On 1 December, Gen. Charles L. Bolte, acting chief of staff, G-3, Department of the Army, had sent to Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, acting chief of staff for administration, a memorandum outlining the US Army's capabilities. It listed approximately 220,000 current forces available in Korea to the commander in chief, Far East, of which 153,000 men were in Army forces, with an augmentation of 23,000 ROK troops; the 1st Marine Division, numbering 25,000 men; and about 20,000 in other UN allies contingents. The United States Army units in Korea, with 153,000 men, were 65,000 under strength. The 220,000 current forces, however, did not include the 121,000 men in the ROK Army. These were available to General MacArthur as UN commander. The total, therefore, available to him would be 342,000 rather than 220,000.
General Boltc listed the reinforcement capabilities as follows:
To get these forces equipped and combat ready would deplete the reserve and take equipment items from reserve components. There would be no further divisions available until August 1952. Thereafter, beginning in November 1952, the Department of the Army could have two additional divisions ready monthly.'
From this inventory of US force availability, only one division could be sent to reinforce the UN forces in Korea within a month, and then it would be mid-1951 before any other Army reinforcements could be sent to Korea-not a happy prospect for the commander, Far East, or the commanding general in Korea, to contemplate in the crisis of early December 1950. In effect, it meant that, whatever happened in the immediate future, the American forces in Koreaan understrcngth and battle-weary force-could not be reinforced and that they would have to get along with what they had.
Eighth Army Falls Back on Pyongyang, 1-3 December
The major objective of the initial phase of Eighth Army's and the UN retreat from the Chongchon River front and of breaking contact with the enemy on 1 December and the week that followed was to protect the Pyongyang-Seoul highway, its MSR from South Korea. While the army was engaged in its initial movements to accomplish this purpose, the 187th Airborne RCT guarded the approaches to Pyongyang and the ROK 2nd and 5th divisions were placed in positions flanking the Pyongyang-Seoul corridor on the cast.' The two ROK divisions were sent to the so-called Iron Triangle area east of the MSR to deal primarily with enemy guerrilla forces that infested that area northeast of Seoul, far behind Eighth Army's front line, and that threatened to cut or harass the army's main withdrawal route. In a subsequent chapter more will be said about the increasing guerrilla threat behind Eighth Army.
On 1 December, the combat-effective units of Eighth Army were the 24th and 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry divisions, the ROK 1st Division, the 27th and 29th British Commonwealth brigades, and the 187th Airborne RCT. The 2nd Infantry Division and the Turkish Brigade, as well as the ROK II Corps, were considered combat ineffective. In the ROK II Corps, the 7th Division on 1 December reportedly had 6,793 men, and the 8th Division only 5,761 men.
The Eighth Army line on 1 December started at Sukchon on the west, about 50 miles north of Pyongyang, and ran generally east through Sunchon to a point about five miles cast of the town to control the crossings of the Taedong River in that vicinity. On this line from west to east were the 12th and 15th regiments of the ROK 1st Division, with the 11th Regiment in reserve; the 27th, 24th, and 35th regiments of the 25th Division; the 1st Cavalry's 8th Regiment, in the vicinity of Songchon; the 5th Cavalry Regiment, northwest of Sunchon; and the 7th Cavalry Regiment, east of Sunchon in the vicinity of Unsan-ni. Remaining elements of the ROK 6th Division were on the left of the 7th Cavalry Regiment and attached to it. The British 27th Commonwealth Brigade was on the right (east) of the 7th Cavalry Regiment on the extreme right flank of the Eighth Army line. The 24th Infantry Division was in Eighth Army reserve. Also under Eighth Army control were the 187th Airborne RCT, the Netherlands Battalion, the French Battalion, and the Thailand 10th Expeditionary Forceall of the UN contingents had recently landed at Pusan and were on their way north to join Eighth Army.
In the next two weeks Eighth Arms' withdrew south 120 miles to the lmjin River line, north of Seoul. During that time there was no contact with the Chinese after 3 December, and American intelligence concerning the CCF was spotty and incomplete. It depended entirely on aerial observation and on Korean civilian reports.
