Salamanca, 1812

by Rory Muir

  The enemy, as I before observed, seemed to be rather in confusion. The cavalry on our right was to them a puzzle. The enemy seemed to have formed parts of squares, and parts of lines, and before they could recover from their panic, our murderous fire opened, which swept all before it. Their first line we fairly ran over, and saw our men jumping over huge grenadiers, who lay down exhausted through heat and fatigue, unhurt, in the hope of escaping …

  The first line of the enemy being broken and falling back in confusion, the 2nd lined the side of a deep trench cut by the torrents of water which roll down from the hills near the village of Arapiles, and so deep and broad that it took a good spring to leap over it. Here the 2nd line kept up a heavy fire of musketry, which checked our centre for a few minutes, while our poor fellows fell fast. To remain long in this way was too much to be borne. The cheer was raised for the charge, a general bound was made at the chasm, and over we went like so many beagles, while the enemy gave way in confusion. The cavalry now came in for their share and cut them down in great number[s].19

  The role of the cavalry will be discussed in the next chapter, but a few points in the descriptions of the infantry combat deserve comment here. Most of the accounts emphasize the same three elements in the British assault: they fired, they cheered and they charged, and these participants give as much weight to the rousing cheer as to the musketry and the bayonet charge. Nowhere did the French stand to meet the charge, and the only hand-to-hand fighting was when the British got in among their fleeing opponents. Douglas claims that the exhausted French grenadiers whom his regiment left in its rear ‘did not behave honourably, for as soon as they found us at a little distance they resumed the posture of the enemy and commenced to fire on our rear; but nearly the whole of them paid the price of their treachery with their lives.’20 This was a common allegation made in many memoirs by soldiers of all nationalities about dozens of different battles. Occasionally it must have been true, although it seems unlikely that overrun troops would often risk their lives in this way. However, in the confusion of battle there were many stray shots flying about, including from friendly units, and it was easy to raise a cry blaming these on enemy soldiers left in the rear. Many innocent men, wounded or taken prisoner, were murdered on this pretext in the heat of battle, and no prisoner could feel safe while still close to the firing line.

  The varied experiences of units in Leith's division are reflected in their casualties. Hale's regiment, the 1/9th, was at the eastern end of the line and encountered little opposition. It lost 46 casualties (3 men killed, one officer and 42 men wounded) from 666 present, or 6.9 per cent, less than half the rate of any other unit in Greville's brigade. The first and second battalions, 38th Foot, were in the centre of the line, and lost 17.9 per cent and 16.9 per cent respectively: 143 casualties in the strong first battalion, 51 in the much weaker second battalion. Douglas's regiment, the Royal Scots, was on the right of the brigade and suffered more than any other unit in the division: 160 casualties including 23 killed or 21 per cent. This excess may be owing to the heavy fire they received before they crossed the gully to attack the French second line, or they may have been more exposed to the French bombardment before and during the advance. Equally Wellington's use of them to test French intentions much earlier in the day may also have contributed to their losses. Overall Greville's brigade lost 400 casualties, or 15.8 per cent of its strength. The 1/4th from Pringle's brigade took its place in the front line next to the Royal Scots, but its losses were very light: only 18 casualties, or 3.9 per cent, the lowest in either British brigade. Pringle's other regiments lost: 2/4th, 31 casualties, or 4.6 per cent; 2/30th, 27 casualties or 7.7 per cent; and 2/44th, 29 casualties, or 11.6 per cent, or 87 casualties between them – 105 if the 1/4th is included. Portuguese losses are less certain, but Spry's brigade probably suffered about 150 casualties, or 6.7 per cent of its strength, about the same as Pringle's brigade, even though – unlike the British regiments – it went on to play an important part later in the day. In total, Leith's division lost about 650 casualties, or perhaps a few more, for the losses of the Brunswick Oels companies are not included.21

