Henry VII

by S B Chrimes

  The measure of his success is not, however, to be found by estimating his consistency or the coherence of his system, or in any particular example of the diplomatic skill of his own, or of his agents, who served him well. Rather it is to be found by comparing the extreme weakness of his international position in 1485 with its unspectacular but substantial strength towards the end of his reign. At the start his position was weak indeed. He became king as the not very impressive protégé of the French government, and as one who owed much also to the duke of Brittany. He began his kingly career as an unknown and insignificant, though for the moment at least, a successful, rebel and quasi-usurper whose potential could hardly have been deemed very fearsome by foreign rulers,2 who might however hope to use him or to embarrass him for their own ends but who scarcely expected to be cajoled or deflected by him. The potentates with whom Henry VII was principally concerned were those of Burgundy, France, Castile and Aragon, and the four popes of the period. Maximilian I, king of the Romans from 1486, emperor from 1493, son of Emperor Frederick III (of Hapsburg), married in 1477 as his first wife Mary, daughter and heiress of Charles the Bold, duke of Burgundy by his second wife Isabella of Bourbon. Charles subsequently married Edward IV’s sister Margaret. Maximilian and Mary’s son Philip married Joanna, heiress of Castile; and their son was the future emperor, Charles V; and their daughter Margaret married firstly John, son of Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, and secondly Philibert II of Savoy. The youngest daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, Catherine, became the bride of Prince Arthur and subsequently of Henry VIII. Louis XI of Valois died in 1483. His elder daughter Anne, who had married Peter II, duke of Bourbon, acted as regent during the minority of his son Charles VIII, who married Anne, duchess of Brittany, in 1491, who subsequently married as his second wife Louis XII, the husband of Louis XI’s youngest daughter Jeanne. Louis XII’s third wife was to be Mary, Henry VII’s younger daughter.

  Map 6 Northern France and the Low Countries

  But as his reign progressed all of these sovereigns and popes had learnt that he was a monarch who could not readily be bent to their wills, and one whose goodwill it was desirable to cultivate. Henry achieved this position, moreover, without sacrificing any essential interests and without engaging in any but minor military activities. He attained his meed of triumph because he negotiated from a position of domestic strength that grew steadily as the years passed. The weakling among sovereigns had become an enviable and eventually unassailable dynast whose sights were pretty firmly set on the attainable, or who at any rate was not disposed to pursue any will-o’-the-wisps into the quicksands of diplomatic disaster.

  Circumstances in the nature of things and circumstances that arose as events unfolded themselves determined that certain objectives inevitably presented themselves to Henry. He must try to restrain hostile actions by Scotland and if possible safeguard his northern borders by establishing amicable relations with that dangerously contiguous foreign realm. He could not be unaware of the home-truth contained in Sixtus V’s telling phrase, ‘England is only half an island’.1 He could scarcely refrain from rendering some aid, however nominal, to the duchy of Brittany when its hour of reckoning with Charles VIII of France came, but he could not afford to antagonize France unduly, and had to be prepared to accept failure to defend Brittany’s independence in the long run. Should a confrontation with France come, he must not appear to emerge from it with less than Edward IV had done. He must use all his skill to reduce and if possible eliminate the capacity of Scotland, France, Spain, and Burgundy to profit from Yorkist pretenders and claimants and take all feasible measures to extinguish the threat to his dynasty from the ‘White Rose’, by whomsoever it might be aided and abetted. He must, so far as he could, play off Spain and France against each other, so as to diminish the capacity of either to do him mischief, and to use Maximilian in the same game as circumstances, including Maximilian’s volatile schemes and the interests of trade with the Netherlands, might from time to time dictate. Should opportunity offer, he would need to try to cement truces and alliances, otherwise apt to be short-lived and shifting, with appropriate marriages of his children, or even, after he had become a widower, with a second marriage of his own, if only he could make a match that was practicable and profitable. As it turned out he could not so provide for himself, but at the end of his reign he had in fact attained a very high degree of success in the pursuit of these other objectives. By then he had managed to eliminate the ‘White Rose’ from the arena of serious politics, had staved off the threats or hostilities of all foreign powers, had married his eldest son into the royal house of Spain and when the death of that son terminated the connection, so arranged matters that it was still possible to preserve the connection by the substitution of his second and only surviving son; had married his elder daughter into the royal house of Scotland; had betrothed his younger daughter to the young man destined to become the Emperor Charles V, even if unbeknown to him she became, not the empress, but the queen of France. By 1509, the adventurer of 1485 had put his house firmly alongside the royal dynasties of Europe, and had brought his realm to a position in international affairs such as it had scarcely ever before attained, at any rate since the days when it seemed that Henry V would unite in himself the crowns of England and France. No such aspirations deflected Henry VII from his pursuit of the practicable. But he did much to confirm and consolidate the revival of England’s prestige that had been initiated by Edward IV. He largely cast the role that England was to play in European affairs far into the modern period.

