Salamanca, 1812
Page 10
We ought unquestionably to have possessed ourselves of them the very first thing, but through some unaccountable Carelessness, they remained unoccupied. The French saw the importance of these Heights, but did not give us jealousy for them by sending at once a Large Body against them. They sent out some straggling parties in different directions which when they got near the foremost height ran together and got to the summit before a small party of the Portuguese caçadores which had been sent to prevent them could arrive. They were only in time to save the other height which was immediately occupied in Force by the 4th Division.13
Many years later the officer who commanded the caçadores, Major (later Sir) John Lillie, told Napier that when he was sent forward he had no idea that there were French troops in the immediate vicinity and that, when he saw them, he took them for Spaniards. It was not until the two bodies were within a few yards of each other, that the French suddenly opened fire. Although Lillie claims that ‘We contested the point so long as anything like an equality of numbers permitted us’, it seems likely that the caçadores were quickly broken, probably as much by the surprise as by actual losses. This at least is the impression given by another British officer in the Portuguese service, who says that the French ‘drove back our people, several of whom were wounded’. Wellington admitted in his official dispatch that by this success the French ‘strengthened materially their own position, and had in their power increased means of annoying ours.’14 French possession of the Greater Arapile cramped Wellington's forces and made even a retreat more difficult, although if the allies had gained the hill they might have found it awkward to hold.
Both sides now consolidated their new possessions. The Lesser Arapile was held by William Anson's brigade of the Fourth Division with the 3/27th on the summit, together with two 9-pounders from Sympher's King's German Legion battery, and the 1/40th in support. The remainder of Cole's division occupied the hill behind the village of Los Arapiles, with Pack's brigade filling the gap between the two heights.15 The allied line now formed almost a right angle with the Lesser Arapile at the corner. It may have been at this time, or a little later, that Wellington gave orders for Pakenham's division and D'Urban's cavalry to cross the Tormes and to form near Aldea Tejada, some four miles north-west of Los Arapiles. This was far beyond the existing allied line, but in this position they would be well placed to support a retreat or check any wide sweep round the allied flank, while it was clear that the French were committed to operating on the south bank of the Tormes.16
Bonnet occupied the Greater Arapile with the 120th Ligne, keeping his other regiments a little to the rear in support, where they were sheltered from allied fire by the hill. Despite the slope the French brought a number of guns up to the summit of the hill: it was too steep for horses to haul them up, so the barrels were dismounted and carried to the top by grenadiers, which lightened the gun-carriages sufficiently for them to be dragged up as well.17 Bringing up ammunition for these guns must have been laborious work, and the steepness of the hill created other problems: a rapid withdrawal was impossible, while there was some ‘dead ground’ in front, for the gun barrels could not be depressed sufficiently to cover all of the forward slope of the hill, so that attacking troops could gain some shelter there. But the approaches were bare and coverless and could be swept by the guns on the summit, while the position protected them completely from the allied cavalry and vastly reduced the risk of a surprise or flank attack. It also placed the French guns in an excellent position to bombard the allied army, especially the troops occupying the Lesser Arapile, which was well within range.
Marmont soon joined Bonnet on the Greater Arapile. From its summit the world seems open and boundless, but the view is actually less revealing than first impressions suggest. The gentle undulations of ground were sufficient to conceal much, though certainly not all, of Wellington's army, while despite the rain of the night before the thousands of men and horses were already beginning to kick up clouds of dust. Even so, the view and the strength of the position encouraged Marmont to continue his turning movement, although he did so with considerable caution. Foy remained at Calvarrasa de Arriba, where he occupied a strong position guarding the flank and rear of the army, with Ferey's division and Boyer's dragoons in support. In time, Sarrut's division, having crossed the Tormes, would also join him, so that Marmont was well placed if Wellington should suddenly assume the offensive. Bonnet's division holding the Greater Arapile was another bastion of strength, under whose protection Marmont gradually shifted the remaining divisions of his army south-west, heading for the edge of the forest behind the Greater Arapile and for the low ridge of El Sierro. Marmont soon established a powerful battery of twenty guns on this ridge to protect his units as they emerged from the wood and regained their order – for all accounts are agreed that the French movements were rapid but straggling and irregular.
Wellington viewed these manoeuvres with concern, for if the French continued to turn his flank he would soon be forced to retreat, while their possession of the Greater Arapile and the proximity of the two armies would make this a delicate operation full of risks. He had already matched the French movements with some of his own: the First Division had been brought up to support the Fourth and Pack along the line from the Lesser Arapile to the village of Los Arapiles, and most of Victor Alten's brigade of light cavalry, under Arentschildt, had been transferred from the far left to the right of the army, where it deployed on the outer flank of the infantry, beyond the village. But these were merely precautionary moves and would not make a retreat unnecessary, and Wellington was still hoping to avoid the latter.
