Salamanca, 1812
Page 21
Unfortunately, there are a number of discrepancies in both these stories. Martinien's list of French officer casualties does not identify either Porte-Aigle of the 62nd as having been wounded, let alone killed, although a Porte-Aigle in the 22nd was wounded. And when one remembers that Leith was lying seriously wounded in Salamanca, while his division was advancing with the rest of the army, one may doubt whether Lieutenant Pearce really presented the captured Eagle to him on the day after the battle. More significantly, Lamartinière's return indicates that the captured Eagles belonged to the 22nd and 101st Ligne, not the 62nd, although this is not accepted by some authorities. Nonetheless, the essence of Pearce's story appears to be true: he did, indeed, capture an Eagle, probably that of the 101st. However, there are more serious difficulties with the claim put forward on behalf of Ensign Pratt. He was an officer in the light company of the 30th, but does not seem to have been attached to the Portuguese. In any case, Crookshank commanded the 12th, not the 7th, Caçadores, although it is correct that his unit was part of the Third Division. Two incidents appear to have been conflated: Pratt himself claimed the capture, not of an Eagle, but of a French standard, that is, a fanion or colour carried by each battalion – another fanion was claimed by Lieutenant Francis Maguire of the 4th King's Own, The Eagle of the 22nd was secured by Crookshank's caçadores.21 John Douglas of the Royal Scots writes:
A little before sunset a Portuguese soldier of our Division picked up an eagle and brought it safe into the lines, to the astonishment of all as you would imagine that a sparrow could not escape between the two fires. This eagle was the subject of an account in a book of anecdotes a few years ago, when it was stated to have been captured by an officer of the British. The statement was false. It was taken as I have mentioned. It lay on the ground along with a number of the Regiment to which it belonged, having fallen by our fire, and was free to be picked up by anyone, but it was first discovered among the dead by the Portuguese soldier. But what became of it afterwards I cannot say …22
It seems likely that this was the Eagle of the 22nd, although Douglas may have been reacting to Pearce's story, not realizing that two Eagles were taken in the same vicinity.
Le Merchant's charge was the finest exploit of British cavalry during the entire Peninsular War. It was perfectly timed and executed, catching the French infantry when they were already shaken, disordered and broken; it converted their defeat into a rout and spread fear and panic throughout the French left wing. This was what cavalry were best at: not dashing against perfectly formed infantry in a desperate attempt to break their will, but taking advantage of a moment of confusion and weakness, so that the infantry dissolved before them with scarcely any resistance. Le Marchant amplified the initial success of Pakenham and Leith, removing any risk that the French left might rally, and reaping a vastly greater harvest of prisoners than the infantry could ever have hoped to gain. Three divisions of infantry, half the army's cavalry and a good part of its artillery were on the French left: after Le Marchant's charge none of it could be brought to face the allies again except the two remaining regiments of Taupin's infantry. Only a calamity in the centre could deprive Wellington of victory.
Commentary
The role of Sir Stapleton Cotton, commander of all the allied cavalry, in the great charge, is far from clear. One might have expected that if Wellington had orders for Le Marchant, he would give them through Cotton, but the memoir of Le Marchant by his son is definite that Wellington gave his instructions in person and directly – indeed, it makes very little mention of Cotton at all. Cotton's life, written by his widow with the assistance of Captain Knollys, is vague on the point, saying only that Cotton ‘had been desired by Wellington to take advantage of any opportunity to charge’, and it gives few details of the battle. However, this is the only source which describes the quarrel between Cotton and Le Marchant before the charge was launched. The memoir of Le Marchant ignores the incident, while other first-hand accounts refer to it obliquely or in passing. For example, Captain Tomkinson wrote cryptically in his diary: ‘(Circumstance that occurred with General Le Marchant previous to the attack of the enemy, and his feelings on that occasion.)’23 But the incident rankled and was made worse by the meagre praise the brigade received for their charge in Wellington's dispatch. Almost fifty years after the battle Lieutenant-Colonel William Legh Clowes, who had served in the 3rd Dragoons at Salamanca, wrote to his brother-in-law Sir George Scovell (who had been on Wellington's staff):
That due credit was not given to the Brigade was much felt by us all, but the real cause was this: no light Cavalry was engaged in that day, and Lord Combermere [Stapleton Cotton], disliking the Heavys, he thought by naming the success generally of the cavalry under his Command, the public would include the Light among the successful ones.
