Disaster in Korea

by Roy E Appleman

  Mortar shells (at least 81 mm) began to land off the road on the right and left of the column and abreast of my KMAG jeeps.

  My interpreter returned and said that Americans would not let my Korean vehicles pass.

  I made an estimate of the situation and decided that the steep drop-offs on either side of the road prohibited my taking my Group on the frozen rice paddies. When a mortar shell (at least 81 mm) hit the mover of a 105 mm howitzer just to the rear of Major Hewette's jeep, I told my KMAG Group to abandon jeep and we went off the road onto a frozen rice paddie at the left. Because of the darkness, the noise and the confusion, I told my group to keep contact by each officer calling the name of the other. We walked on the paddie about 25 yards before getting back on the road. A mortar shell (at least 81 mm) hit the road just in front of me. Two illuminating shells burst in the air off the right of the road. Fifty caliber tracers were passing over our heads. I could hear 50 caliber firing from our rear.

  Suddenly the vehicles began to move. More mortar shells hit on the road around the vehicles. Because of the increase in firing from the rear, I told my group to catch rides on the vehicles going by. A vehicle, traveling fast, grazed my arm....

  Through my interpreter, Colonel Kim [ROK 7th Regimental commander] told me that a Chinese Communist Force of undetermined strength had attacked at 0430 hours 29 November 1950 along the road north of Walpori.

  One platoon of the 1st Battalion was on the road; one company was on either side of the road. The colonel further stated that his men had fired until they ran out of ammunition. The Chinese had broken through."

  Lt. Col. Willard Pearson, as the senior KMAG advisor to General Chang, ROK 6th Division commander, wrote to General Gay on 16 January 1951, forwarding Bennett's statement and making charges on behalf of himself and other KMAG personnel with the ROK troops, alleging mistreatment by 1st Cavalry Division officers on 29 November at Kujang-ni. It must be remembered that the ROK 6th Division was attached to the 1st Cavalry Division at the time. Pearson alleged that General Gay had authorized General Chang "to drift" back on his MSR if the situation required it, yet his troops had been held outside friendly lines and there subjected to enemy small-arms and mortar fire. He acknowledged that the ROK 6th Division had subsequently been allowed to enter the 7th Cavalry perimeter and reorganize there, with less than one-third of its authorized strength. He alleged that the ROK 6th Division was required to protect the daylight withdrawal of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, and then the ROK troops had to withdraw on foot and establish its defense position that night on the MSR in the mountains after dark. Lieutenant Colonel Pearson wanted General Gay to consider the injustice done "to troops under your command." First Lt. Raymond Bishop, of the 27th Field Artillery Battalion, in support of the ROK 7th Regiment, added his complaints to those of Bennett and Pearson.

  General Gay asked Col. William A. Hams, commanding the 7th Cavalry Regiment, for an explanation and reply to General Chang's, Lieutenant Colonel Pearson's, and the other KMAG advisors' charges. Colonel Harris replied to General Gay on 6 February 1951. According to Colonel Hams, the orders given to the ROK 6th Division, in his presence on 28 November, were that it was to hold for three days. Hams said he had not been informed of any authority granted by General Gay to General Chang to "drift back" along the MSR, that any ROK 6th Division plan of withdrawal had not been coordinated with him, and that his request for KMAG or ROK representatives to be stationed at his roadblock and at his headquarters had not met acceptance. He also said that no prior request to withdraw ROK artillery through the 7th Cavalry lines had been made, as stated by Lieutenant Bishop, and the offer of the 77th Field Artillery Battalion, supporting the 7th Cavalry Regiment, to shoot for the ROKs had never been acted on by the ROKs or their KMAG advisors. The ROK 6th Division fell back from Wolpo-ri to the 7th Cavalry lines at Kujang-ni, he said, without a single request for fire assistance and without notifying the 7th Cavalry of its actions. Colonel Hams added that, during 29 November and for several days thereafter, General Chang, Lieutenant Colonel Pearson, and other KMAG and ROK officers had contact with him and his staff officers and gave no indication of displeasure over the events that occurred on 29 November. His impression of their reaction, he said, was that they were happy to be out of a bad situation and to have the opportunity to reorganize behind the lines of the 7th Cavalry.'° Resentment of imagined wrongs apparently built up in the ROK 6th Division commander and his KMAG advisors in the weeks following.

