The Breaking Point
Page 13
Reports began arriving very early about the Germans moving through Luxembourg. As early as 0120 hours on the 10th, France received reports from her ambassador in Luxembourg that German civilians living in the Grand Duchy had assembled with arms. The same report noted, “There are movements this evening that sound like artillery, especially along the German border.” At 0615 hours the Third Army reported that Germans had entered Luxembourg and at 0720 hours signaled the presence of motorized elements. At 0745 hours an aerial reconnaissance mission from the Third Army spotted a “large motorized column” about ten kilometers long approaching the city of Luxembourg.46
Several other reports appeared concerning German activity in Luxembourg. At 0730 hours an aerial reconnaissance mission from the Second Army spotted an enemy “motorized column” entering Luxembourg. At 0900 hours another reconnaissance mission spotted a motorized column consisting of about fifty vehicles moving from Luxembourg into Belgium toward Bastogne. At 1012 hours elements of the 3rd French Light Cavalry Division from the Third Army made contact with “enemy armored elements” in the southwest corner of Luxembourg.47
Reports also appeared about German forces being in Belgium. At 1300 hours an aerial reconnaissance mission spotted about forty motorized vehicles moving from Arlon toward Virton. At 1810 hours the Second Army reported that elements of the 2nd Light Cavalry Division had been engaged during the day by twenty armored vehicles near Arlon. A later report from the Second Army indicated that the French cavalry had withdrawn under heavy pressure and had moved west from Arlon toward Etalle. More threatening to the French strategic plan, however, was a report received at 2335 hours about the Germans having successfully crossed the Albert Canal west of Maastricht.48
That same day, the Second Army provided a summary of intelligence reports and concluded, “[E]nemy motorized elements have pushed back the [Belgian] Chasseurs Ardennais…and have come in contact with our covering [force] elements. Belgian obstacles seem to have been sufficient to halt the progression of the enemy. THERE HAVE BEEN NO INDICATIONS OF ARMORED VEHICLES ON THE ARMY'S FRONT.”49
Given the strong pressure that the 10th Panzer Division had exerted against the 2nd Light Cavalry Division, the statement about the absence of enemy armored vehicles to the Second Army's front and the use of capital letters to emphasize it is inexplicable. This is particularly so, since the daily report rendered by the operations section of the Second Army for 10 May included the following statement, “[I]n the region of Etalle, our cavalry was struck by solid elements (tanks), [and] suffered losses….”50 The intelligence section's strong statement about tanks not being in front of the Second Army clearly demonstrates it was either not talking to or lacked confidence in the field army's operations section. Better communications or relations between the two sections may have permitted the Second Army to have a much better assessment of what was happening to its front.
A summary of intelligence gathered by the Air Force between 1700 hours on the 10th and 0600 hours on the 11th concluded, “In summary, the general impression drawn from intelligence received seems to be: a)—principal enemy effort in the region between Maastricht and Nijmegen; b)—secondary effort but extremely strong to the west of Luxembourg [through the Ardennes]; c)—very moderate advance in the region of Liège.”51 Thus the first day of the campaign passed with no solid information refuting the notion of the Germans making their main attack through Maastricht and the Gembloux Gap.
If anything, reports on the first day of the German attack supported the preconceptions of the French High Command. Since the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions spent much of the day trying to get through Bodange, Martelange, and Strainchamps, Allied aerial reconnaissance did not locate the spearhead division of the XIXth Panzer Corps. Instead, the French intelligence community received reports about an enemy force moving west of Arlon and another moving toward Bastogne. With thirty-five kilometers separating the two movements (probably of the 10th Panzer Division in the south and the 7th Panzer Division in the north), the data obviously did not suggest the presence of extremely large enemy forces or the location of a massive main attack. Additionally, as the commander of the aerial elements supporting the Second Army later reported, heavy antiaircraft fire prevented aerial observers from observing enemy movements and from “identifying in which region the [principal] enemy effort was developing.”52 As in 1914, the French expected some German forces to move through the Ardennes, and from their perspective, reported contacts and aerial observations did not suggest that the forces in the Ardennes comprised the main enemy attack.
Interestingly enough, at least one French aircraft did fly over the spearhead of the XIXth Panzer Corps on the first day of the campaign. Around 1000 hours on the 10th, as German forces began moving into Martelange, a French fighter shot down a German reconnaissance aircraft flying above them. The pilot of the French airplane noticed the German troops below him and reported the German advance in the Ardennes.53 Since the German advance guard in front of the 1st Panzer Division did not include any tanks, the pilot observed only a few enemy vehicles and troops. In this instance, luck was on the side of the Germans.
