The Breaking Point

by Robert A Doughty

  As early as 1935, if France could have chosen an officer to lead a mechanized attack against the vulnerable flank of a German salient, Flavigny would have been the officer chosen. Hardnosed, decisive, and experienced, he was as close to being the Guderian of the French army as anyone. When the High Command attached his XXIst Corps to the Second Army on 13 May, General Huntziger must have been relieved to have a man of his abilities and experience available at such a crucial moment.

  The XXIst Corps, however, did not have any organic divisions already attached to it, for the corps consisted of little more than a headquarters. The corps had spent the winter occupying a sector along the Luxembourg-Belgian frontier in the vicinity of Longuyon, Longwy, and Ottange, being initially part of the Second Army and later of the Third Army. At the beginning of May, another corps headquarters replaced it on the border, and the headquarters of the XXIst Corps (without its attached divisions) moved to the vicinity of Reims as part of the General Reserve for the French Army. During the evening of 11 May, Flavigny learned that the XXIst Corps would possibly be placed under the control of General Huntziger, the Second Army's commanding general. To learn as much as possible about the rapidly developing situation, Flavigny traveled to Huntziger's command post.

  After Flavigny arrived around noon on the 12th at Senuc, he learned that Huntziger intended to insert the XXIst Corps—if it came under his control—either between the two corps in the Second Army (the Xth on the left and the XVIIIth on the right) or to the left of the Xth Corps, depending on the circumstances. Flavigny later wrote, “The general viewed the situation very calmly.”36 Late in the afternoon of the 13th, after having departed Senuc, Flavigny learned that his corps headquarters would be placed at the disposition of the Second Army. He departed immediately for Huntziger's command post, arriving around 1600–1700 hours.37

  In his meeting with Flavigny, which occurred about the time the German 1st Infantry Regiment reached the Chateau of Bellevue, Huntziger seemed confident about the possibility of halting the Germans in the Second Army's sector and did not seem concerned about a lack of time. After informing the corps commander of “small German patrols having crossed the Meuse” and of “heavy aerial attacks” along the river, he told him that the divisions under his control would be arriving “successively during the week.” At 1900 hours the Second Army published the written order for the XXIst Corps to prepare to seal off the front in the Xth Corps’ area and then to counterattack toward Sedan.38

  With orders to move his headquarters to Vouziers, about a dozen kilometers northwest of Senuc, Flavigny left for the small town and after arriving there, went to sleep in a small office where he could be near a telephone. Around 2200 hours a sergeant awoke Flavigny and told him that an artillery sergeant from the front lines had arrived and had requested to meet with him. He wanted to provide him “important information.” Moments later the sergeant, who had fled from his unit after his “colonel had departed the C.P. in a vehicle,” told him that German tanks had overrun the batteries of his unit and were moving toward Flavigny's headquarters. When Flavigny called the Second Army commanding general to gain more information, he found Huntziger “up to date” on the situation and received orders to come to the Second Army's command post with his staff. There he was given the order for a counterattack with three divisions under his corps: one armored division, one motorized division, and one light cavalry division.39

  The XXIst Corps had the mission of moving to the northern edge of the woods of Mont Dieu-Stonne and attacking as soon as possible in the direction of Sedan. If the attack failed or was canceled for some unforeseen reason, the corps had to hold along the line of hills running between Mont Dieu and Stonne, the second defensive line for the Second Army.

  Operations Order Number 1, which was issued by the XXIst Corps at 0400 hours on the 14th, clearly stated Flavigny's understanding of his mission. The corps would occupy a position in the woods of Mont Dieu and seal off the penetration made by the Germans; then it would attack toward Sedan.40 The sequence of first sealing off the penetration and then counterattacking is extremely important, for it meant Flavigny's corps would move forward methodically and halt the attacking Germans before risking a headlong charge into their position.

