Henry VII

by S B Chrimes

  The most recent survey of Henry VII’s diplomacy assures us that in regard to trade matters it hardly looks as if the system was any more foreseen and foredesigned than the rest of his foreign policy; although ‘we can see a system of policy developing, a general pattern emerging’.3 It is perhaps possible that this ‘system and pattern’ are somewhat illusory, but there can be no doubt that Henry’s encouragement of trade was repeatedly subordinated and sometimes sacrificed to more pressing dynastic and strategic interests. ‘It was in fact seldom more than a subsidiary purpose in his policy.’4

  This subordination of trade to diplomacy is most prominently shown in relations with the Netherlands. In this sphere ‘English merchants were the instruments, even the victims rather than the beneficiaries of Henry VII’s policy’.5 Trading prospects in that region were seriously affected by the growth of Antwerp as the principal market, a growth fostered by Maximilian, who wished to encourage a removal of trade from the turbulent centres of Ghent and Bruges. In 1488 he required a transfer of foreign traders from Bruges to Antwerp, which rapidly became the great entrepôt for the Portuguese spice trade and the centre where English goods could most profitably be marketed. English traders were reluctant to lose their contacts with smaller market centres in the Netherlands, but found themselves increasingly obliged to concentrate on Antwerp.

  But by late 1493 Henry VII’s patience with Maximilian’s and Burgundian countenance of Perkin Warbeck came to an end, and he decided on a policy of economic sanctions. He forbade English merchants or any merchants from England to trade at all with Antwerp and the Low Countries, and obliged them to make the best they could of sharing in the trade of the Staplers at Calais, except by special licence under the Great Seal.6 This drastic prohibition remained in force for more than two and a half years, until 24 February 1496,7 and any hope of being able to trade under such licence was quashed by a counter-embargo imposed by the Netherlands government in May 1494.

  In time, however, it was the Netherlands government that gave way and came to terms, and to that extent Henry VII’s policy may be described as successful. But whether Maximilian and Philip were moved more by economic considerations or by political ones springing from the failure of Perkin Warbeck to make much headway and their desire by then to secure Henry VII’s support against France must remain speculative. But judging from their subsequent actions in the commercial sphere, it was not primarily economic motives that induced them to agree to the treaty which Bacon conveniently immortalized, following, so he said, Flemish usage, as the Intercursus Magnus.1

  The commercial aspects of this treaty appeared to give traders from England good prospects for the renewal of trade. They were allowed to sell freely in any part of Archduke Philip’s dominions, except Flanders (included in 1502), without the payment of any tolls or customs in excess of the rates prevailing in the last fifty years; they were to get fair and speedy justice in the local courts, and a number of precise rules regarding commercial procedures were agreed.2

  But before long Philip thought fit to impose a new import duty on cloth, so that by 21 June 1496 Henry VII was obliged to write a dignified but firm and candid letter of expostulation to the archduke’s council, hinting that he knew how he should conduct himself if the treaty were not respected.3 In the absence of redress the English merchants reverted again to Calais.4 In June 1497 after much negotiation the new duty was withdrawn.5 Philip still tried to confine English traders to Antwerp and Bergen, but they declined to leave Calais until the autumn of 1498, and it was not until May 1499 that a new agreement was reached confirming the treaty of 1496.6

  Further dissatisfaction with renewed imposts imposed by the Netherlands government led, according to Henry VII’s own account, to a request by the English merchants that they might be allowed to revert to Calais once again, but this permission was countermanded when in 1502 Margaret of Savoy, then the regent, agreed to renew the treaty of 1496.1 Continued disputes over customs duties and the desire of Henry VII to secure the surrender of the ‘White Rose’, Edmund, earl of Suffolk, brought about another suspension of trade.2 Negotiations for a fresh treaty were not begun until 1504,3 but these dragged on until brought to a climax by Duke Philip’s involuntary visit to England in 1506. Philip did not empower his commissioners until after he had reached Falmouth and was soon to embark, and the treaty was not concluded until 30 April, four days after he left Falmouth. It was to be confirmed within three months, and Henry VII duly confirmed it on 15 May: but it had not been confirmed by Philip before he died at Bruges on 25 September.

