Disaster in Korea

by Roy E Appleman

  General MacArthur made no decisions and issued no orders to Generals Walker or Almond during or at the end of the conference. Before the two commanders left from Tokyo that day, however, to return to their commands in Korea, MacArthur did give them his instructions. He asked General Walker to hold the Pyongyang area if he could but to withdraw as needed to prevent the Chinese forces from getting around his right flank and into his rear. He ordered General Almond to end his offensive action and to withdraw and concentrate the X Corps in the Hamhung-Hungnam area on the coast. This order, no doubt, reflected his intention to evacuate X Corps from northeast Korea and to move it by sea to join Eighth Army in South Korea, or as far north as Eighth Army might be in Korea at the time. But he did not include that in his instructions to Almond on 29 November.

  General Almond left Tokyo at noon on the twenty-ninth. Lieutenant Colonels McCaffrey and Glass and Major Ladd of his staff were on the plane with him. During the trip from Haneda to Yonpo airfield in Korea, the group discussed the situation. General Almond, acting on General MacArthur's directive to him, told McCaffrey and Glass to start preparing a draft of a X Corps order to concentrate the corps's forces at Hamhung, "and action against enemy wherever possible within good judgment."

  Almond's plane arrived at Yonpo airfield at 5:10 in the afternoon. Almond, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel McCaffrey, immediately flew to the X Corps CP. An hour later he began a conference there with his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner; his deputy chiefs of staff; and his general staff officers. An hour and a half later, at 9 P.M., the X Corps section chiefs presented a plan for Operation Order No. 8. The order, when issued, called for a discontinuance of the X Corps attack to the northwest and initiation of a withdrawal of X Corps forces. This order carried out General MacArthur's instructions to General Almond.10

  Detailed information about Lieutenant General Walker's return to Korea and his actions is not recorded in the official Eighth Army War Diary for the day. But it may be assumed that he left Tokyo for Korea about the same time as did General Almond. Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen, Eighth Army chief of staff in Korea, reported that General Walker, after returning to his CP at 5 P.M. on 29 November, ordered his forces to begin a withdrawal from the Chongchon River front." In a sense, the order was redundant because the Chinese were already mandating it themselves.

  Among the orders General Walker issued after his return to Korea was one instructing the 187th Airborne RCT to guard all bridges over the Taedong River. This protection was essential to ensure the ready crossing of the river when the withdrawing troops reached it. To the commanding general of the 187th RUT, Brig. Gen. Frank S. Bowen, Jr., General Walker said that it was "imperative to prevent movement of refugees over bridges Taedong River YD39122, YD405253, YD440320, and insure uninterrupted movement of military traffic through Pyongyang and across bridges. Responsibility yours until combat units I and IX Corps arrive bridge sites. . . . CG I and IX Corps assume responsibility to relieve 187th Abn. when arrive at bridges."" This order might indicate that General Walker was not planning on 29 November to have the entire army halt north of Pyongyang if the Chinese offensive continued.

  It should be noted here that the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 29 November approved General MacArthur's plan to pass from the offensive to the defensive in Korea as stated in his radio message on 28 November. Their approval said that "strategic and tactical considerations are now paramount." But they also asked, "What are your plans re the coordination of operations of the 8th Army and X Corps and the positioning of X Corps, the units of which appear to us to be exposed?""

  In another development on 29 November, General MacArthur revived the proposal to use Nationalist Chinese troops in Korea against the Chinese Communists. General MacArthur's radio message to the Joint Chiefs proposed:

  The Chinese armies on Formosa represent the only source of potential trained reinforcements available for early commitment. Troops drawn from this source could be landed in Korea in approximately 14 days and a much larger force than that originally offered would undoubtedly be made available if desired.

  I strongly recommend accordingly that the theater commander be authorized to negotiate direct with the Chinese Government authorities on Formosa for the movement north and incorporation in the UNC of such Chinese units as may be available and desirable for reinforcing our position in Korea."