  As mentioned earlier, subsequent events demonstrated that the mission played into the hands of the Germans. When the XXIst Corps eventually ceased trying to attack and reverted to holding along the hill line that runs through Mont Dieu and Stonne, the French did not pose a grave threat to the German flank. In fact, the French left the Germans free to turn toward the west as long as the Germans continued putting some pressure against Mont Dieu and Stonne.

  On the morning of the 14th, neither the Second Army nor the XXIst Corps had precisely fixed the hour of attack toward Sedan, but they envisaged the attack beginning around 1200 hours on that day. By attacking at this hour, the XXIst Corps could follow the counterattacks of the 205th and 213th Infantry regiments and the two tank battalions (which were scheduled for the early morning) and could take advantage of any gains made by them. The rapid succession of two major counterattacks would clearly deal a significant blow to the German forces that had crossed the Meuse.

  Thus on the evening of the 13th, the prognosis for halting the German forces and throwing them back across the Meuse still seemed favorable. With General Flavigny in charge of the Second Army's attack and with his having an armored division and motorized division, as well as a cavalry division under his control, the chances for a dramatic and successful counterattack appeared high. Significant difficulties, however, soon appeared, and these difficulties did not pertain solely to the performance of the 55th Division and the Xth Corps.

  The three divisions attached to the XXIst Corps were the 3rd Armored Division, the 3rd Motorized Infantry Division, and the 5th Light Cavalry Division, which was further reinforced by the 1st Cavalry Brigade. Of the three divisions, only the motorized division was fully up to combat standards. The cavalry division had fought in Belgium and had suffered significant losses in men and materiel. The armored division was hardly ready for combat and suffered from shortages or insufficiencies in almost every area. Of the three divisions, the performance by the 3rd Armored Division was the most disappointing and in the broadest terms the most significant for France.

  THE FAILURE OF THE 3RD ARMORED DIVISION

  The French did not create the 3rd Armored Division until 20 March 1940. After assembling the division's various components near Reims, the division commander, Brigadier General Antoine Brocard, discovered that the new division lacked numerous key personnel and important pieces of equipment. In the broadest sense the division consisted of little more than four tank battalions, one motorized infantry battalion, and two towed artillery battalions. Two of the tank battalions had B-1 bis tanks, and the other two had H-39 tanks.

  Many key elements of an armored division were missing. For example, while the division had a commander for its artillery, it had no staff. Moreover, the division had almost no maintenance capability and no resupply capability in the field. The absence of an engineer company also reduced the ability of the division to clear roads or remove obstacles. Other major deficiencies included the absence of an antitank battery and a shortage of liaison vehicles (motorcycles and trucks).41

  The division also suffered from inadequate communications equipment. Despite the requirement for excellent communications if it were to function as part of the General Reserve of the French Army, it was not issued command vehicles with sophisticated communications. It had a few of the newer model E.R. 30 radios, but most of its radios consisted of the older E.R. 26 ter model, which were mounted in trucks. The shortage of radios was so critical that the tank battalions did not have sufficient radios for internal nets, particularly in the two H-39 tank battalions.42 Later events demonstrated that the division lacked sufficient radios to be as mobile or as responsive as it had to be in the fighting around Mont Dieu.

  While the division did not have all its auth
orized tanks, the shortage was not of the same magnitude as other deficiencies. Theoretically consisting of a brigade with 68 B-1 bis and 90 H-39 tanks, the division had 62 B-1 bis and 73 H-39 tanks. Out of an authorized strength of 158 tanks, the 3rd Armored Division thus had 135 available at Reims. If one company of H-39 tanks had not been sent to Norway, the division would have had on hand almost all the tanks it was authorized to have. While the two B-1 bis battalions had only 31 tanks each, instead of the authorized 34, the shortage in tanks occurred because each battalion lacked the 3 replacement tanks it was authorized. Of the two H-39 battalions, one battalion had almost all its authorized tanks, and except for a company that had been dispatched to Norway, the other battalion had almost all its authorized tanks.43 Nevertheless, the division did not take all of its tanks to Sedan, since a few were left behind because of maintenance problems.

