The Prime Ministers: An Intimate Narrative of Israeli Leadership
Page 52
This affront upset him deeply. His hurt was reflected in the withering sarcasm of the occasional working notes he would send me, addressing them, “From Shylock to Shakespeare,” and signing them, “Menachem Mendel Shylock.”
By the spring of 1978, the talks were in the doldrums and Jimmy Carter had to intervene urgently in an effort to rescue the waning hopes. He pressed Begin to come to Washington to thrash things out. The prime minister, knowing what lay in store, asked Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan to accompany him.
The acrimony of those talks, held in the White House Cabinet Room on 21 and 22 March, is vividly illustrated in the following exchange, which I recorded verbatim. What follows is the full version:
Begin: …We decided, in our July talks last year, to talk frankly. When I saw you [privately] at that time I read to you a three-point document. You sent me a five-point response and, in it, you used language that said we would have to withdraw ‘on all fronts.’ I said we would not agree to such language. I later said we had a claim and a right to sovereignty in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, but that we would leave that claim open. So we did two things in an effort to make an agreement [with Egypt] possible: First, we did not apply Israeli law to Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, proposing that the question of their future sovereignty be left open. Secondly, we offered administrative self-rule for the Palestinian Arabs in these areas, and suggested that their autonomy would be reviewed after five years. After five years all questions would be open for renegotiation. These, I submit, Mr. President, are far-reaching proposals.
Carter: They nevertheless represent a change compared to the position of previous [Labor] governments [i.e., a readiness for a withdrawal on all fronts, including the West Bank].
Begin: Yes, but not a drastic change. Under previous governments, the Jordan River was to be designated as Israel’s security boundary. There was to be no Israeli withdrawal from the river. The Labor governments planned to evacuate only a part of the West Bank. The Israeli Army was to remain along the Jordan River.
Carter: In an effort to break the present deadlock, could you envisage that your security needs could be met by having Israeli military forces deployed for a period of five years in military positions along the river, or in the hills around Jerusalem? In other words, would you agree to withdraw into cantonments in a manner that would satisfy Arab demands and yet preserve your security? Is that a possibility?
Begin: I don’t know about the word cantonments. We could consider withdrawal into emplacements. In all circumstances, our forces must stay in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.
Dayan: I would like to refer to the question of whether there has been a change in the policy of the present government compared to the [Labor] governments of the past. I was in previous Labor governments, and I can tell you that for several months after the Six-Day War, the Israeli position was that we would return the whole of Sinai and the Golan Heights in return for assurances, but we totally excluded the West Bank…the plan of the present government to offer the Palestinian Arabs a regime of self-rule grants them a far greater measure of genuine self-expression than any plan of previous Israeli governments. Our current plan begins with the proposition that we don’t want our forces to rule over the Arabs. We don’t want to impose ourselves on them. We don’t want to tell them how to run their lives. But we must be in a position to check the movement of those who cross into our territory. Among the Palestinians are refugees, laborers, and, yes, terrorists. Speaking as an ex-soldier, I want to know who will be in charge of the border checkpoints from Jordan and Syria into the Palestinian and Israeli areas. If our own soldiers are not going to do the checking we shall have to fence off our whole country with barbed wire. I don’t want Israel to become an isolated fortress. We will, therefore, have to deploy our soldiers in the West Bank and Gaza wherever they are needed for our security, without imposing ourselves on the daily lives of the Arabs who will, under this government’s plan, enjoy self-rule.
Note attached to letter from author to P.M. Begin, with P.M. Begin's reply.
Translation: “Your letter to [Canadian premier] Trudeau.”
Begin’s reply: “From Shylock to Shakespeare – With thanks. No payment,” 6 February 1978
Carter: Let me repeat one thing. I have no doubt that Sadat really wants a peace agreement with Israel. I have had hours of private talks with him, and he is flexible on the issues. He has obligations to the other Arabs, and he acts as spokesmen for their interests. He is the best Arab leader with whom you can negotiate. But because of the pressure of the terrorists, and the pressures on Sadat himself, I am afraid that the chance for an agreement will slip away and the prospects for peace be lost.
[…]
Brzezinski: As we try to advance toward a solution, it is important to note that your self-rule proposal can be seen in different ways. To put it bluntly, it can be seen as a continuation of your military and political control over the West Bank and Gaza. This would make it clearly unacceptable. It would render Security Council Resolution 242 ambiguous, displaying unwillingness on your part to apply the term ‘withdrawal’ to the West Bank and Gaza. If Israel were to speak of its forces being withdrawn from control of the West Bank and Gaza to agreed emplacements, then your plan could be the basis for a solution, and open the way to peace. But if not, there could be strong suspicions that you intend to perpetuate your control over these occupied territories. Need I say that the Middle East is an essential area of interest to us? It is vital that the region be engaged with the West, and be set on a course of moderation and stability. This is in your interest as well as ours.
