The fact is, however, that Maj. Gen. Leven Allen, Eighth Army chief of staff, on General Walker's orders, went to Yongdong-po and verbally relieved Keiser of command of the 2nd Division. Lt. Gen. Walton Walker, therefore, relieved General Keiser of command of the 2nd Division, apparently believing him responsible for the disaster that overtook the division below Kunu-ri on 30 Novembcr 1950.10
Some years later, after General Keiser's death in 1969, Marshall, an analyst for a private firm that contracts with the military to make operations studies for it, published a newspaper article dealing with General Keiser's relief from command of the 2nd Division. Marshall was at Yongdong-po at the time of Keiser's relief from command in December 1950, and was acquainted with Keiser. His article purports to be a summary of what General Keiser told him immediately after Keiser visited Eighth Army Headquarters in Seoul after he had learned that he must report to a hospital in Japan for treatment. Keiser was angry at the time, Marshall said, and felt that he was being made a scapegoat. He walked into Army Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Leven Allen's office and said to Allen, "You can see that I do not have pneumonia." Allen replied by asking, "You are going to comply with an order, aren't you?" Keiser answered, "Yes, I'll go along with it because it is an order; but I want to make it plain that my health is not the reason." Allen then said, "Gen. Walker will take care of you with a job around this headquarters." Keiser allegedly shouted his reply that he would have nothing to do with such a job, in a voice loud enough to make sure that Walker, in the next room, would hear it. Marshall concludes his article speculating that perhaps not Walker but someone else in a higher headquarters wanted Keiser removed from command of the division.'2' No evidence has surfaced to support Marshall's speculation.
After General Keiser had been in Japan for a week and had recovered somewhat, he visited Mrs. Margaret Almond, wife of Gen. Edward M. Almond, the X Corps commander. The Keisers and Almonds had been longtime friends. General Keiser told Mrs. Almond about being relieved of his command in Korea and commented about the terrible ordeal of his division. At one point he wept openly. He said one of the worst things for him personally was when he had to take the dead body of one of his aides (probably his bodyguard, who had been killed) from his jeep in the fireblock and lay it at the side of the road south of Kunu-ri to make room fora badly wounded sergeant, whom he carried through to safety.'22
When General Keiser was ordered to Japan for hospital treatment, the question arose as to who would be in temporary command of the 2nd Division. Maj. Gen. Joseph S. Bradley, the assistant division commander, telephoned higher authority for information, probably IX Corps, where General Coulter presumably referred the matter to Eighth Army, and received back the answer that the senior officer in the division should assume command. Brig. Gen. Loyal M. Haynes, commander of the 2nd Division Artillery, was the senior officer, and he assumed command of the division temporarily.'23
It is clear that General Keiser never recovered from being relieved of command of the 2nd Infantry Division for what he believed was a false and unwarranted cause that tarnished his reputation thereafter. Perhaps Keiser's feelings about Kunu-ri are best reflected in what he said to Colonel Epley. The latter wrote, "In the days and years following Kunu-ri I saw and conversed with Gen. Keiser on several occasions. His attitude concerning Kunu-ri became and remained, `It is over-it is done, Let it lie." 1112`
As stated earlier, Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter of IX Corps and Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker of Eighth Army must share a large burden of responsibility for what happened to the 2nd Infantry Division at Kunu-ri. They did not send an adequate force of the available troops from the Sunchon area to attack the Chinese fireblock area from the south on 30 November and to help the exhausted 2nd Division. While the Middlesex Battalion of the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade was under orders to attack north on 30 November for this purpose, it never did so. It had demonstrated on the previous day that it could not even reach the southern end of the Pass. Higher command at that point should have reassessed the situation. It had added reinforcements at hand on the morning of the thirtieth to join in the attack north to meet the 2nd Infantry Division.
