Disaster in Korea

by Roy E Appleman

  The CCF attack on the CP of Task Force Wilson stopped by 7:15 A.M., shortly after daybreak of 27 November, and the main enemy forces withdrew from the vicinity to avoid the punishing air strikes they knew would soon be delivered. When the last enemy attack of the night began at 5:30 A.M., the headquarters group had put every man on its defenses except one operator to receive and send messages. At daybreak only Lt. Col. Gordon Murch's 2nd Battalion was left as a combat-effective force, and even it had suffered many casualties by this time.

  Brig. Gen. Vennard Wilson, the task-force commander, knew he had to try to get the remnants of the task force out of the area north of Ipsok during the day, or they would never get out. He established communication with General Kean, the division commander, and recommended that Task Force Wilson be dissolved, since it was no longer an effective fighting force. He explained the situation. General Wilson suggested that Lieutenant Colonel Murch be given command of an effort to extricate the task force with his 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry. General Kean agreed to this proposal. About 9 A.M., General Wilson told Murch what was planned and asked, "Can you extricate this force?" Murch replied that he could. Both Wilson and Murch knew that the enemy were behind them all the way to Ipsok and that a strong enemy force held Hill 216, on the cast side of the road, just a short distance south of Murch's perimeter. To get the task force started south, that hill had to he captured first. Murch immediately ordered preparations for F Company to attack it.

  In preparing for the attack, Murch decided to leave G Company in its present position to support the attack on Hill 216 and to protect the various elements of the task force that were then within the 2nd Battalion perimeter. F Company had been engaged in a hard battle all night, but after daylight it was not under fire. It could maneuver from its position to the eastern side of the perimeter and from there prepare to launch an attack on Hill 216. Captain Gough of F Company had two platoons of his company that could still fight effectively, despite losses during the night. Murch reinforced Gough with a platoon from G Company, a tank section, two 75-mm recoilless rifles, a section of heavy machine guns from H Company, and all the battalion 4.2-inch and 81-mm mor tars. Virtually all the battalion's heavy firepower was to be used in supporting the attack. Air strikes would help pave the way.

  Captain Gough launched his attack at 11:30 A.M. with two platoons abreast, supported by tanks. An enemy rocket hit one of the tanks on the left flank of the line and killed the driver. Lieutenant Gallagher, 3rd Platoon leader, was wounded and out of action almost at once, and the other platoon leader, Lt. Clyde Force, was wounded by a mortar fragment and out of action at the beginning of the attack. These initial losses occurred almost at the line of departure when the assault platoons crossed the road, which the CCF swept with a curtain of fire from Hill 216. The two platoons raced for a rock ledge on the east side of the road and took shelter there. Lieutenant Mahoney, now commanding the 3rd Platoon, organized the men and arranged for a barrage of marching fire from that point on up the hill. When this fire was laid down, the men moved behind it. They overran a CCF .50-caliber machine-gun crew less than 200 feet up the slope. Captain Gough joined the assault line. He sent back for all the .50-caliber machine-gun ammunition that could be hurried up. Then he turned the captured gun around and gave Corporal Mosier the job of firing it on enemy farther up the hill. The large volume of mortar, machine-gun, recoilless-rifle, and small-arms fire delivered on the crest of the enemy-held hill caused the Chinese soldiers there to run off to the north into a ravine on that side to escape the hail of bullets and exploding shells.

  Gough sent a tank along the road to a point where it had enfilading fire into this ravine, and Mosier and some men with him ran to the edge of the ravine, where they could see the bunched Chinese below. For them it was a shooting gallery. One Chinese ran from the group for the tank with a satchel charge, the fuse already burning. Mosier shot him just before he reached the tank. In another instant the charge exploded, and the Chinese soldier disappeared.

  When the 2nd Platoon of G Company, in support of F Company, started across the road, an American jeep with two men in it sped right in front of the platoon. At that moment the jeep and the men in it went up in a big explosion, possibly from an enemy explosive charge buried in the road. Some parts of the bodies of the two men landed among the 28 men of the platoon, and the jeep's engine hit a ROK soldier and broke his leg. This incident only slightly delayed the platoon in joining Mosier at the ravine, where the men helped kill the last of the Chinese trying to climb out.

