The Breaking Point

by Robert A Doughty

  The step-by-step approach to battle became a vital part of French doctrine. By the term “methodical battle,” the French meant a tightly controlled battle in which all units and weapons were carefully marshaled and then employed in combat. The French preferred to have a step-by-step battle in which units obediently moved between phase lines and adhered to strictly scheduled timetables, since they believed such methods were essential for the coherent employment of enormous amounts of men and materiel. They preferred a time-consuming, intricate process that prized preparation rather than improvisation and that made great allowances for the extreme complexity of massing large amounts of weapons and materiel. If the French had their way, they would weaken an attacker with their deadly defensive fires, and then destroy him by a massive, but tightly controlled, “battering ram” attack.

  Within the methodical battle, the artillery provided the momentum and the rhythm for the attack. When an attack began, according to French doctrine, the infantry advanced 2,000 to 2,000 meters before halting in order to readjust the artillery fire. The attack again commenced, and after advancing 2,000 to 2,000 meters, another readjustment of fire was necessary. To control the advance of the infantry and to ensure artillery support, a number of intermediate objectives were established that corresponded to these advances of 1,000 to 2,000 meters. After a total advance of about 4,000 to 5,000 meters, a displacement of artillery was required. This displacement ensured that the infantry remained under the cover of the artillery and did not go beyond its maximum effective range. For control purposes, the maximum advance was sometimes limited to 3,000 to 4,000 meters before the 75mm artillery began its displacement by increments. One rule of thumb was given by an instructor at the French staff college when he stated the distance of the advance ought to be half the maximum range of the artillery supporting the attack (usually no more than 7,500 meters).48 Hence the French believed the infantry had to remain under the umbrella of artillery protection, and only the methodical battle could ensure the maximum possible coordination and integration of the artillery and the infantry.

  The methodical battle resembled the methods used in World War I, but it represented an intensification of those methods. According to the French, the new firepower that had become available after 1918 made centralized control much more important than ever before and made the methodical battle more essential in an offensive.

  For the defense, the French emphasized the need for depth. When a French unit (from battalion to corps-sized) occupied a defensive sector, it organized its forces into three parts: an advance post line, a principal position of resistance, and a stopping line. The principal position of resistance was the most important and heavily defended portion of the French defenses. Theoretically, it could be located along an easily protected front, preferably in an area where the enemy could be channeled into carefully selected zones or fields of fire between natural and man-made obstacles. Because of the requirement for depth, the principal position of resistance rarely resembled a line. To its rear was the stopping line, which was supposed to halt an attacking enemy force after it had been weakened by forward defenders.49

  If an enemy managed to penetrate a stopping line, French doctrine called for a process known as colmater, or filling. A commander expected to meet a penetration by having his reserves, as well as the reserves of larger units, move in front of attacking enemy troops and gradually slow them down until they were halted. By shifting additional infantry, armor, and artillery units laterally into a threatened sector or forward from the reserves, an attacker could be slowed and eventually halted. After sealing off an enemy penetration, a counterattack would follow, but this counterattack would usually rely on the use of artillery and infantry fire rather than the charge of infantry or tanks. To halt an enemy using this procedure, the defender had to be able to move units in front of a penetration faster than an enemy attacker could advance.

  The emphasis on the methodical battle and the process of colmater resulted in a dangerous degree of rigidity within the French system for command and control. Centralization became the primary concern of higher commanders, especially as they considered how to shift units about the battlefield. The French believed the locus of decision making had to remain at the higher level, because a higher command had to have greater control for coordinating the actions of numerous subordinate units. The army's doctrinal and organizational system stressed the power and authority of army group, field army, and corps commanders and left little flexibility or room for initiative to lower-level commanders. Each lower level had less room for maneuver than the level immediately above it. The entire system was designed to be propelled forward by pressure from above, rather than being pulled from below. In contrast to a decentralized battle in which officers were expected to show initiative and flexibility, the French preferred rigid centralization and strict obedience. Unfortunately, this resulted in a fatal flaw; the French military establishment could not respond flexibly to unanticipated demands and could hardly capitalize upon an important gain made by a lower-level unit.