… His quarrel with poor Le Marchant, and with Elley, determined his hostility to our Brigade and prevented him from doing justice to it.
I have never ceased to feel annoyed at our treatment, which in addition to my being superseded by Lord Charles Manners, drove me out of the service.24
Most accounts of the actual charge refer only to Le Marchant, but Napier says: ‘Nor were these valiant horsemen yet exhausted. Le Marchant and many other officers had fallen, but Cotton and all his staff were at their head, and with ranks confused and blended in one mass they still galloped on against a fresh column.’ This is implicitly rebutted in the memoir of Le Marchant, which goes out of its way to show that Le Marchant was killed at the very end of the charge, even claiming that his was probably the last life lost in it. According to this source, Cotton ‘had been too far distant to share in the charge’ and only arrived with his large staff when it was over, his attempts to spur the exhausted dragoons into fresh effort meeting with no response. If this suggests a certain understandable hostility, it is at least more plausible than the claim in the life of Cotton that Wellington greeted Sir Stapleton after the charge with uncharacteristic effusiveness; ‘By G–d, Cotton, I never saw anything more beautiful in my life! – the day is yours.’25
The memoir of Le Marchant was written by his son Denis, who became a Liberal MP and Clerk to the House of Commons. This was not the son, Ensign Carey Le Marchant, who had served as his father's ADC in the battle; he had died of wounds in 1814. Lieutenant William Light, another of Le Marchant's ADCs, kept a diary, but unfortunately the entry for the battle is brief and unhelpful. Napier's description of the charge, and particularly Cotton's role in it, is based on the much later testimony of two officers, Colonel Money and General Sir Charles Dalbiac, who both believed that Cotton not only ordered the charge but led it from the outset, or at the very least joined it early on. However, it is rather odd, if Cotton took such a prominent role in the charge, that the accounts written immediately afterwards by Norcliffe Norcliffe and William Bragge, should not mention him. And on other points, where there is independent evidence, it tends to confirm the reliability of the account given in the memoir of Le Marchant.26
Cotton's proper place, of course, was not in the forefront of the charge, but at the head of the supports which could exploit success or cover a retreat. The only brigade available for this role was Anson's light cavalry, but there is much doubt as to how they were employed. Napier prints two letters: one from Colonel Money of Anson's brigade, who claims that they took a full share in Le Marchant's charge from the outset; the other from Charles Dalbiac of the 4th Dragoons, who emphatically denies that the heavy dragoons received any support whatsoever, except from the infantry. Other accounts support Dalbiac rather than Money: neither Tomkinson nor Cocks, both in the 16th Light Dragoons, records any great feats of arms in their diaries and letters, while Captain William Smith of the nth Light Dragoons – Money's own regiment – writes in his journal that ‘it was a very easy day for us.’ Neither of these regiments suffered a single casualty, while the 12th Light Dragoons, which did lose a few men, had remained on the left flank and was engaged late in the day. A contemporary hand-drawn ma
p in the papers of Major-General Ashworth shows Anson's brigade proceeding, not in the wake of the heavy cavalry, but in a wide circle on the outer flank of Pakenham's division. However, this is probably nothing more than a simple mistake, confusing Anson's with Victor Alten's brigade.27
Evidently Anson's brigade was not seriously engaged, and was probably too far to the rear to lend any useful support to Le Marchant, even when the charge was exhausted and the men vulnerable. But Le Marchant's men were not entirely unsupported, for the cavalry of the right wing (Alten's and D'Urban's brigades) took full advantage of the French confusion. Ashworth's map shows a substantial French unit ‘charged and routed with very considerable loss by the Portuguese cavalry under General D'Urban’ (to quote from the key), and its location implies that this would have been at the end of the charge, about the time Lord Edward Somerset captured the French guns.28 Arentschildt's report to Cotton gives a more detailed account of the actions of Alten's brigade:
