To Arms

by Hew Strachan

  Von der Goltz was to secure fame, and death, as commander of the 6th army in Mesopotamia. But the origins of his appointment, and its rationale, lay in Persia, not Iraq. His status was being used to woo the Persians, to soothe Turkish sensibilities, and to fuse the divergent policies of the German army and foreign office. It was from the latter that he encountered most resistance: Enver’s original brief, giving him supreme powers from Lake Van to the Persian Gulf, was moderated by his subordination to Germany’s conventional diplomatic service (although he remained in charge of the military attachés and the consuls in southern Persia). His task, Enver instructed him, was ‘to prepare an independent war against India’.179 To this end he was to win Persia to the Central Powers, to drive out Britain and Russia in the process, to secure Persia’s freedom and independence, and to establish the foundations of a Persian army.

  For von der Goltz, such a mission was a fulfilment of his life’s work. He did not underestimate the hazards, the supply and equipment problems, the difficulties of terrain and communications; and if he had been minded to forget, a morose letter from Moltke urging him not to sacrifice himself in Mesopotamia made him appreciate that failure was more probable than success. But he was convinced that Britain could be brought down only by a direct threat either to its own shores or to India. Since German naval inferiority ruled out the former, the latter alone could be decisive.180

  Von der Goltz appreciated that his first task would be to secure Turkey’s position in Baghdad from the British advance up the Tigris. Although operations in Persia would therefore be delayed, he was convinced by talks in Constantinople with the Persian ambassador and with a Swedish gendarmerie officer that conditions there were very favourable. As he boarded the train on 15 November he was confident that the gendarmerie was efficient, the Majlis would be welcoming, and that all southern Persia could be won with relative ease.181 When he arrived in Baghdad on 6 December the Turko-German position in Persia had almost entirely collapsed.

  British policy in Persia, after settling its differences with Russia in March, fell prey to its own internal divisions. The plan initiated by Mushir ud-Daula’s cabinet in April 1915, and eventually endorsed by the Foreign Office in London, was for Britain to provide a loan so as to prop up the government and thus enable it to sustain its neutrality. The loss of customs revenue through the collapse of the Gulf trade on the outbreak of war had deprived the Shah of much of his income—hence the problems in paying the gendarmerie. Moreover, Persia’s existing debts were secured on the same customs receipts. A direct loan from the Entente powers would have provoked the ire of the nationalists, and have therefore failed to achieve its objectives. What was proposed instead was a moratorium on Persia’s existing debts. The allies would suspend interest on current loans and would give the government a monthly subsidy equivalent to the lost customs duties.

  But governmental instability made the negotiations protracted. A run on the silver reserves of the Imperial Bank of Persia, initiated by the German agents in April, confirmed the interaction of financial chaos and cabinet weakness. Marling in Teheran, therefore, wavered. He oscillated towards bringing Russian troops into Teheran. London, still clinging to the figment of Persia’s neutrality, disliked the idea.182

  Moreover, British foreign policy in Persia was not the exclusive domain of the Foreign Office. The consuls of southern Persia wore two hats: they were responsible to the Foreign Office, but they were also political agents of the Government of India.183 German penetration in 1915 generated increasing concern for India’s security. On 2 July the viceroy told the consuls to meet fire with fire, and to raise their own local forces to stop the Germans reaching Kabul. An eastern cordon, formed of British troops in the south and Russian in the north, was created as a barrier between Persia and Afghanistan.

  On 12 July Wassmuss and 300 to 400 tribesmen assembled outside Bushire. The British advanced to reconnoitre, and in the subsequent engagement two officers were killed. Marling now felt that Russian military intervention was fully justified. But India suddenly became cautious. A forward policy could drive Persia into the arms of the Central Powers and take Afghanistan with it. The viceroy preferred a more limited approach, including the payment of compensation for the British casualties. Thus, rather than give the Persians money, the Foreign Office was being urged to take it from them. Finally, in September, it was agreed to ask Persia to provide guarantees against further incidents in the south, and to offer in return a moratorium and subsidy. In October the first instalment of the subsidy, set at 200,000 tumans per month, was paid. But by now this was no more than a holding operation. On 21 October the India Office authorized an advance on Baghdad. Military action in Mesopotamia might resolve, at least in part, Britain’s predicament in Persia.184

