Gutiérrez, G., and T. Philippon (2017). Investment-less growth: An empirical investigation. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Fall).
Gutiérrez, G., and T. Philippon (2018a). How EU markets became more competitive than US markets: A study of institutional drift. NBER Working Paper No. 24700, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, June.
Gutiérrez, G., and T. Philippon (2018b). Ownership, governance and investment. AEA Papers and Proceedings 108, 432–437.
Gutiérrez, G., and T. Philippon (2019a). Fading stars. NBER Working Paper No. 25529, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, February.
Gutiérrez, G., and T. Philippon (2019b). The failure of free entry. Working paper.
Guzman, J., and S. Stern (2016). The state of American entrepreneurship: New estimates of the quantity and quality of entrepreneurship for 15 US states, 1988–2014. NBER Working Paper No. 22095, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, March.
Hamm, K. E., and R. E. Hogan (2008). Campaign finance laws and candidacy decisions in state legislative elections. Political Research Quarterly 61(3), 458–467.
Haskel, J., and S. Westlake (2017). Capitalism without Capital. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Higham, S., and L. Bernstein (2017). The drug industry’s triumph over the DEA. Wall Street Journal, October 15.
Hirshleifer, J. (1971). The private and social value of information and the reward to inventive activity. American Economic Review 61(4), 561–574.
Holburn, G. L. F., and R. G. Vanden Bergh (2014). Integrated market and nonmarket strategies: Political campaign contributions around merger and acquisition events in the energy sector. Strategic Management Journal 35(3), 450–460.
Hölscher, J., and J. Stephan (2004). Competition policy in central eastern Europe in the light of EU accession. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2), 321–345.
Hortaçsu, A., and C. Syverson (2015). The ongoing evolution of U.S. retail: A format tug-of-war. Journal of Economic Perspectives 29(4), 89–112.
Huckshorn, R. J. (1985). Who gave it? Who got it? The enforcement of campaign finance laws in the states. Journal of Politics 47(3), 773–789.
Hyatt, H. R., and J. R. Spletzer (2013). The recent decline in employment dynamics. IZA Journal of Labor Economics 2(5).
Hylton, K. N., and F. Deng (2007). Antitrust around the world: An empirical analysis of the scope of competition laws and their effects. Antitrust Law Journal 74(2), 271–341.
Jayachandran, S. (2006). The Jeffords effect. Journal of Law and Economics 49(2), 397–425.
Jones, C. (2017). Discussion: Long-term growth in advanced economies. Presentation at the ECB Sintra Forum on Central Banking, European Central Bank, June 28.
Jovanovic, B., and P. L. Rousseau (2001). Why wait? A century of life before IPO. American Economic Review 91(2), 336–341.
Kalemli-Ozcan, S., B. Sorensen, C. Villegas-Sanchez, V. Volosovych, and S. Yesiltas (2015). How to construct nationally representative firm level data from the ORBIS global database. NBER Working Paper No. 21558, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, September.
Kang, K. (2016). Policy influence and private returns from lobbying in the energy sector. Review of Economic Studies 83(1), 269–305.
Khan, L. M. (2017). Amazon’s antitrust paradox. Yale Law Journal 126(3), 710–805.
Kleiner, M. M., and A. B. Krueger (2013). Analyzing the extent and influence of occupational licensing on the labor market. Journal of Labor Economics 31(S1), S173–S202.
Kroszner, R. S., and T. Stratmann (2005). Corporate campaign contributions, repeat giving, and the rewards to legislator reputation. Journal of Law and Economics 48(1), 41–71.
Krueger, A. B. (2017). Where have all the workers gone? An inquiry into the decline of the U.S. labor force participation rate. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Spring).
Krueger, A. B., and O. Ashenfelter (2018). Theory and evidence on employer collusion in the franchise sector. NBER Working Paper No. 24831, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, July.
Krugman, P. (1998). It’s baaack: Japan’s slump and the return of the liquidity trap. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 137–187.
Kumar, S. (2016). Relaunching innovation: Lessons from Silicon Valley. Banking Perspectives 4(1), 19–23.
Kwoka, J. (2015). Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kwoka, J. (2017a). A response to the FTC critique. Working paper, April 6. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2947814.