  That same day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff replied to General MacArthur, denying his request. Their radio said:

  Your proposal (C 50021) is being considered. It involves world-wide consequences. We shall have to consider the possibility that it would disrupt the united position of the nations associated with us in the UN and leave us isolated. It may he wholly unacceptable to the commonwealth countries to have their forces employed with Nationalist Chinese. It might extend hostilities to Formosa and other areas. Incidentally, our position of leadership in the Far East is being most seriously compromised in the UN. The utmost care will he necessary to avoid the disruption of the essential Allied line-up in that organization. 1-1

  Late on the night of 29 November, General Walker issued a memorandum for the press, stating that his attack to the border, which began on 24 November, had revealed the Chinese troop situation and had saved his army by discovering their deployment and intent in time. A British war correspondent then at the front wrote, "At first no one would believe that this was not a hoax, but when they knew it was meant to be serious, it spread consternation, anger and dismay among all ranks with whom I came into contact in the next few days .1116

  The New York Herald Tribune on 30 November printed an AP dispatch, datelined US Eighth Army Headquarters, 29 November 1950, which quoted General Walker. The statement apparently was intended to be a public-relations document to explain the Eighth Army action of the past week and to justify it, even though the army was in the midst of defeat and retreat at the time. It also buttressed General MacArthur's radio dispatches and communiques he issued at Tokyo the day before. Because of the furor at the time and the continuing controversy it caused, Walker's press release is given in full:

  The assault launched by the 8th Army five days ago probably saved our forces from a trap which might well have destroyed them. Had we waited passively in place, the 200,000 Chinese troops thrown against my lines would have increased within a short time to double that strength. From beyond the Yalu they undoubtedly would have brought the 200,000 additional Chinese troops known to be assembled there. We naturally had hoped to find at least some semblance of truth in the public assurance of the Chinese Communist authorities that no formal military intervention had been perpetrated. However, only by assault tactics could the actualities have been fully developed. In my opinion this saved the army from possible destruction. The timing of our attack to develope the situation was, indeed, most fortunate."

  Thus began the frequently discussed theory that General MacArthur's brilliance in ordering the 24 November attack saved Eighth Army from destruction at a later date. This line of public-relations propaganda and excuse conveniently overlooked the fact that, at the time General MacArthur ordered the attack, he stated that it was to go to the Korean border, end the war, and unify Korea.

  By daylight of 30 November all major units of Eighth Army had received orders to withdraw south of the Chongchon River. By nightfall most of them had crossed and were headed in the direction of Pyongyang. A few units of the ROK 1st Division and of the 25th Infantry Division were still north of the river but rapidly approaching it. They would cross within an hour or two. The 5th RCT of the US 24th Division held the planned major crossing site east of Anju. The rest of the 24th Division had already crossed the river at Sinanju. The I Corps of the army, on the westernmost part of the line, was almost entirely south of the river before dark on 30 November. The last units of IX Corps to cross, the 3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry, of the 25th Division, escaped in fragments to the south side of the river just before dark, near Kunu-ri, with the help of strong, close air support and the tank and
artillery fire of the 23rd Infantry Regiment, which still held its rear-guard defensive position southwest of Kunu-ri.

  At this time, on the army's cast flank, large formations of Chinese troops were executing flanking and encircling movements through the rear areas of the ROK II Corps and attempting to entrap the US 2nd Infantry Division before it could escape southward. Eighth Army had thrown in its reserve, principally the US 1st Cavalry Division and the British 27th Brigade, to check the enemy on the east in its enveloping move. Of all major units of the army, the 2nd Infantry Division was in the most danger on 30 November. It had in a real sense acted as the army's rear guard. Now it faced the continuing main frontal push of the Chinese XIII Army Group, while at the same time it was being encircled on its right flank and from the rear.

  The US 24th Infantry Division, on the army's left (west) flank, was the first division to withdraw all its units south of the Chongchon River. Eighth Army had ordered the division, after it had crossed, to assemble its forces about 18 miles cast of Pyongyang in the vicinity of Kang-dong. At the time of this order, the 21st Regiment was already assembled in the vicinity of Sunchon. Kang-dong was 20 air miles southeast of Sunchon and astride the important lateral road across the waist of Korea, which ran from Wonsan, on the east coast, to Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. At Kang-dong, the 24th Division was expected to protect Pyongyang from encircling Chinese forces, which were driving southwest around Sunchon, and it was also calculated to hold open the roadnet from the north by which Eighth Army would retreat south from the Chongchon River front. Upon arrival at Kang-dong, the 24th Infantry Division reverted to Eighth Army control. In its movement to Kang-dong, Eighth Army ordered the division to destroy all supplies and equipment it could not evacuate and to carry out demolition that would slow down or obstruct enemy advance.'