  This treaty of 1506, which according to Bacon the Flemings called the Intercursus Malus, thus never became effective in the Netherlands, but according to the draft treaty English cloth was to be imported and transported and be saleable in Philip’s and his heir’s dominions in the Netherlands, free of any duties or imports, and numerous clauses clearly shifted the scales to the advantage of the English merchants, while the Netherlands merchants got little if anything beyond the treaty of 1496.4 It is not surprising therefore that after Philip’s death his sister Margaret (who in the meantime had rejected proposals for marriage with Henry VII) as regent during the minority of Archduke Charles firmly insisted that any effective agreement must do no more than confirm the treaty of 1496.5 This was the essence of the further treaty of 5 June 1507,6 which remained the basis of commercial relations between England and the Netherlands for the rest of Henry VII’s reign and the early years of Henry VIII.7

  Henry’s concession did not cause Margaret to change her mind on the matrimonial project; he had used economic sanctions to dispel the threat of Perkin Warbeck, and had secured the surrender of the ‘White Rose’, but in the end he had obtained little economic advantage except a favourable position as regards customs duties for English merchants. He had indeed ensured a prosperous market in the Netherlands, and so opened up prospects for the future in what was to be the greatest European entrepôt, but in the process of trying to get more he had over-reached himself and had suffered a diplomatic defeat.

  Henry VII’s policy towards the powerful Hanseatic League of German merchants in the Baltic ports was conditioned much more by commercial than political motives, and was primarily directed to reducing the privileged position of the Hanse in England and to furthering the trading prospects of the English merchants in the Baltic and Scandinavian regions. Something was achieved in these directions, but the achievements were limited by the practical possibilities, and in the long run were distorted by political considerations.1

  Edward IV had left behind him serious problems for any successor who might wish to grapple with the Hanse. He had been much indebted to the Hanseatic League for their help in 1471 and had granted them extraordinary privileges by the Treaty of Utrecht of 1474,2 including less heavy taxation than the English had to pay, full liberty of trade, and the right of judgment by special judges. Their headquarters in London, the Steelyard, was recognized as their free property. But the promises of reciprocal freedom of trade for English merchants were not kept, and the problem for Henry VII was how to force the Hanse to carry out their commitments. At the start he could not risk antagonizing the powerful League, and felt obliged to grant a charter, on 9 March 1486, which confirmed the Utrecht treaty, and another on 26 June ratifying the compensation for damages clauses in that treaty. The fact that the Hansards were not exempted from the provisions of the acts of 1486 and 1489,3 forbidding aliens from exporting undressed cloth, or bullion, and the ‘navigation act’, hardly amounted to whittling away their privileges. He need do little to compensate the Hanseatics when mobs attacked the Steelyard as protest against their attempting to profit from the suspension of English trade with the Netherlands in 1493 and could oblige them to desposit £20,000 as security that they also would suspend trade from England to the Netherlands whilst the suspension lasted. He could apply some restrictive interpretation on their privilege of importing their goods at preferential rates by constructing this phrase to mean only goods produc
ed or grown in their own territories and towns. Conferences at Antwerp in 1491 and Bruges in 1498–9 to try to reach amicable settlements on all these questions failed to find a settlement.

  But a settlement was reached, in the long run, by Henry VII’s giving way entirely to the Hanseatic desires. By the act of 1504,1 all previous acts, statutes, or ordinances which prejudiced the ‘ancient liberties and privileges’ of the merchants of the Hanse were nullified, provided that nothing should prejudice the mayor, sheriffs, citizens, and commonalty of the City of London. This measure thus restored to the Hanse their position under the treaty of Utrecht of 1474, notwithstanding the effect of any statute made since. This extraordinary acknowledgement of total defeat against the Hansards was clearly not dictated by economic considerations, and must therefore have been accepted for very strong political reasons. No political explanation has so far been offered other than Henry VII’s fears of Edmund, earl of Suffolk’s, the ‘White Rose’s’, machinations on the continent, and Henry’s desire to prevent the Hanseatic League from giving him any support, as once they had to Suffolk’s uncle Edward IV.2 If this is the true explanation it must raise doubts as to the validity of Henry VII’s political judgment by that date, for the sacrifice of English trading interests involved appears to be out of all proportion to the political risks, and is better considered under the heading of diplomacy.

