The Breaking Point

by Robert A Doughty

  Though their eyes remained fixed on the high ground of La Boulette and the Bois de la Marfée, the leading German elements drifted toward the right where they eventually entered the small wooded area north of the Chateau of Bellevue and found some cover along the slope of the river bank. The 7th Company moved directly toward the woods of Bellevue while the 8th Company moved through Claire and the area just south of Villette. The after-action report for the 2/1st Battalion described the “heavy flanking fire” that poured into the advancing Germans from French defensive positions.26 Though some enemy artillery rounds exploded nearby, the chief danger came from small-arms fire, much of it coming from the heights of Hill 247 to their left-front.

  More than any other factor, the rapid advance of the 1st Infantry Regiment enabled the 1st Panzer Division and the XIXth Panzer Corps to break through the French defenses. Assisted by Stuka attacks against French positions, the regiment pushed forward rapidly toward Bellevue and Frénois. Charging forward aggressively through the small woods around Bellevue and sometimes disregarding the heavy French fire coming from the heights to their front, the 1st Infantry Regiment advanced more rapidly than the Gross Deutschland Regiment to its left (east). While the Gross Deutschland Regiment continued to cross the river and remained on both banks of the Meuse, the 1st Infantry Regiment quickly became embroiled in sharp fighting against several bunkers near the Chateau of Bellevue.

  To the west of the 1st Infantry Regiment came the 1st Motorcycle Battalion. With the explosion of the last aerial bomb, the 1st Motorcycle Battalion moved forward southwest of St. Menges and carried their assault boats toward the Meuse. Crossing at a point on the northeast edge of the buckle of the Meuse where a small island splits the current of the flowing water, the first motorcyclists moved quickly across the Meuse at 1500 hours, but it took almost an hour for the entire unit to cross the sluggish river. The 1st Company, 37th Armored Engineer Battalion assisted them in the crossing.

  Preferring to defend along the Canal de l'Est at the base of the buckle, the French had little or no defenses in the buckle, but German accounts suggest the presence of at least one strong point. The commander of the 1st Company (Captain von Bothmer) and several other soldiers lost their lives in the crossing. Von Bothmer died from shell fragments. The absence of, or at least the presence of only a few, French infantry in the buckle ensured that there was little small-arms fire except for that which came from the bunkers around Glaire about two and a half kilometers to the south. But when they selected the crossing point by the island, the Germans chose a point that was readily identifiable on the map and that probably had several preplanned artillery concentrations marked for it.27

  The motorcycle battalion moved slowly on foot across the three kilometers between Iges and Villette, and finally around 1800 hours crossed the Canal de l'Est into the mushroom of Glaire.28 By the time the motorcyclists crossed the small canal, the 1st Infantry Regiment had already cleared out almost all the opposition along the Canal de l'Est and had moved into the edge of Frénois. Thus their crossing of the canal was essentially unopposed.

  As the 1st Infantry Regiment moved forward, it encountered the key French defenses located around Bellevue. Directly behind Bellevue lay the French principal line of resistance, which consisted of two lines of bunkers from Frénois to Wadelincourt. The first line consisted of only three large bunkers. Near the river, number 103 was located about 200 meters to the north of the road junction and slightly west of the road from Glaire. About 700 meters to the east lay bunker 104. The final bunker in this line, number 105, lay another kilometer to the east of 104 but had not yet been completed and may not have been occupied by the French. A second line of bunkers was to the rear of these three forward bunkers. Just to the east of the road junction at Bellevue lay bunker number 7; 500 meters farther to the east was bunker 7 bis; and another 500 meters to the east was bunker 7 ter. Other bunkers occupied the area between bunker 7 ter and Wadelincourt. To add to the strength of the sector, the French had placed two bunkers forward of the first line of bunkers and closer to the river. Bunker number 43 bis was in Les Forges. Bunker number 42 lay between bunkers 43 bis and 103, about 300 meters north of bunker 103 and just east of the road to Glaire.29 This bunker provided covering fire to bunker 43 bis.