Army engineers had by now reconnoitered the routes south that Eighth Army could take in its withdrawal from North Korea. Their report, studied and confirmed by the G-3 section of the army, reached the conclusion that only two routes were feasible. One would proceed from Pyongyang through Chunghwa, Sariwon, Namchonjom to Kaesong, and hence to Seoul; the other would go south to the port of Haeju and then cast to Kaesong. Any other route, it was decided, would be too far to the east and would have to pass through North Korean guerrilla country, and hence was not safe. As it developed, almost the entire army took the main road south through Sariwon and Namchonjom to Kaesong.°
The elements of the 2nd Infantry Division that came through the CCF fireblock north of Sunchon during the night of 30 November were still coming into Sunchon after daylight of 1 December, and were the northernmost combat troops of Eighth Army still moving south, except for the 1st Cavalry Division, which was holding a defensive position around Sunchon, and the Middlesex Battalion north of Sunchon. The movement of the 38th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Division, survivors may be taken as typical of the rest of the division in leaving the battle area. At 8 A.M. on I December the 38th Infantry received orders to move from Sunchon to Chunghwa, 18 miles south of Pyongyang. The next day orders came to continue 125 road miles farther south to Munsanni, on the south bank of the Imjin River. The 2nd Division and the Turkish Brigade hastened south to the Seoul area in a practically nonstop motorized movement, where they were to reorganize (and the 2nd Division take in replacements) and to reequip to become combat effective again as quickly as possible. The 38th Infantry, leading the way, closed at Munsan-ni on 4 December."
The British 27th Brigade and the 1st Cavalry Division were the last of Eighth Army, on its right flank, to have combat contact with the Chinese. After the trickle of soldiers from the 2nd Division coming through Sunchon had ended in the afternoon of 1 December, the Middlesex Battalion moved south to Chasan, six miles south ofSunchon, where it joined the Australian Battalion. That afternoon Eighth Army, acting through the IX Corps, attached the British 27th Brigade to the 1st Cavalry Division for operations. The next day the Australian Battalion moved ten miles southeast from Chasan to defend a bridge that was being built across the upper Taedong River at Apa-n, as it is shown on some maps. This bridge and the road over it were expected to serve as the escape route of parts of the 1st Cavalry Division and the British 27th Brigade. CCF forces were already on the hills north of the river when the Australians arrived there. In an attack on the enemy, the Australians dislodged the CCF, but an enemy buildup took place during the night. Other CCF had moved around and behind nearby 1st Cavalry Division troops and forced them to withdraw westward. A heavy snow fell during the night of 2-3 December. Between on 3 December the Australians withdrew south across the river at Apa-ri. When the Australians left Apa-n and the Taedong River, they moved south 94 miles in 12 hours to Hayu-ri. Reportedly they did not like this "bugging out," as they called it.10
Eighth Army troops pass Korean refugees as they withdraw from Sunchon to regroup at Pyongyang, 1 December 1950. National Archives 111-SC 355303
The Argyll Battalion of the British 27th Brigade, meanwhile, attached to the 7th Cavalry Regiment, was on a flank-guard mission cast of Unsan-ni. There they marched and countermarched through the hills, encountering no enemy, for a period of 36 hours. They lost some tanks and troop carriers with thrown tracks, and one tank was destroyed when it became wedged in a narrow place in the road. The Argylls derisively called this period "the Cavalry Canter." The British 27th Brigade, under orders, withdrew after these misadventures to Pyongyang. On the evening of 3 December it crossed the Taedong River near Pyongyang, and on 4 December passed through the newly arrived British
29th Brigade, which was holding the Taedong bridgehead for troop withdrawals from the north. From Pyongyang the 27th Brigade continued on south 112 air miles to Uijongbu, which it reached on 11 December."