Pondering the question of why Kunu-ri happened and where and how errors of command judgment were made, one keeps coming back to a precept that General Ridgway stated several times, that in battle, "the place for a commander, certainly from Regiment up through Army, is where the crisis is, anticipating it if possible, but if not, then getting there as quickly as possible after it has developed."125 He also believed there was seldom more than one real crisis at a given time. The crisis for Eighth Army, and for its subordinate 2nd Infantry Division in covering the final stages of the army withdrawal from contact with the Chinese forces along the Chongchon River on 30 November 1950, was along the 2nd Infantry Division withdrawal route from Kunu-ri to Sunchon. There was no other crisis at that time for Eighth Army-all the other subordinate units of the army had broken contact with the enemy and executed successful withdrawals or were in the final stages of doing so. Only the 2nd Infantry Division, after covering the right flank of the army and the successful withdrawal of the army units in the center and on the left, was in danger in its own efforts to break contact with the Chinese and then to withdraw successfully. There was the crisis for the 2nd Division, the IX Corps, and the Eighth Army on 30 November. Applying Ridgway's dictum for battle leadership, one may ask where General Coulter of IX Corps and General Walker of Eighth Army were on that day of crisis, 30 November 1950, and what they did to help the 2nd Division, the major army unit enmeshed in the crisis.
General Coulter closed his CP at Happacham (Unhung-ni), four miles west of Kunu-ri on the Anju road, at 1:30 P.m. on 29 November, and opened his new CP at Chasan, six miles south of Sunchon at the same time. His CP remained at Chasan until 2 P.M. the next day, 30 November, when he closed it and opened his new CP at the same time at Pyongyang. There in Pyongyang, he conferred with Generals Walker and Church at 4:30 P.M. Just when on the thirtieth Coulter went to Pyongyang is not known, but presumably it must have been, at the latest, in the early afternoon of that day, because he opened his CP there at 1:30 P.M. In the afternoon of the thirtieth and that night, he was nowhere near the place of crisis and battle-the enemy fireblock and roadblock on the road from Kunu-ri to Sunchon. He was in Pyongyang.
General Walker's movements during the last days of November 1950 are hard to trace. He kept a sort of Advance CP near that of I Corps and the 24th Division in the Anju-Sinanju area. He probably left that CP when I Corps departed from its CP in Sinanju at 8:20 A.M. on 30 November. General Walker apparently left in a liaison plane and flew over the 2nd Division withdrawal route from Kunu-n' to Sunchon on the thirtieth, since his pilot told Colonel Stebbins, Eighth Army G-4, about it later. Walker's reaction to the 2nd Division on that occasion has already been stated. Walker apparently went on to Pyongyang to the Eighth Army main CP there. Just when he arrived is not known, but he certainly was there by 4:30 r.M., when he conferred with Generals Coulter and Church. Walker apparently did nothing on the thirtieth to help the 2nd Division, even though from the air he had seen that it was in trouble.
Neither General Coulter nor General Walker, the superior commanders responsible for taking action to assist one of their subordinate units in its crisis, did anything on 30 November or that night, nor is there evidence that they gave any special thought to it. Where did the greater failure lay? With General Keiser in whatever mistakes he may have made in trying to carry out General Coulter's orders, or in the indifference or carelessness of superior command in failing to keep on top the developing situation with regard to the 2nd Infantry Division and to intercede with whatever force was necessary to save it from disaster? In judging General Keiser one must not forget also that he never knew until after the event that his rear-guard RCT did not carry out its planned mission in his division movement.
When the stragglers from the 2nd Infantry Division arrived at Sunchon on 1 December and were carried on to Pyongyang and points
south during the next few days, all other units of Eighth Army were already on their way to Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, except for some 1st Cavalry Division and 27th British Brigade units covering the army east flank at Taedong River crossings south ofSunchon. Although General Walker had told General MacArthur in Tokyo on the night of 28-29 November that he expected the army to hold a line north and east of Pyongyang and to retain control of the North Korean capital, he made no effort to do so when the moment for decision arrived. General Walker did not officially order the evacuation of Pyongyang until 3 December. But from 30 November on, he and his senior staff officers knew that no battle would be fought north of the city or in its vicinity and that the city would not be held.