  To those bewitched by maps rather than by the realities of movement in an impoverished and increasingly lawless land, the British march up the Tigris was part of a massive converging operation. Ultimately it would link with the fronts in the Caucasus and Azerbaijan, outflanking the Turkish armies to the north of the Taurus Mountains and threatening to isolate those in Kurdistan and Iraq. There is no evidence that General Sir J. E. Nixon, for all the over-extension of his forces now put in train, thought in these terms; there is some that the Russians did.185

  In March the Russians landed a detachment at Enzeli, on the Caspian Sea, and then pushed it forward to Kazvin. The Russians said they were relieving the troops already at Kazvin; the Persians detected a threat to Teheran. On 18 May the manager of a Russian bank was murdered in Isfahan. Two days later more Russian troops arrived at Enzeli. Throughout the summer the Russian and British ministries advocated further Russian intervention; by September both deprecated the policy of drift favoured in London and Delhi, arguing that only an ultimatum to Persia could check the increase in German influence. Sazonov supported this line; neither Yanushkevitch at Stavka nor Yudenich at headquarters in Tiflis felt able to do so. For them, Persia was no more than a continuation of the Caucasian front; at the beginning of September Yudenich released only 1,200 more troops. Then, on 24 September, Vorontsov-Dashkov was replaced as governor-general of the Caucasus by Grand Duke Nicholas. Nicholas overruled Yudenich and approved a Russian expeditionary force of 8,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry, under the command of Baratov. It landed at Enzeli on 12 November, and occupied Kazvin on 1 December. Its instructions were to isolate Teheran, but not occupy it. On 7 November the Russians already at Kazvin demonstrated in the direction of the capital.186

  The Russian military build-up, therefore, constituted a gradual and sustained threat rather than a sudden and decisive attack. Its effect on the Perso-German exchanges was to increase the German sense of urgency while strengthening the Persian ability to negotiate. On 28 October Mustaufi ul-Mamalik pointed out to the Germans that if Persia declared war, its richest provinces were those that could be most quickly seized by the Entente powers. Teheran would therefore need a monthly subsidy of at least 2 million marks, and after the war it would require a loan of 100 million marks as well as the repayment of its war costs. Reuss, breathing the frenzied atmosphere in Teheran, felt that Germany had no choice but comply. Jagow in Berlin preferred to leave matters to military solutions and von der Goltz.

  Recognizing that the Russians could get to Teheran before von der Goltz could even reach Baghdad, Reuss decided that the Persian government should be persuaded to move to Isfahan. On 10 November he took it upon himself to agree a twenty-year defensive treaty with Persia without reference to Berlin. But on the 12th the Shah insisted that Berlin should be asked for its approval and so postponed its ratification for a fortnight. By now the Russians were encamped four hours’ march from Teheran. Muharram, the month of mourning for the Shi’ite holy men massacred by the Umayyad Caliphs at Kerbela, added to the tension in the city. Kanitz decided that military action should replace negotiation, and urged the Persian Cossack brigade to turn against its Russian officers and escort the Shah and his government from the capital. The Russ
ians got wind of the plan. The brigade was paraded, declared its loyalty to the Tsar (not the Shah), and the Russians threatened to restore Muhammed Ali, Ahmad’s deposed father.

