The Breaking Point
Page 32
But hardly had the commanders departed when calamity struck. Subsequent events demonstrated that friction (in the Clausewitzean sense) is a more common feature of war than crisply executed plans. A panicked staff officer from the 55th Division came running into the command post of the 213th Regiment and exclaimed that German armored vehicles had broken through at Chaumont. He cried out, “What is the division going to do?” Labarthe tried to calm him and moments later walked out of his command post into the streets of Chémery. He later explained, “A veritable panic reigned in the village.” The street was filled with soldiers, vehicles, and convoys, all heading south. He stopped several officers with convoys behind them, and each insisted that they had received orders to withdraw toward Tannay (eight kilometers south of Chémery).17 Though Labarthe was generally regarded as perhaps the best regimental commander in the 55th Division, the sight of the fleeing soldiers, the continued reports of “tanks at Bulson,” and the environment of chaos clearly affected his judgment and subsequent actions.
The exact sequence of events over the next few hours is not clear, for the accounts and times given by the participants do not completely agree. Each offers a sequence, a time, and a description of events to accord with his own interpretation and perhaps with an attempt to absolve himself of blame.
The general sequence is as follows:
1900 hours: Telephone discussion between Grandsard and Lafontaine about attachment of additional infantry and tanks for a counterattack.
1930 hours: Telephone discussion between Grandsard and Lafontaine about moving command post of 55th Division.
After 1930 hours: Movement of 55th's command post. Lafontaine meets Labarthe in Chémery.
After 1930 hours: Lieutenant Colonel Cachou, who was the deputy Chief of Staff of the Xth Corps, meets Labarthe in Chémery. Approves Labarthe's decision not to move north.
After 1930 hours: Cachou meets Lafontaine east of Chémery. Informs him of Labarthe's decision.
After 1930 hours: Lafontaine calls Grandsard to discuss counterattack.
2200–2300 hours: Lafontaine definitely learns of the 205th Regiment and 4th Tank Battalion's being attached to 55th Division.
2400 hours: Lafontaine departs for Xth Corps command post.
0130 hours: Chaligne learns that counterattack would consist of two infantry regiments and two tank battalions.
0300 hours: Lafontaine returns to Chémery without having reached Xth Corps.
0345 hours: Written order arrives from corps.
0415 hours: Lafontaine issues order for counterattack.
0630–0645 hours: Counterattack by 213th Regiment begins.
0945 hours: 205th Regiment reaches Maisoncelle and begins counterattack.
According to General Grandsard, the corps commander, he called General Lafontaine at Fond Dagot around 1900 hours and told him that the 205th and 213th Infantry regiments, as well as the 4th Tank and 7th Tank battalions were now placed under his command. His mission was to use these forces to establish a defensive line between Chehéry, Bulson, and Haraucourt. If this line could not be established, Lafontaine would establish a line between Chémery, Maisoncelle, and Raucourt.18 The important point is Grandsard's insistence that he told Lafontaine around 1900 hours of his having control of the two infantry regiments and two tank battalions that were moving into his division's sector.
Lafontaine later offered different information about when he learned of his having control of the two infantry regiments and two tank battalions. He said he did not learn until around 2200 or 2300 hours from a liaison officer from the Xth Corps that he had control of two infantry regiments and two tank battalions. He insisted that Grandsard told him around 1900 hours only of his having control of one infantry regiment and one tank battalion.19 He also implied that the exact circumstances of the commitment of the 205th Infantry Regiment and the second battalion of tanks were not known until the arrival of the written order around 0345 hours on the morning of the 14th.20
Shortly after the conversation between the two generals had ended around 1900–1930 hours, Lafontaine made a return telephone call. He called the corps commander and either requested permission to move his command post from Fond Dagot to Chémery or was told by Grandsard to move. According to Grandsard, Lafontaine explained that he could best accomplish his new mission if his command post were at Chémery. Grandsard concurred in the move, later explaining that the division commander was better placed than he to determine the best location for his command post. According to Lafontaine, however, he was ordered to move his command post.21 Unfortunately, movement of the 55th Division's command post accelerated the negative effects of the panic that began around 1800 hours. The fears of the soldiers who were fleeing could only have been reinforced by the sight of the division command post hastily moving to the rear.