  The G Company platoon then directed its fire at the crest while F Company climbed for the top. A small force, only six men, got there first. Others followed quickly. But at once, accurate, preregistered Chinese mortar fire hit the captured position. This mortar fire was devastating. The 2nd Platoon, F Company, lost 12 men there in a few minutes. Captain Gough guessed the enemy mortars were on the reverse slope of a ridge to the east of Hill 216, and he concentrated the fire of his 81-mm mortars there. This slackened the enemy mortar fire."

  Meanwhile, Task Force Wilson survivors within Murch's perimeter had loaded on trucks while F Company attacked Hill 216. They started down the road. Enemy snipers were close to the road on both sides, in brush and behind rocks. Their marksmanship was poor, and casualties from their fire were relatively light. Murch put these casualties on tanks and took them out ahead of the task-force command elements. F Company held Hill 216 while the vehicular column passed. Lieutenant Colonel Dolvin ordered the few men left in B Company, 35th Infantry, to occupy high ground at a former enemy roadblock site, and he ordered E Company, 27th Infantry, together with some tanks, to form a defensive line to cover the rear of the withdrawing task force. After the task force had cleared the perimeter, E Company was to load on tanks and follow. C Company, 65th Engineer Combat Battalion, escorted a convoy of wounded.

  Air strikes now covered the withdrawal of F Company from Hill 216 with napalm drops, rockets, and .50-caliber strafing runs. F Company and its reinforcing units came down to the road. There the men went into a dogtrot alongside tanks that carried their wounded. After F Company had hurried off the crest of Hill 216, an air strike dropped napalm on it. This strike prevented Chinese from closing on the rear of the withdrawing task force, and it reached Ipsok. General Wilson had told Lieutenant Colonel Murch when the withdrawal started that he would collect the able-bodied men he could find at Ipsok and set up a delaying position south of the town. This was necessary to help the 35th Infantry west of the Kuryong River to withdraw eastward across a bridge farther downstream.

  During the day 76 air sorties aided the 25th Division, more that day than for any other division sector. Air strikes destroyed one enemy roadblock near Ipsok. Fighter planes' strafing helped Task Force Wilson every mile of its withdrawal.

  Task Force Dolvin-Wilson was now, on the afternoon of 27 November, only a remnant of the force that had started north four days earlier. B Company, 35th Infantry, had 18 men left; the Ranger Company had 22 men; the platoons of F Company of Murch's 2nd Battalion were now reduced to an average of 17 men; E Company, 27th Infantry, had about the same number; half the tanks of B Company, 89th Tank Battalion, had been knocked out; and many of the light tanks of the 25th Reconnaissance Company had been destroyed.

  The large trains of the 25th Division that had followed Task Force Dolvin to the Ipsok area had already returned to Yongbyon, their starting point on 24 November. Enemy had infiltrated almost to the edge of that town. During 27 November a group of Chinese ambushed an ambulance just northwest of Yongbyon, killing the driver and his assistant.

  Since the beginning of its attack north on 24 November, Task Force DolvinWilson and other elements of the 25th Infantry Division had captured only nine Chinese soldiers-six from the 117th Division, two from the 115th Division, and one from the 116th Division, all from the CCF 39th Army. Intelligence from prisoners was so scanty that it is difficult to know just what Chinese units made specific attacks against any given American unit. Appar
ently the 117th Division carried most of the fight against Task Force Dolvin-Wilson.35

  The Chinese followed hard on the heels of Task Force Wilson as it fought its way back to Ipsok. General Wilson collected all the useful combat elements of the task force at Ipsok, and when Murch arrived there about 4 P.m., his troops went into position on Hill 201, southwest of the town. This hill on the western side of the road, beginning at its eastern edge about half a mile southwest of Ipsok, extended about a mile west toward the Kuryong River and then turned abruptly south for another mile. It was a two-mile-long, dogleg-shaped ridge. F Company went into position on the west-running part of the ridge just below (south of) Ipsok; G Company took the southern leg of the ridge. In their greatly depleted strength these two rifle companies could not hope to cover the many-fingered approaches to their two-mile-long position. It was a precarious position.

  Tanks of B Company, 89th Tank Battalion, held the road and some low ground cast of the road just south of Ipsok. The 25th Reconnaissance Company guarded the crossing of an arm of the Wichon River just south of Ipsok, on the right flank of the F and G Company positions. The 8th Field Artillery Battalion remained to support Murch. The 64th and 90th field artillery battalions continued their withdrawal toward Yongbyon.

