by Rory Muir
Chapter Nine
Ferey and the French Last Stand
The defeat of the divisions of Clausel and Bonnet left no doubt that the French had lost the battle. More than half of Marmont's army had been broken; thousands of French troops had been captured and the remainder were streaming to the rear in great disorder, even panic. But there was still a large number of men – almost half the infantry in the army – who had yet to be seriously engaged, and who remained in good order. With skill and luck these units might be salvaged from the wreck, but first they were needed to check the allied pursuit of the rest of the army; otherwise the panic would spread and further enormous losses would be inflicted. The long afternoon was drawing into evening; if a couple of hours could be gained, night would cover the flight of the broken divisions.
Three and a half French infantry divisions remained intact. Foy, on the far right, had only been engaged in the morning's skirmishing. He could do little to cover the retreat of the rest of the army at this stage and was in some danger of being separated from it, although, even if this had happened, he could still have crossed the Tormes at the fords of Huerta and Encinas. Ferey's division was in the centre; it had advanced in support of Clausel and Bonnet but had not been involved in their ruin; now it would cover their retreat and attempt to halt, or at least delay, the allied advance. Further south and west lay half of Taupin's division – five battalions of 17th Léger and 65th Ligne – which was all that remained of the left wing; and Sarrut's division which had been sent by Clausel to try to stem the allied advance and cover the flight of the left.
There is little reliable evidence for the activities of Taupin's brigade and Sarrut's division in this phase of the battle. Most historians – French as well as British – suggest that Taupin's regiments were either so demoralized that they dissolved almost of their own accord, or that they were constantly driven back by the steady advance of the allied Third and Fifth Divisions. But Norcliffe Norcliffe is quite clear that the French infantry who treated him so well were from the 65th Ligne (see above, p. 132) and that the British infantry who drove them back included the 32nd Foot from Hinde's brigade of the Sixth Division. If this is correct, Taupin's regiments had either fallen back in good order, carrying Norcliffe with them, and joined the French rearguard on the ridge of El Sierro; or, less plausibly, Hinde's brigade engaged them separately before it attacked the final French position. Taupin's losses are more than usually difficult to establish, as the casualties suffered at Salamanca are combined with those incurred four days earlier at the Guarena. Lamartinière gives totals of 262 casualties (23 per cent) for the 17th Léger and 359 (23 per cent) for the 65th Ligne. While these losses suggest similar experiences, the distribution of officer casualties differs sharply: according to Martinien, the 17th Léger lost 8 officers (including two killed and one mortally wounded) on the 18th, and only 3 on the 22nd; while the 65th lost 3 on the 18th (two of them killed), and eleven on the 22nd (one killed, two mortally wounded). These figures would seem to indicate that the 17th Léger was only lightly engaged at Salamanca, having lost quite heavily on the Guarena, while the 65th Ligne suffered four-fifths of its losses (271 men) in the battle. So perhaps the 17th escaped or dissolved and joined in the flight of the rest of the French left, while the 65th retreated in good order back to El Sierro.1
According to one French account, Sarrut's division advanced onto the Monte de Azan with its first brigade (2nd Léger and 36th Ligne, six battalions) deployed in line, and its remaining regiment (4th Léger, three battalions) in columns on its left to guard against the British cavalry. The mere appearance of this new force checked the allied advance. Many of the allied troops were still far to the rear, collecting prisoners and attending to the wounded. Pakenham's infantry in particular were tired by their long march in the heat of the day, and the initial excitement of combat may now have passed. The allied reserves which might have taken over at this point – the Seventh Division, Bradford's Portuguese and the Spanish Division – had not been brought forward. And the allied commanders were probably most anxious not to let their troops get out of hand and so jeopardize the success which had already been achieved. Whatever the reason, Sarrut was able to gain time without being seriously engaged, and Pakenham's men took three hours to advance the three miles from the Pico de Miranda to El Sierro.2
Sarrut's losses in the battle were very light. Martinien records only eight officer casualties in the whole division (or 4 per cent of the 198 officers present on 15 July), and none of these was killed. Lamartinière's figures are actually higher than this would imply: 384 casualties, or 8 per cent of the division. But of these, 158 were ‘killed or captured’; and while some would have been wounded men who could not escape, others were probably men who lost touch with their unit in the retreat and were subsequently taken prisoner.
