Neo-Conned! Again

by D Liam O'Huallachain

  As framed by the Bush administration, rather than being an election in support of a particular candidate or policy, the purpose of the January 30 election is to show Americans and the rest of the world that the Iraqi people support the theory and practice of democracy itself, and that they are willing to identify “democracy” with the political process created by the United States.2 As this political process is, according to the Bush administration, the whole point of the occupation, the January 30 election is a drama to demonstrate Iraqi support for the occupation itself (emphasis mine).3

  What Choices Did They Have?

  The conduct of the election was largely determined by Iyad Allawi (Iraq's previous interim leader) who was obliged to follow clear parameters laid out by the United States. Before leaving his post in the summer of 2004, Paul Bremer established the High Commission for Elections, which in turn set the rules for the vote.

  Most important is the fact that the American-appointed commission possessed the authority to disqualify any party or individual from the democratic process which did not meet with Washington's approval, and disqualifications could not be appealed. Based upon this set up, candidates for election were naturally those who were either long-time opponents of the Ba'athist government, or those who did not fundamentally object to participating in an American-sponsored process designed to crystallize the transformation of Iraq's political landscape.

  Not surprisingly, the candidates who were allowed to run included such figures as ex-CIA asset, Iyad Allawi, and his Iraqi National Accord party, and convicted embezzler and former Pentagon poster boy, Ahmad Chalabi, and his Iraqi National Congress. Both groups were made up of Iraqi expatriates who had received American financial support for years. Prior to the election they drew upon their U.S. funding and training, as well as superior access to security and the media, to increase their position relative to indigenous Iraqi groups on the ballot. Other candidates included those affiliated with the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), a broad coalition, backed by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, of mostly Shiite Arab parties. The most prominent figure of the UIA is the leader of the al-Dawa party, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, described as “a 58-year-old doctor and a devout Shiite who fled into exile in 1980 on the day an arrest warrant was issued that would probably have sent him to the gallows.”1

  Beyond simply controlling the list of acceptable candidates, there was also the activity of two U.S.-funded organizations with long records of manipulating foreign elections – those in Venezuela and Ukraine being but some of the most recent examples2 – on behalf of American interests. These are the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), “democracy-building” organizations established shortly after the creation of the well-known National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

  The NED is, according to its own website,1 a private, non-profit corporation funded by U.S. government appropriations. It acts as a grant-making foundation, distributing funds to private organizations for the purpose of “promoting democracy abroad.” Two of the four “affiliated” institutions of the NED, through which most of the “democracy-promoting” grant money is funneled, are the above-mentioned NDI and IRI. The NED thus would serve as “the umbrella organization through which these … groups and an expanding number of other private sector groups … receive funding to carry out programs abroad.”2

  The White House originally intended to mobilize CIA assets to “aid U.S.-friendly candidates in the [Iraqi] elections.”3 When the secret “finding” exploring that possibility became known to U.S. members of Congress and others, “lawmakers from both parties raised questions about the idea …. ”4TIME Magazine reported that, according to an official but anonymous U.S. source, “House minority leader Nancy Pelosi 'came unglued' when she learned about … a plan for 'the CIA to put an operation in place to affect the outcome of the elections.'”5 A spokesman for former National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Sean McCormack, told TIME that the plan was originally a vision to help “level the playing field” for candidates who would be trying to compete with those who the U.S. suspected of being helped by Iran. “In the final analysis,” he declared (no doubt with an air of moral superiority reflecting the “nobility” of his government's decision in having renounced covert election-rigging), “we have adopted a policy that we will not try to influence the outcome of the upcoming Iraqi election by covertly helping individual candidates for office.” But he only ruled out “covert” involvement. Another official U.S. source quoted in the same article revealed that “[o]ur embassy in Baghdad will run a number of overt programs to support the democratic electoral process.6

  These overt operations included activities by the NDI and the IRI. In June, the IRI's “Baghdad team” hosted political party training conferences for the participants whom, it claimed, “represented the diverse spectrum of political parties.”1 This diverse spectrum, interestingly, included “the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq [SCIRI], [the] Da'wa Party, and dozens of small-to-medium sized organizations.”2 It is noteworthy that the major factions that received political and financial support from the U.S. are predominantly those that spent the better part of the last two decades trying to overthrow the Ba'athist government.