  In the intervening two months between the actions themselves in late No vember 1950 and the charges submitted to General Gay in January 1951, one can be sure that this quarrel had echoed up and down the Eighth Army chain of command, involving General Farrell, KMAG chief, probably Generals Walker and Ridgway, the ROK army chief of staff, and President Syngman Rhee.

  The facts of the attack by the Chinese 125th Division, 42nd Army, on the 7th and 19th ROK regiments, ROK 6th Division, north of Wolpo-ri, before dawn on 29 November seem to be that the Chinese made a frontal attack and at the same time outflanked both regiments, which then fled down the road. The KMAG advisors with them at the time seem to have been unavailable (we know from his own statement that Major Bennett and his group with the ROK 7th Regiment were in bed asleep at the time of the attack and made no effort to halt the retreating ROKs) at the front and exercised no influence on what quickly turned into a ROK precipitate withdrawal that was close to a rout. Both the ROK 7th and 19th regiments hurried south until they came up against the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, roadblock at Kujang-ni, where they were halted. The 27th Field Artillery Battalion lost all its guns, four 105-mm howitzers and eight 75-mm guns, their ammunition, and their trucks in front of the 7th Cavalry perimeter. Major Bennett alleged that, when the 2nd Battalion roadblock halted the retreating column, this resulted in considerable loss of life among the ROKs, who were then subject to enemy fire from the rear. He claimed he saw at least 12 ROK dead after daylight in front of the roadblock area. At this same time, the hotly pursuing Chinese came into contact with the perimeter defenses of both the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 7th Cavalry and a battle began that lasted most of the day and into the following night. Chinese prisoners identified themselves as members of the CCF 125th Division, 42nd Army.`'

  When KMAG personnel with the ROK troops were taken to Colonel Harris's CP and they explained the situation to him, he at once authorized the ROK column to enter the 7th Cavalry perimeter, which it did. It seems that Major Bennett, senior advisor to the ROK 7th Regiment, was taken to the CP of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, which at the time of the incident was in regimental reserve inside the perimeter and behind the 1st and 2nd front line battalions.

  Lt. Col. James H. Lynch, the 3rd Battalion commander, questioned Major Bennett about the whole affair, and it seems Major Bennett took exception to the line of questioning and what he considered rough treatment. It can be said of Lieutenant Colonel Lynch that he was a capable, tough, no-nonsense battalion commander, well tested in many battle situations. One may assume that Lynch had little patience with a KMAG officer who had been able to get out of bed and hit the road south away from the enemy in the short space of eight minutes. When the question of Lynch's treatment of Bennett came up later, other officers present said Lynch's questioning of Bennett was no different from his treatment and attitude toward his own officers.

  The 7th Cavalry repulsed the Chinese attack against its perimeter by 8:20 A.M. Colonel Hams then ordered that the equipment abandoned by the ROKs during the early morning hours be recovered. Some 7th Cavalry patrols, or ROK detachments under protection of 7th Cavalry troops, went out in front of the perimeter toward Wolpo-ri and succeeded in recovering most of the equipment. Colonel Hams ordered that it be turned over to the ROK units. Meanwhile, the ROK units reorganized inside the 7th Cavalry perimeter.

  Later in the morning of 29 November, General Gay ordered Colonel Hams to withdraw to the key road junction of Sinchang-ni, about seven road miles southwest of Kujang-ni on the MSR. The ROK 6
th Division was to withdraw there first, and then the 7th Cavalry would follow. Snow showers that started in the morning continued until noon. Colonel Harris started his regiment toward Sinchang-ni at noon, and all its elements had closed there before dark. The 2nd Battalion acted as rear guard and covered the withdrawal. The Chinese followed closely.