  The inherent difficulty in expounding diplomatic history lies in the fact that whereas in reality a multitude of motives, moves, and negotiations are activated more or less simultaneously, it is impossible in exposition to unravel the threads at the rate of more than one or two at a time if the exposition is to be intelligible. The selectivity necessarily imposed upon the historian of any theme inevitably results in an over-simplification and artificiality which fail to reflect the complex reality. This defect is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in diplomatic history. As in all historical studies, the historian has an advantage denied to the men who made the history itself. We are in a position to know the outcome of their actions, whereas they could only guess and hope what the upshot would be.

  Three fairly clear phases of Henry’s foreign policy are discernible. The first of these ran from the first cautious moves in 1485 up to the Treaty of Étaples with France in 1492; in the course of it the Breton question was settled, Anglo-French relations were defined for the time being, the project for an Anglo-Spanish matrimonial alliance was first mooted, and the Treaty of Medina del Campo in 1489 set up a basis for further negotiations with Spain.

  The second phase went up to 1503. European affairs in this period were largely conditioned by the freedom which Charles VIII of France had gained during the earlier phase to turn his aggressive attentions in an easterly direction and to invade Italy, in 1494, a turning-point in continental history. This fresh orientation of affairs enabled Henry VII to figure as a significant European monarch by bringing him into the Holy League of 1496, designed to restrain Charles VIII’s aggrandizements, as well as by the conclusion in the same year of the important commercial treaty with the Netherlands; whilst he also initiated proposals for a marriage treaty between his daughter Margaret and James IV of Scotland, and made such a proposal possible by the conclusion in 1497 of the Treaty of Ayton, the first treaty of peace with Scotland since 1328; in the same year the negotiations with Spain reached the stage of a marriage treaty and the betrothal of Prince Arthur and Catherine; before this phase was over, the marriage of Arthur and Catherine had taken place and been terminated by the death of the prince in April 1502; the question of her being married to Prince Henry had been mooted; the marriage of James IV and Margaret had occurred in November 1503, four months after Henry’s queen, Elizabeth, had died.

  The third phase of Henry VII’s foreign policy was largely conditioned by the facts that the ki
ng was now a widower and could consider the possibilities of a matrimonial alliance on his own account, and of the death in November 1504 of Isabella of Castile, which not only threatened that cohesion of Castile and Aragon which went to make up ‘Spain’, but reduced Ferdinand of Aragon to a widowerhood similar to Henry’s and also raised to the forefront the question of the succession to Castile. The heiress was the eldest daughter of Isabella and Ferdinand, Joanna, married to the Archduke Philip of the Netherlands, with whom Henry VII came into very friendly relations in 1506. But Philip’s death before the end of that year entirely changed the prospects. With him died the union of the Netherlands and Castile, leaving Joanna a disconsolate widow, Henry VII’s marriage with whom might have substituted some sort of union of Castile and England. This somewhat grandiose project did not materialize, but the next best thing, also destined to frustration, that Henry could devise was the betrothal of his second daughter Mary to Joanna and Philip’s son – the Archduke Charles. In the meantime in 1505 Ferdinand had swallowed his antipathies towards France, and solved his widowerhood problem by marrying a niece of Louis XII, king of France since 1498. When, therefore, the time came in December 1508 for Louis XII, Maximilian, the Archduke Charles, Ferdinand, and the pope to arrange among themselves the League of Cambrai, Henry was not invited to join in this plot directed against Venice. Nevertheless, his reign did not end by any means on a note unfavourable to himself. He remained uncommitted to the plans of the European potentates, but at the same time, each of them, for their own purposes, sought his goodwill and cultivated friendly relations with him. He could by that time scarcely have desired much more than that.