  The activities of the NDI and IRI were not limited to hosting a few workshops. Beginning with “political party formation and civil society efforts in Iraq shortly after the spring 2003 invasion,” the two groups would eventually receive – along with other organizations – “more than $80 million” from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) “to provide technical and political assistance to the electoral process.”3

  Ken Wollack, President of the National Democratic Institute, made it plain that support would be available only to those who “are participating in the country's emerging political process.”4 As for those who feel obliged to continue an armed struggle against occupying forces, International Republican Institute President Lorne Craner said, “If you're a violent party outside the process, this is not the right place for you.”5 (Never mind that al-Jaafari's al-Dawa Party “was implicated by American intelligence in terrorist acts across the Middle East, including a 1983 bombing of the American Embassy in Kuwait.”6)

  The heavy involvement of groups like NDI and IRI speaks volumes about the “objectivity” of the electoral and political process that the U.S. managed in Iraq. Experts see groups like the NDI and IRI as “extensions” of the U.S. State Department. Professor and author William I. Robinson of the Global and International Studies Program at the University of California, Santa Barbara said shortly before the election that NDI and IRI were probably “trying to select individual leaders and organizations that are going to be very amenable to the U.S. transnational project for Iraq,” a project that included “pacifying the country militarily and legitimating the occupation and the formal electoral system.”1

  Criticism of the NED and its sponsored organizations has come from the “right” no less than the “left.” Barbara Conry wrote, for the conservative CATO Institute, that the NED's “mischief overseas” has amounted to U.S. taxpayers funding “special-interest groups to harass the duly elected governments of friendly countries, interfere in foreign elections, and foster the corruption of democratic movements.”2 Congressman Ron Paul (R-Tex.) noted in an October 11, 2003, article that the purposes for which NDI and IRI are used around the world “would be rightly illegal in the United States.”3

  A Glaring Omission

  With the sponsorship of candidates and parties who opposed the “former regime” in Iraq and who support the continued American enforcement of its elimination, a large swath of the Iraqi people – those who do not sympathize with the America's plan for the “new Iraq” – found themselves disenfranchised during the election process. The Ba'ath Party – which had literally millions of members before the Anglo-American invasion – was totally excluded from the electoral process, in keeping with the “d
e-Ba'athification” process, on the grounds that it “preached hate” and was involved in “terrorist activities.” (The fact that al-Jaafari's party is widely recognized as “terrorist” and has the dubious honor of having carried out the first modern suicide bombing is evidently not enough reason for it to have been forbidden to participate in this “peaceful” election. The U.S. Secretary of State dismissed those inconvenient truths as aspects of “the past.”4) But if the current level of armed resistance is any indicator, the Ba'ath Party still enjoys a considerable measure of support in the country. In a truly fair election, should it not have also enjoyed a place on the ballot? As Lew Rockwell pointed out, “when you think about democracy in Iraq, just remember that most real experts admit that Saddam Hussein would win if he ran.”1

  Keeping Ba'athists and other Iraqi “nationalists” out of the process turned the election into a more or less incestuous process of providing supporters of the U.S. role with an opportunity to vie for leadership of a country already politically and militarily dominated by it. That process by its nature put former dissidents at the forefront, and marginalized the former leadership of the country. As a Los Angeles Times piece put it quite directly, “Hussein's fall gave once-clandestine and now victorious Shiite and Kurdish movements an instant edge over the disparate Sunni Arabs.”2An edge that they have not used subtly. For instance, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the SCIRI – a constituent part of the UIA – has insisted that “former regime” elements be denied any role in the new government, demanding that leaders not “hand over the country's assets to our enemies.” He insisted the new government “de-Ba'athify Saddam's terrorists from all state institutions.”3

  In effect, what the U.S. has done by means of this election is hand a society over to those who opposed its former, legitimate authority. One can hardly claim that this is not what was in fact accomplished; right or wrong, under international law it is completely illegitimate. Even from a practical standpoint, the process seems hardly viable. A conservative estimate shows that at least a third if not half of the country was simply left out of the election by the terms under which it was conducted. “It isn't a real election,” said retired Jordanian General Ali Shukri.

  Geographically one half of Iraq and demographically, one third of Iraq are not voting. There has to be a parliament that rules Iraq. How does that happen without the acquiescence of the Sunnis? Can you really write the constitution for all of Iraq in that circumstance? It's mission impossible.4

  Indeed, as reported by Richard Boudreaux of the Los Angeles Times, “Most Sunni Arab groups shunned the election in hope of undermining the new government's legitimacy. An estimated 85% of eligible Sunni Arab voters stayed home, out of principle or fear of insurgent attack.”1 Perhaps it would be more correct to invert Boudreaux's logic, and speculate that the Sunni Arabs, or Iraqi “nationalists” generally, shunned the election because they already doubted the legitimacy of the whole process. Either way, the election as it was conducted is hardly a recipe for rebuilding a cohesive and distinctly Iraqi society in the aftermath of the destruction of the government that held it together for so many years.

  Occupation, Anyone?

  The failure of the NED, NDI, and IRI to support any parties that offered serious political resistance to the occupation (such as al-Sadr's movement and Ba'ath Party members) is further proof of what many have suggested: that the election was conducted to legitimize occupation rather than provide a serious government. True or not, the legitimacy of any election which doesn't include a vote on the occupation is questionable at least. One would be hard pressed to find an issue more on the minds of the average Iraqi, and yet to leave it out of the picture simply brings us back to the stark fact that the U.S. never intended to “transfer” real power to Iraq by means of this election. Had it had such an intention it would have facilitated political opposition to the occupation by allowing known opponents of occupation to participate. Anyone claiming otherwise would run up against the fact that opponents of the occupation tend to concentrate around the groups that were sidelined by the electoral focus on those who for decades worked against the Ba'athist government. The election, from this perspective, was a self-serving enterprise omitting those who posed a credible threat to continued occupation.