  Murch and Task Force Wilson took this position just below Ipsok, instead of continuing a withdrawal south, to hold back the enemy on the east side of the Kuryong River in order to give the 35th Infantry Regiment, retreating on the west side of the Kuryong, a chance to reach and cross the bridge near Yongsandong and to escape through Yongbyon.

  The pursuing Chinese soon arrived in Ipsok and began feeling out the new defense positions south of the town. The CCF attack against this new position began half an hour before midnight. Assault groups crawled close to the rifle line and hurled grenades in close attack. The thinly manned line was vulnerable, and it broke in places. At 1:30 A.M. on 28 November, General Kean asked for a report on the situation. He wanted to know if Murch could hold off the Chinese until Colonel Fisher's 35th Infantry had crossed the Kuryong River to its cast side.

  Murch said he would do his best. He ordered his rifle companies to hold where they were, and he then made an unusual request of General Kean to help them do it. He asked for a close-in air strike at night. Kean said he could get some B-26 planes over the area. They arrived about half an hour later. Murch marked the targets in front of him with white phosphorus mortar shells and communicated with the planes through his TACP leader. The planes came over the targets and strafed the northern slope and foot of the ridgeline, sometimes within 50 to 60 yards of the infantry foxholes. These B-26 bombers made a great effort that night. It succeeded. In the course of their attacks they also hit Ipsok and set many buildings in the town on fire. They burned brightly during the rest of the night. Murch's troops, with the critical help of the strafing in front of them, held long enough to permit the 35th Infantry to fight its way to the Kuryong River bridge and escape eastward on the Yongbyon road.'"

  As soon as the 35th Infantry had crossed the river, General Wilson at 2:30 A.M. ordered Murch to withdraw another mile and a half toward Yongbyon. G Company had to fight its way from its lines. Most of the remaining tanks of B Company, 89th Tank Battalion, went to F Company, on orders from Murch, and helped it break contact and start withdrawing. F Company had 23 able-bodied men left. This withdrawal ended with the task force taking a new position at Yongpo-dong above the Kuryong River bridge and a mile from Yongbyon.

  Meanwhile, Captain Harrington and the 25th Reconnaissance Company re mained in their positions guarding the crossing of the arm of the Wichon River immediately south of Ipsok. Its 1st Platoon was the last unit to leave as the leap-frogging platoons of the company started south, the rear guard of the taskforce withdrawal. Sergeant 1st Class Taylor of the 1st Platoon blew up an abandoned ammunition truck, and the exploding ammunition in it served as an effective roadblock for 45 minutes and helped his platoon disengage. It crossed the western fork of the Wichon River at 5 A.M., 28 November, and got away. The 25th Reconnaissance Company had 24 casualties in this night battle just south of Ipsok, lost one tank to a satchel-charge attack, and had three vehicles destroyed. The next morning, Sergeant 1st Class Taylor and Lieutenant Martin, with some riflemen aboard, got in a tank and recrossed to the north side of the Wichon River and picked up 18 stragglers of the task force, many of them wounded."

  Eighth Army Orders 25th Division to Withdraw to Chongchon River

  At 5:45 A.M. on 28 November, Eighth Army ordered the 25th Infantry Division transferred to the operational control of I Corps. The division received this news from IX Corps 20 minutes later and sent a liaison officer to I Corps at once. This change was only one of several that Eighth Army took on 28 November as a result of defeats everywhere along its front and the need to make realignments to carry out preparations for a massive retreat, which the higher command now realized was necessary.

  The date of 28 November can be remembered as the one on which Eighth Army withdrawal began as a planned operation everywhere on its front. On this day Task Force Dolvin and Murch's 2nd Battalion concentrated in the vicinity of Yongbyon, with the 89th Tank Battalion and the 25th Reconnaissance Company covering its rear. The 25th Division was ordered at noon to withdraw to the Chongchon River line. The divisional withdrawal began at The 89th Tank Battalion, after covering the withdrawal of the main parts of the division south of Yongbyon to the Kunu-ri area, was to proceed southwest to Sudong on the north bank of the Chongchon, eight miles west of Kunu-ri, where there was a major ferry and tank ford of the river. It was to assemble there on an island in the river. The 25th Division had reached its Chongchon River line position north of Kunu-ri by 6 P.M., 28 November.