  Among these casualties were General Leith and his aides Andrew Leith Hay and William Dowson. The little knot of officers riding so prominently in advance of the centre of the line was too obvious a target to miss and, as well as those who were hit, others such as Colonel Greville, commander of the first brigade, had their horses shot under them. Leith was wounded by a musketball in the arm, which fortunately did not shatter the bone. Leith Hay writes that ‘a Musquet Ball entered my left leg about 3 inches below the knee close to the shin bone, and passed out at the Calf, it then went through the Flap of the saddle, the Blanket under it, and entered the Horse's body just under the Flank, of which he died the same afternoon. General Leith and myself remained for the night at the village of Las Torres and were on the afternoon of the following day removed to Salamanca.’ They both recovered, but Dowson was less fortunate: his foot was shattered and he lay out on the field all night; he appears in the returns as ‘severely wounded’, and he died in Liverpool in 1814, probably from the effects of the wound.22 However great the inequalities between officers and men in the Napoleonic Wars – and in many respects they were great indeed – they shared equally in the dangers of battle.

  These casualty figures show that the French resistance was not completely ineffectual, but the question remains why a complete division of French infantry, which had suffered few previous losses and which was supported by powerful artillery, was broken so easily. Numbers favoured the allies: Leith's division was about 6,700 strong, compared to Maucune's 5,200, but this numerical advantage was never really brought to bear – except for their light troops, Pringle's and Spry's brigades were not seriously engaged; indeed, they probably did not fire a shot, while Greville's brigade did almost all the fighting. It can be argued that the numerical superiority helped give the allies confidence and demoralized the French, but it is hard to give great weight to this argument. Much more important was the advance of the British cavalry, which disconcerted and disrupted Maucune's left even before it charged. There is also the possibility that fugitives from Thomières's division might already have reached Maucune's position, spreading dismay and alarm. But against this, Douglas's account and the casualties suffered by his regiment suggest that the French left fought at least as well as the rest of the division. The importance of the cavalry charge is debatable: it may have done no more than increase the panic of already broken troops, ensuring that they did not rally and that far more of them were captured; or it may have converted the defeat of the French first line into the rout of the whole division, virtually destroying the nearest French regiments and sending the others into precipitate retreat.

  Without the cavalry, Maucune's division would probably have resisted more strongly, but it was never likely to succeed in repulsing Leith's attack. There was a qualitative as well as a numerical difference between the two divisions. While Leith's men were mostly veterans and full of confidence, Maucune's regiments had too much experience of the wrong kind. All four of his regiments had suffered greatly in Masséna's invasion of Portugal, losing a quarter or more of their strength mainly through disease and deprivation. The 66th Ligne had also lost heavily in action at the Coa and at Busaco and then again, less severely, at Fuentes. The 82nd had suffered at Busaco and more heavily at Fuentes and the evacuation of Almeida, while years before its third battalion had been cut up at Vimeiro. The 86th had also suffered at Vimeiro, and again at Oporto, although it had not seen much fighting since. These losses would not necessarily have mattered if they had been suffered in the course of a victory, but each of these actions had been a defeat, and the officers and men of these regiments can have felt little enthusiasm for crossing swords with the British again. Only the 15th Ligne had never been broken in battle against the British, although it had been present, if not closely engaged, at many French defeats in the Peninsula, so was unlikely to be m
uch more confident.

  But if the psychological advantage lay firmly with the British, the French should have had a tactical advantage. Wellington had frequently proved the great benefits of standing on the defensive and deploying his infantry on the reverse slope, so that they remained in good order while the attacking French arrived breathless and rattled by the fire of skirmishers and artillery, and so vulnerable to an immediate counterattack. Why did Maucune not benefit from the same things, and why was Leith not equally vulnerable? One obvious difference is that the forward slope of the Monte de Azan is open and gentle compared to some of the ridges Wellington chose, most famously at Busaco. Another is that the French attacks relied greatly on impetuosity, advancing rapidly in column, while Leith took great pains to restrain his men and keep them in good order. The advance in line greatly taxed their discipline, but it ensured that there need be no dangerous halt to deploy and that, when they encountered the French, they would bring every musket to bear in their opening volley. Maucune's men, by contrast, were formed in column or square – partly no doubt owing to the threat posed by the British cavalry, but also in readiness to charge the British with maximum effect after the initial exchange of fire. It seems that the British volley overwhelmed them and the British cheer broke their resolution, so that when Leith's line surged forward, the French took to their heels. Ideally, Maucune's second line of columns should have seized this moment to charge forward and attack the British when they were disordered by their success, but they did not do so and were soon broken in their turn by the exultant men of Greville's brigade. Even if they had charged and achieved some temporary success, Pringle and Spry were perfectly placed to check the trouble before it spread.

