Disaster in Korea

by Roy E Appleman

  In the six months' war of movement, the Chinese held the initiative most of the time. During this period they mounted what they called phase attacks, or campaigns. Their captured documents and orders fist five different campaigns against the UN forces in Korea. One can do no better than to adopt their nomenclature to divide the war during this period into its principal phases, as listed below. The abbreviation "CCF" will be used generally throughout this work for the UN term "Chinese Communist Forces." The Chinese referred to their troops in Korea as Chinese Volunteers. The official Chinese name for its armed forces was the "People's Liberation Army," or PLA, as it is often referred to in documents.

  Map 1. Eighth Army's area of combat in Korea, 25 November-2 December 1950.

  The CCF Phase Attacks

  The 1st Phase Campaign must be considered a Chinese victory, in that it accomplished its purpose. It stopped the UN advance toward the Yalu in October 1950.'

  The 2nd Phase Campaign was a massive attack across the breadth of Korea against all the advancing UN forces. This volume takes up the combat story of that phase with Eighth Army's projected attack to the border, beginning on 24 November 1950, and the resulting CCF 2nd Phase attack. The 2nd Phase Campaign succeeded brilliantly in the west, but in the east against the X Corps it must be considered a limited success. Even though X Corps withdrew from northeast Korea, actually it defeated the CCF IX Army Group and largely destroyed it.

  Then followed the Chinese 3rd Phase Campaign, which was successful. It drove the Eighth Army and the UN command out of Seoul and south of the Han River. The Chinese and the revived North Korean forces were now penetrating once more into South Korea.

  The 4th Phase Campaign tried to open a way down the central part of the peninsula behind the main part of Eighth Army to Pusan. It failed.

  The 5th Phase Campaign, 1st Impulse, was a major effort in the west; the 2nd Impulse concentrated its strength in the central part of Korea. Both parts of the 5th Phase Campaign were disastrous defeats for the Chinese.

  Why Did Chinese "Volunteers" Enter Korea?

  The true story of why the Chinese government decided to intervene in the Korean War and just when that decision was made cannot be known with certainty until the Chinese, and possibly the Soviet, archives are opened to researchers.

  The Chinese involvement in the initial North Korean attack is less clear, but according to Nikita Khrushchev, China approved it in advance. Once the war had begun, Chinese authorities started moving strong combat forces from central and south China toward its Manchurian border with Korea. After the Inchon landing in September and the subsequent disintegration of the North Korean Army following the fall of Seoul, the Chinese government became intensely interested in the future actions of the UN forces.

  This concern was clear when, on 3 October 1950, Chou En-lai, the Chinese foreign minister, called Ambassador Sardar K. M. Panikkar of India to his office. He told him that, if the United States or United Nations forces crossed the 38th Parallel, China would send troops to defend North Korea. He said that this action would not be taken if only South Korean troops crossed the parallel. The Indian goverment quickly spread this message to all the world. On 10 October, a week later, Peiping radio broadcast a declaration of Chinese intentions that repeated this warning. Five days later a reliable source reported that Moscow would have a surprise awaiting the American force it if approached the northern border of Korea, The net result, however, in the high councils of the United States, and particularly in General MacArthur's Far East Command Headquarters in Tokyo, was general disbelief and an underestimation of the seriousness of these declarations.'

  Two reasonably reliable sources now available to us clarify the contemporaneous Chinese attitude toward the Korean War. Edgar Snow, in his Red China Today: The Other Side of the River, published in 1962, records a conversation he had with Chou En-lai in China. This conversation, according to Snow, was on 30 August 1960. Chou En-lai said that, after the Korean War broke out and American troops entered South Korea, the United States adopted a policy of aggression toward Communist China. It sent the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait and exercised military control over Taiwan and the waters separating it from the mainland. Communist China deeply resented this presence. When the United States showed intentions of crossing the 38th Parallel and pushing on up to the Chinese border at the Yalu River, China issued its warning through the Indian ambassador. Snow quoted Chou En-lai as saying of that period: "The Chinese people could only take the action of volunteering support to Korea in its war of resistance against the United States. But this action was not taken until four months after the United States stationed its forces in the Taiwan Straits and exercised military control over Taiwan, and not until the United States troops had crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel and approached the Yalu River."3