  Meanwhile, during the time the 7th Cavalry and elements of the ROK 6th Division were slowing down the enveloping movement of the Chinese 125th Division on the Wolpo-ri-Sunchon road, the 5th Cavalry Regiment had concentrated at Sunchon to cover the withdrawal south of the US 2nd Infantry Division. The 8th Cavalry Regiment, still taking in replacements and reorganizing after its ordeal a month earlier at Unsan, had been ordered to Songchon, 20 air miles southeast of Sunchon, on the main mountain road from Yongdok to the cast. At Songchon the road forked, with one arm going northwest to Sunchon and the other southwest to Pyongyang, 30 air miles away. This route offered the CCF an opportunity to flank the Eighth Army and reach the North Korean capital. When the advance elements of the 8th Cavalry Regiment arrived at Songchon on 28 November they found it deserted. This was always a telltale sign that enemy troops were approaching. The civilian population always knew in advance of an enemy approach. The next day, 29 November, the 8th Cavalry Regiment reported that CCF forces had established three roadblocks around the town.

  The Battle of Sinchanq-ni At Sinchang-ni, the CCF closed up quickly and began a night attack against the 7th Cavalry Regiment. The latter's defense position was astride the road and adjacent high ground about two miles east of the town. By 10 P.M., the Chinese had engaged C Company in a heavy firefight and then overran the left-hand platoon. After a series of bugle-call signals, Chinese attacked the F Company CP. Still another enemy force overran the F Company roadblock and passed on down the road toward Sinchang-ni. By midnight, Chinese had reached the 1st Battalion CP and a close, hard fight developed there. The 1st Battalion Headquarters Company and C and D companies withdrew 1,000 yards to form a new line. The 3rd Battalion received news of the enemy penetrations and prepared a counterattack force composed of L Company with attached tanks and heavy machine guns. This force began its counterattack at 2 A.M. on 30 November. Five hours later, at 7 Amt., as daylight began to appear, the 7th Cavalry Regimental lines were reestablished. One of the twists of bad luck in this desperate night battle occurred just before midnight, when outposts thought a body of troops on the road were American, when in fact they were Chinese. Because of this error of perception, the Chinese drove a wedge between the 1st and 2nd battalions and were thus able to attack both battalions' CPs."

  In this night battle near Sinchang-ni, M. Sgt. Richard Beard, C Company, 70th Tank Battalion, was supporting a roadblock. His tank platoon was the object of a heavy enemy attack using mortars, automatic weapons, and smallarms fire. Sergeant Beard mounted the rear deck of his tank, fully exposed, directed the fire of his tank gun, and manned the tank deck machine gun. His fire caused heavy casualties in the attacking Chinese and forced their withdrawal. The enemy force reformed and came at his tanks again, but once more his machine-gun fire routed them. Beard later received orders to move his tank platoon to another location. When he was unable to reach one of his tank crews by radio, he dismounted and ran to the other tank through enemy fire. He delivered his instructions and ran back to his own tank. While directing his platoon's withdrawal to the new positions, enemy fire killed him.

  During this night battle the Chinese overran the CP of the 77th Field Artillery Battalion. Capt. Gordon Sumner, Jr., of the artillery battalion was wounded in this action. He lay immobile in the overrun position, unnoticed by the enemy. Later, he reported that he saw two platoons of enemy horse cavalry in the initial attack, deployed perfectly. Just before midnight he watched about 300 CCF marching in platoon groups in a column of four pass near him. Subsequently, about 50 Chinese dug defensive positions in his vicinity. He said the Chinese had been very noisy in their attack, shouting and blowing whistles and bugles. While digging their defensive position, however, they were very quiet.

  Despite the fact that the enemy overran two of its CPs, the 7th Cavalry did not withdraw during the night. But in the fighting on 29-30 November, the regiment had five of its tanks destroyed, 42 men killed, and 140 wounded. At Sinchang-ni alone, the 7th Cavalry Regiment had 38 of its men killed, 107 wounded, and 11 missing in action."

  During 30 November the 7th Cavalry withdrew to Sinchang-ni but did not remain in possession of the town very long. At 7 P.m. a KMAG officer with the ROK 6th Division reported to the 1st Cavalry Division that Chinese were in the town. During the day IX Corps ordered the 1st Cavalry Division to hold its positions at Sunchon and those near Sinchang-ni and at Songchon as long as possible to help the 2nd Division escape. That division was still many miles north of the enveloping forces of the Chinese 42nd Army and was then trying to withdraw south through Sunchon.