  The German mission, its supporters, and most of the democrats had already fled to the holy city of Qum. The Shah was due to follow on the morning of 15 November. But without the pressure of Reuss or the nationalists, his resolve weakened. At 9 a.m. he decided to stay. The German attempt to seize control of the Persian government had failed. Its major ally, the nationalist lobby of the Majlis, had dissipated, and the Majlis itself did not reconvene until after the war. The nationalists established a rump parliament, the committee of national defence, in Qum. Reuss first stayed at Qum, then returned to Teheran, and finally concluded that he had failed and retired to Berlin. Kanitz still pressed for military action. But without arms the Persians could not and would not turn against the Russians. The gendarmerie in Teheran, uncertain whether its loyalty lay with the Shah or with the Germans and the nationalists, opted for neutrality.187

  Thus, the effect of the attempted coup was to leave the capital clear for the Entente powers. The Persians agreed to a policy of benevolent neutrality on condition that the Russians halted 32 kilometres from Teheran. Farman Farma, an Anglophile, came in as minister of the interior, and on 24 December he formed his own cabinet. His policy was to seek an alliance with Britain and Russia. The Shah was anxious to make amends, even suggesting his own abdication but accepting instead an allowance as an indication of his dependence. The Cossack brigade was increased to 10,000 men under Russian officers. Teheran remained an Entente enclave for the rest of the war.188

  Kanitz’s hopes of forming a front on Qum proved short lived. Within the city the nationalists and the clericalists fell out. Outside, Nizam as-Saltana, the governor of Burujird, accepted a subsidy in exchange for 4,000 armed men. But his troops proved of little military worth. Baratov occupied Hamadan on 14 December, and on the 20th entered Qum. Kanitz and his tribesmen fell back to Kermanshah, which had been secured by Klein’s group in September. Here they linked up with the German military mission sent by von der Goltz to form the Persian army. Commanded by Colonel Bopp, and bearing six machine-guns and 20,000 rifles, it was also accompanied by three Turkish battalions, a mountain battery, and a machine-gun company. The Kurds in the surrounding area, rallied by a German agent, helped provide a block to direct Anglo-Russian collaboration.189

  The retreat of Kanitz, and of as-Saltana and the nationalists, to the fringes of western Persia initiated the collapse also of much of the German strength in central and eastern Persia. In November the Germans staged a coup in Shiraz, only to lose control again in December. Seiler advanced from Isfahan to Kerman in November, but found his line of retreat exposed. Zugmayer, who was even further to the east at Bam, and aiming for Baluchistan, fell back on Kerman in March 1916. The two then returned westwards, but Seiler was captured in Shiraz and Zugmayer in Niriz. The British occupied Bandar Abbas on 16 March 1916, and the Russians entered Isfahan three days later. Only Wassmuss with the Tangistani and Kardorff with the Bakhtiari remained at large. Therefore, while Niedermayer and Hentig negotiated in Kabul, their lines of communications across Persia collapsed behind them.

  The German expedition to Afghanistan successfully evaded the Russians of the eastern cordon and crossed the frontier on 19/20 August 1915. Hentig wore a cuirassier’s white tunic and helmet to enter Herat;190 the governor of the town was polite but unenthusiastic. He had received the Caliph’s summons to holy war some time previously but had elected not to forward it to Kabul. Now the Germans found themselves virtual prisoners while the governor awaited instructions as to whether they could proceed. On 1 October the expedition reached the Afghan capital—their journey had taken a year. But here too their status was that of captive guests; they were not allowed into the city and their activities were circumscribed. Furthermore, the Emir was away at Paghman, his summer residence.

  Habibullah was astute, realistic, and hard-headed. He was guided by practical politics and not by religious fervour. His aim was to use the German mission to regain Afghan sovereignty. In 1880, after the Second Afghan War, Britain had taken control of Afghanistan’s foreign policy. This treaty had been renewed in 1905, and in 1907 Russia had accepted that Afghanistan was outside its sphere of interest. The advent of Germany enabled Afghanistan, like Persia, to exploit its position as a buffer state in pursuit of its own independence. Habibullah wanted weapons, money, and a seat at the peace conference. The German expedition became a pawn in his efforts to exact these concessions from Britain.191

  Under the terms of the treaty Britain had no direct representation at Kabul; its diplomacy on the empire’s most volatile frontier was likened by one observer to ‘navigating a ship in a fog’.192 Hardinge, as viceroy of India, was not unduly worried. The Afghans were frightened that the Russians would use the war as an excuse to invade; the British could argue that their alliance represented security against that. German intentions were known in Delhi by December 1914. Thereafter intelligence on Niedermayer’s progress was full and reasonably up-to-date. British intercepts, particularly after the windfall of Wassmuss’s papers in April 1915, enabled Britain’s policy in Kabul to anticipate that of Germany. In July Hardinge forewarned the Emir of the German arrival, and emphasized British friendship for and protection of Islam. On 29 October Britain increased its subsidy to Afghanistan to 2 lakhs of rupees.