  There can be only even today, as to details of the story behind Chinese intervention in the Korean War and of a possible Soviet role in starting the war. But one account known to us since 1970 seems highly credible in its general outline. In that year Nikita Khrushchev published a portion of his memoirs in English under the title Khrushchev Remembers. He told what he knew of the North Korean, Chinese, and Soviet roles in starting and then continuing the Korean War.

  Khrushchev said that North Korean Premier Kim II Sung originated the idea. Near the end of 1949, he headed a North Korean delegation to Moscow. At that time he proposed to Joseph Stalin that North Korea invade South Korea. Stalin was sympathetic to the idea of extending Communist control over South Korea. Kim 11 Sung assured Stalin that, as soon as his troops invaded the South, there would be a civilian uprising that would overthrow Syngman Rhee. He felt that the war would be short.

  Stalin, however, did not approve the plan at that time but asked Kim Il Sung to consider the matter further and then come back with a definite plan. The North Korean premier returned home but soon came back to Moscow with his plan. According to Khrushchev, Stalin was still concerned that the United States might intervene. Kim 11 Sung argued that the war would be won so quickly that the United States would have no chance to interfere.

  At this point, Stalin decided to ask for Mao Tse-tung's opinion of Kim II Sung's proposal. The Chinese leader approved it. Mao thought that the United States would not intervene but would treat the matter as an internal affair for the Koreans to decide themselves. Khrushchev tells of a big dinner at Stalin's dacha at this time where the Soviet leaders gave Kim Il Sung their blessing and toasted him success.

  Just before Kim II Sung launched his surprise attack across the 38th Parallel on 25 June 1950, Stalin ordered all the Soviet military advisors with the North Korean regiments, divisions, and army headquarters, as well as other Soviet consultants who for years had been helping to organize the North Korean Army, back to Soviet territory. Khrushchev asked Stalin why he was doing this, as they could be of great assistance to North Korea. Stalin snapped back, "It's too dangerous to keep our advisors there. They might be taken prisoner. We don't want there to be evidence for accusing us of taking part in this business. It's Kim II Sung's affair."

  Later, when things started going bad for North Korea, Khrushchev suggested to Stalin that perhaps they should send a qualified Soviet military commander, such as Malinovsky, commander of the Russian Far Eastern Military District, to help Kim Il Sung wage the war. He said Stalin reacted to this suggestion with extreme hostility.

  American troops crossed the 38th Parallel in force on 9 October and moved rapidly northward. At this point, Chou En-lai arrived in Moscow. Stalin had gone to Sochi, the Black Sea resort, and Chou flew directly there to see him. On his return to Moscow, Stalin told Khrushchev what transpired at Sochi. He said Mao Tse-tung had sent Chou to see him. Mao wanted to know if Stalin thought the Chinese should move troops into North Korean territory to stop the American and South Korean forces. In their discussions on this subject at Sochi, Stalin and Chou concluded it would be fruitless for China to intervene. But before Chou started back to China, either Stalin or Chou
(at Mao's instructions) reopened the discussion. This further discussion ended with a reversal of the earlier decision. It was now decided that China should help North Korea. Chinese troops were already massed along the border and in nearby areas of Manchuria. Stalin and Chou believed these troops were numerous enough to stop the United Nations forces.

  From Chinese sources we learn that the question of whether Communist China would enter the Korean War was debated in a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in China, held 3- 7 October 1950 in Peking. The decision of the group, and of Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), was to establish the Chinese People's Liberation Army of Volunteers (CPV) to aid North Korea. The decision was taken by Mao Tse-tung on 8 October, and Peng Dehuai, commander of the Northwest Military Region, was appointed CPV commander and concurrent political commissar in orders signed in the early-morning hours of 8 October by Mao as chairman of the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Commission. This meeting is mentioned in the English edition of Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal.