Shortly after departing Fond Dagot, General Lafontaine arrived at Chémery with his staff sometime after 1930 hours. To Labarthe's amazement, he assisted in marshaling the soldiers and units toward the south. Labarthe informed the general officer what the 213th Regiment was doing but received no orders; Lafontaine apparently neglected to tell him that he was now under the control of the 55th Division. Concerned about his ability to move forward in the crush of men and vehicles, Labarthe made a fateful decision; he sent his intelligence officer to tell the battalions to remain in place and not move forward.22 In essence, his decision—which was made without consulting Lafontaine—nullified the attempt by the corps commander to create a second defensive line near Bulson.
Around 1930 hours the deputy Chief of Staff of the Xth Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Cachou, arrived at Chémery. Lafontaine could not be located. Labarthe gave the staff officer a quick rundown of events and informed him of his having ordered the battalions to remain in place momentarily. Recognizing that the regimental commander's decision could probably not be reversed, Cachou approved the decision and told Labarthe not to attempt to establish a defensive line between Chehéry and Bulson. Instead, the regiment would establish a defensive line that extended east and north of Chémery to the woods northeast of Maisoncelle-et-Villers.
The exchange between Cachou and Labarthe later became extremely controversial, because Cachou essentially approved Labarthe's nullifying Grandsard's order. Cachou explained, “I began by expressing my astonishment to learn that the corps order was not even in the course of being executed…. I could only approve this decision by the responsible commander, believed by my corps commander and myself to be an excellent leader of men.”23
Labarthe reacted to Cachou's having approved his orders by telling the 2nd Battalion to occupy Chémery, the 3rd Battalion to hold the woods to the east and northeast of Chémery, and the 1st Battalion to occupy Maisoncelle-et-Villers. By 2200 hours the battalion commanders reported that they were in position.24 During the remainder of the night the regiment remained in place.
Following his exchange with Labarthe, Cachou went in search of General Lafontaine and finally located him on the road about two kilometers east of Chémery. The division commander was involved in selecting a site for a battery from the 78th Artillery Regiment. In a short meeting, Cachou informed him of Labarthe's decision to halt his regiment and then told him that he would receive orders from General Grandsard for a counterattack on the following morning.25 But he could not provide him any details about the counterattack.
As Cachou pointed out in his description of the events on the night of 13 May, General Lafontaine did not intervene or modify the decision made by the 213th regimental commander. The passive manner in which he accepted Labarthe's decision is astonishing, but his failure to act or react is perhaps indicative of his actions in this entire battle. In contrast to the German generals who undoubtedly would never have accepted Labarthe's decision, Lafontaine accepted an action by a lieutenant colonel that ended the attempt to establish a second line near Bulson.
Nevertheless, Lafontaine did return to his command post at Fond Dagot and called General Grandsard. Though Grandsard
does not mention this telephone call in his memoirs, Lafontaine later wrote that the two generals discussed the counterattack by the 213th Regiment. While the conversation did not alter the course of events, Lafontaine's description of his discussion with Grandsard is remarkable, for it clearly demonstrates his reservations about launching a counterattack with infantry against the German penetration. After explaining the objections of Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe, he posed the question to his commander as to whether the counterattack should consist of an attack by the infantry or an attack by artillery and infantry fire.26
Though his explanation is not completely clear, Lafontaine obviously did not believe the 213th Regiment should be pushed forward rapidly. Having studied and practiced for years the doctrinal procedures of colmater for sealing off an enemy penetration and for using artillery and infantry fire in a counterattack, he saw no real advantage in hurling the infantry forward. He preferred to await the arrival of the Germans. Separated from the comfort of his concrete bunker, Lafontaine seemed indecisive and unable to assert himself. Neither Labarthe nor Cachou was impressed with Lafontaine's efforts to regain control over his division or to prepare for a counterattack. Nevertheless, Lafontaine later insisted he did not know if his corps commander had decided to counterattack until the written order arrived in the early hours of the 14th.