  In the evening, Brig. Gen. Vennard Wilson sent a message to General Kean, recommending that the various elements of Task Force Dolvin-Wilson revert to their parent units. General Kean approved this recommendation, and the task force was dissolved effective 10 P.M. The 25th Division CP on the night of 28 November was a short distance southwest of Kunu-ri.

  The companies of the 89th Tank Battalion remained with the 25th Division's regiments or battalions-B Company remained with Murch's 2nd Battalion, blocking on the Anju road westward; A Company was with the 35th Infantry on the Anju road; D Company was with elements of the 24th Regiment still north of the Chongchon, trying to escape pursuing Chinese. The tank companies of the 89th Tank Battalion had been widely separated from each other during the 25th Division attack and subsequent withdrawals. During this time the battalions and rifle companies of the 24th Regiment had become disorganized and were mostly ineffective."

  While the headquarters and CP of the 25th Division was south of the Chongchon River near Kunu-ri on the night of 28-29 November, all its combat infantry units were still north of the river on what was called the river line. This line in general varied from two miles north of the river on the right, or east, flank to five miles on the left, or west, flank. The major units on this line from left to right were the 35th Infantry Regiment, ::.e 27th Infantry Regiment, and the 24th Infantry Regiment. During 29 November the division troops withdrew southward, always under pressure from Chinese, who followed them closely. Kunu-ri lay south of the 24th Regiment. The 25th Division line extended westward north of the river toward Anju. The bulk of the enemy action during the withdrawal on 29 November was against the 27th Regiment in the division center, south of Yongbyon. The 8th Field Artillery Battalion supported the 27th Regiment at this time, firing for all companies from its position near the Sudong Ferry at the Chongchon River, about eight miles west of Kunu-ri.

  At 5 A.M. on 29 November, Chinese attacked both the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 27th Regiment near Pong-dong, approximately three miles southeast of Yongbyon. The enemy overran K Company on the outpost line of resistance at 6:30 A.M. and then withdrew. Chinese then attacked L Company half an hour later. The enemy penetrated its right-hand platoon, continued on, and overran the company CP a little after 7 A.M. The company committed
all its reserves. K Company regrouped and went back on the line between L and I companies. The Chinese closed to the foxholes of I Company. A hard fight followed, but by 9 A.M. the 3rd Battalion had regained its original positions. For a while around noon the 3rd Battalion lost contact with A Company, 24th Infantry, on its right flank, but contact was soon reestablished.

  To the west of the 3rd Battalion, the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, came under enemy fire at 5 A.M. Artillery fire helped greatly in repulsing the first attack. But soon an enemy group infiltrated past the 2nd Battalion boundary to engage I. Company, 3rd Battalion, and cut the road behind both battalions. By noon, however, the two battalions had driven off the enemy in their front with the help of artillery fire and air strikes. At 4 P.M., all three battalions of the 27th Infantry withdrew under cover of air strikes. The 2nd Battalion marched 18 miles, closing on its bivouac area south of the Chongchon River at 11:30 that night. The troops waded the waters of several icy streams during the march. The 3rd Battalion had a similarly hard march, closing at Sangcham, on the south bank of the Chongchon, just cast of its junction with the Kurvong River. The 1st Battalion, under only minor enemy pressure, withdrew six miles.

  The right flank of the 25th Division in this withdrawal was held by the 25th Reconnaissance Company. It established a roadblock northeast of Kunu-ri and held a delaying position two miles north of the town. The CP of the 3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry, was in Kunu-ri, but its units were widely scattered. During the day the CP of the 25th Division moved southwest to a point five miles east of Sukchon on the Sunchon road, well below the Chongchon River.29

  The 35th Infantry Fights Its Way Back from Unsan

  It is necessary now to backtrack and follow the movements and actions of Colonel Fisher's 35th Regiment, 25th Division, which was separated by the Kuryong River from Task Force Dolvin-Wilson and the rest of the division. The 35th Infantry Regiment, minus B Company, which had been included in Task Force Dolvin, advanced from its point of departure on 24 November without enemy opposition. The most noteworthy event of its advance was coming upon the place south of Unsan where the CCF had surprised and overrun large numbers of the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, three weeks earlier, in the CCF 1st Phase Offensive. There, members of the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry, found a shambles of 31 dead men, most of them still in their sleeping bags, and about 30 vehicles burned.