  The French also encouraged commanders to remain in their command posts, rather than moving forward and being drawn into the fighting. A commander, in their view, should remain in his command post, being constantly updated on the status of the ongoing battle and frequently making decisions about the movement and commitment of units and supplies. By keeping their hands “on the handle of a fan,” and by managing units and materiel, commanders were not available to lead by personal example, but they could theoretically ensure the entire operation proceeded smoothly and efficiently.

  GERMAN DOCTRINE

  German doctrine contrasted sharply with French doctrine. During the interwar period, the Germans published two field service regulations, one in 1921 and the other in 1933, which strongly emphasized the concept of a continuous battle. Both the 1921 and the 1933 German field service regulations stressed the importance of the penetration, which was based upon infiltration-type tactics and which could be developed into a complete breakthrough of enemy lines. If a breakthrough were made, the attacking troops would push as far forward as possible, leaving the widening of the shoulder of the breakthrough to the reserves.50 The 1933 German regulations observed: “The objective of the combined arms in an attack is to bring the infantry into decisive action against the enemy, with sufficient fire power and shock action so that it is possible to drive through deeply and break down the final hostile resistance.”51 Such a doctrine assumes that continuous pressure and a deep attack would prevent the reestablishing of strong defensive positions.

  Infiltration tactics were an important part of German doctrine and contributed significantly to the German ability to make a penetration. The essence of these tactics, which were developed in 1917, was rapid advancement and infiltration by small infantry groups, but the main concepts also applied to larger units. The tactics emphasized maneuver more than fire. The objective of leading elements was not destruction of enemy soldiers; rather, it was to seek penetration by attacking the weak spots of the enemy's resistance. If an enemy strong point were encountered, German infantrymen usually bypassed it, leaving its destruction to follow-on forces.52 Thus the main point of the tactics was the effort to “drive through deeply.”

  The 1921 German field service regulations emphasized the need to prevent the enemy from reestablishing successive positions and the need for immediate pursuit. The 1933 manual also emphasized the need to follow the enemy closely. Should the attack halt, the Germans foresaw the commitment of reserves to continue the momentum of the attack and the formation of new reserves from those units that had been bypassed by the forward-moving old reserves.53 Similarly, they foresaw the commitment of reserves to reinforce success and to accelerate gains before the defender could react. They did not automatically assume the defender's mobility exceeded that of the attacker. The breakthrough, however, was only a “preparatory move,” which would ultimately lead to “subsequent operations of encirclement.”54

  German
doctrine, in short, emphasized the advantages of one continuous battle, ultimately leading to the complete rupture of the hostile defenses and the defeat of the enemy, while French doctrine accepted the possibility of a successive series of methodical battles. The Germans believed this continuous battle enabled them to retain the initiative and to achieve victory.

  German doctrine also emphasized decentralization and initiative. The 1933 German field service regulations stated, “Simplicity of conduct, logically carried through, will most surely attain the objective.” The regulations also said, “Independence of action of the lower commanders…is of decisive importance at all times.”55 While the French doctrine emphasized pushing from above, German doctrine emphasized pulling from below. The Germans recognized that while strategic or operational-level concepts had to be formulated by higher-level commanders, the success of those concepts depended upon the lower-level commanders having the flexibility and freedom to capitalize upon any momentary advantages they might gain. Because of the emphasis on flexibility and initiative, the Germans relied strongly on counterattacks while they were on the defensive. Since the Germans remained on the offensive during the 1940 campaign, they did not capitalize upon counterattacks, but they did use them frequently during later campaigns in the war.