  In chapter 14, "The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea," Marshal Peng states: "At noon on October 4, 1950, three days after National Day, an airplane arrived in Xi'an City. I was told to leave for a meeting in Beijing without the slightest delay.

  "The Party Central Committee was holding a meeting to discuss the dispatch of troops to aid Korea when I arrived at Zhongnanhai [part of the former im penal palace used as the premises of the Party Central Committee and the State Council] at 4 P.m...

  "The Central Committee meeting resumed in the Yiniantang Hall ... the next afternoon (5 October). After listening to other comrades, I said, `It is necessary to dispatch troops to aid Korea. If China is devastated by war, it only means that the Liberation War will last a few years longer. The U.S. will find a pretext at any time to invade China if its troops are poised on the bank of the Yalu River and in Taiwan.'

  "Chairman Mao made the decision to send me to Korea. I did not decline the offer...

  "At dusk on October 18, 1950 I crossed the Yalu River with vanguard units of the Chinese People's Volunteers."

  Peng established his first headquarters in Korea in an old mine at the village of Taeyu-dong, a few miles northwest of Onjong and Huichon. He remained there during the Chinese 1st and 2nd Phase campaigns, after which he removed to a different headquarters near Pyongyang. Of the 2nd Phase Campaign, Peng states: "The enemy fled south in panic, abandoning Pyongyang and falling back on the 38th Parallel.

  "This campaign laid the foundation of victory in the War to resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea recovered all its lost territory by the end of the campaign. In the wake of the Second Campaign, our forces pursued the enemy and by mid-December made a sneak approach to the 38th Parallel. After making a thorough reconnaissance of enemy positions, our forces got everything ready for an offensive."'

  The UN forces and MacArthur's headquarters believed all this time that Marshal Lin Piao, commander of the Chinese Fourth Field Army, commanded the Chinese Volunteers in Korea. That belief is still held by nearly all American and British writers on the Korean War. Clay Blair in his book The Forgotten War.Americans in Korea 1950-1953, published in late 1987, places Lin Piao as the Chinese commander of the Chinese Volunteers in Korea in 1950-51. The truth is that Lin Piao was never in Korea and never was associated with the Chinese Volunteers in Korea.

  According to Chinese writer Wei Wei, in his historical novel East and supplements to it entitled "Chief Peng," in seven chapters published in the JulyAugust 1984 issue of Kunlun magazine, a bimonthly magazine put out by the Chinese Liberation Army, Peng had an extensive conversation with Mao Tsetung on the afternoon of 5 October in which Mao told him of a meeting with Lin Piao the previous night. In that meeting Mao broached the subject of Lin leading the Volunteers in Korea. He told Lin that "we've assembled some armies in south Manchuria. They used to be units of the Fourth Field Army. If they fight, they will have to depend on the northeast for support at first. We felt that sending Comrade Lin Biao would be pretty good. When I sounded him out on this last night though, he was obviously very nervous and said right away that his health was very poor and that he was only able to sleep two or three hours a night. . . ." Lin had previously commented that he was dubious about China sending Volunteers against American forces in Korea.

  At his first headquarters in Korea, Mao Anying, the oldest son of Mao Tse tung, was killed by a napalm burst during an American air attack on 25 October 1950.

  Gen. Han Xianchu was deputy commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and second to Marshal Peng in command of the Korea Volunteers. He had a very active role in the Korean War. In the 2nd Phase Campaign he commanded forces in the Tokchon and Yongwon areas, destroying a large part of two South Korean divisions, making the campaign's breakthrough there and continuing on to cut off and destroy US forces and their allies in the Samso-ri and Kunu-ri areas. In the 3rd Phase Campaign he commanded units that crossed the 38th Parallel and captured Seoul.'