Begin: We all understand the need for an agreement with the Arabs. We have, therefore, elaborated a peace plan which will enable the Palestinian Arabs to elect their own Administrative Council – self-rule – and run their daily lives themselves without our interference. We only reserve for ourselves the maintenance of security and public order.
Carter: You envisage the autonomy agreement for the West Bank and Gaza to last for five years, am I not right?
Begin: Correct.
Carter: What will happen after that?
Begin: After that, we shall see. We have carefully considered the possibility of conducting a plebiscite in which the Palestinian Arabs would be given the choice of continuing the status quo, or opting for a tie with Jordan, or for a tie with Israel. However, with the pistols of the PLO pointing at their heads, and with the almost daily assassinations and the threats which the population constantly endures, a plebiscite will be futile and dangerous. The PLO will either force the people to boycott it or force them to vote for a Palestinian state. This we will not allow. Therefore, we suggest, let’s wait and see how the [five-year] self-rule experiment works out – how the reality will unfold.
Carter: This practically gives Israel a veto – a de facto veto – even over Arab administrative affairs. And it keeps Israel in indefinite control of the West Bank. Without Israeli willingness to give the Palestinian Arabs a voice in determining their own future, there is no chance for a peace settlement. I know that Sadat won’t agree to the perpetuation of Israeli control over the West Bank, if the Palestinians are not given a guaranteed chance to choose their future. If Israel insists they have no voice, there will be no prospect of a peace settlement. You are getting more and more demanding. You are slamming the door shut.
Brzezinski: We have to have an agreement that is satisfactory to you on security grounds, but which is politically realistic. If you want genuine security while giving the Palestinians genuine self-rule and an identity, that can work. Security – yes, political control – no.
Begin: In our self-rule plan, we give the Palestinian Arabs the option of [Israeli] citizenship after five years. They can even choose to vote for our Knesset.
Brzezinski: But it works both ways: Israelis are allowed to buy land in the West Bank, but there is no reciprocity for the Arabs in Israel proper. This is an unequal status.
Begin: This is a right of our citizens.
Begin: But we are giving them the option of becoming our citizens.
Dayan: According to our plan, Palestinian Arabs after five years can opt for either Jordanian or Israeli citizenship, or they can retain the status quo, and keep their present local identity cards. We will make no obstacles to their choice. The main point about any referendum in the future is to allow individuals to decide their citizenship, but not to decide the sovereign status of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. The kind of plebiscite you are suggesting will determine territorial sovereignty, not just the status of the people. If we allow what you call ‘deciding their own future’ in terms of territory, they will be deciding not only their own future, but ours, too. If they have a right to decide whether Israel gets out of the territories, they are, ipso facto, deciding our future.
Begin: Nothing is excluded. There will be a review after five years. But we are not ready to commit now to a referendum that will inevitably lead to a Palestinian state under the existing conditions of PLO intimidation and threat. Hence, we suggest that matters be left open for review. To agree now to a plebiscite could have incalculable consequences for our future.
Prime Minister Begin’s initial draft of “Proposed Principles” for Palestinian autonomy in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, December 1977, to which reference is made in this discussion. (Paragraph 7 offers Palestinians the future option of voting and election to the Knesset)
Carter: Mr. Prime Minister, in my view the obstacle to a peace treaty with Egypt is your insistence on keeping political control over the West Bank and Gaza, not just now, but to perpetuate it even after five years. I had hoped we could reach a point of possible success of the peace process, but now we are on the verge of seeing it all lost.[1]
It was on this sour note that the first round of the White House talks ended. They continued the following day, again in the Cabinet Room, when President Carter, reading from a typed page, addressed the prime minister with disdain in his voice and fury in his eyes, saying:
“Mr. Prime Minister, the Israeli position, as I understand it, is that even if there were a clear statement by us against a total Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and against a Palestinian state, and even if this were to be accepted by Egypt, Israel would still not stop building new settlements or the expansion of settlements; Israel would not give up the settlements in Sinai; Israel would not permit an Egyptian or UN protection over the Israeli settlements in Sinai; Israel will not withdraw its political authority from the West Bank and Gaza; Israel will not recognize that Resolution 242 applies on all fronts, including the principle of withdrawal from the West Bank; Israel will not give the Palestinian Arabs, at the end of the [five-year] interim period, the right to choose whether they want to be affiliated with Israel, with Jordan, or live under the interim arrangement. This is my understanding of the present situation. If I am correct, the likelihood that the peace talks can be resumed with Egypt is very remote. There are no immediate prospects of a substantial movement toward a peace agreement. I would like to have your comment.”