Late in the morning – some accounts say 11 o'clock, others noon; as usual it is impossible to be precise about the time – he decided to attack the French on the Greater Arapile. Orders were issued and the First Division moved forward, the Guards brigade occupying the village. But then, before the attack could be properly launched, it was cancelled and the troops were withdrawn, leaving only the light companies of the Guards to defend the village.18 A letter, apparently written by Henry Campbell, commander of the First Division, adds a few interesting details:
Another view of the battle. Map from Jean Sarramon's La Battaille des Arapiles, showing his view of the terrain and the location of the troops between 9 and 11am. (In Sarramon's book the map is rather larger, 230 × 184mm, and with the troops and the river coloured in blue, red and green.)
Lord W. at one time determined to attack them, and sent for me, and told me to move forward in two Columns up a Hill in front of our Right, where this Division then was, and attack their left, while the 4th Division was to attack them in front, but I had hardly put the Columns in motion, before I received a Counter Order and moved back to the Ground I had before quitted.19
This implies that Wellington's plan was to attack the Greater Arapile in front with the Fourth Division, while the First Division swung round to assault its eastern end and to engage the supporting troops to its rear. What is not clear is whether Wellington intended this as a limited operation to seize the Greater Arapile and so facilitate his retreat if it should be unavoidable, or as the first stage of a full-scale battle. However, the armies were so close that it would have been very difficult to limit the action, while if the initial allied attack had succeeded Wellington would have been well placed to take the French at a great disadvantage. But the French position was extremely strong; the western end of the Greater Arapile is particularly rocky and precipitous, and it was well occupied and well supported. Even with hindsight it is impossible to tell whether the attack would have succeeded or failed.
What is fairly certain is that it was on Beresford's advice that the attack was cancelled. He had been reconnoitring the French position and had observed strong forces to their rear (it was not clear if these were Bonnet's reserves or other French divisions further back) and he urged caution as he had done throughout the campaign. His voice may have been seconded by Stapleton Cotton, for an officer in the Guards who re
corded many headquarters rumours reports that ‘The two senior officers next to Ld Wellington were decidedly averse to attack.’20 But more important than Cotton's opinion was the suggestion that the French might be preparing to launch an attack of their own, for Wellington still much preferred to fight on the defensive.
And so the proposed attack was cancelled, and Wellington re-positioned his troops to meet a French assault which never came. But he did not altogether give up the idea of taking the initiative. The sources are too fragmentary to trace the evolution of his plans with confidence, but it seems that he continued to look for an opportunity to strike throughout the afternoon, and that several other plans of attack may have been considered only to be deferred or rejected. Meanwhile, Wellington prepared to retreat if necessary. Early in the day, soon after the French seized the Greater Arapile, he had instructed Colonel De Lancey to draw up plans for a withdrawal, while during the morning or early afternoon orders were issued to the commissariat and other supporting services to begin their march. This caused great discontent among Wellington's staff, who were confident that the army would triumph if only it was allowed to fight, and who deeply resented Beresford's dampening influence on Wellington's initiative.21
Among the arrangements Wellington made to resist a French attack was the withdrawal of Sympher's two guns from the Lesser Arapile – they joined the rest of their battery on the hill behind the village of Los Arapiles – and their replacement with two 6-pounders from the battery of horse artillery attached to the Seventh Division. These guns were commanded by Captain Dyneley, and the importance of his task was made clear to him, as he later explained to his brother:
The order I received had certainly a very awkward signification: ‘His Lordship desires you will get your guns up that height and wishes you to defend it as long as you have a man left to your guns. In the event of your being obliged to retire, you will spike your guns and leave them and the General officer commanding has most positive orders that he supports you to the last; in fact,’ his Lordship says, ‘he must have the hill kept.’
From these orders I made sure of an ‘ex’ or ‘dis’-tinguish. I got my guns up with the assistance of a company of the 40th regiment, unloaded my limbers and sent them and my gunners' horses to the rear, as I thought, if we had to run for it, my men should get away as fast as the infantry. On arrival on the hill I had some satisfaction in finding my friend General Cole in command, knowing there was not any run in him. But the enemy never put us to the test.22
Later in the day Dyneley was joined by the remaining four guns in the troop, and they replied to the French battery on the Greater Arapile.
Marmont had observed Wellington's preparations for an attack and had been much encouraged by their cancellation. He thought that Wellington would now retreat and was confirmed in this idea by the sight of troops moving westwards in the allied rear, as Wellington shifted his reserves from his left to his right wing, and perhaps also by the dust raised by Pakenham's division and D'Urban's cavalry as they moved towards Aldea Tejada. But still Marmont did not act precipitately. He did not want a battle which would place the success of the whole campaign at risk; rather he sought to maul the allied rearguard and so gain a triumph which would add éclat to the solid success he had already gained. He would not attack the allies directly until he could be sure that their main body was withdrawing, but in the meantime he would extend his left wing on to the Monte de Azan, thus continuing to turn Wellington's flank and threatening the allies' communications as he had done so successfully in recent days.