  At this time, Khrushchev was in Moscow, an important member of the politburo. He was allowed to read the numerous documents and reports that flowed regularly into Moscow from Peiping on the Korean War. He wrote of this period:

  In the archives you can find documents in which P'eng Te-huai gave his situation reports to Mao Tse-tung. P'eng composed lengthy telegrams expounding elaborate battle plans against the Americans. He declared categorically that the enemy would be surrounded and finished off by decisive flanking strikes. The American troops were crushed and the war ended many times in these battle reports which Peng sent to Mao, who then sent them along to Stalin.'

  It would appear that neither the Soviet Union nor China contemplated intervening in the worsening state of affairs for North Korea after the Inchon landing and the collapse of Kim II Sung's plan for winning in the South, until the UN troops crossed the 38th Parallel. The UN crossing of the 38th Parallel seems to have surprised the Soviets, the Chinese, and even the North Koreans themselves. In an order to the North Korea People's Army, dated 14 October 1950, Kim Il Sung said in part, "Many of us felt that the 38th Parallel would be as far as the US Forces would attack.""

  The outbreak of the Korean War directly affected Communist China's plans for an invasion of Taiwan, where Chiang Kai-shek's remnant Nationalist forces had taken refuge. The victorious Chinese Communists had concentrated their best troops, the Fourth and Third field armies, along the coast of the East China Sea, opposite Taiwan (Formosa), where they had been undergoing amphibious training. At the same time, all kinds of watercraft, big and small, were being assembled along the mainland coast for the projected crossing."

  We have noted that Mao Tse-tung approved Kim II Sung's idea of an invasion of South Korea, but we do not know the date of that approval or when Kim received the final approval of both the Soviet Union and China. The date may be suggested by the fact that in June, before the North Korean crossing of the 38th Parallel on 25 June, elements of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army, considered the best in the People's Liberation Army, suddenly left their positions opposite Taiwan and marched to Canton. There they entrained for Antung, Manchuria, on the Yalu River, bordering Korea. Other parts of the Fourth Field Army from different parts of China also moved to the Korean border. Just what motives and intentions prompted these moves are unknown. It would seem that they were precautionary against any eventualities that might develop, since the Chinese leaders knew that Kim 11 Sung was about to launch his in vasion of the south. Once the war began and the United States intervened, the United States Seventh Fleet immediately took position in the Taiwan Strait, and a Chinese Communist crossing from the mainland to Taiwan then became impossible.

  In the late summer and early autumn of 1950, as the military situation worsened for the North Koreans, the Chinese Third Field Army began moving from South China to Manchuria, adding greatly to the buildup of Chinese Communist strength there. By mid-October the CCF Third and Fourth field armies had
concentrated about 400,000 troops in Manchuria just across the Yalu River from North Korea. It was elements of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army, but not under the command of Lin Piao, that first intervened in the Korean War near the end of October.1°

  On 25 October 1950 the ROK 1st Division captured three Chinese prisoners near Unsan in North Korea, the first to be taken by UN forces in Korea. On the other side of the peninsula in the X Corps zone of action, the 26th Regiment of the ROK 3rd Division captured 16 Chinese prisoners four days later, on 29 October. Although these Chinese troops had not entered combat until the last week of October, they had crossed from Manchuria into Korea two weeks earlier. Within a few days after United States troops crossed the 38th Parallel at Kaesong on 9 October, Chinese troops of the Fourth Field Army began crossing the Yalu. The first crossed on 13-14 October, or possibly on 12 October. The evidence on this point is conflicting. By 20 October, four CCF armies of three divisions each had crossed into Korea. All were from Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army.

  Two of these armies, the 39th and 40th, crossed the Yalu from Antung in Manchuria to Sinuiju, North Korea. Two other armies, the 38th and 42nd, crossed farther east, from Chian, Manchuria, to Manpojin, Korea. Three of the four armies, the 39th, 40th, and 38th, marched south and southwest to face the Eighth Army in northwest Korea. The 42nd Army moved southeast to guard the left (east) flank of the other three armies and, if necessary, to confront elements of the X Corps that might advance toward the Chosin Reservoir from the Hungnam area on the east coast. The 124th Division of this army started down the road from Chosin, and it was this division that the ROK 26th Regiment, moving north from Hamhung, met near the end of November.