  Henry VII’s first moves in the sphere of foreign affairs were designed to ensure a breathing space before more far-reaching policies could be pursued. Having been assisted by France to make the expedition that had led to Bosworth, naturally he sought to establish relations with that realm. A proclamation of a one-year truce with France was made on 12 October 1485, and this was subsequently extended to last until January 1489.1 Although James III of Scotland had shown that his sympathies laid with Henry rather than Richard III, and some Scots may have participated at Bosworth,2 tensions between the two countries continued; attempts at establishing pacific relations got off to a slow start, but were actively pursued by Henry as circumstances permitted.3 By 3 July 1486 a three-year truce was signed, confirmed, and ratified by October.4 Negotiations with James III went on almost continuously, and abortive proposals for an alliance in the form of a marriage between James III and Henry VII’s mother-in-law, the widow of Edward IV, as well as between his two sons and two of her daughters, were seriously considered.5 But the political conditions in Scotland were not conducive to such schemes. Soon James III was confronted with the rebellion that was a prelude to his assassination and the accession of his son as James IV, aged fifteen, on 11 June 1488. Any further advance must needs wait on events, and in the meantime Henry maintained his contacts and agents in Scotland and was kept fully informed of Scottish affairs.6 Before this, in July 1486, amicable relations had been confirmed with his former host, the duke of Brittany, by the conclusion of a commercial treaty.7

  Overtures from Maximilian, king of the Romans, however, resulted only in a renewal of Edward IV’s treaty as from January 1487 for one year.1 As early as March 1488 negotiations for a future marriage between the infants Prince Arthur and Catherine of Aragon were begun, which led to a draft treaty by 7 July2 and paved the way to the Treaty of Medina del Campo, on 27 March 1489. But before that date arrived Breton affairs had grown to crisis point, and Henry VII was faced with the need to consider intervention.

  The deterioration in the affairs of Brittany, the prospect of the succession to the duchy of a young heiress in the event of the death of the aged and infirm Duke Francis II, the intrigues resulting from the marriageability of the heiress, Anne, and the overt intentions of Charles VIII of France to intervene and to annex the duchy3 brought Henry VII reluctantly to the point of agreeing in the Treaty of Redon (14 February 1489) to aid Brittany.4 He had striven hard to avoid this commitment. He had sent envoys to try to mediate between Brittany and France, had extended his truce with France until January 1490,5 had connived at the unofficial military intervention by Edward Woodville, Lord Scales, governor of the Isle of Wight, which did nothing to prevent disaster for Brittany at the battle of St Aubin du Cormier on 28 July 1488. But by 20 August Duke Francis capitulated, acknowledged himself to be Charles VIII’s vassal, and died three weeks later. The wardship of the twelve-year-old heiress Anne was at once claimed by the king of France. Henry feverishly sent another mission to France, and sought the aid or the countenance of Ferdinand and Isabella, of Maximilian and his son the Archduke Philip. Negotiations with the former resulted in the Treaty of Medina del Campo, and with the latter to a treaty which in effect renewed Edward IV’s treaty of 1478.

  The Treaty of Medina del Campo,6 the negotiations for which were protracted and difficult, was a considerable triumph for Henry VII, who showed himself a tougher diplomat than Ferdinand at first thought him to be. Apart from haggling over the precise terms of dowry and the date for the bride’s arrival in England, the important thing was that the Tudors were brought into a definite prospect of marriage with the Spanish royal family. The prospect was of a matrimonial alliance of far greater significance than had befallen the English monarchy since the far-off days when Henry V had married the daughter of the king of France, Henry VII’s grandmother. It was important too that Ferdinand should have been brought to repudiate aid to any of Henry’s rebels. The fact that at the same time he was obliged to agree to clauses concerning attitudes towards France that were more advantageous to Ferdinand than to himself, was much less important, as they were more academic than practical.1