  Thus as the soldiers of the 1st Infantry Regiment pushed forward from the river bank, they had four bunkers directly in their path (numbers 43 bis, 42, 103, and 7, from north to south). After initially bypassing bunker 43 bis in Les Forges, the Germans attacked bunkers 42 and 103, which were located near the chateau, around 1730–1745 hours. What happened at the first bunker they encountered (number 42) is not clear, but the bunker may have been abandoned by its occupants with little or no fighting. Continuing to advance, the Germans attacked and quickly captured the next large bunker (number 103, which was commanded by Lieutenant Verron). While bunker number 103 fell relatively easily, number 104 continued fighting. Since this bunker lay about 700 meters to the east of bunker 103, it did not block the advance of the 1st Infantry Regiment, though its occupants did continue firing into the regiment's flank. After firing about 10,000 rounds and suffering more than 50 percent casualties, bunker 104 did not succumb until some time around 1700 hours, according to the Germans, or after 1845 hours, according to the French.30 Since the 1st Infantry Regiment reached the Bellevue-Torcy road around 1730 hours, bunker 104 probably fell around 1800 hours.

  As early as 1815 hours, elements of the 1st Infantry Regiment pushed beyond Bellevue and used flame throwers to attack from the rear the first bunkers to the west of the road leading south from Bellevue. In essence, the Germans moved south to Bellevue where some continued forward and others turned right (west). The attack did not halt even though isolated bunkers around Bellevue and in the mushroom of Glaire continued fighting and even though the Gross Deutschland Regiment had advanced only a few hundred meters across the Meuse River.

  Details on the attack deep into the French positions are provided in the following, but the move by the 1st Infantry Regiment beyond Bellevue was the beginning of the important breakthrough at Frénois. Adding to the significance of that regiment's advance, the 2nd Panzer Division had failed to make a successful crossing at Donchery and the 10th Panzer Division had been able to cross only a handful of soldiers near Wadelincourt.

  WITH THE GROSS DEUTSCHLAND REGIMENT

  To the east of the 1st Infantry Regiment was the Gross Deutschland Regiment, which barely reached the crossing point on time. At 1600 hours on 12 May, the regiment rode in trucks toward Sedan from an assembly area near Orgeo, about five kilometers southeast of Bertrix, Belgium. The distance was twenty-five kilometers in a straight line but much longer through the twisting, hilly, heavily forested roads of the region around the Semois River. During the middle of the night of 12–13 May, the regiment had still not reached the Semois and stopped for some rest. Around 0200 hours on 13 May, the battalions began moving in the direction of Bouillon. This extremely early departure had not been anticipated, and many of the soldiers received less than an hour's sleep during the entire night.31

  After passing through Bouillon, the regiment rode forward through Corbion into the Bois de Sedan and Bois d'Illy. Here they dismounted and occupied their designated assembly areas. At 1300 hours the battalions departed for the Meuse. Marching quickly across the ten kilometers between their assembly areas and their crossing point in two hours, they passed through Fleigneux, St. Menges, and Floing. They carried their heavy machine guns, mortars, and ammunition on their backs and were undoubtedly exhausted from the effort, particularly since they had received such little sleep and had moved so far during the previous three and a half days.

  As the Gross Deutschland Regiment marched toward the Meuse, the column halted for a short while in Floing, causing the narrow streets of the town to overflow with troops. Fortunately for the Germans, the French artillery fired very little during the most intense period of the aerial attack against them. Though bottlenecks caused dangerous bunching
to occur, few rounds fell amongst the groups of infantrymen. Some of the German soldiers noted the silence of the French guns and wondered whether the absence of French fire came from their being hit so strongly by German aircraft or from their waiting and hiding until the best moment to deliver deadly fire.32 Subsequent events demonstrated the important effects of the aerial bombardment.