  In the course of his endeavours to improve English trading prospects in the Baltic and north German markets, Henry sought and obtained an agreement with the king of Denmark in 1489, extended in 1490, which procured promises of freedom of trade on favourable terms in Denmark and Norway, the reopening of a trade depot at Bergen, and the right to fish in Icelandic waters.3 It was this sort of pressure that did induce the Hanse to consent at the conference of 1491 to English trade direct to Danzig, but as Danzig refused to allow it, the gesture was useless. When later Riga fell out of the League, Henry VII speedily came to a trade treaty with that town in 1499, but this proved likewise to be in vain, as Riga soon returned to the League and the treaty lapsed.1 Henry’s very protracted and tortuous negotiations with George, duke of Saxony and of Friesland, almost wholly undertaken to frustrate any hopes that the ubiquitous ‘White Rose* might have to get support from him, led to a treaty at the end of 1505 which envisaged amicable commercial relations, but appears to have had little practical results in the economic sphere, whatever may have been achieved in the field of Henry’s dynastic diplomacy.2

  The regions in which Henry met the least friction in negotiating trade agreements were those nearest home; Brittany and France. In 1486 he rapidly came to a commercial agreement with the duke of Brittany,3 and another with Charles VIII of France which removed the obstacles in Franco-British trade set up in the time of Edward IV.4 The ensuing stresses and strains arising from French designs on Brittany resulted in French impositions on English merchants, but these were modified by the Treaty of Étaples in 14925 and removed in 1495. A new Anglo-French commercial treaty in 14986 settled matters for the rest of the reign. There had been no difficulty in 1489 in renewing the 1378 treaty with Portugal.7

  Henry VII’s diplomatic dealings with Spain were so much conditioned by broader questions of policy and the project for the matrimonial alliance that the commercial aspect was subordinate, but by no means insignificant. In December 1485 Henry VII could do no more than confirm the privileges granted to the Spanish merchants by Edward IV in 1486,8 which exempted them from the duties payable by other aliens (except the Hansards) on the export of English goods, and under these conditions the Spanish share of Anglo-Spanish trade prospered, even if restricted somewhat by the ‘navigation acts’ of 1466 to 1489. But the political pressures which resulted in the earliest major diplomatic success of the reign, the Treaty of Medina del Campo, 27 March 1489,1 brought commercial clauses highly favourable to the English. The English in Spain and the Spaniards in England were to be in the same position, but customs duties were to be fixed on both sides at the rates prevailing thirty years before. This meant for the Spaniards that they were deprived of the favourable rates granted by Edward IV in 1466. Subsequent efforts by the Spaniards to amend these clauses failed. The later treaty of I499,2 couched in very amicable terms and intended to bring the marriage proposals to a conclusion, confirmed the reciprocity of commerce, but said nothing about the rate of customs duties. The Spaniards had lost their privileged position and some of their share of Anglo-Spanish trade, but Castile in 1494 had introduced a ‘navigation’ act of its own which forbade the export of goods in foreign ships when Spanish ships were available, and in so far as it enforced this law it reduced the dispatch of English ships to Spanish ports.