About this time our heavy cavalry fell upon the French infantry from the other side, and I ordered the hussars to keep on the extremity of the left wing of the enemy's infantry, and cut off whatever they could, following myself with the fourteenth in close order. The hussars were then a great way in front, doing great execution among the enemy's infantry, and, according to the nature of the service and ground, (this being in the wood), very much dispersed – when about two squadrons of the French third hussars came up to attack them. But Major Gruben, Krauchenberg and other officers rallied, by great exertion, a body strong enough to oppose the enemy, though they were all mixed; some hussars, some fourteenth, and even some Portuguese. They then fell upon the enemy and drove them back, on which occasion some French officers were cut down; and from that moment the French cavalry never showed their faces again on that side. The pursuit of the infantry was then renewed together with some advanced parties of General Le Marchant's brigade, until they came close to the large hill under the French batteries where you have seen them; four guns have been sent back to the rear by the hussars. … The number of prisoners is not to be ascertained, for they were driven back in crowds.29
It is also possible that Julián Sánchez's Spanish lancers were engaged at this point, although the reference to their role is so brief and cryptic that it might equally apply to the very end of the battle when the whole French army was in flight.30
So it seems that at first the heavy dragoons advanced with direct support only from the infantry, and that Arentschildt, D'Urban and perhaps Sánchez joined the charge as it progressed. The brigade itself was formed in two lines. Oman, presumably following regimental sources, states that the 4th Dragoons and the 5th Dragoon Guards were in the first line, with the 3rd Dragoons in support; but nothing in William Bragge's letter suggests that his regiment was not in the first line from the outset. Ashworth's map has the 4th Dragoons some distance in front of the other two regiments, the whole brigade forming three lines; but again this does not fit well with other sources. The most plausible statement comes from Philip Bainbrigge, an assistant to Colonel De Lancey, the acting Quartermaster-General, who says that the left squadron of each regiment was kept back in the second line.31
None of the sources gives a completely reliable statement as to which regiment was on the left, which on the right and which in the centre, but there is some inconclusive evidence that the 5th Dragoon Guards were on the left, that is, closest to Leith's division. The regimental history of the 44th Foot names them as the cavalry which attacked Maucune's flank; John Douglas identifies them correctly, while mistaking the other regiments of heavy cavalry. The charge brought them, as a trophy, the staff of the drum-major of the 66th Ligne, the regiment in Maucune's division which suffered most. But these are slender threads on which to hang an argument, while the unpublished memoirs of an anonymous dragoon in the 5th clearly state that they passed through the ranks of the Third Division – although this is a poor source, and may in any case refer to the light infantry.32
Anonymous hand-drawn map from the papers of Major-General Charles Ashworth. North is at the bottom. A is the Lesser Arapile; B is the Greater Arapile; P the village of Los Arapiles; Q the village of Las Torres; E shows Pakenham's advance; G and H represent Le Marchant's brigade with the 4th Dragoons leading.
Charles Dalbiac told Napier in 1833 that the brigade charged ‘with no more than 750 sabres’. This is a surprisingly low figure, given its official strength of just over a thousand officers and men on 15 July. Part of the difference is explained by the absence of Major Onslow's squadron of 4th Dragoons, which had been detached about noon. (Dalbiac is the only source for this but, as he was second-in-command of the regiment on the day, his word must be accepted.) This still leaves a substantial discrepancy, which may be explained in one of two ways. Either Dalbiac's ‘750 sabres’ counts only the rank and file, excluding officers, sergeants and drummers – the phrase ‘sabres and bayonets’ was quite often used to refer just to the men in the ranks. If this is the case, the total number of men taking part in the charge would have been not far short of nine hundred. Alternatively, the discrepancy may be caused by the large number of supernumeraries – orderlies, farriers, camp-kettlemen and so on – who were part of a brigade of heavy cavalry. A British officer, writing of the Waterloo campaign, estimated that these might amount to at least 120 men in a brigade of this size. We do not know which explanation is correct in this instance, or even if much credence should be placed on Dalbiac's remark, but it does serve as a salutary reminder of the uncertainties concealed even in the apparently simple and transparent figures of a weekly state.33
Only one important first-hand account of the charge is not quoted in the main narrative. This was published anonymously in the United Service Journal in November 1833, at a time when the ability of cavalry to break formed infantry by an impetuous charge was the subject of much debate.