  When the Gross Deutschland Regiment reached the Meuse, it attempted to cross the river with its 2nd Battalion and have the other battalions follow.33 The regiment's crossing point was between the streambed of the Ruisseau de Glaire and the bend in the Meuse about 400 meters to the southeast. The commander of the 2nd Battalion, Major Fost, had been killed by the French at Etalle in Belgium, and Major Greim now commanded the battalion.

  Assault boats for the regiment did not arrive until the last possible moment. Riding a motorcycle, a sergeant from the 37th Engineer Battalion was supposed to meet the trucks carrying the rubber boats at 1415 hours at a point along the French border. Because the route was so congested, only part of the river-crossing materials arrived. At 1435, after only five trucks had arrived, the sergeant started toward the Meuse with the much-needed boats. Because French artillery fell continually along the road, he instructed the drivers to go as fast as possible. Luckily, none of them were hit, and thus sufficient boats were available.34

  At the crossing point for the 2nd Battalion, the engineers carried the boats near to the eastern bank of the river, but massed enemy fire prevented them from placing the boats in the water. The 15th Heavy Weapons Company of the 4th Battalion, Gross Deutschland Regiment, provided support with its 150mm cannon, but its fire did not silence the French bunkers.35 Protected by the buildings and stone walls in Sedan, the Germans moved assault cannon forward, but the small shells could not penetrate the concrete and steel of the bunkers. Precious time was lost until a heavy 88mm gun came forward to fire directly into the apertures of two bunkers near the bridge known as Pont Neuf just to the east of the regiment's crossing point. Though this powerful, high-velocity gun soon earned a reputation as a superb antitank weapon, it made its most important contribution in the early phases of this battle as a destroyer of French bunkers. With its highly accurate fire, it could place rounds directly in the apertures of the bunkers.

  After several direct hits with the 88mm guns, the engineers attempted to place the assault boats in the river, but again the French fire halted them. A young German lieutenant and two engineers attempted to move forward despite the enemy fire and paid for their courage with their lives. The heavy 88mm gun opened fire again, and under its protection the 7th Company of the 2nd Battalion finally crossed in assault boats. A platoon from the 6th Company with its platoon leader in front moved across with the 7th Company and was followed immediately by another platoon and a machine gun section from the 6th Company. Soon the Germans had elements of two companies from the 2nd Battalion on the western bank.36 After it finally managed to get two platoons across the river, the 6th Company moved to the east (left) of 7th Company, and both companies moved forward into the French positions. Despite the presence of some Germans on the southern bank, the determined French defenders in the two bunkers near Pont Neuf managed to prevent other German infantry from crossing.

  Even though the two companies from the 2nd Battalion had worked hard in their training on attacking deep into an enemy's defenses and breaking through his positions, they did not initially move forward as rapidly as the soldiers in the 1st Infantry Regiment to their right (west). Since their objective was Hill 247, about three kilometers to their front, they wanted to go around Torcy without becoming embroiled in house-to-house fighting in its outskirts, but heavy fire from their flanks and from Hill 247 to their front delayed their advance. They moved straight ahead into some small orchards and the outskirts of Torcy, which provided them some concealment and thus protection from the heavy French fire. As a result of the difficulties encountered in crossing the river and the delay in advancing rapidly, they remained a significant distance behind the leading elements of the 1st Infantry Regiment. They also had fewer reinforcements and less support following them.

  Elements from the 3rd Battalion of the Gross Deutschland Regiment eventually crossed the Meuse behind the 2nd Battalion, but only part of the battalion managed to get across the river. The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Garski, initially remained on the eastern bank of the river, marshaling and hurrying his men forward. The first company across was the 11th Company, which was commanded by Captain Krüger. He and his officers were the first from the 3rd Battalion to cross the river; part of his company followed. Without waiting for the other companies, he and his men moved to their left (east) around the outskirts of Torcy and attacked the French positions in the city from the rear. When they reached the Torcy-Bellevue road, a messenger from the battalion commander told them to hold in place until a Stuka attacked the bunkers to their front.37

  By the time Garski made his way across the river, Krüger and his men had seized positions on the edge of Torcy. Crossing the remainder of the battalion, however, was extremely difficult because of continued machine gun and sniper fire against the crossing point. The battalion also remained embroiled in close-in, house-to-house fighting in the outskirts of Torcy. Only half the battalion crossed in the afternoon; the final two companies crossed after dark.