  In the end Leith had too many advantages – his troops were too good, too numerous and too well supported – for the result of the combat to be in much doubt. But the French were far from contemptible opponents, and if the attack had been arranged and executed with any less care the result might have been very different – as the experience of Cole's division was to prove.

  Commentary

  Oman places the episode involving Lawson's guns and Leith's fears of an impending French attack in the time after Leith had moved next to Cole and was facing Maucune, and links Wellington's observations of the French forces to his decision to attack. This fits into his narrative very neatly, but Leith Hay, who is our only source for both these stories, explicitly states that they occurred before Leith's division moved to the right wing. It is curious that, while Leith Hay specifies that it was Captain Tomkinson's troop of the 16th Light Dragoons which covered Lawson's withdrawal, neither Tomkinson nor Lawson mentioned it in their diaries – although the latter, to be fair, is extremely terse. On the other hand, Leith Hay's account of the incident provides a plausible context for Douglas's strange story that Wellington deliberately sent the Royal Scots forward to draw the enemy fire and test whether the French were really intending to attack Leith's division.23

  It is rather surprising that Wellington's orders to Leith should have specified how the division was to be formed – normally such matters could be left to the discretion of as capable and experienced a divisional commander as Leith, but Leith Hay is quite definite: ‘General Leith was directed to form his division in two lines, the first of which was composed of …’, and ‘all [Wellington] directed was as to time and formation.’ And as Leith's trusted ADC, Leith Hay was well placed to know.24

  Leith Hay says only that ‘part of the 4th regiment from General Pringle's brigade … [was] brought forward for the purpose of equalising the lines’. The 4th had two battalions in the field, and it seems reasonable to assume that the whole of the relatively weak first battalion (457 officers and men) was brought forward, except the light company which had joined the skirmishers. It is also an assumption that the 1/4th formed on the right of Greville's brigade beyond the Royal Scots, who would take the place of honour in their brigade. Cowper's history of the 4th King's Own supports both statements – though it is not clear whether Cowper had firm evidence or was working from the same assumptions; but he does add some interesting new details, including the fact that the combined light companies of the division were commanded by Major Alured Faunce of the King's Own.25

  There is some confusion as to whether the 1/38th joined the army on the morning of the battle or on the previous evening, but in his unpublished papers Leith Hay says they ‘joined us the day preceding the action’, and this is confirmed by the anonymous memoirist in the battalion.26 Fortescue risks causing confusion on another front when he includes the 2/58th in Pringle's brigade. Technically this is almost correct, but although the orders for its transfer had been issued as early as the beginning of April, they were not implemented until after the retreat from Burgos.27

  The anonymous recollections of a soldier in the 1/38th are quoted several times during the chapter. These quotations have been edited so as not to distract the reader with their eccentricities; the literal transcriptions are as follows:

  Genl. Leath Came up Waving his Hat and Shouting Now my Lads this Is the day for England they would play at Long Ball with us from Morning untill Night But we Will Soon give them Something else

  altho the Scene was dreadfully Awfull I never was in A more Composed and Comfortable Frame than on that day for in all that I saw I saw that I had cause to be truly thankful Not that I had any certainty of Life more than others but I felt Confident that I was under the care and protection of almighty God and my Life was in his Hands and nothing could happen without his divine Permission. But I was powerfully Struck at the Commencement of the Action with this passage of Scripture For all they that take the Sword Shall Perish with the Sword But in my Situation I knew that I was bound by the Law to do my duty as A Soldier beside I knew that if I did not my hown Life was Liable to pay for it. And I thought that as providence had placed me in that Situation it was my duty to be resined to his Will and prayed that wether it ended in Life or in Death it might be for his Glorey and my everlasting wellfare.