On the 11th some reports appeared that suggested a large German presence in the Ardennes. At 0730 hours aerial reconnaissance by the Second Army reported, “Heavy road activity in Luxembourg. Movement oriented from east to west toward Diekirch….” At 0845 General Billotte, the Army Group 1 commander, called General Georges’ office and reported, “An important German column is reported going from Prum toward Bastogne.” He added that the situation to the west of Arlon was “delicate” and that the 2nd Light Cavalry Division, after suffering “serious losses,” had withdrawn to Jamoigne (thirty kilometers west of Arlon). At 1200 hours General André G. Prételat, the Army Group 2 commander, reported that the Third Army had not encountered strong forces on its left. He added, “The enemy's movements are going from east to west.”54
On the 11th reports also began appearing about enemy tanks being in the Ardennes. At 1230 hours the Second Army reported a column of thirty tanks about ten kilometers southwest of Neufchâteau. Other reports from the Second Army indicated sizable enemy forces to the front of its cavalry. At 1625 hours the field army reported that its cavalry was withdrawing “under pressure” from Neufchâteau toward Bertrix (fifteen kilometers to the west). At 2015 hours a more extensive report was dispatched by the Second Army. It said, “To the left, the 5th Light Cavalry Division, strongly pressed at Neufchâteau by heavy tanks in the beginning of the afternoon and then at Bertrix, has been forced to withdraw to the Semois [River]…. Very heavy combat near Neufchâteau. Lost one [artillery] battery which destroyed 3 tanks armed with large cannons.”55
Earlier, Army Group 1 had reported at 1835 hours to Georges’ office about developments in Belgium. This report indicated that pressure coming from Arlon, to Etalle, to Jamoigne had decreased but that pressure somewhat farther to the north coming from Bodange, to Neufchâteau, to Bertrix had increased. French cavalry in the latter avenue of approach had moved behind the Semois River and had earlier encountered tanks carrying large-caliber cannons. To add to the amount of information about the enemy in Belgium, an aerial reconnaissance mission identified at 2300 hours on the 11th four enemy columns in Belgium, each having a length of about five kilometers.56
At 2345 hours on 11 May, the Second Army reported the identification of several enemy units in the Ardennes. Papers on a dead German soldier in Bertrix revealed that he was from the Gross Deutschland Regiment. At 1600 hours on the 11th, a radio intercept unit also had monitored a message directed to the 1st Panzer Division.57
Despite strong evidence of sizable German forces in the Ardennes, and despite the 5th Light Cavalry Division's having been almost routed in its withdrawal to the Semois, the summary of intelligence gathered by the aerial unit supporting the Second Army for the 11th did not include any alarming observations. The report included the following comments:
The action of heavy enemy tanks appearing at Libramont
and at Neufchâteau forced [the French cavalry in Belgium] to withdraw…. At the end of the day, the delaying action continued…according to the established plan, our troops having the mission of occupying [positions] behind the Semois and here achieving the maximum delaying effect. Through the interrogation of prisoners, three active [enemy] divisions have been identified to the front of the [Second] Army.
The report concluded, “The enemy seems to be presenting himself in force in front of the Second Army. As a consequence, our light divisions have accomplished the prescribed delaying action in a rhythm that appears normal.”58 This matter-of-fact report, which did not evince special concern, serves as a good representation of the general attitude of the French. Unlike the previous day, the operations section of the Second Army did not offer any information substantially different from the intelligence section, except for the note that the enemy tanks at Neufchâteau were probably from the 1st Panzer Division.59 Though the enemy seemed to have significant forces in the Ardennes, nothing had occurred on the 11th that suggested to the Second Army, Army Group 1, or Georges’ headquarters the possibility of an unexpected move from the Germans. The French infantry and cavalry that were struggling to maintain their grip on the Semois would undoubtedly have had a different opinion.
Even if the French High Command had devoted special attention to the German forces in the Ardennes, other reports on the 11th served to maintain its primary focus on Maastricht and the Gembloux Gap. At 1320 hours on the l1th, Army Group 1 reported that the forts at Liège were still holding but that two blockhouses at Eben Emael had been neutralized by the enemy with flame throwers. Two hours later, Army Group 1 reported the enemy's seizure of the interior of Eben Emael. At 1700 hours General Gamelin informed Georges about the 1st Belgian Corps’ being in a “bad situation” and German tanks arriving southwest of Maastricht.60 These developments evidently created great concern among the French military hierarchy.
Because of its primary concern with Maastricht and the Gembloux Gap, the French High Command responded cautiously to increasing evidence about a sizable German force being in the Ardennes. At 0815 hours on the 12th, General Georges met with key members of his staff and decided to send the 53rd Division to the Ninth Army and the 1st Colonial Infantry Division to the Second Army. He also directed the 14th Infantry Division to move into the area southwest of Mézières.61 These decisions occurred about the time the 5th Light Cavalry Division received reports of heavy enemy tanks having crossed the Semois at Mouzaive. Nevertheless, the French High Command maintained its primary focus on events occurring near Maastricht and the Gembloux Gap, even though it did take the precaution of reinforcing the Second and Ninth armies in the Ardennes sector.