Troops of the British Eighth Kings Royal Irish Hussars on top of a Centurion tank cover the withdrawal of UN troops from the Pyongyang area, 3 December 1950. National Archives 111-SC 354735
The 1st Cavalry Division Breaks Enemy Contact on Right Flank
On 1 December the only Eighth Army contact with the CCF was on its right flank, where the 1st Cavalry Division and the attached Argyll Battalion were deployed to guard against a threatened strong enemy push around that flank. The enemy had at least one roadblock south of Songchon and above Kangdong, about 30 road miles northeast of Pyongyang. There were continuing reports of enemy movements on the lateral (cast-west) road from Yangdok to Songchon in the central part of the peninsula, indicating probable enemy use of the road from Wonsan on the cast coast west toward Pyongyang. This was in the area often referred to as the waist of Korea. There was no evidence on 1 December that the CCF were trying to close rapidly on the Eighth Army rear, as they had done in the previous several days when they had shown a strong desire to close in combat, even in daytime, on the army front along the Chongchon. In its right flank-guard deployment, the 1st Cavalry Division had all three of its regiments in defensive positions east and south of Sunchon, together with the attached 27th British Brigade and its three infantry battalions, the Australians, the Middlesex, and the Argylls. Also, the remnants of the ROK 6th Division were in positions to help hold this flank while the rest of Eighth Army moved south out of the battle zone. On 1 December, one battalion of the 8th Cavalry was still near Sunchon, and two battalions of the 8th Cavalry Regiment had firefights with CCF in the vicinity of Sunchon.
During the night of 30 November-1 December, CCF drove Korean refugees into the 8th Cavalry lines at Songchon and then followed them with some of their own troops. This CCF force of approximately 50 men captured the 8th Cavalry roadblock at Songchon, but an American platoon attack recaptured it at 5:30 A.M. on 1 December. Enemy soldiers during the night occupied high ground around the town, and the 8th Cavalry defenders, low on ammunition, decided during the day to abandon it. The two battalions retreated to Kangdong to the southwest. This withdrawal from Songchon was unauthorized by higher authority. At 3 P.M. in the afternoon, when Eighth Army learned of the withdrawal, it directed the 1st Cavalry Division to order the two battalions of the 8th Cavalry to return to Songchon, retake the town, and hold it. Soon after daylight on 2 December the two battalions regained Songchon. The commanding officer of the 8th Cavalry Regiment sent a message to the G-3 of the 1st Cavalry Division that it was impracticable to hold the town against a night attack, but he was ordered nevertheless to stay there.'2
Air observers in the afternoon of 2 December, however, reported so many enemy troops moving in the vicinity of Songchon that to them "the ground seemed to be moving." A Mosquito plane directed fighter planes on enemy in the vicinity of Songchon that were estimated to number perhaps as many as 8,000 men. The fighter-bomber planes made strikes on this enemy concentration all afternoon. They were not dug in but on the move and apparently prepared to attack. The 7th and 8th regiments had to withdraw in the face of this approaching force. The 7th Cavalry Regiment and the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, followed the road leading to the crossing of the Taedong River at Apa-ri, west of Songchon. There they encountered a CCF roadblock and enemy in position on Hill 335. They turned back and eventually, together with the British 27th Brigade, successfully withdrew by a more westerly route through Chasan and Sainjang, south of Sunchon."
In its actions on the army right flank along the Taedong River, the 1st Cavalry Division had many cases of frostbite and other foot ailments. At this time one observer saw a bit of grim humor at the division CP. On its bulletin board was a newspaper clipping carrying huge headlines saying "Americans Due to Leave Korea by Christmas." Pinned to it was the joker from a deck of cards."