It was at this critical juncture that the heavy cavalry brigade, 3rd and 4th dragoons, and 5th dragoon guards, received from Sir Stapleton Cotton, their orders to advance; and, moving rapidly forward between the flank attack of the 3rd and the more direct one of the 5th division, which was the right of our infantry line, came first into contact with the 66th (French) regiment, consisting of three battalions, and formed in a sort of column of half-battalions, thus presenting six successive lines, one behind the other. Strange to say, though drawn up in that formidable manner, their fire was so ill-directed, that it is believed scarcely a single dragoon fell from its effects; and no check taking place, the cavalry bore vigorously forward at a gallop, penetrating their columns, nearly the whole of which were killed, wounded, or taken, leaving the broken infantry to be made prisoners by the 3rd division as they cleared the ground before them, to assist in which one squadron of the 4th dragoons was for the moment detached. They presently came upon another column, however, of about 600 men, who brought down some men and horse by their fire, but attempted no stand of any consequence, and, falling into confusion, were left as before to be captured by the advancing infantry.
The nature of the ground, which was an open wood of evergreen oaks, and which grew more obstructed as they advanced, had caused the men of the three regiments of Cavalry to become a good deal mixed in each other's ranks; and the front being at the same time constantly changing as the right was brought forward, the whole had now crowded into a solid line, without any intervals. In this order, but without any confusion, they pressed rapidly forward upon another French brigade, which, taking advantage of the trees, had formed a colonne serrée, and stood awaiting their charge. These men reserved their fire with much coolness till the Cavalry came within twenty yards, when they poured it in upon the concentrated mass of men and horses with a deadly and tremendous effect. The gallant General Le Marchant, with Captain White of his staff, were killed; Colonel Elley was wounded; and it is thought that nearly one third of the dragoons came to the ground; but as the remainder retained sufficient command of their horses to dash forward, they succeeded in breaking the Frenc
h ranks, and dispersing them in utter confusion over the field. At this moment Colonel Lord Edward Somerset, discovering five guns upon the left, separated from the brigade with one squadron, charged, and took them all.
Here terminated the series of attacks we have endeavoured to describe; for by this time, (about forty minutes after the first charge, which took place soon after five o'clock,) it was with difficulty that three squadrons could be collected and formed out of the whole brigade, and any further advance would have been unnecessary as well as imprudent. The spot where Lord Edward captured the guns was about three miles from where the first shot was fired by the Third Division.34
Not surprisingly, this article has greatly influenced all subsequent descriptions of the charge, even that in the memoir of General Le Marchant. Yet its very virtues raise questions. How can an account written more than twenty years after the event be so clear, comprehensible and detailed, when letters written within days are generally confused and fragmentary? Could anyone really take such careful note of the formation of the enemy, the range at which they fired and the identity of their units, while galloping straight at them amid the noise, anxiety, excitement and jostling turmoil of a cavalry charge? This is not to suggest that the account is fraudulent; rather, that it contains as much unconscious reconstruction of events as direct, immediate memory. It is still useful and has influenced the narrative at a number of points, but it cannot be accepted without question.
However, the greatest difficulty in understanding Le Merchant's charge lies ‘on the other side of the hill’, in working out which French units were involved, what they were doing and how they came to suffer so much. Many accounts, of which Oman's is the most important, closely follow the article in the United Service Journal, and as a result accept that the charge was primarily directed at Maucune's division. According to this scheme the cavalry first crashed into the unprotected flank of the 66th Ligne (which had two, not three battalions), then broke a battalion of the 15th Ligne (the column of ‘about 600 men’), before charging the 22nd Ligne formed in ‘colonne serrée’ in the fringes of the forest.35 But several objections can be made to this neat formulation. When it charged, Le Marchant's brigade had a frontage of about six hundred yards, vastly wider than the flank of the 66th, even if the infantry had already been broken. Nor is it easy to see how the 22nd could have been so completely destroyed if it had fought in the skirts of the forest, when the fleeing infantry would have found safe refuge among the trees. Some British cavalry certainly did charge Maucune's flank, but it may not have been the whole brigade, and the United Service Journal article may better describe the experiences of the left regiment than the entire force.