  I Corps closed its CP at Sinanju and moved south on the coastal road, opening its new CP at Yongju, at 8:20 P.M. on 30 November. Yongju was about midway between Sinanju and Pyongyang. At 2:15 P.M., I Corps had reported all its troops south of the river. That part of the 5th RCT still on the north side of the river at the bridge sites withdrew to the south side. At 4:15 P.M., the 5th RCT, on I Corps orders, destroyed the east bridge across the Chongchon, and one and a half hours later, at 5:45 P.M., it destroyed the west bridge. The next chapter will tell the story of why it waited that long-to allow the 23rd Infantry Regiment to escape westward on the Anju road from Kunu-ri. The 5th RCT, its mission well performed, then moved out west through Anju to Sinanju, where it turned south to assemble at Yongju in I Corps reserve.'

  Meanwhile, the ROK 1st Division crossed to the south side of the Chongchon at Anju, or just east of the town. The 555th Field Artillery Battalion, which supported the 5th RCT in guarding the two bridges at Anju and in holding a block on the river road east of the town, gave covering fires for the ROK division as it crossed. The ROK 15th Regiment crossed first after daylight. The ROK 11th and 12th regiments followed, beginning their crossings about 10:30 A.M.

  All had not gone well, however, with the supporting units of the ROK 1st Division in their crossing of the Chongchon. Some hours before daylight on 30 November, the last artillery unit of I Corps met enemy opposition as it approached the Anju bridges. Capt. Darrell Putnam, commanding a battery of 90-mm guns of the 68th AAA Battalion, which had been supporting the ROK 1st Division, said his men came under enemy small-arms fire at 4 A.M., when they were still more than a mile from the bridges. The battery had to destroy and abandon two guns they were unable to move.'

  Lt. Col. Clarence E. Stuart's 555th Field Artillery Battalion covered all these crossings at the Anju bridges by delivering interdicting fire on enemy forces following the UN units to the bridges. His battalion remained in its emplacements covering the bridges and river roadblock until dark on 30 November, until after the 23rd Infantry Regiment from Kunu-ri had safely passed on the Anju road about dark. Stuart's battalion then withdrew down the Anju road without the loss of a vehicle or of a gun. But he barely got away unscathed. As he was leaving, he saw Chinese vehicles drive down to the river's edge opposite him on the north side with their fights on .4

  The 25th Infantry Division had been the left-hand component of IX Corps during the heavy Chinese attacks and was on the right of the ROK 1st Division. It, too, had now escaped south of the Chongchon. Its F Company of the 27th Regiment was the last tactical unit of the division (except the lost fragments of the 3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry) to cross to the south side of the river during the night of 29-30 November. There it received orders to join the 89th Tank Battalion and the 25th Reconnaissance Company as a special task force to cover the Anju road west of Kunu-ri. F Company joined this force before dawn of 30 November. When the 23rd Regiment of the 2nd Division withdrew to its covering position southwest of Kunu-ri that night, it relieved the 25th Division of blocking on the Anju road just west of Kunu-ri. F Company then joined its battalion, and the 2nd Battalion followed the 1st Battalion through Anju. At Anju the regiment obtained much-needed food, and at 4:15 in the afternoon it resumed its march south. Trucks later met most of the 27th Infantry's troops and carried them to assembly areas. F Company and its 2nd Battalion rode the last 20 miles to their assembly area at Wolbong-ni, on the lateral road between Sukchon and Sunchon, arriving there at midnight. The 35th Regiment had closed at dusk that afternoon at Sunchon, the 25th Division's new area of responsibility.s

  The last elements of the 25th Division to cross to the south side of the Chongchon were remnants of the 3rd Battalion, 24th Regiment. They escaped by the skin of their teeth. They reached the Chongchon about midafternoon of 30 November at a point opposite Kunu-ri, hotly pursued by Chinese. It chanced that the 23rd Infantry of the 2nd Division still held its defense arc northwest of Kunu-ri on the south side of the river when the 3rd Battalion remnants appeared on the north side opposite them. The 23rd Infantry thus could give vital fire support to the exhausted men of the 3rd Battalion and save some of them. Only an hour or two later the 23rd Infantry hurriedly left its positions and escaped west on the Anju road. Had it not been for the presence of the 23rd Infantry when the shattered 3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry, reached the Chongchon, it almost certainly would have been destroyed or captured by the Chinese that afternoon.