  Henry VII’s other efforts at promoting trading opportunities elsewhere in the Mediterranean met with no more than very partial success. The great difficulty here was to make inroads on the virtual monopoly of Venice in English trading with the eastern Mediterranean. The spices and luxury trade with the Orient, the wines of Greece and Crete, and the dried fruits of the Levant largely came to England in Venetian galleys putting in to Southampton, while the wool and woollen cloth of England returned in the same galleys to Venice, and northern Italy.3 Any attempt of English traders to encroach on the trade was apt to be confronted by a Venetian imposition of extra tax. The chief hope of making headway depended upon the manipulation of Venetian-Florentine rivalries. In December 1490 Henry made a treaty with Florence, whereby the Florentine port of Pisa was recognized as the Italian Staple for English wool. The export of English wool to Venice was restricted and its transport confined to English ships. Venetian reprisals provoked in 1492 an English act of Parliament4 imposing a heavy duty on wines brought to England in Venetian ships. But in the meantime the treaty with the Florentines, who had themselves initiated the proposals as a means of securing a monopoly of the English wool trade for Pisa, did something to promote English trade in the region, and to raise Henry VII’s diplomatic prestige, but the treaty was probably never fully effective, and in any event the revolt of Pisa against Florence in 1494 upset the local commercial system, and the prospects of any considerable English trade there were disappointed.1

  1 G. R. Elton, ‘State planning in early Tudor England’, Econ.H.R., 2nd ser. XIII (1961), 433–9, esp. 439.

  2 P. Ramsey, Tudor economic problems (1963), 177.

  1 cf. R. B. Wernham, Before the Armada (1966), 62.

  2 See below, p. 224.

  3 See below, p. 232 ff.

  4 e.g. Busch, op. cit. ch. VII; and followers thereof.

  5 1 Henry VII, c. 8; S.R., II, 502.

  6 4 Henry VII, c. 10; S.R., II, 534. Toulouse wood was added to the imports specified, and the employment of foreign ships was forbidden if English ships were available.

  1 1 Henry VII, c. 3; S.R., II, 501.

  2 3 Henry VII, c. 9; S.R., II, 517.

  3 19 Henry VII, c. 7; S.R., II, 652.

  4 12 Henry VII, c. 6; S.R., II, 638.

  5 3 Henry VII, c. 9; S.R., II, 518.

  6 1 Henry VII, c. 10; S.R., II, 507.

  7 7 Henry VII, c. 7; S.R., II, 553.

  8 1 Henry VII, c. 5; S.R., II, 502, no tanner to be a currier; 1 Henry VII, c. 9; S.R., II, 506, reciting 22 Edward IV, c. 3, and 1 Richard III, c. 10, and confirming for twenty years restrictions on import of certain silk goods by aliens; 3 Henry VII, c. 12, S.R., II, 520, reciting 7 Edward IV, c. 3, and prohibiting export of woollen cloths incompletely finished; 4 Henry VII, c. 2 (possibly initiated by the Crown), S.R., II, 526: regulations for finers and porters of gold and silver, who are to sell to the Mint or goldsmiths; 5 Henry VII, c. 3; S.R., II, 527, butchers not to slay beasts within the City of London or any walled town or in Cambridge, Carlisle and Berwick excepted; 4 Henry VII, c. 11; S.R., II, 535, regulating the seasons for purchase of wool in certain counties; 4 Henry VII, c. 22; S.R., II, 545, regulating the weight and working of gold (threads for embroideries) from Venice, Florence, and Genoa; 11 Henry VII, c. 19; S.R., II, 582, for the proper stuffing of beds; 11 Henry VII
, c. 27; S.R., II, 591, against deceitful foreign fustians; 12 Henry VII, c. 1; S.R., II, 636, for apprentices for Norfolk worsted makers; 12 Henry VII, c. 4, reciting 1 Richard III, c. 8, concerning the making of woollen cloth; 12 Henry VII, c. 23; S.R., II, 587, regulating sale of salmon and other fish by aliens; 19 Henry VII, c. 6; S.R., II, 651, restricting sale of pewter to fairs and private houses until the next parliament; 19 Henry VII, c. 17; S.R., II, 662, regulating the craft of worsted sheering; 19 Henry VII, c. 21; S.R., II, 664, import of certain silk goods prohibited; 19 Henry VII, c. 19; S.R., II, 663, reciting 2 Henry VI, c. 7, and 1 Henry VII, c. 5, regulating the trades of cordwainers, curriers, and tanners.