Salamanca, 1812

by Rory Muir

  101st Ligne in Thomières's division suffered 81.8 per cent casualties

  All four regiments were on the French left, and it is likely that their exceptionally heavy losses were caused, at least in part, by Le Marchant's charge. But the heavy fighting in the centre also exacted its toll: Clausel's division suffered 26 per cent casualties, Bonnet's 23 per cent and Ferey's 17 per cent. The French cavalry failed to make any significant impact in the battle, but still lost over 400 casualties (13 per cent of Boyer's dragoons, 14 per cent of Curto's light cavalry).3 The only divisions in the French army which lost less than one-tenth of their strength were Sarrut's (8 per cent) and Foy's (perhaps 4 per cent, but this is just a guess); although the artillery also seems to have escaped remarkably lightly, suffering fewer than 150 casualties, only 4 per cent.

  The figures for the allied army are much more reliable, although still not without problems. Overall, Wellington's army lost 5,220 casualties in the battle: 694 killed, 4,270 wounded and 256 missing.4 The British suffered nearly 61 per cent of these casualties (3,176 officers and men), the Portuguese 39 per cent (2,038 officers and men), while the Spanish division lost only 6 casualties, or 0.1 per cent of the army's losses. These casualties amount to almost exactly 10 per cent of the army's strength, with the Portuguese suffering slightly more, proportionally, than the British.

  British suffered 3,1776 casualties from 30,578 all ranks, or 10.4 per cent

  Portuguese suffered 2,038 casualties from 17,999 all ranks, or 11.3 per cent

  Spanish suffered 6 casualties from 3,360 all ranks, or 0.2 cent

  By far the heaviest allied losses were in the Sixth Division, where the three battalions of Hulse's brigade suffered 849 casualties from an initial strength of 1,464 officers and men, or 58 per cent (the 1/11th and 1/61st both lost two-thirds of their strength; the 2/53rd lost ‘only’ 42 per cent). The other brigades in the division suffered much less, but still heavily: Hinde's brigade 24 per cent; Rezende's brigade 23 per cent. The Fourth Division also suffered considerably: 21 per cent casualties overall, with the 1/7th Fusiliers losing 40 per cent. All Cole's regiments suffered, with the sole exception of the 3/27th, which remained in garrison on the Lesser Arapile and lost only one officer and seven men wounded from an initial strength of around six hundred all ranks. Pack's brigade lost 18 per cent of its strength, mostly as a result of its unsuccessful assault on the Greater Arapile; this was a little more than the leading brigades of the Third and Fifth Divisions (Wallace's brigade lost 15.4 per cent, Greville's 15.9 per cent). The losses of the cavalry were extraordinarily light: fewer than two hundred in all. More than half of these were in Le Marchant's brigade, which lost 105 casualties, or 10.2 per cent, a remarkably small cost given the brigade's impact on the battle. Most of the remainder were in D'Urban's Portuguese and Victor Alten's German hussars. The artillery suffered only fifteen casualties, spread among the 1,300 officers and men present, which once again proves it to have been a surprisingly safe occupation. But it was not only the artillery which suffered little: many allied regiments suffered negligible or no casualties, including such a renowned unit as the 1/52nd, which lost only two men wounded from 799 officers and men present. Almost half of the army was scarcely engaged: the First, Seventh, Light and Spanish Divisions, Bradford's Portuguese brigade and Bock's heavy dragoons all lost less than 3 per cent casualties; while even in divisions which were closely engaged, there were units such as the 3/27th which may never have fired a shot. However, this does not mean that these troops were wasted or unnecessary, let alone that the battle could have been won without them. Most were deployed in the second line where they could be brought into action if the need arose; and it was just the absence of such well-placed reserves which made the French left wing so vulnerable.

  The battle took an extremely heavy toll of senior officers. Marmont and Bonnet were seriously wounded, Ferey mortally wounded, Thomières killed and Clausel slightly wounded. In other words, the commander of the French army and the commanders of four of its eight infantry divisions were hit by allied fire. Brigadier Desgraviers from Foy's division and Brigadier Menne from Ferey's were also wounded, Desgraviers mortally, while five staff officers and no fewer than eight aides-de-camp were also casualties. If Clausel's wound had been a little more serious, the command of the whole army would have devolved onto Ferey almost before the battle had begun; while if Ferey had still been wounded late in the battle, the task of organizing the retreat would have been left to Foy. Marmont's wound had already left the army leaderless at a critical point in the day, but at least in Clausel he had a capable and confident successor. Ferey had neither the temperament nor the ability to command the army, while Foy – who may have had both – was too far away to do so effectively. Bad as the French luck was, it might very easily have been much worse.