  One important deficiency of the tanks centered around the armament on the H-39 tanks. While the 42nd Tank Battalion had tanks armed with the low-velocity Model 1916 37mm cannon, which had been the main gun of the FT-17, a small World War I tank, the 45th Battalion had tanks armed with the higher-velocity Model 1938 cannon, which was much more effective against enemy tanks. Fortunately for the 3rd Armored Division, the company of tanks sent to Norway was armed with the older model cannon.44 Thus, for all its significant shortages, the division did not suffer seriously from a lack of tanks.

  Nevertheless, the 3rd Armored Division did suffer significantly from being formed so late in the war. After being formed on 20 March, the division was not even alerted on 10 May. The French High Command believed it required additional time for training and did not wish to disrupt its ongoing training. When it finally received orders to join the fight, it had never maneuvered as a division and had only conducted battalion-level training, since it lacked the supply and command vehicles necessary for a large-scale maneuver.

  The decision to commit the newly formed division occurred on 12 May. Around 1430–1445 hours, the division received a warning order to prepare to send its mixed demi-brigades (one battalion of B-1 bis and one battalion of H-39 tanks) forward to two different locations. Fifteen minutes later, another order arrived ordering the entire division to move northeast as quickly as possible. The division's commanding general, General Brocard, sent his subordinate units a warning message and scheduled a meeting of his commanders for 1800 hours, but at 1700 hours the Inspector General of tanks, General Marie J. P Keller, arrived and ordered the division to move as quickly as possible to an area five or ten kilometers southwest of Mont Dieu. Using a Michelin road map, Keller marked the route for the division to take and explained that the division remained part of the High Command's General Reserve in the zone of the Second Army. It could be committed in either the Second or Ninth armies’ areas.45

  Because the division was scattered across a wide area, General Brocard proposed, and General Keller approved, having the division conduct a two-stage move with part of the division moving on the night of 12–13 May and the other part on the next night. The division had to move about sixty kilometers, but some of its battalions were as much as thirty kilometers away from its center of mass. Beginning at 2000 hours on the 12th, the move of the first increment went without incident. On the following night, the second move encountered numerous refugees and fleeing troops and moved more slowly. Although German aerial attacks did not delay the move substantially, their bombs caused sufficient damage (particularly in villages) to hamper the move of the second increment.

  On the morning of the 13th, General Brocard met with General Huntziger, who seemed “anxious” but did not suggest that the division would be committed immediately. That night between 2000 and 2100 hours, a message that had been completed at 1700 hours arrived from the Second Army. This message warned of the possibility of the enemy's attacking the Second Army's main position of resistance in the region west of Sedan.46 The message, of course, arrived much too late, for the XIXth Panzer Corps had crossed at Sedan at 1500 hours and was pressing against La Boulette by 2100 hours. The message also said nothing about committing the 3rd Armored Division.

  To counter any push by the enemy to the south of Sedan, the Second Army received control over the 3rd Motorized Infantry Division and ordered it to occupy a nine-kilometer front from the Ardennes Canal, east across the woods of Mont Dieu, to La Berlière (three kilometers south of Stonne). With the 5th Light Cavalry Division protecting and extending the flanks of the 3rd Motorized Division, the 3rd Armored Division was told to occupy an area to the rear of the 3rd Motorized Division about a dozen kilometers southwest of Stonne. A message from the Second Army told the armored division to prepare for a counterattack either toward Sedan in the north or toward Poix-Terron in the northwest.47 General Huntziger's headquarters apparently ignored the fact that the High Command in Paris, as represented by General Keller, had told the division to occupy a position ten kilometers northwest of the position identified by the Second Army and that half the division was already in this position.

  In any case, at 0230 hours on the 14th, a liaison officer from the Second Army summoned General Brocard to a meeting at the field army's command post in Senuc, about twenty-five kilometers south of Brocard's command post. Arriving around 0400 hours, he met General Flavigny and learned that his division had been attached to the XXIst Corps. He also learned that the corps had the mission of occupying a defensive position in the woods of Mont Dieu, sealing off the penetration made by the Germans, and then attacking toward Sedan.