  The German emphasis on decentralization and initiative came from their tradition of auftragstaktik, or mission-oriented tactics. The success of auftragstaktik rested on subordinate commanders understanding the intent of their commander and acting to achieve his goal even if their actions violated other guidance or orders they had received. According to this concept, which was deeply ingrained in the German officer corps and essentially acted as a philosophy of command, a commander could act according to the circumstances of the moment and perhaps ignore a directive or a control measure such as a boundary if his actions contributed to the accomplishment of the unit's mission. Though an officer did this at his own risk, the results could be astounding, for the concept of auftragstaktik permitted, if not encouraged, an officer to use his initiative to solve a tactical problem.

  On the negative side, however, the tradition of auftragstaktik sometimes enabled commanders, particularly headstrong ones, to act independently and for personal reasons to ignore directives from higher headquarters. The actions of such individuals could disrupt carefully planned, complex operations and could place an entire operation in jeopardy. In a profession in which victory was everything, the degree of success attained was the most important measure of whether an officer had acted for selfish reasons or had acted to achieve the intent of his commander.

  As German doctrine evolved, the introduction of the tank and the development of Panzer divisions reinforced many of its major themes. In 1935 the German Army approved the organization of its first three Panzer divisions. During the next five years, armored commanders capitalized upon the fundamental precepts of German doctrine and carried them to their most extreme point in the 1940 campaign.

  French and German doctrine thus differed sharply on several key points. While one emphasized methodical battles, firepower, centralization, and obedience, the other emphasized continuous battles, mobility, decentralization, and initiative. During the fighting around Sedan, the doctrine of the Germans provided them a distinct advantage over the French.

  CHAPTER 2

  The German Fight in the Ardennes

  According to Plan Yellow, Army Group A had responsibility for the main German attack against the Allies. The commanding general of Army Group A, Colonel-General K. R. Gerd von Rundstedt, placed three field armies on line (Fourth, Twelfth, and Sixteenth, from north to south). With forty-four divisions, including seven Panzer and three motorized, their fronts stretched about ninety kilometers from a point south of Aachen to a point along the Franco-German border just east of Luxembourg. To the front of this vast phalanx of forces the Germans placed the XVth Panzer Corps and Panzer Group von Kleist, which consisted of the XIXth Panzer Corps, XLIst Panzer Corps, and XIVth Motorized Infantry Corps.

  Group von Kleist planned on moving through Luxembourg and eastern Belgium with its three corps following each other. The order of march was the XIXth, XLIst, and XIVth corps. After the XIXth Panzer Corps turned south toward Bouillon, the XLIst Corps was supposed to pass on its right and advance toward Monthermé on the Meuse River. As Group von Kleist moved west, follow-on infantry units were supposed to fill in on their left and secure the flank. The XIXth Corps wanted to cross the Meuse near Sedan, and the XLIst Corps near Monthermé. The XVth Corps, which was not part of Group von Kleist, wanted to cross the Meuse near Dinant.

  PLANNING AND PREPARATION

  The mission for the XIXth Panzer Corps, which was commanded by General Heinz Guderian, was given in the operations order published by Group von Kleist on 21 March 1940. The order stated:

  XIXth [Panzer] Corps—leading element of Group von Kleist—crosses the Luxembourg border together with Twelfth and Sixteenth Armies on A-day at Y-hour…. It rushes through the Luxembourg area and on the first day pushes through the Belgian border fortifications between Bastogne (excluding) and Arlon (excluding) and [next] pushes through the fortifications line Libramont-Neufchâteau-Hachy [sic]. Therefore it is important to take Libramont as quickly as possible and to clear the entire length of Panzer Routes 1 and 2 through Neufchâteau to free [the routes] for the use of the XLIst Corps [which follows XIXth Corps].

  Immediately after this, the XIXth Corps crosses over the Semois between Alle (including) and Bouillon (including)—passing the latter by encircling around the south—and reaches the Meuse for a surprise crossing between Nouvion (including) and Sedan (including). It is critically important to get the leading units across the Meuse on the first attack.