  Nonetheless, Habibullah could not appear too openly to favour the British. The British received no acknowledgement of the increased subsidy until December, and the Emir then complained that it was too small. His aim was not simply to extract further concessions from Delhi. He had also to counter a pro-German lobby within his own court, headed by his brother Nasrullah and supported by the Young Afghans, a small nationalist and constitutionalist movement founded in 1908 in emulation of the Persians. In itself this radical fringe was weak, but it had the potential to rally the more traditional sectors of society, the religious establishment and the frontier tribes. The one Afghan newspaper, Siraj al-Akhbar, embodied this fusion, appealing to pan-Islam, pro-Ottomanism, and Afghan nationalism. Some Afghans had joined the Mohmands in fighting on the frontier in 1915.193 Habibullah’s neutrality was therefore double-sided—outwardly between the Entente and Central Powers, inwardly between the competing camps in Kabul.

  On 26 October the Germans were granted their first audience with Habibullah. The Emir stalled. As the Germans waited for the next summons the friction within the party, particularly between Hentig and Pratap, flared. By mid-December both Hentig and Niedermayer had concluded that their mission had failed and that they should return home.

  The danger of losing his lever on Britain prompted Habibullah to summon the Germans once again. He told them on 23 December that Afghanistan had decided to seek a treaty with Germany before it declared war; the terms of the treaty were to include a guarantee of territorial integrity, a seat at the peace conference, £10 million, 100,000 rifles, and 300 guns. Nasrullah encouraged Niedermayer to think that if Germany would give sufficient aid to Afghanistan, rather than just expect Afghanistan to sacrifice itself for Germany, the chances of an agreement were good.

  Niedermayer now felt justified in exercising his military skills. He asked Germany to send immediately £1 million and large quantities of arms. He drew up plans for an Afghan army 70,000 strong, with officer schools and a demonstration company; he initiated training in musketry and tactics. But as January gave way to February and then March, his pessimism returned. At a durbar on 23 January Habibullah announced Afghanistan’s neutrality. The Germans thought this might be another tactical ploy, but the Afghans knew of the collapse of Germany in Persia. Niedermayer’s frustration led him in directions that show he had lost contact with the broad thrust of the war. He developed a plan for contacting the Russians in Meshed in order to propose a joint German-Russian advance on India; his respect for the status of Afghanistan had become secondary to the local balance of power. He
also spoke of organizing a coup in Kabul. The British intercepted Niedermayer’s communications and informed Habibullah. On 12 March Habibullah said Afghanistan would not enter the war unless two prior conditions were met—that there should be revolution in India, and that at least 20,000 German or Turkish troops should attack Baluchistan. Both sides knew that both conditions were impossible of fulfilment. The negotiations were at an end.

  Hentig argued that, as he had been offered terms by Kabul his diplomatic mission was fulfilled. Niedermayer wanted to stay in order to foment action in India. The Emir would have no truck with this. A weakened German mission would incur danger without diplomatic advantage. Both made their own way home. Hentig travelled north through China, and reached Berlin on 9 June 1917 via the United States, Halifax, and Bergen. Niedermayer slipped the Entente patrols by passing through Russian Turkestan, where he was robbed and left for dead. He eventually arrived back in Teheran on 20 July 1916. In September he rejoined the Turko-German forces at Kermanshah. Nadolny tried to prevail upon him to lead a second expedition, but Niedermayer refused. He reported that in theory a force of up to 300,000 men could be raised in Afghanistan, but the tribes were too divided and the frontiers too exposed for an Afghan invasion of India—even with 20,000–50,000 German troops in support—to get any further than the Indus.