Carter’s words were met with an oppressive silence. Dayan’s face remained impassive; Begin’s was ashen. But after a few moments of silence, this political combat brought out the defiance in him, and in a spitfire tongue, he declared:
“Mr. President, you have seen fit to couch all your definitions in negative terms. I shall state them positively. Israel has made a two-part peace proposal which is positive and constructive. Part one: we are resolved to negotiate peace treaties with a view to reaching a comprehensive settlement with all our neighbors. We have accepted Resolution 242 as the basis for negotiations with all our neighbors. We are determined that the negotiations be direct. We want secure and recognized boundaries, as called for in 242, but that same Resolution does not call for a total withdrawal on all fronts. The possibility of less than a total withdrawal applies not only to Judea and Samaria, but also to Sinai and the Golan. Nevertheless, Israel has stated its willingness for a total withdrawal to the international border in Sinai. We have asked for the demilitarization of the Sinai beyond the Gidi and the Mitla Passes. We have also suggested that after our total withdrawal from Sinai – which, I repeat, is not called for by 242 – two United Nations zones be established embracing our settlements there, which will be under the protection of Israeli contingents. We could have demanded border changes with Egypt, but again, I say, we have not done so, for the sake of peace.
“And now to part two of our positive peace proposals, dealing with Judea, Samaria and Gaza. We have proposed self-rule – or administrative autonomy – for the Palestinian Arabs in these areas. They will be enabled to elect their own administrative council which will deal with all issues of daily life, with no interference from Israel. Israel will reserve for itself control of security and public order only. This means that our forces will be in designated camps in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. The question of the future sovereignty of these areas shall remain open. We are dealing here with human beings, not with the status of the territory. The Palestinian Arabs shall have full self-rule and the Palestinian Jews security. We agree that there should be a review of the situation after five years. We suggest that people on both sides, Jew and Arab alike, be given the opportunity to work and live side by side together, and we shall see how this reality unfolds. After five years everything will be open to review. This, Mr. President, is part two of our positive peace proposal.”
Begin’s words made no impression. The stalemate was absolute. The White House encounter was simply nasty. Arriving back at Ben-Gurion Airport two days later, Menachem Begin made no bones about the seriousness of the situation. He told the waiting press:
“Our talks in Washington were difficult. Certain demands were made of us which we could not accept. Our lives would have been made much simpler had we been able to say ‘yes’ to the demands of the greatest power on earth, but we could not. We represent a small yet courageous nation, and we, its spokesmen, are concerned only with safeguarding our people’s future. Always remember that what is, admittedly, a matter of important policy for the mighty United States of America, is for us a matter of life and death. On the table were issues which I cannot yet reveal. We shall, of course, continue to maintain contact with the president and his advisers. I have no doubt that the U.S. government desires peace in the Middle East. We, certainly, aspire to it with all our hearts. And so we hope the peacemaking process will continue, despite all the present difficulties.”
Next, Begin answered some of the pointed questions the journalists had.
“It has been publicized that a senior U.S. representative has asserted that in order to make peace Israel will have to replace its prime minister. What is your reaction to that?”
“I do not know to whom you are referring, but the prime minister was chosen by the people of Israel, and not by a representative of the United States of America.”
“While you were en route back to Israel, your Minister of Defense [Ezer Weizman] called for the establishment of an emergency national peace government. How do you view this proposal?”
“I have not read my colleague’s remarks. If a peace government is required – it already exists. The government in which the Defense Minister is Defense Minister is a peace government.”
“You said in your opening remarks that you hope the peace process will continue. In what way will it continue? What form will it take?”
“In every form available to us.”72
In the tense and frustrating months that followed, the best way available turned out to be an enormous gamble on the part of President Carter. In September 1978, he invited Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat, together with their senior aides, to Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland. Here, confined behind locked gates, far from the maddening pressures of Washington and the ever-prying eyes of the press – in what Menachem Begin dubbed a “concentration camp deluxe” – the two parties went at it hammer and
tongs for thirteen days and nights, with Carter serving as an indefatigable go-between. Finally, a two-part accord was reached, the first calling for the implementation of an autonomy plan for the Palestinian Arabs of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, to be followed after five years by a negotiated permanent settlement. The second was a framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, with full normalization and diplomatic relations, in return for Israel’s complete withdrawal from Sinai within three years, and the dismantling of all of its settlements there. In recognition of these accords, Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat were jointly awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace.
The White House talks – Prime Minister Begin and his team face President Carter and his team across the table in the Cabinet Room, 1 May 1978
Photograph credit: Ya’acov Sa’ar & Israel Government Press Office
The Egyptian and Israeli teams went home, and continued their work of intensive negotiations to translate the general principles agreed upon at Camp David into the binding language of concrete contracts. This proved to be easier said than done, and necessitated a last-minute, whirlwind visit by President Carter to both Jerusalem and Cairo to dot the i’s and cross the t’s of the treaty with Egypt, and to put into place the machinery for a Palestinian autonomy negotiation. Although this latter ultimately came to naught, and despite the fact that the Arab world was in uproar, Sadat nevertheless decided to go ahead and sign his peace treaty with Israel.