  But in the end, Henry had to ‘go it alone’. He could not avoid asking the parliament of 1489–90 for financial aid, and dispatched the six thousand men promised in the Treaty of Redon to go to the defence of Brittany in April 1489. Despite the English aid under Daubeney, which secured a victory for Maximilian’s forces at Dixmude on 13 June, all was in vain.2 Maximilian was soon bought off by Charles VIII, and his attempt at clinching matters by marrying Duchess Anne by proxy in early 1491 proved to be derisory. All the trump cards were in Charles VIII’s hands. Nothing could now impede his virtual conquest of the duchy nor indeed of Anne herself, to whom he was married on 6 December 1491. The king of France was now duke of Brittany and the duchess was queen of France.

  The dilemma now facing Henry VII was perhaps the most acute of his whole reign. He could scarcely hope to reverse the fait accompli but he could not avoid a direct military confrontation with France. He must needs vindicate his pledge to support Brittany, show that his intervention could not be flouted, and display that his part in international affairs was not to be merely supine. But at the same time he could not afford the grave risks that would follow from any major military defeat at the hands of Charles VIII.

  Henry made a brave show at penalizing the Valois. He could assert his intention of claiming the crown of France for himself, elaborately prepare for war, and set out himself with a substantial army to Calais and lay siege to Boulogne in October 1492. But it was already very late in the season for serious military campaigns, and by 27 October he was able to consult his councillors on proposals for peace which had been sent to him at Étaples. Within a few days, by 3 November, these proposals were accepted.1 Charles VIII, being eager and anxious to be freed from English annoyances so that he could set out to pursue his aggressive policies in Italy, was quick enough to be placatory. Henry got what he wanted – Charles’s agreement not to assist Henry’s rebels and to pay off the arrears of the payments due under the Treaty of Picquigny and a large indemnity for the costs of Henry’s interventions in Brittany, amounting in all to 745,000 gold crowns payable at the rate of 50,000 crowns a year.

  By his rapid intervention at a crucial moment Henry had scored something of a triumph. He had obliged the
king of France to come to terms quickly, had scotched any hopes that Perkin Warbeck entertained of help from Charles VIII, and had secured a useful supplement to his income. These gains were undoubtedly important to him in the circumstances of 1492, but none the less they concealed the harsh fact that his endeavour to save Brittany had entirely failed. The independence of the duchy had gone for ever. The farther side of the Channel, except for Calais, was now to be French. The power of the French monarchy and its potentiality for future action inimicable to English interests had become much greater. But there was nothing that Henry VII could effectively do to prevent these results. He had shown that he could not be ignored in continental affairs, but must be placated. He had done what he could and had secured solid concessions. Time alone would show the outcome. His vacillating allies were also placated. By January 1493 Ferdinand of Aragon was appeased by France’s cession to him of Rousillon and Cerdagne;2 by May Maximilian’s hostility was deflected by the cession of Artois and Franche-Comté. By September 1494 Charles VIII was free to march towards the Alps.

  Perhaps Henry VII’s greatest successes fell within the period of the second phase, running from the end of 1492 to the end of 1503. These years saw some of the plans he had initiated during the first phase come to fruition without undue strain and anxiety, and it was not until the last year or so of this second phase that he suffered the shattering blows of the death of his eldest son and of his queen, both of which events not only represented grave personal loss but imperilled or distorted the objectives of his diplomacy.

  The successes in the early years of this phase, however, were scored not so much by Henry’s own moves as by the consequences of Charles VIII’s triumphs in Italy. These so alarmed the European powers that by March 1495 the League of Venice was formed by the pope, Ferdinand, Maximilian, Venice, and Milan to restrain him and if possible to oust him from Italy. This objective was realized without any assistance from England, but Ferdinand spared no effort to strengthen his own position by sweetening his relations with both Maximilian and Henry VII. He married his daughter Joanna, the heiress of Castile, to Maximilian’s son the Archduke Philip of Burgundy (1496); the following year saw a confirmation of the treaty made in 1496 for the future marriage of his youngest daughter Catherine with Prince Arthur; his agents had been active in promoting negotiations for a treaty between England and Scotland, and the Treaty of Ayton of 1497 marked the success of these protracted efforts.