There were a few other instances of enemy contact on the army right flank cast and south of Sunchon on 2 December. The most important of these was on the Taedong River, east of Sainjang, where B Company, 8th Engineer Combat Battalion, had been building a dam across the river. The 16th Reconnaissance Company protected the engineers at the site. A liaison plane dropped a message to the Reconnaissance Company to send a patrol five miles north to rescue wounded who had been seen there. It did so, and rescued ten men. At 9:40 A.M., an estimated enemy battalion attacked the engineer troops. A firefight between the engineers, the 16th Reconnaissance Company, and apparently some British Argyll troops that arrived at the scene and the Chinese continued until the early afternoon. Air strikes were called in. These caught the enemy in the open and decimated them. In this fight, the American ground forces claimed 200 Chinese killed. The air strikes killed an estimated 500 more Chinese. If these claims were near the facts, a Chinese battalion was destroyed. The Middlesex Battalion then reinforced the ground troops in the vicinity of the bridge site." On 3 December the 7th and 8th cavalry regiments continued their withdrawal on the right flank of Eighth Army and reported some minor contact and exchange of fire with Chinese forces.16
As might be expected, the Fifth Air Force kept the Chinese on the Chongchon River front under constant surveillance and continuing attack in the first days of December, while Eighth Army was withdrawing south. Quite noticeable was the continuing heavy CCF crossing of the Chongchon River, both infantry columns on foot and vehicular columns south of Kunu-ri. All available aircraft, including naval air, was sent there, and between 40 and 50 aircraft kept the river crossings in the vicinity of Kunu-ri under constant attack during 1 December. During the day there were 183 sorties in the IX Corps area alone. These sorties reported 13 different enemy troop concentrations attacked with an estimated 825 men destroyed. On the ridges southwest of Kunu-ri, pilots said they attacked an estimated 10,000 enemy and estimated 300 of them killed. Just southwest of Kunu-ri, air strikes caught an estimated 1,500 Chinese halfway across the Chongchon River, and pilots estimated 400 of them were killed. South of Kunu-ri, aircraft pilots reported seeing many enemy wearing captured American clothing."
Another air observer reported seeing about 1,000 enemy troops change from their uniforms to white civilian clothes four miles southeast of Kunu-ri. All day there were enemy targets moving in the open, either crossing the Chongchon River from Won-ni on the north to west of Kunu-n or moving south after crossing the river. Some of these enemy groups and columns were estimated to number in the thousands. The full force of UN air strength was directed against them. That hundreds and probably thousands of CCF were killed or wounded in the air attacks on 1 December cannot be doubted, but the exact number can be only speculated."
The Army Destroys Supplies in Its Rush South
When Colonel Freeman's 23rd RCT hastily mounted trucks and tanks for a quick departure on the road west to Anju, they joined the tide of soldiers and trans ports that had preceded them on the coastal road west and then south. Only the 5th RCT, still manning the roadblock five miles east of Anju, remained to follow them. The next morning before daylight a small, lone enemy plane strafed Sukchon. Maj. Sam Radow of the 23rd Infantry said later that, at Sukchon, everyone seemed to be blowing up ammunition and running wildly about making preparations to move farther south. Rumors were rife, he said, that the army was going to evacuate Korea and that orders were to get on the road and move south-and to keep going.19 This view was generally prevalent among Eighth Army personnel as the big retreat began. As it progressed, the idea of getting out of Korea seemed to become a settled conviction for most.
With it came massive traffic jams on the main coastal road running south, where very quickly most of Eighth Army funneled itself, as intelligence and rumors mounted that enemy were encircling the army's right flank, and there was increasing danger that they would cut the main road south to Seoul. With this haste to get away came a quick destruction or abandonment
of equipment and supplies that would be encumbering.
The 25th Infantry Division on 30 November found the road south to Sunan so congested that northbound travel was virtually impossible. An official report said there were "numerous accidents and mechanical failures. Disabled equipment that could not be evacuated on the spot was pushed off the highway to permit continuous flow of traffic." The 40-mile road trip from Yongyu to Pyongyang took six and a half hours for one group, an average of six miles per hour. At Sinanju, I Corps reported there were five M-46 tanks needing repair. Three of them were repaired so they could be driven south. The other two were destroyed. Many ordnance items were destroyed at Sinanju and vicinity because of lack of transportation to move them south quickly. Included among these items were three 90-mm antiaircraft guns and four M-4 tractors. On the road south from Sinanju to Pyongyang, two officers of I Corps said they saw a tank retriever, a tractor and its 8-inch howitzer, and ten high-speed tractors pulled off the road and burned. The air officer for I Corps said later of the first days of the Eighth Army retreat:
Disaster in Korea Page 48