  the French were in a … [here the paper is soiled making one small word illegible] Square not more than 200 yards from us as soon as we saw them we gave a shout hopened a tremendous Fire and ran into them directly so that that Line was in a few Minets killed and taken Prisoners. We then attacked their rear lines and After we had engaged them some time we where Charging them I received a Ball in my Right Foot28

  Leith Hay, writing in his Memoir of General Leith, states that the 1/9th had to pass through the village of Los Arapiles and then ‘rejoined the line of their brigade the moment they debouched from the houses’. This, together with other praise for the regularity of Leith's advance, seems to override the statement in Cannon's history of the Ninth that, after passing through the village, the regiment became separated from the rest of the division. Cannon's histories are unreliable, and James Hale, who was a sergeant in the Ninth, says nothing relevant. More curious is the statement from the anonymous memoirist of the 1/38th that he advanced through a village under heavy fire before closing on the French. This is strange, for other sources make it clear that the 1/38th was in the middle of Leith's line, implying that the 2/38th was between it and the 1/9th (as one would expect: the 1/38th would normally form on the right of the 2/38th). Does this mean that half of Leith's line overcame the obstacle of the village in the course of its advance: if so, why do Leith Hay and Gomm not make more of it?29

  It is much easier to dispose of the claim in Carter's Historical Records of the Forty-Fourth, repeated in Bannatyne's History of the Thirtieth, that Pringle's brigade led the initial advance and was only overtaken by Greville's brigade, if at all, when it became encumbered with prisoners. All the primary sources suggest that the reverse was the case, and they are supported by the casualties suffered by the two brigades. For the story given in these regimental histories of the capture of a French eagle, see below, commentary to chapter six.30

  Maucune's movements are impossible to reconstruct precisely, but it seems fair
ly clear that he was on the forward slope of the Monte de Azan when Wellington made the decision to attack, but had retired behind the slight crest which marks the edge of the plateau before the British assault reached him.

  The description given in the narrative of the formation of Maucune's division is largely speculative, based on French casualties and comments in British accounts of the fighting quoted in the chapter. The casualties indicate that the 66th and 15th Ligne suffered far more than the 82nd or 86th, and it seems reasonable to assume that they were at the western end of the line and so more exposed to Le Merchant's cavalry. Most of the British accounts – except Leith Hay, who was wounded in the first clash – imply a succession of opponents, supporting the idea that the French had two lines of columns, not one. Furthermore, if the French had formed a single line of battalion columns they would have been left with relatively small gaps between them – too small for them to deploy if they had wished to do so, although perhaps this is what Leith Hay means when he says that the French were ‘drawn up in contiguous columns’.31 (Nine columns with an average frontage of about 45 yards equals 400 yards, leaving only about 60 yards between each column – eight intervals, not nine – whereas each battalion would need over 120 yards to deploy into three deep lines.) The 66th suffered considerably more than the 15th, which may indicate that it was in the front line; but if the British cavalry charged just as Leith's men were breaking the second line, it is likely that the nearest French battalions in the second line were the ones which suffered the most. Jean Sarramon's ideas on how the French were deployed are discussed below in the commentary to chapter six.

  A related question is, how far behind the skyline were the French deployed? In other words, at what range did they open fire on the British infantry? Writing home two days after the battle Leith Hay says that ‘we were about 30 yards from them’, although he changed this in his published account to ‘about 50 yards’, while the anonymous memoirist of the 1/38th says that the French were ‘not more than 200 yards from us’. Leith Hay was, of course, riding a little in front of the line – but ten, not 170, yards seems an appropriate allowance for this. One can split the difference, or opt for the source written closer to the event or the more conservative estimate (the range was certainly not more than 200 yards), according to taste; but the problem remains ultimately insoluble. The range probably varied in different parts of the line, but this is no explanation, for Leith Hay was with his uncle in front of the centre of the 1/38th.32