Marmont probably issued his orders between 1 and 2 o'clock, an hour or two after Wellington had cancelled his attack. Maucune, with the leading division of the French left wing, would advance on to the Monte de Azan, with Curto's light cavalry acting as a screen in front and on his flank. He would be supported by several batteries of artillery and Thomières's 7th Division, while Clausel's 2nd Division would be in reserve when it arrived, and Taupin's 6th Division would occupy the El Sierro ridge in the rear. It appears that Clausel and Taupin were lagging behind; possibly they had been delayed by the march through the forest, or Clausel may have been waiting to be rejoined by the 27th Ligne, which had been recalled from Alba de Tormes some hours earlier.23 At the same time Marmont ordered Boyer to leave one of his regiments of dragoons to protect Foy's right flank, and to bring the remaining three regiments of his cavalry division to the centre of the army. Finally, he detached the 122nd Ligne from Bonnet's division to occupy a gentle rise halfway between the Greater Arapile and Monte de Azan.24
These movements were not without risk: they would extend Marmont's army in a wide arc perhaps five miles long, with the allied army concentrated inside the arc. The Monte de Azan is open ground, nothing like the strong defensive position of the heights of Calvarrasa de Arriba which Foy occupied; and it was always dangerous to manoeuvre so close to the enemy. The exact degree of risk is impossible to determine, for it depends on the precise location of French divisions – particularly Clausel and Taupin – which we simply do not know. Still, Marmont's whole campaign had been bold, and he had good reason to think that Wellington would not suddenly change character and take the offensive, while, even if he did, the French position was far from hopeless, for Maucune had Thomières, Curto and a powerful force of artillery to provide immediate support, with Clausel and Taupin further back.
Maucune's advance was covered by Curto's light cavalry, who soon began skirmishing with the German Hussars and 14th Light Dragoons of Victor Alten's brigade. The French had the better of this affair, although the fighting was not very serious: a British infantry officer who observed it described it as ‘the most beautiful and stage-like skirmishing’, while a light infantry officer said that watching the spectacle,‘whiled away some hours for us most agreeably’. The historian of the King's German Legion admits that the Hussars generally had the worst of it and suffered some loss, but gives details of one creditable incident: ‘Lieutenant Bobers of the regiment, however, made a gallant reprisal, attacking a superior number of the enemy with twenty hussars; rescuing a wounded man from the middle of the enemy's ranks, and bringing in several prisoners.’25
In his Mémoires Marmont claims that he ordered Maucune to occupy only the near end of the Monte de Azan, but that his hot-headed subordinate pushed forward precipitately and, with his light infantry, attacked the allied troops who were defending the village of Los Arapiles. Whoever was to blame – and Marmont had an obvious motive for attributing the fault to his subordinate, while such behaviour would be in character for Maucune – the result was dangerous. Maucune's division was too far forward, too close to the allied position, and lacked adequate supports. There was a gap of almost a mile between Maucune's right flank and the Greater Arapile, which the 122nd Ligne was quite inadequate to fill, while there was a risk that the fighting in the village might escalate. The problem was not yet insuperable, but it suggests that the French movements were beginning to appear careless and overconfident.
The village of Arapiles was defended by the light companies of the British Guards brigade (First Division) and of the Fusilier brigade (Fourth Division), together with the company of Brunswick Oels light infantry attached to the Fusiliers. Friedrich von Wachholtz of the Brunswickers gives by far the best first-hand account of this fighting in his journal. His company had been deployed in open order in front of the village some hours before: ‘We lay on our stomachs on the open field, nibbled on rusks [and] drank fresh water which the inhabitants of Arapiles brought us.’ The initial French advance, by a mere company of voltigeurs, was tentative, and Wachholtz's men opened a slow fire to keep their opponents at a distance. But then the French were reinforced and pressed forward, while their artillery inflicted some losses on the allies, including severely wounding Major Dalmer of the 23rd Fusiliers, who was in overall command of the Fourth Division light infantry in the area. The allied skirmishers fell back to the village and were closely followed by the French until the fire of Sympher's
guns checked their advance – at this point, seeing their opportunity, the allies charged and drove the voltigeurs back. However, the French were soon reinforced and made a new attack, which carried them into the village before the allied reserves were fed into the fray and drove them out again. This was as far as the French came, although the skirmishing continued for some time. Wachholtz says that his company lost ten men wounded from an initial strength of about fifty-four all ranks. The losses of the light companies of the Fusiliers are merged with those of their parent regiments, but the Coldstream Guards lost thirty-eight casualties, including seven men killed, and the Third Guards suffered twenty-four, with the regimental historians confirming that these casualties came almost entirely from the light companies. Given the small numbers of men engaged, these losses were quite heavy, especially as the allies had the advantage of fighting from under cover.26
It is not known why the French abandoned their attack on the village. Perhaps the stiff resistance of the allied light infantry convinced Maucune that there was nothing to be gained by pressing the attack, or he may have obeyed the order to withdraw which Marmont claims to have sent him.27 Alternatively the sudden appearance of fresh allied troops (Leith's Fifth Division) to the north and west of the village may have persuaded him to retire to a more respectful distance from the allied line. The evidence for Maucune's movements is extremely sparse, but it seems likely that when attacking the village he had brought at least part of the main body of his division to the top of the hillside overlooking Los Arapiles, and that when the attack was given up, he moved further west, occupying the long, gentle forward slope of the plateau, due south of Las Torres.