- level Japa nese official.

  The Nadir of Sino- Japanese Relations, 2010–2014

  When Hatoyama Yukio of the Demo cratic Party of Japan became prime

  minister in September 2009, he announced that he wanted to move away

  from the Liberal Demo cratic Party’s policy of depending on the United

  States, make Asia the center of his policy, and develop better relations with

  China. Like Abe, he visited China before he visited the United States, and

  during his visit he offered a sincere personal apology for Japan’s war time

  be hav ior. Later, when he was no longer prime minister, he visited the Me-

  morial Hall of the Victims of the Nanjing Massacre to express sorrow for

  the atrocities caused by Japa nese soldiers. Although the Japa nese govern-

  ment had insisted that there was no dispute concerning Japan’s sovereignty

  over the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands, Hatoyama Yukio said there was a dis-

  pute and that it had been caused by Japan rather than China. After less than

  nine months as prime minister, Hatoyama was replaced by the Demo cratic

  Party’s Kan Naoto, who also sought to promote good relations with China.

  For years, Kan had been inviting Chinese students in Japan to his home for

  friendly visits. Yet despite the stated willingness of the Demo cratic Party

  to maintain good relations with China and to take China’s side in some key

  disputes, relations between the two countries reached their nadir in 2010

  and 2012 while the party was in power.

  Collision at Sea near the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands, 2010

  Within weeks of the World Bank’s announcement that the size of China’s

  economy had passed Japan’s, an incident occurred that led to a clash between

  the two countries. The incident was unplanned, and it was not resolved

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  The Deterioration of Sino- Japanese Relations, 1992–2018

  smoothly by officials on the spot, leading to a test of wills at the higher levels

  of government. As each side tried to force the other side to yield, the raw

  emotions of an aroused public came to the fore in both countries. Ulti-

  mately, China escalated the pressures it brought to bear beyond what was

  routine to resolve such issues, and Japan yielded. The confrontation ended

  within three weeks, but the passions it generated brought relations be-

  tween the two countries to a new low.

  On September 7, 2010, a Japa nese Coast Guard patrol boat noticed that

  a Chinese fishing trawler, the Minjinyu 5179, was seven and a half miles

  northeast of the disputed Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands and within the terri-

  torial waters administered by Japan. After Japan had taken over adminis-

  trative control of the islands in 1972, the two countries had reached an un-

  derstanding that, to avoid incidents, Chinese ships would not enter Japan’s

  territorial waters near the islands. If they were to enter by accident and a

  Japa nese patrol boat asked them to leave, it was agreed that they would do

  so immediately. In this case, when the patrol boat demanded that the Chi-

  nese trawler leave Japan’s territorial waters, the trawler did not move. The

  Japa nese Coast Guard boat then demanded that Japa nese officials be al-

  lowed to board the Chinese trawler to inspect it. The trawler tried to es-

  cape, but several Japa nese patrol boats, much larger and faster than the

  trawler, encircled the fishing boat and cut off its exit. The captain of the

  trawler, Zhan Qixiong, rammed against the side of a patrol boat and then,

  in trying to escape, ran into the side of another patrol boat. Thereafter, Japa-

  nese Coast Guard officials boarded the Chinese trawler and took the cap-

  tain and the crew. It was later determined that the trawler’s presence in the

  area had not been approved by Chinese officials and, in addition, the trawler

  captain was drunk.

  On the rare occasions when Japa nese Coast Guard officials had picked

  up Chinese crew members near the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands, they had

  quickly returned them to China. This time, however, since the Chinese cap-

  tain had damaged a Japa nese boat, the Japa nese explained that it was nec-
r />   essary to try the captain in a Japa nese court. This news was quickly relayed

  to Beijing, where Chinese officials called in the Japa nese ambassador, Niwa

  Uichiro, at 3:00 a.m. and demanded that the crew and the trawler be handed

  over to China immediately. Japan did not yield, and the day after the incident,

  the Chinese began carry ing out demonstrations in front of the Japa nese

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  embassy in Beijing, the Japa nese consulate in Shanghai, and some Japa nese

  businesses.