The continuous movement of troops through and south of Pyongyang during and after 30 November, and the destruction and abandonment of supplies there and elsewhere built up day after day into a hectic rush to get south. There was no indication of an intent to stop, face about, and confront the enemy. And there was none until Eighth Army reached the line of the Han and Imjin rivers, 20 air miles north of Seoul and 100 miles south of Pyongyang. This was in fact the old defense line between the two Koreas, virtually on the 38th Parallel. In effect, the movement south from the Chongchon River front that was in full swing on 30 November carried Eighth Army south without pause until it had abandoned practically all of North Korea.
Tokyo-Washington Jitters at the End of November 1950
A short digression from events at the battlefront in Korea is necessary to put in perspective the state of mind in the military and political high commands in Tokyo and Washington, caused by the alarming course of events in Korea. Even at Pusan, several hundred miles to the south of the battlefront, the course of events on the Chongchon was reflected by 30 November. There all ships loading received orders to stop. LSTs and other resupply vessels that were discharging cargo were ordered to hasten their unloading and to stand by for further instructions. Evacuation of Eighth Army obviously was already in the minds of Eighth Army transportation officials and higher authorities.'
A series of messages on 30 November between General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff reflected some of these thoughts. General MacArthur sent two messages that day to the Joint Chiefs in which he said that Chinese reinforcements from the Manchurian border could reach the battlefront in Korea in two night marches and result in a heavy and continuous buildup of their forces numbering several hundred thousands of additional troops. He added that "it is quite evident that the 8th Army will successively have to continue to replace to the rear." This message indicates that MacArthur as early as 30 November contemplated the evacuation of Pyongyang.
In an earlier message that day he said that the X -Corps in Northeast Korea had tied up six to eight Chinese divisions that otherwise would have been available for the attack against Eighth Army and that the Chinese could not safely penetrate southward in the west until the threat of the X Corps to their eastern flank had been nullified. MacArthur further said that any concept "of actual physical combination of the forces of the 8th Army and X Corps in a practically continuous line across the narrow neck of Korea is quite impracticable due to the length of that line, the numerical weakness of our forces, and the logistical problems due to the mountainous divide which splits such a front from north to south."2 Yet such a line was formed later and at a wider part of the peninsula on a weaker defense line.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied the same day to MacArthur that his plans "arc causing increasing concern here." The Joint Chiefs expressed fear the enemy could move strong forces between the X Corps and Eighth Army, and therefore the X Corps and Eighth Army should be brought together sufficiently so that their actions could be coordinated. Their message then continued to clarify what they considered the mission given to the Far Fast Commander in Korea, saying, "Regarding the mission assigned you by the UN the entire region northeast of the waist of Korea should be ignored except for strategic and tactical considerations relating to the security of your command."' (A later chapter will discuss what might have been accomplished if the UN command had seized and established a defense line at the waist of Korea.)
The next day, 1 December, General MacArthur said his lack of authority to act against the Chinese north of the border in Manchuria was "an enormous handicap without precedent in military operations." When asked about the use of atomic bombs, MacArthur replied it would he "inappropriate at this time" for him to comment on their use in Korea.`
Clement Atlee and Truman Meet on the Atomic Bomb Issue
The jitters now building in Washington as a result of the disastrous news from Korea is shown best by a remark of President Truman to reporters at a press conference on 30 November. He said the use of the atomic bomb was under consideration. This comment produced a shock, and nowhere more than in England. Many observers and listeners erroneously jumped to the conclusion that President Truman meant to leave the decision to General MacArthur as to how and when to use the bomb. That same day, 30 November, Clement Atlee, the British prime minister, asked to be received for a visit to Washington to discuss with Truman the meaning of events in Korea and the potentials in the future course of the war. The conference was arranged promptly. It was to begin on 4 December. On the third, South Korean Defense Minister Shin Sung Mo added his voice to the call for use of the atomic bomb. He said its use immediately was necessary to prevent his country from being conquered. He went as far as to avow that the people of South Korea would rather perish in an atomic holocaust than become slaves of the Chinese Communists.