  After crossing the Meuse, the operational direction for the XIXth Corps is [toward] Rethel. Under no circumstances should the corps be drawn to the south.1

  In a daring maneuver, the Germans intended to rush the XIXth Panzer Corps through the Ardennes and make a hasty crossing of the Meuse River before continuing west. Except for a few light forces scattered along the vulnerable left flank of the corps, the main protection against a French attack into the flank came from the rapid advance across Luxembourg and Belgium, as well as the action of close follow-on forces. If the German forces could reach the Sedan area before the French identified their main attack, they could seize the initiative and never permit the French to regain it.

  One of the most complex aspects of the 1940 campaign was the movement through the Ardennes by the XIXth Panzer Corps and follow-on units. The complexity of this task is perhaps best illustrated by Group von Kleist, with three corps, having 134,000 soldiers, 41,000 motor vehicles, and more than 1,600 tanks and reconnaissance vehicles.2 General Ewald von Kleist later explained that if the Panzer forces that moved through the Ardennes had advanced on a single road, they would have extended from Trier to Königsberg in East Prussia, a distance of more than 1,000 kilometers.3 Getting this large force through the Ardennes would not be a simple or easy task.

  Moreover, if the Germans were to make their attack successfully, units had to move through Luxembourg and Belgium in a sequence and according to a timetable that enabled them to arrive at a point when they were needed. For example, ammunition supplies had to be moved early, so they would be available when needed. Also, during the move across Belgium, materials had to be available for constructing bridges across streams and rivers where bridges had been destroyed; bridging materials could not arrive late. Once the Germans reached Sedan, they also had to have bridging materials to cross the Meuse River. If a single unit got out of sequence, the entire maneuver could be placed in jeopardy. Thus traffic control emerged as an extremely important factor in the preparation for and conduct of the campaign.

  To the rear of the XIXth Panzer Corps, a huge mass of troops that extended beyond Frankfurt stood in line impatiently awaiting their turn to pass across the fragile and limited road network in the Ardennes. To move the huge phalanx of forces through L
uxembourg and Belgium, the German General Staff—adhering to its tradition of technical excellence—produced an extremely detailed plan and timetable. In many ways the complexity of this plan exceeded that of the Schlieffen Plan, for a major portion of the German Army had to move through the bottleneck formed by the rough terrain and limited road network of Luxembourg and Belgium. Nothing could be left to chance if the German forces were to make their way successfully into France.

  The first step in the deep attack of the XIXth Panzer Corps was a rapid advance across Luxembourg with its three divisions on line. The 1st Panzer Division, which was under the command of Major General Friedrich Kirchner, moved in the center and crossed into Luxembourg at Wallendorf. To its north was the 2nd Panzer Division, which was commanded by Major General Rudolf Veiel, and which crossed into Luxembourg at Vianden. To the south of the 1st Division, the 10th Panzer Division, which was commanded by Major General Ferdinand Schaal, crossed into Luxembourg at Bollendorf and Echternach. The crossing points into Luxembourg for the two flank divisions of the corps were only twenty kilometers apart.

  The XIXth Panzer Corps had a detailed march plan that included routes and priorities for their use. For its move from its assembly areas in Germany to the Luxembourg border and then to the Belgian border, the XIXth Panzer Corps was assigned four “Panzer Routes.” In Luxembourg, these four routes extended from Vianden to Harlange, Wallendorf to Martelange, Bollendorf to Attert, and Echternach to Arlon.4 Group von Kleist and the XIXth Corps spent a great deal of time studying the routes through the rough terrain of Luxembourg and Belgium. Detailed analyses were made using maps, aerial photographs, and—on at least one occasion—photographs taken by German officers. Photographs and sketches of bridges and potential obstacles were also used.5 Judging from the amount of surviving materials, the headquarters of Group von Kleist and the XIXth Panzer Corps probably spent more time planning for the move across the Ardennes than for any other aspect of the operation.