Kwoka, J. E. (2017b). U.S. antitrust and competition policy amid the new merger wave. Research report, Washington Center for Equitable Growth, July 27. https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/u-s-merger-policy-amid-the-new-merger-wave/.
Kwoka, J., and L. J. White (2014). The Antitrust Revolution, 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Leech, B. L., F. R. Baumgartner, T. M. La Pira, and N. A. Semanko (2005). Drawing lobbyists to Washington: Government activity and the demand for advocacy. Political Research Quarterly 58(1), 19–30.
Leucht, B. (2009). Transatlantic policy networks in the creation of the first European anti-trust law. In The History of the European Union, ed. W. Kaiser, B. Leuchter, and M. Rasmussen, 56–73. London: Routledge.
Leucht, B., and M. Marquis (2013). American influence on EEC competition law. In The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law, ed. K. K. Patel and H. Schweitzer. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, B., A. Augereau, M. Cho, B. Johnson, B. Neiman, G. Olazabal, M. Sandler, S. Schrauf, K. Stange, A. Tilton, E. Xin, B. Regout, A. Webb, M. Nevens, L. Mendonca, V. Palmade, G. Hughes, and J. Manyika (2001). U.S. productivity growth, 1995–2000. McKinsey Global Institute, October.
Lucca, D., A. Seru, and F. Trebbi (2014). The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation. NBER Working Paper 20241, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, June.
Lyon, S. G., and M. E. Waugh (2018). Redistributing the gains from trade through progressive taxation. Journal of International Economics 115, 185–202.
Mahoney, C. (2008). Brussels versus the Beltway: Advocacy in the United States and the European Union. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Mathews, A. W. (2018). Behind your rising health-care bills: Secret hospital deals that squelch competition. Wall Street Journal, September 18.
McGrath, C. (2006). The ideal lobbyist: Personal characteristics of effective lobbyists. Journal of Communication Management 10(1), 67–79.
Meyer, B., and J. Sullivan (2018). Consumption and income inequality in the United States since the 1960s. VOX, January 15.
Miller, M. H. (1998). Financial markets and economic growth. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 11(3), 8–15.
Mishak, M. J. (2016). Drinks, dinners, junkets, and jobs: How the insurance industry courts state commissioners. Center for Public Integrity, October 3.
Monnet, J. (1978). Memoirs. London: Collins.
Moore, K. B., and M. Palumbo (2010). The finances of American households in the past three recessions: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances. FEDS Working Paper No. 6, Finance and Economics Discussion Series, February.
Mullainathan, S., M. Noeth, and A. Schoar (2012). The market for financial advice: An audit study. NBER Working Paper No. 17929, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, March.
Olley, G. S., and A. Pakes (1996). The dynamics of productivity in the telecommunications equipment industry. Econometrica 64(6), 1263–1297.
Olson, M. (1971). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Papanicolas, I., L. R. Woskie, and A. K. Jha (2018). Health care spending in the United States and other high-income countries. JAMA 319(10), 1024–1039.
Perrone, M., and B. Wieder (2016). Pro-painkiller echo chamber shaped policy amid drug epidemic. The Center for Public Integrity, December 15.
Peters, R. H.,
and L. A. Taylor (2016). Intangible capital and the investment-q relation. Journal of Financial Economics 123(2), 251–272.
Philippon, T. (2015). Has the US finance industry become less efficient? On the theory and measurement of financial intermediation. American Economic Review 105(4), 1408–1438.
Philippon, T., and A. Reshef (2012). Wages and human capital in the U.S. finance industry: 1909–2006. Quarterly Journal of Economics 127(4), 1551–1609.
Philippon, T., and A. Reshef (2013). An international look at the growth of modern finance. Journal of Economic Perspectives 27(2), 73–96.
Pierce, J. R., and P. K. Schott (2016). The surprisingly swift decline of US manufacturing employment. American Economic Review 106(7), 1632–1662.
Pigou, A. C. (1932). The Economics of Welfare, 4th ed. London: Macmillan.
Piketty, T., and E. Saez (2006). The evolution of top incomes: A historical and international perspective. American Economic Review 96(2), 200–205.
Pinkham, R. (1999). European airline deregulation: The great missed opportunity? SAIS Europe Journal (1 April).