Meanwhile, in the centre, the defeat of Clausel and Bonnet had made the French position on the Greater Arapile untenable. The light companies of the King's German Legion brigade in the First Division turned its eastern flank; Clinton's advance had already passed it to the west; and Cole's division, now rallied and restored to order, was advancing on it frontally. There was no resistance: Colonel Bouthmy of the 120th withdrew his regiment in good order, although it is said to have suffered heavily from British fire before it could make a clean break.3
Ferey's division had also fallen back in the face of the allied advance and now occupied the ridge of El Sierro. This was a long, low ridge, smooth and easy of ascent, but giving no cover to troops advancing from the north-west; behind it were the low trees and rough scrub of the ‘forest’ which stretched towards Alba de Tormes. Clausel ordered Ferey to hold the position until night fell, so that the rest of the army could escape. Ferey's division consisted of nine strong battalions, almost 5,700 men on 15 July if the divisional artillery is included. He deployed in a single line (three ranks deep) along the forward face of the ridge, with a battalion at each end of the line formed in square to protect its flanks. Behind and above the infantry, presumably firing through gaps in their ranks rather than over their heads, were fifteen guns. This well-posted rearguard attracted support from fragments of other divisions. As we have seen, it is likely that the 65th Ligne from Taupin's division joined it, as the 119th Ligne from Bonnet's division may also have done. On the other hand, Sarrut's division appears to have withdrawn beyond it and was not engaged in its support, although it may have helped to protect its outer, or southern, flank.4
The sight of this new opposition brought Clinton's advance to a halt. His division had already fought hard to break Bonnet's attack and needed time to reorganize and gather support before plunging into fresh combat. Unfortunately, it halted within range of the French guns, and the men of the Sixth Division are said to have suffered severely in the interval before they resumed their advance. Gradually additional units arrived, ready to support or take part in the impending attack. The Fusilier brigade of the Fourth Division, now fully restored to order, formed on the left of Clinton's line. Wellington directed the remaining brigades of the Fourth Division – Stubbs's Portuguese and W. Anson's two British regiments – to turn Ferey's right (or north-eastern) flank. They would be assisted by Gardiner's battery of artillery from the First Division, whose fire took Ferey's line in the flank in the later part of the combat, and more distantly by the advance of the First and Light Divisions. The Third and Fifth Divisions were ordered to support Clinton's attack, but they might have been better employed turning Ferey's southern flank. According to Napier – who in this case was writing as a historian, not a witness, for his regiment was several miles away – Pakenham urged Clinton to delay his attack until the Third Division could turn the French left, but an unnamed staff officer suddenly ordered Clinton's troops to advance.5 Thomas Hamilton, writing as Spencer Moggridge, gives an elaborate version of this story, but it must be remembered that, despite the use of the first person, he was not at the battle.
At length, an aide-de-camp of Lord Wellington,
– who, during this interval, had been engaged in reconnoitering the new position of the French, – came riding up at full speed, with orders to General Pakenham. These were, for I heard them delivered, – that the 6th division, commanded by General Clinton, were to lead the attack on the front of the heights occupied by the enemy, and that the 3d division were to support them. ‘I shall do so with pleasure,’ rejoined General Pakenham; ‘but tell Lord Wellington that my decided opinion is in favour of a flank movement. To storm that height,’ he continued, his voice becoming more elevated and his eye more sparkling as he spoke, ‘is nothing less than an inhuman sacrifice of life. Everything can be gained by operating on the flank.’
Ferey's rear-guard (all troop positions approximate, many conjectural).
‘General,’ replied the aide-de-camp, ‘it is not for me to judge of such matters. It is my duty merely to deliver the orders with which I am intrusted.’
‘I know, I know,’ rejoined Pakenham; ‘but, nevertheless, tell my Lord Wellington what I say. Tell him my opinion is decidedly in favour of taking them in flank – to do otherwise, is taking the bull by the horns.’ The aide-de-camp bowed and rode off, and so ended this extraordinary colloquy.6
There is no confirmation of this remarkable story in the letters written by Pakenham immediately after the battle. However, an unpublished letter from Colonel De Lancey, the acting Quartermaster-General, to his old chief, George Murray, reveals considerable unhappiness with the attack:
The 6th Division afterwards were brought into Action, but I think unnecessarily at about two or three Miles from the Field of Action.
The Enemy retired from the Field of Action towards Alba de Tormes and to cover his Retreat occupied a strong Height on the Road. Part of our Force was already between the Height and Alba de Tormes. The Height however was attacked and carried by the 6th Division but at the expense of 1,000 men.
… Hulse is very highly spoken of in the Attack of the 6th Division. I understand he executed it extremely well and had nothing to say to the planning of the attack.7
Unfortunately, we do not know nearly enough about the position of the various units at the time to be able to judge whether this criticism is justified or not. If all had gone well, an attempt to turn Ferey's southern flank might have dislodged him as quickly, and much more cheaply, than a frontal assault. But the attempt might not have succeeded: it might have encountered Sarrut's division, which – according to one French source8 – was in a perfect position to block such a move; or it might have taken too long to organize and execute, so that Ferey would have achieved his objective and been able to withdraw under cover of night before his line of retreat was seriously threatened.
Rather than turn the French flank, the allied troops advanced up El Sierro in a costly frontal assault. There are a number of first-hand accounts of the subsequent fighting, but unfortunately most were written years after the battle, and they contain numerous contradictions and inconsistencies. We do not even know whether the whole of the Sixth Division was in the front line, or whether Rezende's brigade was – initially at least – in a second line in support; nor whether the combat involved one round of fighting or two. Nonetheless, both its severity and its ultimate result are clear.