  Chinese officials continued to demand that the Japa nese promptly re-

  turn the captain and the crew. On September 12, five days after the inci-

  dent, State Councilor Dai Bingguo again called in Ambassador Niwa in Bei-

  jing and told him, “Make a wise po liti cal decision and release the Chinese

  fishermen and trawler immediately.” On the next day, fearing further esca-

  lation, Japan handed over the crew members and the trawler, but the cap-

  tain remained in Japan because he had caused damage to Japa nese prop-

  erty and was being held for a hearing in a Japa nese domestic court.

  On September 20, four Japa nese construction com pany employees who

  had been dispatched to China to remove some of the chemical weapons

  placed there by Japa nese forces during World War II were arrested in Bei-

  jing for filming military targets. Demonstrations against the Japa nese broke

  out in vari ous Chinese cities, and many Japa nese citizens in China reported

  that they felt that their lives were in danger. China, which then controlled

  97 percent of the world’s sources of rare earths, chemical ele ments neces-

  sary for the electronics industry, restricted the export of rare earths to Japan.

  Japa nese electronics companies immediately began discussions with other

  countries to expand the mining and production of rare- earth metals else-

  where. Chinese officials encouraged Chinese citizens who had been plan-

  ning to travel to Japan to cancel their trips. On September 19, China an-

  nounced that all high- level exchanges with Japan would be frozen. On

  September 22, Premier Wen Jiabao, while in New York attending UN meet-

  ings, announced, “I strongly urge Japan to release the ship captain, Zhan

  Qixiong, immediately and unconditionally.” Wen Jiabao stated that China

  was prepared to take further mea sures and that Japan would bear “all re-

  sponsibility for the consequences.”

  Japan’s leaders considered the Chinese response excessive, but they

  wanted to avoid further escalation of the situation. Two days later Japa nese

  officials, acknowledging that the tense situation was hurting Sino- Japanese

  relations, released Zhan Qixiong to the Chinese without demanding that

  he stand trial. In the weeks following the incident, the Chinese and Japa-

  nese media were filled with reports of the incident and its outcome. The

  confrontation increased hostile feelings between Chinese and Japa nese of-

  ficials, as well as between the general populations of the two countries.

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  The Deterioration of Sino- Japanese Relations, 1992–2018

  The trawler incident occurred just as Ozawa Ichiro was challenging

  Japan’s new prime minister, Kan Naoto, to become head of the Demo cratic

  Party, and Japa nese po liti cal leaders who other wise might have devoted

  time to resolving the conflict with China were preoccupied with domestic

  politics. During the previous de cades of LDP- controlled government, when

  tensions arose between China and Japan, experienced se nior China special-

  ists in Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with LDP politi-

  cians and through established channels of communication with their Chi-

  nese counter parts, had often been able to keep such incidents under control.

  This time, however, communications between Chinese and Japa nese diplo-

  mats broke down.

  After Zhan Qixiong was returned to China, LDP supporters used the

  occasion to criticize the inexperienced Demo cratic Party for its misman-

  agement of the incident. They criticized the Demo cratic Party for initially

  being so firm about holding the crew and insisting that the captain face trial

  and then caving in completely to China’s demands. When Zhan Qixiong

  was returned to China, he was at first given a hero’s welcome. Although there

  was no public acknowl edgment that he had been drunk at the time of the

  incident, several weeks after his return to China he was unceremoniously

  sent to the countryside.

  After the trawler incident, the Chinese media were filled with more stri-

  dent anti- Japanese content than usual. The Chinese government increased

  its patrols in the waters near the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands, the Japa nese

  government expanded its efforts to defend the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands,

  and the U.S. government reaffirmed its commitment to defend Japan if it

  were to be attacked in territory under Japa nese administration.