  Allied generals suffered almost as much: Beresford, Cotton, Leith and Cole were all wounded, as were the commanders of two Portuguese brigades, the Conde de Rezende (Sixth Division) and the one-legged Richard Collins (Seventh Division), while Le Marchant was killed. As Cotton's wound was inflicted after the fighting was over, either he or Beresford would have taken command of the army if Wellington had been incapacitated. But if Wellington had been killed or wounded the following day at Garcia Hernandez, the command would have fallen to Henry Clinton, who before the battle was the sixth most senior officer. No doubt Hill would soon have arrived from Estremadura and taken the command into his own safe hands, but the possibility of such carnage in the senior ranks must have been a shock to those in London who had always been anxious to provide Wellington with a competent deputy as a safe guard against misfortune.

  The allied army took between five and six thousand prisoners in the battle, many of whom were wounded, but there were also many unwounded prisoners: men who surrendered in the face of Le Marchant's charge.5 Lamartinière's return acknowledges the loss of twelve guns: six 8-pounders, five 4-pounders and a 6-inch howitzer. According to the return:

  Clausel's division lost one 4-pounder;

  Ferey's division lost one 8-pounder and three 4-pounders;

  Sarrut's division lost one 6-inch howitzer;

  Taupin's division lost one 8-pounder;

  Thomières's division lost three 8-pounders and one 4-pounder;

  Bonnet's division lost one 8-pounder.6

  This suggests that the French batteries were not all formed of guns of a single type, but in some cases at least contained a mixture of 8- and 4-pounders, despite the obvious problems this would cause.

  British accounts usually claim the capture of twenty guns, following Wellington's statement in his dispatch that ‘The official returns only account for eleven pieces of cannon, but it is believed that 20 have fallen into our hands.’ However, the details of the official return (in the PRO) coincide closely with Lamartinière's statement, listing six 8-pounders, four 4-pounders and one 6-inch howitzer. It thus seems probable that Wellington had been misinformed – possibly with several units claiming the capture of the same gun – and that only a dozen artillery pieces changed hands.7

  Other trophies included two French Eagles, six French battalion flags or fanions, and many other prizes, such as the famous ‘Jingling Johnny’ captured by the 88th and a highly decorated drum-major's staff taken by the 40th. These objects had considerable symbolic importance, as Sergeant Lawrence of the 40th makes clear:

  I found that our regiment had taken at the famous battle of Salamanca a splendid drum-major's staff from the enemy, which was stated to be worth at least £50, and it must have come in very useful, for ours was terribly worn and knocked about, being very old, having been itself taken from the French in Holland, during the commandership of the Duke of York.8

  On the other hand, the French have some claim to have taken the King's Colour of the 2/53rd, and possibly one other allied flag.9

  Salamanca was predominately an infantry battle, reflecting the composition of the two armies. The powerful French artillery was strangely ineffective. Its i
nitial bombardment was noisy but seems to have done little or nothing to daunt the allied troops. Its flanking fire is said to have troubled Cole's division in its first advance, and the guns on the Greater Arapile helped to repulse Pack's attack, while Ferey's rearguard must have gained much support from the powerful battery deployed on the summit of El Sierro; but this was a meagre return from a force of nearly eighty guns employing 3,500 men. The allied artillery had a far greater impact with the single shot which disabled Marmont, and must also be credited with the death of Bonnet, the wounding of Clausel and all the resulting confusion in the French command. Other than this, its part was fairly marginal: Bull and Douglas gave useful, but hardly decisive, support to Pakenham's initial attack; the batteries in the centre are supposed to have played an important part in checking the French counterattack; and late in the day Gardiner's battery from the First Division enfiladed Ferey's position on El Sierro. But with the exception of the extraordinary losses among the French generals, Salamanca was not a good advertisement for the value of artillery. It was the wrong type of battle, with too much rapid movement and quick, decisive combat, whereas artillery was at its best in a protracted, grinding combat of attrition.