Major Newman, of the 1/11th in Hulse's brigade, describes the wait under fire in front of El Sierro, and the subsequent fighting where it was hottest:
During this time their artillery played incessantly on us with shot and shell, by which I lost about forty men; and the loss increased so fast by their getting the range, that I told Hulse something should be done, either in retiring or by.the line lying down. The latter he agreed to, and we had hardly a casualty after …
The next advance of the 6th Division was to the attack of the French position, As soon as the French saw this, a cloud of their skirmishers came down to the foot of the hills forming their position, and as we neared them opened their fire, supported with terrible effect by their artillery with grape; however, the brigade kept moving on, and in spite of every obstacle carried the position. Not a shot was fired by the 11th until we reached the top, when we gave them a farewell discharge. By this time the loss of the 61st and 11th was most severe: the Portuguese brigade in attacking their portion of the position found the ground steeper and more difficult of access, which enabled the enemy to retain that part, and eventually the French came down and attacked them in turn. I saw this and proposed to Hulse to wheel up the 11th to their right and attack them in flank, but for the present he declined, thinking we were too much reduced. After a while poor Bradford, the assistant adjutant-general, came up, and instantly went to the rear and brought up our support a brigade of the 4th Division which had been reformed; the 61st and 11th then changed their front to the right, and attacked this hill and carried it. This was the last of the engagement, and at this period the 61st and 11th had about five officers and eighty men each left.9
Captain Harry Ross-Lewin of the 32nd Foot in Hinde's brigade tells a similar tale, if with more striving for literary effect:
It was half-past seven when the sixth division, under General Clinton, was ordered to advance a second time and attack the enemy's line in front, supported by the third and fifth divisions. The ground over which we had to pass was a remarkably clear slope, like the glacis of a fortification – most favourable for the defensive fire of the enemy, and disadvantageous to the assailants, but the division advanced towards the position with perfect steadiness and confidence. A craggy ridge, on which the French infantry was drawn up, rose so abruptly that they could fire four or five deep; but we had approached within two hundred yards of them before the fire of musketry began, which was by far the heaviest that I have ever witnessed, and was accompanied by constant discharges of grape. An uninterrupted blaze was then maintained, so that the crest of the hill seemed to be one long streak of flame. Our men came down to the charging position, and commenced firing from that level, at the same time keeping their touch to the right, so that the gaps opened by the enemy's fire were instantly filled up. At the very first volley that we received, about eighty men of the right wing of my regiment fell to the rear in one group; the commanding officer immediately rode up to know the cause, and found that they were all wounded.
Previously to the advance of the sixth division, the light companies of the right brigade were formed on the right of the line, and, as we moved on, one of the enemy's howitzers was captured by the light company of the 32nd regiment. It had been discharged once, but before the gunners could load it again, it was taken by a rush.10
These accounts can be broadly confirmed by that of John Douglas, of the Royal Scots (3/1st) who was advancing in their rear:
While this was occurring on the right, the 6th Division on our left was ordered to charge a hill crowned with cannon. The day was extremely warm. Our poor fellows, having to bear up against the united fire of cannon and musketry, had their ranks equally thinned ere they commenced to ascend the hill. So determined were the enemy to maintain this post that one brigade of our division was cut off. Fortunately, our work was settled on the right as the enemy were falling back in confusion. We brought up our right shoulder and flanked the hill, on which they gave way here also, abandoning their guns in disorder. 'Twas now near sunset, which appeared as red as sunset through the dense clouds of smoke, while the cheers of the British advancing to the charge, and the peals of musketry which seemed to increase, was a scene so awfully grand that no pen could describe it. The 2nd Queens, the 11th and 61st were the Regiments which composed the Brigade I have mentioned … I never saw the British casualties so thick, while we passed on in pursuit, striving to avoid treading on the wounded, who were calling for a little water for God's sake, which was entirely out of our power to give; or in the more feeling accents of comrades they pleaded, ‘Don't trample on us.’11
The casualty figures leave no doubt of the severity of the fighting in the centre. The 1/11th, Newman's battalion, suffered 341 casualties from 516 all ranks, or two-thirds of its s
trength; and the 1/61st in the same brigade suffered just as severely. Newman was probably exaggerating little, if at all, when he said that each regiment was reduced to a handful of officers and eighty rank and file by the end of the fighting, for many unwounded men would have left the ranks in the course of the day and failed to find their way back. (Each unit was left with a nominal total of about 180 unwounded rank and file.) Hinde's brigade suffered much less: 344 casualties from 1,456 officers and men, or one-quarter of its strength. The 1/32nd, Ross-Lewin's unit, lost 137 of these casualties, so that his story of 80 men wounded at one blow is possible, if unlikely. The remaining brigade in the division, Rezende's Portuguese, suffered almost as heavily as Hinde's: probably rather more than 600 casualties from its strength of 2,631 all ranks. All these casualties, of course, were suffered in the battle as a whole; many, perhaps most, in the earlier fighting with Bonnet.