Before he Iefr England, Atlee conferred with leaders of the Commonwealth nations and with the French premier and foreign minister. In the United States the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and presidential advisor Averell Harriman met to discuss their position and advise the president on his forthcoming talks with the British prime minister. The British were known to oppose General MacArthur's Korean proposals, which they feared might widen the war. If the British withdrew support for the Korean War at the UN, no one could foretell the consequences.
At the time, General Collins, Army chief of staff and agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Korean War, was in Korea assessing the situation. The consulting group decided on 3 December that it would not submit recommendations to President Truman until General Collins returned from his trip. It was known to the group and to President Truman that Prime Minister Atlee was strongly opposed to use of the atom bomb before consulting with him and believed that it should not be used in China. On 4 December, the day President Truman and Prime Minister Atlee began their talks, the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to the secretary of defense their view that the president should not make a commitment to Mr. Atlee restricting American freedom of action in using the atomic bomb.
Serious differences developed between the State Department and the Defense Department on a proposal to Prime Minister Atlec as to the course of action in Korea. The Defense Department considered the State Department proposals too rigid and binding on freedom of action of the military for protection of its forces in Korea, and too specific in proposed lines for withdrawal, including the possibility of withdrawing from Korea to Japan. The Defense Department insisted that the Chinese must not be offered too much for too little and that the UN commander (General MacArthur) must not be restricted operationally. The Joint Chiefs of Staff found the State Department proposals unacceptable. They revised the State Department proposals to embody their own. President Truman agreed with the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
President Truman, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, Prime Minister Clement Atlee, and the British ambassador to the United States met at the White House on 4 December and daily thereafter through 9 December, six days in all. Truman told Atlee that, if the enemy proposed a cease-fire, the United States would accept it but would pay nothing for it. If a cease-fire was not proposed and the Chinese continu
ed their offensive, the United States would fight as hard as it could. After the meeting on 7 December, President Truman and Prime Minister Atlee agreed there would be no voluntary evacuation of Korea in the current conditions.
On his return from Korea, General Collins reviewed with the two heads of government on 9 December the military situation in Korea as he judged it to be, saying he thought the UN forces there could take care of themselves without further heavy losses. In the end, the complex negotiations between Truman and Atlee ended with agreement that, if solutions could not be found for a peaceful settlement of the Korean, Formosa, and Indochina problems in Asia, the American and British troops would fight in Korea until they were forced out. Prime Minister Atlee went home with the understanding that the atomic bomb would not be used unless an unforeseen and wholly disastrous situation should develop.' General MacArthur received resumes of these discussions as they occurred, but it is doubtful whether many on his Far East Command Staff knew of them in any detail, and probably only some press accounts reached a few persons in Korea.
MacArthur Faces a Lack of Reinforcements
By 1 December the stated objective of Eighth Army was to disengage from enemy on all its fronts and to move rapidly south out of contact. By the end of the day it had done this, except for a few patrols and one or two larger-unit contacts on its eastern, or right, flank. On 28 November General MacArthur had queried the Joint Chiefs about picking up Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's offer in June 1950 to send Chinese Nationalist troops from Formosa to help repel the North Korean invasion. General MacArthur now wanted to raise the size of the Nationalist Chinese contingent to 50,000 or more, rather than the 33,000 Chiang Kai-shek had originally offered. The Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected this proposal, feeling that it would create more problems in the UN, and particularly with British allies, than it would be worth. The only other source of reinforcements for the UN forces in Korea in this crisis, other than relatively small UN contingents that had been pledged, would have to come from the United States. In view of the need for immediate and rather sizable reinforcements in infantry and supporting arms in Korea to confront the victorious Chinese and a rapidly growing reorganization of the North Korean Army that was expected to join the Chinese at the front in the near future, the status of United States Army reserves at this time came under review at the Pentagon.
Disaster in Korea Page 47