  Cavalry also played a limited part in the battle. Le Merchant's charge, perfectly timed and executed, yielded far greater results than anyone could have hoped or expected, and proved just how effective a relatively small force of confident, well-led heavy cavalry could be against a disorganized and demoralized opponent. D'Urban and Arentschildt on the allied right were useful, both in protecting Pakenham's flank and exploiting the advantage he gained, but did not have a dramatic impact on the course of events. George Anson's brigade was scarcely engaged, although his two regiments in the centre ought to have been employed in supporting Le Marchant's brigade more closely. And Bock's heavy dragoons saw no fighting at all, although they more than made up for this on the following day at Garcia Hernandez. On the other side, the French cavalry were uniformly disappointing. Curto had almost two thousand horsemen under his command, but had less influence on the battle than Arentschildt with only one-third of that number. Boyer's dragoons were presented with an opportunity almost as promising as that facing Le Marchant, but failed to take much advantage of it. Excuses such as the introduction of untrained horses are insufficient to explain such a lamentable failure, and it appears that the French cavalry were both poorly commanded and overawed, all too aware of their unusual inferiority.

  The French infantry, by contrast, generally fought well whenever they were given a reasonable chance of doing so. It is true that the left wing collapsed without much resistance, but the troops there were taken at a great disadvantage, and their defeat was primarily owing to the mistakes of their generals. In the centre, where the terms of the contest were more even, the French infantry did much better. Clausel and Bonnet repulsed the initial attack of Cole and Pack, and there was much hard fighting before Clinton's fresh division defeated their counterattack. Ferey's rearguard may have been somewhat less heroic than Lemonnier-Delafosse suggests, but it checked the allied advance and gained crucial time for the army to retreat. The French may not have displayed the tactical flexibility, verve and high morale of Napoleon's army at its very best, but they employed line, column and square as appropriate, manoeuvred rapidly and generally showed considerable spirit both in attack and defence, although their skirmishers were rather disappointing.

  Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the Anglo-Portuguese infantry of Wellington's army proved their superiority in the battle. They displayed great confidence and élan in attack, eagerly pressing forward to the charge and so bringing each combat to a rapid decision. Yet when necessary they had the endurance and discipline to sustain a protracted musketry duel and to emerge victorious from it. When they were defeated and broken, they rallied quickly and, in the case of Cole's division, returned rapidly to the fray. With one or two possible exceptions – Wallace's brigade from Pakenham's division springs to mind – their impetuosity was kept within safe bounds, and they did not recklessly pursue their advantage too far and so become vulnerable to a counterattack. Wellington's doubts about his infantry thus proved to be unfounded: they were as effective in attack as when standing on the defensive, being robust, combative, confident and yet well disciplined.

  The battle was won and lost on the French left. Thomières, Maucune and Taupin between them lost more than five thousand casualties (including prisoners) compared to the 1,346 suffered by their immediate opponents, Pakenham, Leith and Le Marchant. Yet the allied forces in the immediate area were no stronger than the French; indeed, if Curto is included on the French side, and the brigades of D'Urban and Arentschildt on that of the allies, the French outnumbered their opponents 16,224 to 14,845.10 (However, the allied right had powerful reserves available to support it if its advance was checked: the Spanish division, Bradford's brigade and the entire Seventh Division.) The real problem for the French was not lack of men on the left, but the fact that they were poorly deployed. Taupin's division was too far to the rear to provide effective support for Thomières and Maucune. Thomières's advance along the Monte de Azan left him exposed at its far end facing Pakenham's entire division with a force barely half its strength. Inevitably the leading French brigade was broken, and Curto's cavalry, which had failed to protect it, also failed to exploit the potential opportunity provided by Wallace's enthusiastic pursuit.

  The defeat of Thomières put the whole French left at a disadvantage. An attempt was made to halt the allied advance and rally the broken troops under the protection of the Ist Ligne, Thomières's remaining regiment, with the leading regiment of Taupin's division, the 22nd Ligne, providing support. It is doubtful if this could have succeeded against the triumphant advance of the Third Division, but before it could really be put to the test Le Marchant's cavalry decided the combat. The shaken and disordered French infantry were in no state to resist the British heavy dragoons, whose charge transformed the defeat of the French left into a wholesale disaster and explains most of the disproportion of losses in this part of the field, less through the men they killed or wounded than by the hundreds or even thousands whom they terrified into surrender.