Meanwhile, the units fleeing south affected the battle not only by reducing the number of rifles and artillery tubes that could be used against the Germans but also by hampering the forward movement of other units. When Lieutenant Colonel Cachou left General Lafontaine and attempted to return to Xth Corps headquarters, he could barely move along the road because of the large number of soldiers and vehicles. He made his way south using small roads and trails, but he finally had to abandon his vehicle near Tannay and walk about one or two kilometers before a gendarmerie vehicle took him the remainder of the way.
The 7th Tank Battalion, which was supposed to accompany the 213th Regiment in the counterattack, also encountered problems with movement on the road as it attempted to make its way north to Chémery after dark. Leaving its assembly area south of Mont Dieu around 2030 hours to avoid aerial attack, the battalion moved slowly. Numerous trucks and vehicles moving south filled the road. At one point the battalion commander, Major Giordani, and his intelligence officer moved ahead of the column and halted at the edge of a small village, awaiting the arrival of the column. After waiting half an hour and not seeing the column, the two returned south. They discovered that the tanks were barely moving at the pace of a walking man because of the heavy traffic heading south. Around 2300 hours Giordani received notice of a meeting at Chémery with the commanding general of the 55th Division. He left his slowly moving battalion and drove north immediately.27
Around midnight Colonel Chaligne, having made his way safely from the old command post at Fond Dagot, arrived at the division's new command post, which was now functioning in a villa on the edge of Chémery, and reported to the commanding general. Lafontaine explained that the division had to push the 213th Infantry forward to strengthen the French defenders north of Chaumont or it had to withdraw them toward the south but not as far as the line between Chehéry, Bulson, and Haraucourt. Considering subsequent events, this was an astonishing discussion. Apparently neither Lafontaine nor Chaligne understood the growing strength of the Germans, the increasingly desperate situation of the few defenders north of Chaumont, or the requirement for decisive and rapid action. In Chaligne's words, “The general hesitated [and] then decided to report to the commanding general of the [Xth] Corps to receive orders.”28 Though he did have communications with corps headquarters, he apparently believed he had to make personal contact with Grandsard.
After Lafontaine departed his command post, a messenger arrived at 0130 hours with a report from Lieutenant Colonel Pinaud that spelled out the dangerous situation facing his regiment, as well as the division. In an effort to inform the division commander, Chaligne called the Xth Corps and asked for Lafontaine, but he had not yet arrived. In this telephonic communication, first with Lieutenant Colonel Cachou and then with General Grandsard, Chaligne learned the details of the corps’ plan for a counterattack. He also learned that Cachou would be departing shortly with a written order for the attack. Lafontaine had apparently not told him about the corps commander's desire to counterattack, having only explained the requirement to seal off the German penetration.29
Around 0300 hours Lafontaine returned to the division command post without having reached corps headquarters. The roads were too filled with troops and convoys for him to make the trip. At a time when France's safety depended on his action, he had wasted three hours trying to reach corps headquarters.
Between 0300 and 0400 hours a meeting was held in the command post of the division in Chémery. Among those attending were General Lafontaine, Colonel Chaligne, Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe, and Major Giordani (commander of the 7th Tank Battalion). Other officers from the division also jammed into the room. The meeting could not begin until the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Cachou, deputy Chief of Staff of the Xth Corps, who was bringing the written order for the counterattack.
Until Cachou arrived, General Lafontaine sat at a table with his Chief of Staff and two officers from his operations bureau. Working at a map that was lit by an oil lamp, they attempted to mark the location of the front line, using information that had been provided to the command post. In reality, they knew very little about what was happening to their north. They also studied the possible direction and objective for a counterattack. Because of Cachou's having provided Lafontaine additional information around 2200–2300 hours and because of Chaligne's discussion with General Grandsard on the telephone around 0130 hours, they must have known the division was supposed to conduct a counterattack with two regiments (the 205th and the 213th) and two tank battalions (the 4th and 7th). Nevertheless, no firm plans were made or orders issued until the written order arrived.