On the 12th the enemy's effort to move toward the Semois River became more apparent. At 0700 hours the Air Force reported “unconfirmed” sightings of the “enemy advancing in a southwesterly direction toward the Semois River.” At 0730 hours the Second Army reported that its cavalry had been pushed to the southern bank of the Semois River by units that were probably from the 1st Panzer Division.62 Strong pressure continued against the cavalry to the front of the Second Army. At 1025 hours Colonel Lacaille, the Chief of Staff of the Second Army, reported, “In spite of the demolitions which were exploded along Semois, the cavalry of the Second Army is receiving very heavy pressure (tanks-infantry) which is being exerted in the direction of Sedan.” Another telephone call at 1330 hours from the Second Army to General Georges’ headquarters requested additional aviation support and the commitment of an armored division to strengthen the sector. At 1515 Colonel Lacaille reported, “Situation on the left of the Second Army (Sedan) very serious. Heavy losses…. The cavalry is crossing the Meuse.” At 2200 hours Lacaille called again, this time to report, “Front momentarily returned to calm.”63
That same day the Ninth Army reported seeing four German divisions in the Ardennes around 1130 hours; two of these were Panzer divisions. One Panzer division was reported to be at Marche and another at Neufchâteau. Two other divisions of an unknown type were near Arlon.64 Unbeknownst to the French, the division at Neufchâteau was the 1st Panzer Division, and the supposed two divisions at Arlon were probably the 10th Panzer Division or other follow-on divisions.
The summary of intelligence gathered by aerial forces supporting the Second Army on the 12th still did not raise any alarms. In its conclusion the report stated, “The enemy faces the Second Army in force and attacks with vigor. Our light divisions accomplish their delaying action with a rhythm that appears normal, except perhaps on the extreme left. The rhythm has increased a little.”65 Had an aerial observer watched the action from the ground, he may have noticed a much faster rhythm!
In its daily summary for the 12th, the Second Army concluded that the main enemy pressure seemed to be oriented on the axis from Bouillon to Sedan. The report added, “It seems that the enemy is moving the mass of its armored forces in this direction.”66 The daily report from the operations section of the Second Army, which was signed by Huntziger, was surprisingly positive. The report stated, “In spite of pressure from the enemy and the presence of tanks, our front has not been ruptured at any point, and the delaying action occurred under satisfactory conditions.” He added, “During these three days, the morale, the spirit of the troops has been excellent despite the obvious losses and fatigue suffered.”67
Gamelin's headquarters also described the events of the 12th in confident terms. A report signed by Gamelin's Chief of Staff for operations stated, “Throughout the day of the 12th, the enemy increased his movement in the Belgian Ardennes where our delaying elements have been forced to withdraw. He is making contact in some places with forward elements of our fortified line. In contrast, to the west of Maastricht, his advance has noticeably decreased….”68
At 0945 hours on the 13th, the Air Force indicated, “The [enemy] movements reported during the night in the region from Neufchâteau-Bastogne toward Bouillon-Sedan have been confirmed by reports rendered by bombing missions during the night.” The report added that the roads along this axis were illuminated during the night by moving vehicles. At 1045 hours the same report arrived at Georges’ headquarters. The report concluded, “Everything confirms a large German effort on the Bouillon-Sedan axis.”69
According to André Beaufre, who was an operations officer in the French High Command in May 1940, he assembled information early on the 13th that had come in during the night and early morning and posted it on a map. This information demonstrated that the main German attack was not coming through the Gembloux Gap but was coming instead through the Ardennes. According to Beaufre, General Georges’ headquarters had reached the same conclusion at about the same time. Ironically, the new assessment was considered “particularly favorable” by the French,70 for they remained confident of the complexities of moving through the Ardennes and of the strength of their defenses along the Meuse.
At 1600 hours, an hour after the Germans crossed the Meuse at Sedan, the Second Army reported to Georges’ office that “enemy infiltrations” continued to the north of Sedan and that the enemy's artillery had “made its appearance.” Despite the Germans’ having been across the river for an hour, the report concluded, “No contact yet on the [principal] position of resistance.” A report later that evening from the Second Army provided a more accurate portrayal of the German assault across the Meuse, but it did not mention the panic of the 55th Division. Instead, it said, “The day was very hard for the division on the left….”71
Even though the Germans crossed the Meuse in three locations on the 13th, Gamelin's headquarters did not mention the crossings when it completed its summary of the day's activities. The report noted the presence of significant armored forces in Holland, near Maastricht and Liège, and near Bouillon-Sedan. After observing that the great majority of Allied units would be in place on the Dyle River on the morning of the 14th, the report concluded, “It is not yet possible to determine the zone in which the enemy will make his main attack.” Th
e final line of the report was added by hand, probably by General Koeltz, the head of Gamelin's operations bureau: “[Overall] impression [is] very good.”72
Rarely has any assessment by a military command been so wrong.
CHAPTER 4
French Defenses Along the Meuse
After the French cavalry withdrew across the Meuse, the XIXth Panzer Corps faced the Second Army, commanded by General Charles Huntziger, who had the reputation of being one of France's most capable military leaders. A popular and intelligent officer, Huntziger had served with distinction in the French colonial army and was promoted rapidly. Following an assignment as commander of French troops in Syria, he was named to the Superior Council of War in 1938. After being named commander of the Second Army at a very young age, he was frequently mentioned as a future commander of the French Army. One of his loyal subordinates later wrote, “The Second Army could not have been in better hands.”1 Despite Huntziger's many talents, his field army was not a well-trained, highly capable force.