  Between September 2008, before the confrontation over the trawler,

  and August 2012, China sent several ships into the twelve- nautical- mile

  territorial zone. Beginning in September 2012 China began sending more

  than twelve ships each month into the twelve-nautical-mile zone. Although

  China began decreasing the number of ships sent to this zone in August

  2013, it still sent ships to the area each month.6

  Tensions between the two countries eased slightly following the Tohoku

  earthquake of March 11, 2011. Just as Japan in 2008 had sent aid to China

  after the Sichuan earthquake, after the Tohoku earthquake, the Chinese

  promptly sent aid to Japan. In September 2011, when Noda Yoshihiko

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  became prime minister, he quickly arranged for a two- day visit to Bei-

  jing, during which time he expressed his appreciation for China’s assistance

  after the earthquake. But relations between China and Japan remained far

  more tense than they had been prior to the trawler incident.

  Japan’s “Nationalization” of the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands, 2012

  Within Japan, the person who ignited the fuse that blew up Sino- Japanese

  relations in 2012 was a popu lar, macho writer- turned- politician, Ishihara

  Shintaro. Ishihara had become a cult figure in 1956 when, as a writer and

  playwright, he and his brother Yujiro made a famous movie in which they

  became symbols of a new and assertive young generation. Because Ishihara

  already had a huge popu lar following, when he became a politician and was

  elected governor of Tokyo, he always attracted more attention than other

  politicians. Aware of Ishihara’s vast popularity, other politicians hesitated

  to criticize him publicly. When the United States was at the peak of its

  power, Ishihara proclaimed that Japan could say “no” to the United States.

  In 2010, when the Chinese economy was passing Japan’s in size, Ishihara

  proclaimed that Japan could also say “no” to China. When Ishihara lam-

  basted Demo cratic Party leaders for their feeble response to China’s pres-

  sure to release the trawler captain, his views struck a responsive chord

  among the Japa nese public. Since World War II the Senkaku / Diaoyu Is-

/>   lands had been uninhabited, and three of the islands were officially owned

  by Kurihara Hiroyuki, whose relatives had once used the islands in their

  business of preparing dried bonito flakes ( katsuobushi) for the market. In

  April 2012, in a talk at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C., Ishi-

  hara announced his intention to raise money to buy the Kurihara’s three

  islands and build structures on them.

  Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko of the Demo cratic Party, aware that

  Ishihara’s purchase of the islands would infuriate the Chinese and fearful

  of how Ishihara might use his possession of the islands, de cided it would

  be better for the Japa nese government to buy the islands than to run the

  risk of prob lems with China if they were in Ishihara’s hands. Noda was more

  pragmatic than his two Demo cratic Party pre de ces sors, Hatoyama Yukio

  and Kan Naoto, but he did not want to appear weak in the face of China’s

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  The Deterioration of Sino- Japanese Relations, 1992–2018

  requests. He vastly underestimated China’s determination to assert that it

  was the dominant power in the region.

  On July 7, 2012, with limited consultations with other Japa nese leaders,

  Noda de cided that the government would buy the islands from the Kuri-

  hara family for $25 million, but he wanted to keep his plan secret and then

  have discussions with the Chinese, hoping this would avoid an escalation

  of tensions. The next day, however, the Asahi newspaper revealed his plan

  under the headline: “Nationalization.” The Chinese were, as Japan’s Min-

  istry of Foreign Affairs had predicted, furious and they strongly opposed

  Japan’s “nationalization” of the islands. The issue became a test of po liti cal

  will at a time when China’s leaders had gained confidence that they were

  the dominant country in East Asia. In many Chinese cities, street demon-

  strations broke out in which Japanese- owned shops and factories were

  attacked, causing damages totaling $100 million, according to Japa nese esti-

  mates. Up until this point the Chinese had sent only Chinese Coast Guard

  ships into the waters near the islands, but on September 14, three days after

  the Japa nese government purchased the three islands, China began sailing

  government patrol ships near the disputed islands, some even within the