Rajan, R. G., and L. Zingales (2003). Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists. New York: Crown Business.
Reinhart, C. M., and K. S. Rogoff (2009). This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Renkin, T., C. Montialoux, and M. Siegenthaler (2017). The pass-through of minimum wages into US retail prices: Evidence from supermarket scanner data. Working paper, November.
Ritter, J. R. (2019). Initial public offerings: Updated statistics, April. https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2019/04/IPOs2018Statistics-1.pdf.
Robinson, J. (1952). The generalization of the general theory. In The Rate of Interest and Other Essays. London: Macmillan.
Schreyer, P. (2002). Computer price indices and international growth and productivity comparisons. Review of Income and Wealth 48(1), 15–31.
Schuur, J. D., H. Decker, and O. Baker (2019). Association of physician organization–affiliated political action committee contributions with US House of Representatives and Senate candidates’ stances on firearm regulation. JAMA Network Open 2(2), e187831.
Sen, A. (1982). Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Shapiro, C. (2018). Antitrust in a time of populism. Journal of Industrial Organization 61, 714–748.
Snyder, J. (1989). Election goals and the allocation of campaign resources. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 157(3), 637–660.
Snyder, J. (1992). Long-term investing in politicians; or, give early, give often. Journal of Law and Economics 35(1), 15–43.
Song, J., D. J. Price, F. Guvenen, N. Bloom, and T. von Wachter (2019). Firming up inequality. Quarterly Journal of Economics 134(1), 1–50.
Srinivasan, D. (2019). The antitrust case against Facebook: A monopolist’s journey towards pervasive surveillance in spite of consumers’ preference for privacy. Berkeley Business Law Journal 16 (1), 39–101.
Stigler, G. J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2(1), 3–21.
Stratmann, T. (1998). The market for congressional votes: Is timing of contributions everything? Journal of Law and Economics 41(1), 85–114.
Stratmann, T. (2019). Campaign finance. In The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, ed. R. D. Congleton, B. Grofman, and S. Voight, vol. 1, 415–432. New York: Oxford University Press.
Stratmann, T., and F. J. Aparicio-Castillo (2007). Campaign finance reform and electoral competition: Comment. Public Choice 133(1–2), 107–110.
Syverson, C. (2004). Market structure and productivity: A concrete example. Journal of Political Economy 112(6), 1181–1222.
Syverson, C. (2017). Challenges to mismeasurement explanations for the US productivity slowdown. Journal of Economic Perspectives 31(2), 165–186.
Tabakovic, H., and T. G. Wollmann (2018). From revolving doors to regulatory capture? Evidence from patent examiners. NBER Working Paper No. 24638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, May.
Tirole, J. (2017). Economics for the Common Good. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Tripathi, M., S. Ansolabehere, and J. M. Snyder (2002). Are PAC contributions and lobbying linked? New evidence from the 1995 lobby disclosure act. Business and Politics 4(2), 131–155.
Tseng, P., R. S. Kaplan, B. D. Richman, M. A. Shah, and K. A. Schulman (2018). Administrative costs associated with physician billing and insurance-related activities at an academic health care system. JAMA 319(7), 691–697.
Valletta, R. G. (2016). Recent flattening in the higher education wage premium: Polarization, skill downgrading, or both? NBER Working Paper No. 22935, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, December.
Vassalos, Y. (2017). Le pantouflage financier à la commission européenne. Savoir / Agir (3), 49–57.
Vita, M., and F. D. Osinski (2018). John Kwoka’s Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A critical review. Antitrust Law Journal 82(1), 361–388.
Welch, W. P. (1980). The allocation of political monies: Economic interest groups. Public Choice 35(1), 97–120.
Whelan, K. (2000). A guide to the use of chain aggregated NIPA data. FRB Working Paper, US Federal Reserve Board, June.
Zeitz, D. (2009). Overview of microeconomic reforms undertaken by EU member states based on the MICREF database. Joint Research Center, European Commission. Luxembourg: Publications of the European Community.
Zingales, L. (2017). Towards a political theory of the firm. Journal of Economic Perspectives 31(3), 113–130.
Zucman, G., T. Tørsløv, and L. Wier (2018). The missing profits of nations. NBER Working Paper No. 24701, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, June, rev. August.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many people and institutions have helped make this book possible.