  Despite their desire to move forward rapidly, the Gross Deutschland Regiment had crossed the river after the 1st Infantry Regiment with less than half of its infantry and moved forward more slowly. The continued resistance of a few French defenders in Torcy also delayed their advance. The 6th and 7th companies of the 2nd Battalion, nevertheless, soon began advancing very rapidly.

  After crossing the Meuse, the 6th and 7th companies of the 2nd Battalion momentarily became enmeshed in the fighting on the outskirts of Torcy, but they soon reached the Sedan-Mézières railway line and the Bellevue-Torcy road. A brief communication enabled the two company commanders to coordinate their actions. With the 6th Company under Lieutenant de Courbière on the left (east) and the 7th Company on the right (west), the commanders agreed that the 7th Company would concentrate its fire on the bunkers to their front, while the 6th Company attacked.

  Though both companies eventually moved slightly outside and west of the Gross Deutschland Regiment's attack zone, they were about to launch an extremely important attack. Their moving outside the regiment's boundary was clearly in the tradition of German auftragstaktik, or mission-oriented tactics, and in this case it produced extremely favorable results for the effort to penetrate the French defenses. According to this concept, a commander could act according to the circumstances of the moment and perhaps ignore a directive or a control measure such as a boundary if his actions contributed to the accomplishment of the unit's mission.

  Lieutenant de Courbière, the commander of the 6th Company, described the situation confronting his company. “A quick terrain reconnaissance reveals the location of a large bunker with six firing ports 200 meters south of the road at the edge of an orchard, offering good possibilities for an approach, and another one, a bit smaller, 250 meters half-right behind the first.”38 Since the large bunker was the closest, his 1st Platoon attacked through the orchard that bordered it, while the 2nd Platoon moved on its eastern flank and worked its way forward out of a clump of trees. Because of the excellent placement of the bunker, the men moved forward with great difficulty, but after a short fight, a sergeant and two men reached the bunker. Using hand grenades, they quickly flushed out the occupants of blockhouse 104.

  As the French soldiers emerged with their hands raised, several of them called out, “Shoot!” Surprised at this, one of the officers asked the prisoners why they did this. The soldier answered that they had been told the Germans would kill any prisoners captured in a bunker.39 Despite the importance of the bunker and their fear of being shot if taken prisoner, the men inside had not offered extremely strong resistance. Nevertheless, the bunker did not fall until some time around 180
0 hours.40

  The 6th Company, 2nd Battalion, had captured an extremely important bunker that was part of the French center of resistance known as Frénois, which was just west of the La Prayelle center of resistance, and which had continued to fire into the flank of the 1st Infantry Regiment. Though they had widened the crack in the line of bunkers between Bellevue and Wadelincourt by capturing bunker number 104, the attacking German infantrymen of the 6th and 7th companies from the Gross Deutschland Regiment did not get a chance to rest. Heavy machine gun fire from the vicinity of the park and castle in Frénois began pouring into their position. A small-caliber cannon also fired, but the Germans could not identify its location.

  Pushing forward with their attack, they quickly captured the second bunker (number 7 bis), which was located behind the large bunker. While bunker 104 had been almost on the boundary between the two regiments, bunker 7 bis was clearly outside the Gross Deutschland Regiment's sector.

  Since the Germans still were receiving fire from the unidentified cannon, they began trying to locate it. They soon noticed a barn about halfway up the slope, which had a suspicious gray base. Looking more carefully, they identified a small embrasure through which a cannon fired. The Germans attacked quickly even though they crossed the boundary between the two regiments. They used a machine gun section to suppress enemy fire from their eastern flank and moments later captured the bunker (probably number 7 ter). Much to their delight, they discovered about twenty bottles of drinking water in the bunker.41