  The results of the election, in this regard, speak for themselves. Though the largest bloc in the new Iraqi “parliament” – the Shiite-dominated UIA – included in its platform a call for a timetable for withdrawal of occupation forces, President Bush's dismissal of the idea, just four days after the election, was loud and clear: “You don't set timetables.”2 The Alliance has since backed away from insisting on one,3 Bush has tenaciously clung to his position rejecting it4 (nevermind what the “freely elected” representatives of the Iraqi people might call for). Never mind that according to on-the-ground Baghdad journalist Dahr Jamail, those who voted “whether they be 35% or even 60% of registered voters, were not voting in support of an ongoing U.S. occupation of their country.”1 It was, rather, precisely the opposite. “Every Iraqi I have spoken with who voted,” he wrote,

  explained that they believe the National Assembly which will be formed soon will signal an end to the occupation. And they expect the call for a withdrawing of foreign forces in their country to come sooner rather than later. This causes one to view the footage of cheering, jubilant Iraqis in a different light now, doesn't it?2

  Nevertheless, both al-Hakim the SCIRI leader and al-Jaafari, the key al-Dawa figure, have since indicated that “Iraq will need American forces until its new army and paramilitary police can take over the war.”3 Many interpret that as meaning well into 2006, if not longer. Even before the election was conducted, the approved “Iraqi candidates acknowledge[d] that American and coalition support is vital to their new government, which will need to provide food, water, jobs and electricity for its constituents.”4

  What makes the omission of a vote on the occupation most glaring is the number of people in Iraq who actually oppose the continued presence of American forces. A poll conducted just before the election – which produced results that indicate what the vote would have been on the continued occupation, had one been offered – found that “[m]ajorities of both Sunni Arabs (82%) and Shiites (69%) … favor U.S. forces withdrawing either immediately or after an elected government is in place.”5 Of all of Iraq's ethnic and religious groups, it further indicated, “Only the Kurds seem to favor a continued U.S. presence, and are likely to outright reject violent resistance.”6 No wonder, then, that April 9, 2005 – over two months after the election – witnessed a massive turnout in protest at America's continued occupation of Iraq.

  Bearing in mind both the statements of the Bush administration and the actual facts of what has occurred in the months since the election, it becomes harder not to see the election as a legitimization of the occupation rather than as a serious and independent vote on it. Frank Brodhead provided the most profound analysis of this point.

  President Bush and other administration officials have consistently stated that a U.S. exit from Iraq must await the establishment of political democracy and the creation of an Iraqi military force adequate to maintain order. Free markets and an open door to U.S. investments are core constituents of what “democracy” means for the Bush people, and their job will not be done until these goals are secured as well. Also, by definition, a democratic regime is run by “moderates,” understood by the entire spectrum of the U.S. elite to mean political leaders who cooperate with U.S. interests. Moreover, a strong Iraqi security force, agreed by all to be a prerequisite for U.S. withdrawal, will be trained and equipped by the United States, historically a certain recipe for continued close links to the Pentagon and the CIA.

  Thus, when President Bush refuses to discuss a timetable for U.S. withdrawal, or links U.S. withdrawal to political and security benchmarks rather than to the calendar, or when U.S. general Tommy Franks states that U.S. troops will be in Iraq for at least 10 years, we should discard any a
ssumptions that the United States will leave Iraq voluntarily unless and until its economic and military goals are secure. U.S. control of Iraq would be a stupendous achievement for the Bush administration and will not be lightly abandoned ….

  From this different perspective – that the United States occupation of Iraq is indefinite rather than limited – the Iraq election at the end of January assumes a different role and needs to be understood differently than the criticisms coming from mainstream or elite opinion.1

  The Conduct of the Election

  The Anomalies of Iraq's Allegedly “Landmark” Election

  The Bush administration has talked long and loud about its intentions for the future in terms of foreign policy. The administration is committed to exporting what it calls the “global democratic revolution.” In other words, it is seeking to establish democratic structures – the like of which are the norm in Western Europe and the United States, and which our citizens take for granted after long years of habit – in countries which have rarely if ever possessed such structures. Given the fledgling and tenuous nature of any attempt by the Bush administration to implement Western traditions in non-Western societies, a fine and particular attention to detail should be the order of day. Insofar as this election constituted an attempt to plant “popular” democratic traditions in foreign soil, it is not too much to expect that every part of the “first step” towards democracy should have been beyond reproach, in order to make that step a credible and effective one.