  Early in the morning of 30 November, L Company in its counterattack against a Chinese penetration captured eight Chinese prisoners. They said the enemy attacking was the 374th Regiment of the 125th Division, 42nd Army. American intelligence had identified this unit as an elite Chinese assault force. One of the prisoners said their objective was to capture Sunchon and to let the main enemy body through in its sweep to the west behind Eighth Army. In its counterattacks and in restoring its lines at Sinchang-ni, the 7th Cavalry Regiment counted 350 enemy dead within its original perimeter and estimated that artillery had killed another 250 outside the perimeter."

  Chinese Analysis of Operations against ROK II Corps After the battles of the 2nd Phase Offensive in late November and early December 1950, the CCF 38th Army, comprising the 112th, 113th, and 114th divisions, published a bulletin reviewing its experiences in fighting ROK and American forces in that campaign. The CCF 38th Army had initially penetrated the ROK II Corps and rolled up the Eighth Army right flank. One or more of its divisions then swung west into the US IX Corps area and were influential in creating havoc in the US 2nd Infantry Division zone. While the 38th Army was doing this, the 42nd Army, and especially its 125th Division, was engaged in a deep enveloping move around the ROK II Corps and the US IX Corps cast and south of the 38th Army.

  UN forces captured an important document the 38th Army later issued. Its remarks about the 38th Army operations against the ROK II Corps are instructive. (The Chinese documents captured by UN forces during the Korean War tend to be objective and factual, reflecting the enemy's understanding of the events.) Eighth Army issued its own Combat Information Bulletin No. 13 on 13 March 1951, reproducing in it a major part of the document of the 38th Chinese People's Volunteer Army entitled "Experiences Gained in Three Battles since Entering Korea." The following excerpts relate to operations against the ROK mostly, but some refer also to other UN forces the 38th Army encountered:

  When counter-attacking, do not do so in full strength. In order to avoid confusion, light, aggressive assault teams should be organized, consisting of 10-15 men, each equipped with hand grenades, bayonets, and sub-machine guns.... These teams must stay under cover in suitable locations until they take up combat positions, which should not be more than 40-50 meters from the MLR [Main Line of Resistance]... .

  When the enemy advances, the artillery is not supported by infantry. We can turn this time to our advantage. On the defense, the enemy surrounds his artillery with mines, wire entanglements, and infantry support. This is hard to attack.

  Before entering into combat, we should try to locate enemy artillery according to our estimate of the situation and information from prisoners. Light special units should be organized. These special units break through the enemy lines until they reach the enemy artillery position by stealth. These units should be trained to act quickly, silently, bravely, and to fight fiercely. They should not reply to enemy fire, because at night both observation and communication are difficult and it is not easy to distinguish between friend and foe; the enemy fire is likely to be without effect. By advancing quickly without regard to casu
alties, the specialized team can accomplish its mission; to reach and destroy the enemy artillery....

  Our experiences have taught us that daylight movement and combat are possible, provided our units are intermixed with the enemy in confusion (in the case of attack) and we have penetrated deeply inside the enemy territory. Examples:... In all three battles we moved in daylight without cover disguised as enemy troops and despite enemy air superiority, we suffered no losses from air attack.

  Prior to an attack, the assembly point must be located beyond range of the enemy's artillery in order to avoid heavy losses and, at the same time, to make air spotting of targets impossible.

  Surrounding ([translator's note]: double envelopment) tactics are a great threat to the enemy, and it is easy to succeed with such measures. The enemy has no great strength, their morale is low, and fighting ability is not good. Not only is their rear unguarded, a strict watch is not kept, but the enemy are careless of their guard to the front. Thus we can easily succeed in breaking through their lines and going around them. When we surrounded TOKCHON, the unit's objective was divided into two phases to cut through a gap between adjacent units, and to steal into the enemy's rear. During this movement, we frequently met enemy resistance at a unit boundary but the enemy did not dare to fight too long, and upon meeting our fierce attack, fell into disorder and re treated because they had not enough strength and did not fully understand our intentions....

  Consequently, in a meeting of engagement, our mission is to drive the enemy army away and open the route for our advance ... however, the speed of advance should not be sacrificed for a small advantage... .

  In our envelopment of TOKCHON, advance echelons of three units all demonstrated high morale and destroyed the enemy, opening the way for our advance. Our 338th Regiment [in 113th Division] used artillery to the best advantage in dislodging the enemy forces.