  Recognizing the complexity of the mission, Brocard stated, as later reported by Flavigny, “The counterattack should take place tomorrow the 15th.”

  Flavigny explained, “No, this morning [the 14th] as early as possible.”

  “We are not ready,” said Brocard. “We came to this area to continue the training of the division.”

  “It is not a question of training; it is necessary to fight. This is urgent. Can you be at your departure position by 1100 hours?”

  “That is impossible. I am not resupplied with fuel,” answered Brocard.

  “What?” asked Flavigny. “If you were an infantryman, your men would have eaten. If you were a cavalryman, your horses would have received their oats…in the vicinity of the enemy. Your fuel tanks are not empty. How much time will it take to complete your refueling?”

  “Four hours.”

  “That's impossible.”48

  Despite Flavigny's insistence on beginning the attack as quickly as possible, he finally agreed to delay the attack until 1100 hours. This gave the division about four hours to refuel and two hours to march to its departure position. To capitalize upon a massive Allied aerial bombardment scheduled for the morning of the 14th, the attack had to begin before noon.49

  Brocard remained pessimistic about the 3rd Armored Division's being able to attack toward Sedan with the 3rd Motorized Division. With only six hours scheduled for the armored division to refuel and move to its departure position, he again warned Flavigny that his division had not yet completed its move from the vicinity of Reims. With only rudimentary fuel resupply equipment, the attack could begin no earlier than 1600 hours, he believed, not 1100 hours. He had strong reservations about the ability of the division to perform a fifty- to fifty-five-kilometer march, then to resupply with fuel, and finally to move fifteen to eighteen kilometers to the area of Mont Dieu from which the attack would begin. Despite Brocard's having underlined the deficiencies of the division, Flavigny disregarded the warnings and told him to execute his orders.50 Nevertheless, the corps commander did eventually agree to delay the attack until 1300 hours.

  The problem with fuel centered on the B-1 bis tank. Because of its relatively great weight (approximately thirty-five tons), the tank consumed enormous amounts of fuel and had a maximum range of only five to five and a half hours, but under some conditions this range could be reduced to as little as three and a half hours.51 During its development, its designers had anticipated problems with fuel consumption and had included
an extra fuel tank in its design, but this had been eliminated because of cost restrictions. Fuel consumption increased when the French added radios, which quickly depleted the electric charge of the tank's batteries. Since electricity to run the radios and charge the batteries came from a generator attached to the engine, the engine could be turned off only when the radio was not being used.

  The requirement for the tank to burn high-grade aviation fuel rather than gasoline compounded the challenges of successfully resupplying an armored unit. Separate fuel containers and transfer pumps had to be provided, but they were not always readily available.52

  With time and additional training, the armored units could have limited the effect of these problems, but the inexperienced, newly formed 3rd Armored Division found them to be extremely disruptive. Perhaps more importantly, Flavigny and Huntziger did not completely understand the limitations of the B-1 bis tank and had no sympathy for the challenges faced by the armored division commander.

  Following a painfully slow refueling and unfortunate delays in the transmission of orders, the division commenced its movement toward Mont Dieu around 1200–1230 hours on the 14th, but its two columns moved very slowly. Because of the possibility of German tanks appearing without warning, the division headquarters told the battalions to remain on guard during the displacement. The march was also disrupted by numerous elements that were fleeing in disorder and delayed by roads that had been heavily bombed. Since the armored division had no engineers, and the Xth Corps had neglected to have engineers keep the roads clear, the tank crews had to clear the roads for themselves. To explain the slow movement, General Brocard later emphasized the fatigue of his men who had made a long road march and who had refueled three or four times.53 Nevertheless, the caution displayed by the division as it moved forward clearly seems out of accord with the picture of a confident, eager-to-fight unit that some historians have occasionally painted.54