  The story of the 3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry, 25th Division, is one of considerable confusion throughout the last days of November. More often than not, the regimental commander, Col. John T. Corley, had no communication with its commander, Lt. Col. Melvin R. Blair. It has already been told how Lieutenant Colonel Blair, with his headquarters, arrived at Kunu-ri on the night of 29 November, but he had no idea where his companies were. Blair himself seemed to be a case of battle fatigue. Colonel Corley finally located the troops north of Won-ni. At this point, however, there was no way to send a rescue party to meet them. Thus I, K, and L companies of the 3rd Battalion were largely on their own to fight their way through to Kunu-ri.

  Even while Colonel Corley and Lieutenant Colonel Blair during the night of 29-30 November were holding a radio conversation, with Blair in his CP in Kunu-ri, Chinese attacked the CP. In this attack, the battalion sergeant major was killed, and the battalion executive officer, the battalion surgeon, and the artillery liaison officer were wounded, but they escaped. Lieutenant Colonel Blair also escaped. Most of the battalion command group infiltrated individually and in small groups out of Kunu-ri, and eventually, about 4:45 A.M. Of 30 November they were able to join Corley's tactical CP southwest of Kunu-ri. This group stayed with Corley until about 7 A.M., when he sent them west on the Anju road.6 All this left the infantry companies of the 3rd Battalion in limbo, their fate unknown.

  Shortly after noon of 30 November word reached the 23rd Infantry Regiment in its rear-guard blocking position southwest of Kunu-ri that the missing 24th Infantry rifle companies were on the north bank of the Chongchon, trying to cross but hard pressed by pursuing Chinese. Colonel Freeman notified Colonel Corley of this information after a captain and three enlisted men from the
3rd Battalion had crossed the Chongchon and reached his lines. The 3rd Battalion rifle companies were on foot, pursued by about two battalions ofChinese. Freeman moved two platoons of tanks to his left, in front of the 3rd Battalion soldiers trying to escape. The heavy fire of these tanks on the Chinese, together with massive air strikes by 20 fighter planes and three bombers on the pursuing Chinese, now in the open of the Chongchon valley rice paddies near the river, enabled most of I, K, and L companies, 24th Infantry, to reach the south side of the river and then to make their way across the two to three miles of flat delta land of the Chongchon valley at this point. Members of the 23rd Infantry saw several Chinese soldiers run up behind fleeing 3rd Battalion soldiers and capture them. This dramatic scene unfolded about 2 P.M. on 30 November.

  In directing air strikes and artillery fire on the Chinese, an American Mosquito plane crashed three miles west of the Anju-Kunu-ri-Sunchon road junction. A tank went out into the no-man's-land and rescued the pilot and observer.

  Meanwhile, the members of the 3rd Battalion who had escaped to the south side of the river and across the flat marshland there assembled on the Anju road within the 23rd Infantry lines. About 4 P.M. they loaded on 15th Field Artillery trucks and rode out to Anju. By 6 P.m., the last of them had cleared the initial point of traffic control in Anju, where Brig. Gen. Vennard Wilson, assistant division commander of the 25th Division, acted as traffic controller." There were more Korean refugees fleeing south on the coastal roads, the 25th Division reported, than at any time since it had crossed the 38th Parallel.

  At 2 P.M. on 30 November, the IX Corps closed its CP at Chasan, six miles south of Sunchon, and opened its new CP at Pyongyang at the same time. It is not known just when General Coulter arrived at the new CP in Pyongyang. It is known, however, that General Walker conferred with General Coulter, the IX Corps commander, and with General Church, commander of the 24th Division, at 4:40 P.M. at the IX Corps headquarters. We do not know the subject of that conference, but one might assume that it included the situation in the 2nd Infantry Division below Kunu-ri and the continuing Chinese envelopment of the army and the IX Corps right flank (or of the left flank, if one thinks of the army now being headed south)."