Olivier Blanchard has been my teacher, mentor, and friend for the past twenty years. He has taught me to respect facts and theories equally, to keep an open mind and a healthy skepticism of fads and fashions, and to challenge the common wisdom when it appears to be wrong.
New York University has been a wonderful place to learn about economics and finance, and the Stern School has provided the support and flexibility that I needed to complete this project.
Many friends and colleagues have helped me develop the ideas presented in these pages. I would not have been able to write this book without the talent and energy of Germán Gutiérrez. Janice Eberly and Chad Syverson have discussed my papers on several occasions and provided the most helpful critical comments one can hope for. Bo Cutter was one of the first to suggest the idea of a book and has a special talent for asking the right questions.
I owe a great deal to Gerard Anderson, Matilde Bombardini, Nicolas Crouzet, Thomas D’Aunno, Francesco Franco, John Kwoka, Irene Papanicolas, Lasse Pedersen, and Francesco Trebbi, who read and commented on early drafts of various chapters.
I have had the chance to learn from my wonderful co-authors Maryam Farboodi, Callum Jones, Virgiliu Midrigan, Roxana Mihet, and Laura Veldkamp.
I have also benefited greatly from the insights of Ariel Burnstein, Luis Cabral, Gilbert Cette, Emmanuel Combe, Chiara Criscuolo, Jan De Loecker, Robin Döttling, Tomaso Duso, Rana Foroohar, Xavier Gabaix, Bob Hall, Erik Hurst, Seema Jayachandran, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Thomas Piketty, Howard Rosenthal, Tano Santos, Fiona Scott Morton, Dina Srinivasan, Johannes Stroebel, Jonathan Tepper, Jean Tirole, Nicolas Véron, David Wessel, Luigi Zingales, and Gabriel Zucman.
I am grateful to Ian Malcolm and Mark Steinmeyer, who saw promise in my early ideas, to Rob Garver and Katherine Brick, who edited my dry and technical prose, to the team at Harvard University Press for their professionalism, and to the Smith Richardson Foundation for its support. Abhishek Bhardwaj and Matias Covarrubias provided invaluable assistance and feedback.
INDEX
Acemoglu, Daron, 58
adaptation, 287
Adelson, Sheldon, 174
Adelstein, Jonathan, 200
Adenauer, Konrad, 131, 132, 142
age, of successful entrepreneurs, 82
Air France, 139
Airline Deregulation Act (1978), 2, 137
air transport and airline industry: deregulation of, 2–3, 30–31, 137–140; costs in US versus Europe, 7; HHI in, 35–37, 39; and concentration of health care, 231
Alesina, Alberto, 125
Alpert, Abby, 235–236
Al-Ubaydli, O., 95
aluminum tariffs, 160–161
Amazon: growth of, 39–44; profit margin of, 43; state aid for, 135; business model of, 244, 285; MV / Emp ratio of, 255; lobbying by, 260, 261. See also internet giants
Anderson, Gerard, 228
Andrews, Dan, 256
Ansolabehere, Stephen, 189, 202
antisteering, 233
antitrust: and merger reviews, 86–92; European fight against, 131–134; and deregulation in Europe, 135–141; and theory of Europe’s free markets, 145–147; and future of Europe’s free markets, 147–149; and transition from McKinley to Roosevelt, 159–160; and state campaign contributions, 196–197; and Microsoft, 259–260; and internet giants, 273–276; purpose of, 294. See also competition; monopoly power
Aparicio-Castillo, Francisco J., 195
Apple: Irish state aid for, 134–135; business model of, 242–243, 277; market value of, 245; profit margin of, 249; lobbying by, 260; taxes paid by, 264. See also internet giants
Arayavechkit, Tanida, 163
Ashenfelter, Orley, 91, 282
AT&T, 3, 4, 30
Auerbach, Alan J., 262
Autor, David, 48, 50
Azar, José, 280
Baker, Meredith, 200
Baker, Richard, 159
Balassa-Samuelson effect, 112–113, 226
banking. See finance and financial intermediation
bankruptcy, 295
Barnett, Thomas O., 92
Barroso, José Manuel, 201
Baumgartner, Frank R., 157, 163
The Great Reversal Page 35