The commanders of the 213th Regiment and the 7th Tank Battalion were present at the command post, but no one knew the exact location of the 205th Regiment or the 4th Tank Battalion. They also knew nothing about their condition or their preparation to fight. An officer departed the command post to search for the 205th Regiment.
The other officers in the room attempted to learn as much as possible about what was happening. Lieutenant Colonel Labarthe later described the discussions as “confused.” Although the headquarters knew correctly that Bulson was still occupied by the French, Labarthe was told incorrectly that Cheveuges and portions of the Bois de la Marfée were in friendly hands.30
At 0345 hours Lieutenant Colonel Cachou arrived carrying the order for the attack, which was supposed to begin at dawn. The decision of the corps commander was clear: the 213th Regiment would attack. According to Lafontaine, the order also provided him the first clear indication of how the 205th Regiment and 4th Tank Battalion were to be used. At 0415 hours, or about half an hour before dawn, General Lafontaine issued the order for the attack, which would begin as soon as the units were ready to move. This was about nine hours after Grandsard had first talked to him about the counterattack.
Unfortunately, almost the entire night had been wasted, for the division commander had taken no prior actions indicating the regiment was under his control or could be launched on a counterattack. In fact, not until 0530 hours on the 14th did the 55th Division formally state, “The 213th Infantry Regiment is placed at the division of the 55th I.D.”31
Thus one of the most important reasons for the failure of the subsequent counterattack by the 213th Regiment and the 7th Tank Battalion was the lack of decisive action by the division commander. Instead of exerting a superhuman effort to push the 213th forward or to restore discipline and return the runaways and panicked units to the defensive effort, Lafontaine nervously awaited the decision of his corps commander. Tragically for France, every minute he waited was a minute given to the Germans to transport their forces across the Meuse River and to p
repare for an assault against the next line of French defenders. Though Grandsard can be criticized for failing to move forward and exert personal control over the rapidly disintegrating situation, his failure is minor in comparison to the lack of decisive action from Lafontaine. By not acting quickly and decisively, General Lafontaine had missed an opportunity to strike at the Germans when they were at their most vulnerable point.
Apparently not knowing that the Germans had already moved south of Cheveuges but believing that they would do so quickly, the French decided to attack with the 213th even if all the tanks from the 7th Battalion were not able to join it. As the division commander issued his order, however, the first tanks from the 7th Tank Battalion began arriving in Chémery. With the division more confident about the presence of French tanks but still not certain that the entire battalion would be present, the regiment was ordered to attack north on three axes: the 2nd Battalion (under Major Couturier) from Chémery to Chehéry, the 3rd Battalion (under Major Gauvain) from east of Chémery to west of Bulson, and the 1st Battalion (under Major Desgranges) from Maisoncelle to Bulson.
A company of tanks provided support to each battalion. Except for four 25mm antitank weapons, the regiment had no antitank weapons. The 2nd Battalion on the left had two, and the 1st Battalion on the right had two from the 506th Antitank Company (colonial infantry). The only means of communication between the battalions and regimental headquarters or between companies and battalion headquarters were through runners or motorcyclists.
A single battalion of 75mm artillery from the 78th Artillery Regiment was available to provide fire support for the counterattack. Though 174 French artillery tubes should have been available for support on the morning of 14 May, no more than 12 were actually available. The panic on the evening of the 13th had an extraordinarily negative effect on the French ability to resist the Germans, but the weak artillery support for the counterattack was one of the most important effects. Colonel Chaligne explained: “The batteries had suffered a great deal the previous evening, and numerous tubes were destroyed. Communications could not be assured with the remaining battalions…. The necessity to act quickly compelled us to do without organized [fire] support.”32