  Le Marchant's charge also ended any hope that Maucune's division might successfully resist Leith's attack. This was in any case unlikely, for although the French had the advantage of standing on the defensive and a strong force of artillery, their infantry were considerably outnumbered (5,244 French facing 6,710 allies). It also seems that the French preparations were disrupted by the sight of Thomières's defeat and the advance of the British cavalry, which led at least some of Maucune's infantry to form in square – which further reduced their chances of repulsing the allied infantry. In these circumstances, Le Marchant's cavalry charging in upon their flank was almost superfluous, although it greatly increased the losses of the two nearest French regiments.

  Le Marchant's charge finally exhausted its impetus, and the few units which remained in good order on the French left – notably Taupin's second brigade – took advantage of the lull which followed to make their escape. The allies had undoubtedly fought better than the French in each of the encounters in this part of the battle, but they had also had superior numbers at each critical point and had acted with a speed and decision which gave them tactical advantages which more than offset the slight benefits the French received from the terrain.

  The contest was much more fiercely fought in the centre. Here, too, the French (Clausel, Bonnet and Boyer's three regiments of dragoons) had a slight numerical advantage over their immediate opponents (Cole, Pack and Clinton: 14,436 French against 13,376 allies).11 If Ferey's division is included the imbalance becomes more marked, even if Spry's brigade is added to the allied total (the figures are 20,125 French and 15,681 allies). But again, these figures do not include allied reserves which were available but never needed: in this case, the First Division (6,428 men), which more than makes up the difference. The actual numerical advantage of the Fren
ch in the centre was less important than the fact that the allied attack there was less well conceived and executed than that on the flank. Cole's division was spread too thinly and Pack's attack on the Greater Arapile was almost certainly a mistake, while the French in the centre were not caught in such disarray. This led to the failure of the initial attacks by Cole and Pack, but the French proved unable to exploit their advantage, for Wellington's attacks were well supported. The Sixth Division was perfectly placed to check the French advance, while if it had been overwhelmed Wellington could have brought up the First and Seventh Divisions. The risk of the French breaking the allied centre was very slight indeed.

  Nonetheless, Bonnet and Clausel were only driven back after much hard fighting, while Ferey's rearguard covered their retreat admirably and showed just how well French infantry could defend a strong position. Something seems to have gone awry in the conduct of the allied attack here, although it is not clear if the fault lies with Wellington, Clinton or Hulse. But this was a relatively small blemish on a most successful day's operations. It is interesting that, even in the centre, the French lost significantly more casualties than the allies: 4,182 compared to 3,541.12 Defeated troops normally do suffer more than victorious ones, but the disparity here is rather surprising as there were no allied cavalry on this part of the field – unless we accept d'Hautpoul's explanation of Clausel's defeat – and little effective pursuit: evidently the men of Clinton's division inflicted even more damage than they suffered.

  Both generals played their most important part in shaping the battle before Pakenham's men advanced up the slope of the Pico de Miranda and the serious fighting began. Indeed, it is probable that by this point Marmont was already hors de combat. Yet even if we acquit him of the old charge of having deliberately extended the French left, he still bears a very great share of the responsibility for the French defeat. His operations on 22 July, as on the previous days of the campaign, were daring and well conceived, but they needed to be executed faultlessly if they were not to involve great risks. He was manoeuvring in close proximity to an enemy army which was slightly stronger than his own; and there is little doubt that he greatly underestimated both Wellington's boldness and the capabilities of the allied army. This is not to say that he was ridiculously rash. The evidence suggests rather that he was simply careless and somewhat overconfident, his concentration wavering when, after a week's intense work, he saw his goal almost within his grasp and relaxed slightly. As a result, he failed to ensure that each step was methodically consolidated before the next was embarked upon. He allowed his leading divisions to be those commanded by his most impetuous subordinate (Maucune) and his two most junior divisional commanders (Thomières and Taupin – both brigadiers acting for absent senior officers). These mistakes were venial: against most opponents they would not have mattered, and the day, and the whole campaign, would have ended in a successful action against the allied rearguard and a triumphant return to Salamanca. But Marmont had placed his army in a position where even venial mistakes made it vulnerable, and he was facing no ordinary opponent.